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The purpose of this research is to undertake an analysis of gender 
differences among the judges of the Family Law Courts of the city of 
Buenos Aires. A previously men-dominated career, the Argentine judiciary 
has only quite recently begun to include women within its ranks. I shall be 
examining the possible implications of women's entry into the judiciary, 
particularly in terms of exploring the men and women judges' perceptions 
· on whether women bring any different values to the judiciary and, if so, 
what those values are and what is their capacity to impact the judiciary. 
The advocates of a current within contemporary feminism called "cultural 
feminism"1have argued that, due to their embodied capacities to give and 
protect human life and to their traditional roles in the private sphere as 
mothers and nurturers, women in our culture, have developed a distinct 
moral language. This language emphasises care, relationships, 
connection and responsibility as well as certain capacities for empathy and 
the care of others. 
Cultural feminists have argued that because of their different social roles 
and life experiences, men and women develop different moral tendencies. 
While women tend to connection, and develop an "ethic of care", men tend 
to independence and autonomy and develop an "ethic of justice" or a 
rights approach, relating their decisions to some hierarchy of abstract 
principles. 
Their claim is that because of women's long exclusion from the public 
sphere they have been unable to influence it in the past and so, it is the 
masculine mode, based on objective; unemotional moral judgement that 
has been transposed into the legal system. To cultural feminists, it would 
be beneficial if women brought their developed capacities into the public 
1 See chap.1 
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world so that their "different voice" could be heard alongside the male 
voice {Gilligan, 1982:174). 
Women's massive entry into the professions is quite recent. Thus, it is only 
lately that the judiciary has become a career option for women in 
Argentina. Women's entry into the study of law and the legal professions in 
important numbers in Argentina can be traced back to the late 1960's and 
early 1970's; a trend similar to that observed in most Western countries. 
By Latin American standards, the case of professional women in Argentina 
is quite exceptional, let alone the number of women judges, which is 
relatively high, even when compared with the representation of women 
judges in leading nations. 
In the last thirty years the number of women judges in Argentina has 
increased considerably, rising from nearly 0% to nearly 50% in some 
instances and jurisdictions. The feminisation of the judiciary, understood 
as a noticeable growth in the number of women in the profession, seems 
an ideal case study to explore the effects of the incorporation of women 
into a men-dominated profession. 
Women judges constitute a group of women who, by virtue of holding 
public office, wield power in one of the three branches of the State, and 
make important decisions of great consequence to the lives of the people 
involved in legal conflicts. This explains my interest in studying this special 
group of women. 
If one considers that the application of the law is not mechanical, but 
implies an interpretation and is mediated by the worldview of the judge, as 
Mackinson and Goldstein have put it " ... apart from implying the 
interpretation of the law, in a broad sense, each judgement transcends the 
ideology of the judge" {Mackinson, 1987: 178). Seen in that perspective, 
neutrality on the part of the judge becomes another myth sustaining the 
legal system. 
Paraphrasing both Wilson and McGiynn, it then makes sense to wonder, 
whether women judges will make a difference {Wilson, 1990: 516 and 
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McGiynn, 1998: 813); that is to say, whether women use their presumed 
characteristics to administer and interpret the law differently from men. 
The site of this research is the Family Law Courts of the city of Buenos 
Aires. The creation of special Family Law Courts in 1989 constitutes an 
aspect of a general trend towards the democratisation of Argentine 
society, particularly of family law. In fact, the restoration of democracy 
encountered a very outdated family law that was lagging behind and 
superseded by the reality of the Argentine family. This process of 
democratisation also involved the passing of very important laws, such as 
the law on divorce, shared custody, equal rights and duties for mothers 
and fathers in terms of material provision for their children, equality for 
children born in and out of wedlock and a law on domestic violence2• 
The study of the Family Law Courts is important for various reasons. In the 
first place, it is one of the sections of the judiciary with the highest 
proportion of women. This allows for a study of a section of the judiciary 
that has gone well beyond "tokenism" (Kanter, 1977: 228). Secondly, 
being a fairly small section of the judiciary, it enables work with a fairly 
representative sample. Thirdly, since their creation is quite recent, these 
courts have not yet been studied. Finally, given that family matters are 
closely related to gender, it seems interesting to observe whether there 
are differences of orientation between men and women judges. 
The main purpose of this study is, then, to explore whether women judges 
bring into the administration of justice the values of the so called "women's 
culture". The fact is, however, that this is not a simple task. To investigate 
whether women judges make a special contribution to the administration of 
justice is not devoid of theoretical and methodological difficulties. 
From the theoretical point of view, many questions arise that will be 
considered in depth in the theoretical chapter. I am referring to issues such 
as the significance of feminisation, whether numerical or cultural; the 
extent to which it can be expected that men and women perform their 
2 See chap.2. 
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tasks differently; the weight that should be given to socialization in a 
traditionally masculine profession. Other related queries are whether 
women can effect changes on the judiciary or conversely, they need to. 
adapt to the prevailing masculine culture of the legal profession, the extent 
to which one can think of feminine qualities and the way in which 
differences among women -race, social or religious background, sexual 
orientation- can be accounted for. 
From the methodological point of view, the main issue is whether the fact 
that women might decide differently can be observed at all. lt would have 
been interesting to observe the judges' actual practices since such an 
observation could provide data that would be less mediated by the subject 
under study. 
The difficulties of observing judges' actual practices derive from the fact 
that legal procedure in Argentina is written and legal files in family 
proceedings are confidential. Family law judges also frequently hold 
hearings where all or some of the members of the family meet in court, 
summoned by the judge, to talk things over, with the idea of promoting 
certain agreements between the parts in conflict. 1t would, of course, be 
very interesting to be able to observe the way judges lead such hearings. 
Still, only one of the 24 Courts has a Gesell Chamber from where you can 
watch the hearing without being seen. Apart from the ethical issues related 
to confidentiality that this would raise, the presence of a researcher at the 
hearing could . be difficult to explain and quite disruptive to all the people 
involved. Additionally, this would presuppose the compliance of the judge. 
Also, even if one could observe the process of judgement, it seems 
absolutely necessary to take into account the uniqueness of each case. 
Close consideration should be given to the difficulty of finding comparable 
cases in order to do comparative work. As remarked by Bothelho 
Junqueira in her study of Brazilian judges, this is an issue that also applies 
whei1 one intonds to compare judgements (Botelho Junqueira, 1997: 4). 
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Moreover, the small number of women judges in higher tribunals where I 
could have observed men and women judging the same cases prevents 
me, for the time being, from envisaging such a research strategy. 
The hindrances described above have prompted me to adopt an 
alternative methodological strategy: to explore the representations, 
attitudes, beliefs and meanings accorded by men and women family la~ 
judges to women's entry into the judiciary. I look particularly at their 
opinions on whether women judges perform their work differently from 
men judges and at their possible contribution, if any, to the administration 
of justice. Such a strategy minimises problems of comparability while, at 
the same time, brings very interesting and new material into the analysis. lt 
enables us to penetrate the discourse of the judges touching on the ethical 
and practical aspects of their work and to fully appreciate the signUicance 
the judges ascribe to the problems and dilemmas they have to face in their 
daily practice. This also provides the possibility of reaching a better 
understanding of how women and men judges perceive the effects of 
gender in their professional activities and values. 
The methodological strategy followed in this research is mixed. In order to 
picture women's situation within the legal professions and find their 
differential participation within its different branches, I resort to the use of a 
quantitative methodology, drawing on different sources to obtain the 
relevant data. Sometimes I draw on secondary data, although I repeatedly 
found myself in the need to actually produce some new data. In order to 
explore the motivations, values and beliefs of both men and women 
judges, I made use of a qualitative methodology, whose purpose it is to 
analyse the answers provided by the judges In both a personal da~a 
questionnaire and in an in-depth interview held with them3• 
Thus, two instruments for data collection were designed: one was a self-
administered questionnaire that the judges had to fill in with their personal 
data. This aimed at obtaining a picture of this section of the judiciary. The 
other was the interview guide, which led me through the interview. The 
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objective of the interview was to explore the views and opinions of the 
family law judges of the city of Buenos Aires on the massive entry of 
women into the judiciary and its possible impact on it. Of the 24 judges 
that comprise the Family Law section, 14 judges -8 women and 6 men-
filled in the questionnaire, while 12 judges -6 women and 6 men- agreed to 
an interview. 
In the Introduction I include the research subject, argue about its 
relevance, and make explicit the objectives of my research. I also briefly 
present the general methodological strategy I will use in order to meet the 
mentioned objectives and convey the contents and structure of the thesis. 
The introduction is followed by two parts. Part I contains the three chapters 
that provide the background for the research with the family law judges: 
Chapter 1 presents the discussion of the theoretical background to be 
used in the study, where I map the development of feminist legal theory in 
order to place the theoretical frame I will be using in perspective. I also 
convey how this theoretical framework depicts and explains the situation of 
women in the legal professions in contemporary society. Chapter 2 
overviews the process of Argentine women's entry into public life and the 
professions. lt addresses the socio-historical process that has led 
women's entry into public life, outlines the development of the women's 
movement, the evolution of legislation regarding women and the family, 
the changes occurred in family life and women's entry into university and 
the professions. Chapter 3 makes the first known approach to the situation 
of women in the law in Buenos Aires. In it, I give an account of women's 
participation in various fields of the legal profession: the academy, private 
practice and the judiciary. 
Part 11 conveys the findings of the research with the judges; it comprises 
chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 4 looks into the Family Law Courts and the 
way these courts progressed from the time of their creation, in 1989. lt 
3 See further methodological appendix for a copy of the questionnaire and Interview schedule. 
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also provides a brief history and characterisation of their composition and 
compares the men and women family law judges according to their 
personal data, ~ducational background, civil status, career data, and their 
social and religious affiliation. lt ends with the analysis of the men and 
women judges' career trajectories. The analysis is based basically on the 
material contained. in the answers to the questionnaires, except for the last 
points on the judges' careers and motivations, based on the responses to 
the interviews. 
Chapter 5 and 6 deal with the men and women judges' basic views, values 
and attitudes, they draw on the judges' responses to the questions in the 
interview. Chapter 5 is organised around the judge's professional identities 
and values, it explores their motives for becoming family law judges, their 
representations on the "ideal" family law judge, and the way they 
experience the power and responsibility associated to their roles. The last 
section of the chapter examines the explanations of men and women 
judges about women's massive entry into the legal profession. 
Chapter 6 examines the men and women family law judges' gender 
conceptions and their perceptions related to the emergence of large 
number of women in family law and the family law judiciary. lt also 
explores their representations on gender and their awareness of 
discrimination. lt ends with the consideration of the judge's discourse on 
whether women make a particular contribution to the family law judiciary 
by bringing to their work any special attributes or capacities. 
The thesis enos with a section on the general conclusions. Appendix 1 
and 2 follow the core of the theses. Appendix 1 is on Methodology and 
appendix 2 contains the Bibliography. 
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Chapitell' I = Wha~ it«> ®){pecit ~rom womei'il ]udges? 
The Ol'ilsigh~s from feminist lega~ theory 
I = Introduction 
This chapter provides the theoretical background for my study on gender 
differences in the family section of the judiciary in the City of Buenos 
Aires. 
My enquiry has been informed by "cultural feminism", a current within 
feminist thought, that has left a profound imprint on feminist thinking about 
the law. This is especially so with respect to women's increasing 
participation in the legal system and their potential contribution to the legal 
realm. At the same time, this current of feminist thinking has, aroused 
much criticism. 
Carol Gilligan (1982), the main exponent of such ideas, has argued that, 
due to women's embodied capacities to give and protect human life and to 
their historical engagement with the private sphere of society through their 
traditional roles of mothers and nurturers, women in western culture have 
developed a distinct moral language that emphasises care, relationships, 
connection and responsibility as well as certain capacities for empathy 
and the care of others. Cultural feminists have argued that, because of 
their different social roles and life experiences, men and women are 
inclined to develop different moral tendencies. While women tend to 
connection and develop an "ethic of care", men have a propensity to 
independence. and autonomy and develop an "ethic of justice" or a rights 
approach, relating their decisions to a hierarchy of abstract principles. The 
claim of cultural feminists is that, because of women's long exclusion from 
the public sphere, they have been unable to influence it in the past; thus, it 
is the masculine mode, based on objective, unemotional moral judgement, 
that has been transposed into the legal system. In their view, it would be 
beneficial if women brought their developed capacities into the public 
world so that their "different voice" could be heard alongside the male 
voice (Gilligan, 1982: 74). 
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-----------------------------------
The increase in the number of women within the legal profession has 
been interpreted by scholars such as Menkei-Meadow (1985, 1989, 1995, 
1996), Jack and Jack (1989), Freyer (1995) and others who, inspired by 
Gilligan's theory of a feminine ethic of care, have attempted to explain the 
issue in terms of the difference women's massive entry Into the legal 
professions might make. They have argued that the presence of 
significant numbers of women in the legal profession might have a 
profound impact on the legal system, bringing a different perspective to 
the law, employing a different set of methods and seeking different results 
from the prevailing legal tradition. Some consideration has also been 
given to the possible effects that the increasing number of women judges 
might have on the judiciary, especially in terms of speculating about the 
difference women judges could make to the administration of justice, in 
other words, whether they approach their work in different ways to men. 
As a first step towards presenting the theoretical background for my study, 
I intend to outline the development of feminist legal theory in order to 
situate "cultural feminism" in its context. I will then describe Gilligan's 
thought and its applications to law and other disciplines, more particularly, 
to the way women judges, think and speak about their professional 
practice. I will then consider how newer approaches have advanced in 
thinking about women judges and their potential contributions to the 
system. 
11- An overview of feminist legal theouy 
~ ~ General aspects of ithe development of femlnost ~ega~ theory 
In the last thirty to forty years a sustained tendency towards a growing 
participation of women in the professions in general and especially in the 
legal professions has been observed in many countries within the western 
world. A prolific feminist academic development has been noticed as well. 
Particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries, the latter trends have given rise to 
15 
the production of a large body of feminist theory and some research on 
the connections and intersections between gender and the law. 
In these countries, with a common law adversariallegal system, different 
from Argentina's civil tradition, feminist legal scholars have made 
important theoretical contributions to legal theory and practice, covering a 
very wide range of issues. Feminist legal theory appears as an effort to 
introduce feminist theory into legal discourses. lt followed what had been 
already initiated by feminist scholars in terms of raising critical questions, 
specifically in relation to women's relationship to law and legal institutions 
in an attempt to challenge law's professed gender neutrality. 
(Naffine, 1990: 1; Smart, 1989: 66; Fineman, 1991: 229; Conaghan, 2000: 
352 and 359) :; 
Legal feminism constitutes an analytic, academic and transformative 
political endeavour seeking to overcome women's disadvantage. Although 
these three aspects are inextricably linked, but, since academic and 
political concerns occur in different spheres and are subject to diverse 
conditions, they might not develop in a parallel manner (Conaghan, 2000: 
351). Yet during the last few decades, feminist legal theory has 
contributed to a series of ongoing debates and brought forward quite a 
few changes within the legal system itself (Naffine, 2002a and 2002b). 
As legal feminism progressed and its understanding of the law broadened, 
law has come to be interpreted by feminist legal scholars as a 
manifestation of power in society that is found not only in courts, cases, 
legislation and statutes, but in law's implementing institutions, such as the 
professions of social work and law enforcement. Law is found in the 
discourses reflecting understandings about "law", in the beliefs and 
assumptions we hold about the world in which we live, and in the norms 
and values we cherish. (Fineman, 1991: 237) As such, feminist legal 
thought is to be found in different settings:in print, in the legal academy, in 
courts and in substantive law (Dalton, in Olsen 1995: 4-5). 
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lt expresses and is informed by various philosophical traditions such as 
liberalism, socialism, critical legal studies, critical race theory, 
psychoanalytic perspectives, post-structuralism, post-modernism and 
others (Bridgeman and Millns, 1998: 11; Conaghan 2000: 358). 
In an attempt to organise the production of feminist legal thinking, various 
authors have distinguished three phases, closely linked with feminist 
currents -liberal, difference, radical and post-structuralism, which stand in 
a particular relationship vis a vis each other. Because these currents are 
not mutually exclusive and do not conform to a progression in which each 
,, 
phase is superseded by the one that comes next, they have been 
compared to an "ongoing conversation" (Bridgeman, 1997: 11 ), "a 
continuing dialogue" (Greenberg, 1992: ix), an "archaeological dig into 
law" (Naffine, 1990: 1) and as "competing philosophies of equality" 
(Bynion, 1993: 141, ft.7). As a matter of fact, each phase corresponds to a 
deeper understanding of the relationship of women and the law 
(Greenberg, 1992; Naffine, 1990: 1; Bridgeman and Millns, 1998; Smart, 
1995, originally 1992). 
Although there are points in which these different phases are clearly 
opposed, they all share the belief that law has evolved as a masculine 
discipline that has consistently excluded women's realities, interests and 
perspectives. Moreover, they also privilege an interdisciplinary approach 
and recognise women's experience as a valid and valuable source of 
knowledge. 
In spite of the.existing differences between strands or phases within legal 
feminism, central recurring themes can be identified in feminist legal 
scholarship. These themes correspond to both theoretical and substantive 
issues. The former have raised questions about the law as a tool for 
gender oppression and its potential as a tool for change. They have 
challenged dominant aspects of traditional legal theory such as the publ,ic 
and private divide and the relevance of rights discourse. They have 
promoted basic theoretical debates around sameness, equality and 
difference, along with the discussion of autonomy and the female body. 
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They have disputed law's neutrality while sustaining its male bias, and 
have put forward the need for a feminist epistemology and the creation of 
a feminist jurisprudence. The latter refers to employment discrimination 
and job preferences; family, including Issues of gender and divorce; 
issues of property within the family and the way they result after divorce, 
domestic relationships, childbearing, child caring, custody; rape, 
harassment; domestic violence; the legal status of different sexual 
orientations; the limits to state intervention and the power of the various 
practitioners within the legal system. 
More recently, post-modernism has brought new themes to the agenda, 
such as the need to be aware of differences like class, race or sexual 
preference existing among women, (Fineman, 1991: 236; Bridgeman and 
Millns, 1998: 11; Graycar, 1990: 30-62). The commonality in terms of the 
issues to be addressed must not be overstated; on the contrary, 
considerable weight should be given to the actual diversity in terms of the 
perspectives and positions sustained by the representatives of the 
different strands and to the controversial nature of their relationship. 
2D The different phases of feminist legal theory 
As Naffine (1990) explains, tracing the main trends in feminist legal theory 
is not an easy task. First, because the need to categorise necessarily 
implies the oversimplification of an extremely rich and prolific body of 
theoretical production. Second, because of the particular relationship 
these different strands of legal feminism bear vis a vis each other. 
Actually, rather than viewing the development of legal feminism as a 
theoretical progression in which each phase is superseded by the one that 
comes after, most authors see it as an ongoing conversation. Therfor,e, 
whereas one could find contemporary adherents to any of such strands or 
phases, since feminist legal theory is a dynamic discipline in the process 
of being constructed, we might as easily find scholars who, while shifting 
from one phase to the other, feel that their work is in kinship with all three 
phases (Naffine, 1990: 1). 
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As has been mentioned above, in an effort to organise the production of 
feminist knowledge and theorisation on the law, various authors have 
distinguished three approaches or phases that are closely related to 
different feminist currents. (Naffine, 1990: 1-23; Greenberg, 1992; Smart, 
1995: 197-202; Bynion, 1993: 140-143). 
In the introduction to Frug's book Post-modern Legal Feminism, 
Greenberg has identified three approaches that she outlines under the 
labels of the "sameness/difference" model, the "dominance" model, and 
"postmodernism" {Greenberg, in Frug, 1992: ix). She states that each 
model provides powerful insights, but also has its limitations. She sees the 
discussion that arises from the consideration of these models as a 
continuous dialogue among legal feminists. Naffine calls her three phases 
"the male monopoly of law", "the male culture of law" and "legal rhetoric 
and the patriarchal social order", and states that, technically, one can find 
contemporary writers belonging in any of the three phases {Naffine, 
1990:2). 
Carol Smart gives her own account of the development on feminist legal 
theory (Smart, 1995: 186-202, first published 1992). Like Greenberg and 
Naffine, she refers to three stages that she calls "law as sexist", "law as 
male" and "law as gendered". Smart observes that these developments 
parallel others in feminist thought, and also remarks that these three 
levels of argument may be found to be deployed simultaneously in some 
feminist work on law (Smart, 1995:186-187). 
Although it would be both interesting and illuminating to examine the 
different phases of feminism in more detail, space constrains such an 
endeavour. Thus, in sections a to d below, I briefly proceed to outline the 
development of feminist legal theory in order to place "cultural feminism" 
in its context. Accordingly, the following discussion cannot go beyond a 
brief description and constitutes a somewhat schematic approach to the 
main strands within legal feminism which, as such cannot capture the 
nuances within each phase. Then, because of the relevance of cultural 
19 
feminism to the subject matter of this research, the latter strand is 
presented and discussed in more detail. 
a a The first phase: Liberal legal feminism 
Although one can find contemporary feminists who adhere to liberal 
feminism, this phase corresponds with the earlier second wave feminist 
critique of the law, this first approach labelled as "sameness legal 
feminism" by Greenberg, which Naffine calls "the male monopoly of law", 
and Smart, "law as sexist". 
Liberal legal feminists claim that no differences should justify 
discrimination on the basis of sex. They ask for equality in terms of 
sameness of attainment and therefore of treatment. Without denying 
differences between men and women, advocates of this strand would 
argue that the differences are not innate but social, and that they do not 
matter, and hence should not be relevant in terms of women's 
advancement towards gaining the same status as men. They believe that 
once the barriers have been removed and stereotypes overcome, men 
and women could be the same. Consequently, liberal legal feminists seek 
for equality of opportunity with men within a hierarchical society. 
Feminists of this strand have striven to create formal legal equality for 
women; their focus has been equality on the workplace, as a precondition 
for women to be able to achieve economic independence and improved 
life conditions. This strategy, originated from women's exclusion, was 
designed to secure women's access to the public arena. Its effects have 
been substantive law reform, an increase in the number of women in the 
professions and a general acceptance of a principle of non-discrimination 
in access to employment and promotion. 
Naffine characterises the first phase as one concerned with the male 
monopoly of law. She considers two books that stand out as the most 
representative works of liberal legal feminism: Sexism and the Law by 
Sachs and Wilson (1978), where the authors examine male bias in legal 
thinking in Britain and America in the 19th. and 20th. centuries, and Women 
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and the Lawby Atkiris and Hogget (1984), dealing with the legal treatment 
and construction of British women today. These authors' focal point of 
interest was how men had operated to keep the public sphere as a male 
preserve in order to maintain their own power and keep women in their 
place. 
Liberal scholars such as Sachs and Wilson and Atkins and Hogget saw 
law as a rational and fair institution, capable of being impartial, thus 
accepting law's account of itself when it is not dealing with women. The 
failure they see is that law has not developed full and effective rights for 
women. Thus, their aim is to fully extend legal rights to women. While the 
underlying principle is that law can be impartial, the objection of this 
school is then directed to sexist law (Sachs and Wilson, 1978; Atkins and 
Hogget, 1984). They have made important contributions in terms of 
providing an intellectual framework for women's demands for equal 
treatment and for winning formal legal equality in substantive law. 
However, as time went by, the limitations of liberal feminism became 
visible as, in spite of its efforts, it could do little to emancipate women by 
way of legal reform and was incapable of developing equality through the 
courts. 
In spite of the achievements of liberal feminism, by the late sixties many 
feminist theorists recognised that "gender blindness" did not effectively 
bring about sexual equality in the law and that laws based on men's lives 
did not incorporate women's experience into public policy. This was 
particularly true of such aspects of women's lives like sexuality and 
reproduction. (Bynion, 1993: 141). 
The well-founded fear that the law's recognition of differences would bring 
disadvantages to women left them with a formal equality from which they 
could not profit because of the particularities and constraints of their 
material lives. By the late 1970's many feminist theorists recognised that 
gender blindness was not enough to bring about gender equality. The 
feminist movement was then split on whether to continue 'to urge 
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sameness or concede difference: for example, should women equate 
pregnancy with prostate ailments or acknowledge the uniqueness of their 
childbearing capacities? (Dalton in Olsen, 1995: 7). 
Liberal feminists were criticised by subsequent feminist writers because of 
their uncritical acceptance of law's own view of the social world and their 
tacit faith in much of the legal system (Naffine, 1990: 6); for only 
representing the interests of white middle class women, and for not 
claiming equality for all women (Evans, 1994: 15). 
lt was soon realised that a determination of equality required a 
comparison with a model, the model being the male standard. The fact 
that women differ from men determines that when women's rights are 
modelled in male rights, equality is not achieved (Greenberg, 1992: XI, 
Smart, 1989: 67). An example of this is the treatment of pregnancy as a 
disability. 
Although many legal changes introduced during the last century have 
brought about improvements in women's position within society, many 
others have had little impact in practice (Fineman: 234). The paradoxical 
effects brought about by certain legal changes inspired in the sameness-
of-treatment principle that do not take into account the realities of 
women's gendered lives have been pointed out by writers such as Martha 
Fineman and Carol Smart. Examples of these are the recent changes in 
family or matrimonial law that sought to impose 50:50 distribution 
schemes between the partners of marriage after divorce. The authors 
argue that proposed arrangements of that kind might seem gender neutral 
at first sight but, considering the actual situation of most women in 
contemporary society, it is highly unlikely that half of the family assets 
should suffice to provide adequately for them and their children after 
divorce (Fineman, 1991: 234; Smart,1989: 67). 
A similar effect has been observed after the introduction of equality-based 
custody, which has ended up by investing the non-care taking parent 
(usually the father) with the capacity to negotiate 1or a more convenient 
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financial arrangement against his newly gained custodial rights. Fineman 
argues that women's situation has become worse than it was when 
custody was "naturally" awarded to the mother (Fineman 1991: 234). 
b a The second phase of legal feminism: Difference and dominance 
models 
The reaction to the failure of the liberal approach in bringing about 
significant changes in women's lives through equal rights brought about 
the second phase of feminist writing on the law. Authors of the second 
phase of feminist theorising suspect law's professed objectivity and argue 
that law Is an expression of masculinity. Law's structure, contents and 
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methods represent the masculine perspective and have a masculine 
character. Law's claim of objectivity and impartiality actually serves to 
conceal its masculine bias. Accordingly, authors of this phase set 
themselves the task of exposing law's actual partiality and preference of 
men and their view of the world (Naffine, 1990: 6-12). 
With the indictment of the masculinity of law at their base, two different 
currents can be distinguished as the main representatives of the second 
phase of feminist legal theory. These currents are difference feminism and 
dominance theories. 
i · Difference theories 
The consideration of differences between men and women was presented 
as an antidote to male bias in law, capable of exposing the inadequacy of 
the "neutrality paradigm", excluding women's experiences in law and 
revealing the power imbalance this represents. The discussion about 
gender differences has been one of the main themes within feminist legal 
theory. As exponents of difference feminism, cultural feminists advocate 
the consideration of differences between men and women. 
Advocates of ge~der difference theories claim that there are behavioural, 
social, cultural and psychological differences between men and women. 
Some argue that these are biologically based. Most argue that women and 
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men are socialised, acculturated, or psychologically constructed differently 
from each other. Although such differences do not hold true in every case, 
they seem to be sex linked. In trying to identify the tendencies in gender 
construction, they have studied how the genders differ. They found that 
they needed to name and re-describe women's approaches and 
orientations because such traits had been described, if at all, from a male 
perspective and measured against a male standard. 
They see principles such as impartiality, neutrality and objectivity as male 
principles devised to obscure law's partiality, its preference of men and of 
their view of the world. The law is masculine in terms of its contents and 
the ways it operates: the culture of objectivity and detachment, the 
adversarial model, its hierarchical organisation; all of them reflect law as a 
patriarchal institution. Being made by men, it serves as a means to secure 
their position of dominance. Men, they argue, have fashioned the legal 
system in their own image, creating an uncaring adversarial style that suits 
their own ways and, consequently, favours them (Naffine, 1990: 7-11). 
The masculine perspective, which depicts a system of separate individuals 
who care only about their own rights and fear intrusion, ignores and 
devalues women's priorities such as human interdependence. The law, 
difference theorists argue, needs to be challenged from a perspective that 
not only takes Into account women's experience in society, but also stems 
from it; i.e., a perspective capable of correcting the imbalance and 
unfairness of the legal system that results from the implementation of 
perspectives that have ignored the circumstances of women's gendered 
lives. This renewed perspective, which takes women's experience as a 
starting point, implies the use of a new methodology, based on the 
material, specific, concrete and contextual circumstances of women's 
gendered lives (Fineman, 1991: 234-235). 
Unlike liberal feminists who want to eliminate gender differences, 
difference theorists learn from them, and some even celebrate different 
women's traits. Their claim is that, since women live in a society that treats 
them differently from men, different treatment, roles, expectations and 
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experiences based on gender correlate with different ways of thinking, 
relating and interpreting reality. These common traits and differences from 
men create issues of common concern for women. While difference 
feminists share an understanding of women's silence and a belief that, 
with voice, women might emerge with distinctive contributions, they do not 
agree on the sources of women's differences from men. Biology, the 
division of labour, psychological dynamics in identity formation, the 
political structure of gender relations are used, either together or 
alternatively, as diverse explanations of gender difference. 
While liberal feminism would discount differences for strategic reasons in 
order to enter, on an equal standing, a realm that was already constituted 
by men, difference feminists claim that this realm should be reconstructed 
by and with women's participation, taking into account their specific needs 
and reflecting their realities. If, in terms of legal strategy, liberal feminism 
meant the embrace of equality in the law and anti-discrimination litigation, 
difference theory adhered to special protection. 
Some authors of this phase will argue in favour of incorporating the 
feminist perspective to the prevailing masculine legal system in order to 
complement the masculine vision with the feminine perspective (Gilligan, 
1982, 1985 in Mitchell Lecture: 56, Smart, 1989: 74). In fact, advocates of 
"cultural feminism" (also referred to as "relational" or "affiliational" 
feminism), a strand within difference feminism, value positively "women's 
culture" as a set of values developed in the private sphere. They argue 
that, out of their embodied experience to give and protect human life and 
their specialisation in childcare, women have developed special capacities 
for empathy and the care for others and recommend that such capacities 
should be brought into the public world (Gilligan, 82). 
With respect to the legal system, cultural feminism looks for a more 
generative view of human life, capable of transcending the harshness of 
the masculine liberal ideal. To Gilligan, the "ethic of justice", that everyone 
should be treated the same, should be added to an "ethic of care", that no 
one should be hurt for the sake of producing a better outcome. Her 
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conclusion then, is neither to produce a separatist system of justice for 
women nor to replace the "ethic of justice" by the "ethic of care" (Gilligan, 
1982: 174; Smart, 1989: 74). 
ID a Domh11ance theories 
Cultural feminism has been the object of much criticism, coming 
particularly from authors of the dominance model who argue that the 
problem is not one of difference but one of domination. Writers who 
adhere to the dominance model want to supplant the masculine- oriented 
legal system by a whole new one based on women's values (Scales, 
1986: 1381), arguing that it is not only the legal system that needs 
change, but patriarchy itself (Polan, 1982: 303; MacKinnon, 1985 in 
Mitchell Lecture: 28). 
United States feminist Catherine MacKinnon, the most prominent legal 
feminist within the dominance model, has particularly criticised the 
sameness/difference model on the grounds that it does not address men's 
pervasive power over women, which is at the heart of women's 
subordination (MacKinnon, 1985 in Mitchell Lecture: 20-21). In the 
difference approach, especially in cultural feminism, MacKinnon saw the 
reinstatement of dangerous gender stereotypes which could continue to 
separate the sexes and devalue women (MacKinnon, 1985: 48; 
Greenberg, 1992: VIII-IX). 
Notwithstanding the fact that Gilligan and Mackinnon coincide in their 
condemnation of the masculinity of the prevailing legal system, their 
writings differ in significant ways. MacKinnon specifically disputes the idea 
of a female ethical style that she sees as the convenient artefact of men 
(MacKinnon, 1985: 48). To her, the issue at stake is one of dominance, 
rather than one of sameness or difference in relation to the male standard. 
lt is a system of power where women are powerless and men have the 
power to oppress women by controlling language, culture, social and legal 
institutions and, mostly, women's bodies (MacKinnon, 1985 in Mitchell 
Lecture: 18 - 22). 
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Mackinnon sees women's sexuality as the locus of women's oppression 
and tends to explain differences as a result of women's subordination. 
She locates women's oppression in the alienation of their sexuality, which 
leads to false consciousness. She argues that men's total power over 
women derives from their ability to reduce women to "walking 
embodiments" of their sexual needs. In her view, the law reproduces 
sexuality from the perspective of the male, not the female, and thereby 
ensures male control over women's bodies. In her view, domestic 
violence, rape, prostitution and obscenity laws have more to do with 
preserving men's rights over female sexuality than with the preservation of 
women's security (MacKinnon, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1987). Thus, the 
dominance theory presents an important theoretical framework within 
which to understand the harms of violence against women. Because such 
harms are experienced mainly by women and are a result of masculine 
dominance over women, an analysis is called upon to adequately address 
the patriarchal structures of power that perpetuate them (Bowman and 
Shneider, 1998: 252). 
MacKinnon proposes a separatist system of justice for women and the 
development of a feminist jurisprudence. She argues that there is no room 
for women in the existing masculine legal framework. In her view, both 
liberal and difference theories, equality and special protection. take the 
masculine model as the norm and, consequently, rather than trying to 
advance women's positions by making them as good as men, by fitting in 
within the masculine legal system, feminists should ask themselves what 
a legal system that takes women as the starting point would look like. She 
recommends the method of consciousness rising as a way to rediscover 
what is pre-culturally female (MacKinnon, 1979, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1987). 
Implicit in the conception of law as an expression of masculinity sustained 
by both cultural and dominance feminists, there is a suggestion that 
women would do things differently and, according to some, better. Thus, 
women's subjugated position provides the possibility of a more complete 
or a less perverse understanding, and could forrm the basis of a more 
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desirable legal system from the perspective of women (Naffine, 1990: 8 -
1 0). 
In spite of the fact that Mackinnon's main criticism of cultural feminism is 
its essentialism, she herself cannot avoid a different sort of essentialism 
when she refers to a truly female nature and concedes such an important 
role to sexuality (Smart, 1989: 76-77). 
Paradoxically, although MacKinnon has been very critical of the use of 
masculine law, she has been very active and successful in bringing the 
law to challenge gender oppression. Through her work, she has brought 
about the enactment of Important laws in the US in the terrain of women's 
sexuality, such as rape, pornography and prostitution, which were 
previously considered external to legal regulation (Fiss, 1994: mimeo). 
She justifies this by asserting that if women were to restrict their demands 
for change to spheres they can trust or control, there would be none: 
"In point of fact, I would prefer not to have to spend all this energy getting the 
law to recognise wrongs to women as wrong. But it seems to be necessary to 
legitimise our injuries as injuries in order to dellgitimise our victimisation by 
them, without which it is difficult to move in positive ways." (MacKinnon, 
1987: 104 as cited in Smart, 1989: 81 and Evans, 1994: 20). 
Authors such as Scales, for instance, who have absorbed the ideas of 
both MacKinnon and Gilligan, believe in the generation of a new legal 
approach (a feminist jurisprudence) more in consonance with the lives of 
women and view the feminist task as one that will develop a whole new 
law for women (Mackinnon, 1985: 21, Scales, 1986: 1381 -1391). Scales 
considered what a legal system might look like if it were moulded in the 
image of women (Scales, 1986: 1381). Her starting premise is that justice 
means different things to men and women and that there is a distinctively 
feminine legal style. Drawing on Gilligan's work and in agreement with her 
(Gilligan, 1982), Scales argues that boys and girls are socialised to see 
the world in different ways and consequently develop different styles of 
moral reasoning. Boys, who are encouraged to detach themselves from 
their mothers and flourish as independent beings, come to value 
autonomy and develop an ethic of rights. Girls who, by contrast, are 
encouraged to stay close to their mothers, grow to value relationships and 
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hence develop an ethic of care. Scales deplores the existing masculine 
style of law and its view of the social world in terms of the abstract 
competing claims of identical individuals, which she objects to because of 
its rigid focus on the rights of equal and disconnected individuals. To 
Scales, the rights approach that implies applying abstract principles 
regardless of concrete human and social situations, according to some 
supposed standard of fairness and impartiality seems decontextualised 
and uncaring. She prefers the female ~pproach which, on the contrary, 
would tend to produce a unique solution to each unique problem. Since, in 
her view, both approaches are incompatible, the male view must be 
abandoned (in Naffine, 1990: 11 ). lt is here where her analysis strays 
away from Gilligan's to come near to that of McKinnon's. 
The search for a feminist jurisprudence signalled the shift away from a 
concentration on law reform to concern for some other fundamental 
philosophical and methodological issues regarding the law (Smart, 1989: 
66). In that sense, it has produced work that has taught women a lot about 
themselves, empowered them by showing them some of the structures of 
their disempowerment, brought the enactment of certain very important 
laws in the area of sexual offences, offered them new critical tools and 
shown them new forms of communication and political action. (Dalton in 
Olsen, 1995: 1 0) 
c-The third "phase" of legal feminism: deconstruction 
In spite of their achievements, both the sameness, the difference and the 
dominance models have come under the scrutiny of advocates of the third 
phase of legal feminism. In this third phase, writers argue that the first and 
second phases have invested law with too much power and overlooked 
differences within the category women and contest the tendency to grand 
theorising (Thornton, 1986: 21; Smart, 1989: 89). At the same time, they . 
believe it is an oversimplification to think that the law favours men and 
damages women in a uniform way (Smart, 1989: 68-87; Dalton in Olsen, 
1995: 10). 
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Critics of feminist jurisprudence like Olsen, Smart, and Naffine owe many 
of their insights to the postmodern critique of positivism which focuses on 
cultural representation. Based on the work of French scholars like 
Foucault, Lyotard, Lacan and Derrida, postmodern thought has emerged 
as a challenge to the "grand theories" of modernism which present 
themselves as coherent, all-embracing "m eta narratives". lt has had a 
marked impact on the jurisprudential community, particularly among 
feminists and has provided the background for the Critical Legal Studies 
movement. 
From a legal theoretical perspective, postmodernism rejects the grand 
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concepts of traditional theory and calls for its deconstruction. Concepts 
such as rights, equality, and rationality must be rethought from a critical 
standpoint, dismantling the perceived false certainties and revealing the 
realities of life. In this light, fragmentation, contingency and diversity come 
to replace certainty and coherence. 
The implications of postmodernism for legal feminism are important, since 
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many of the concepts used and produced by feminist jurisprudence to 
explain women's subordination are viewed as no longer sufficient and 
need to be revised. Basic concepts such as gender and patriarchy, private 
and public, come under the scrutiny of third phase legal feminists. Thus, 
third phase feminism has developed critiques that concentrate on the· 
reality of the diversity of individual women's lives and conditions, rejecting 
the universal approaches provided by modernist thought and making room 
for diversity, plurality, competing rationalities and perspectives, and 
uncertainty in relation to theory. 
They seek to uncover the ways in which "reality" is constituted by 
language. They recognise the importance of masculine power in creating 
women as different, and focus on the ways power is constructed through 
discourses, as well as on how language constructs women's identities. 
They speak of texts, read the world as if it were made of texts, and argue 
that there are no privileged readings for a text. 
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Thus, post-modernist thinkers insist on the deconstruction of gender 
differences and identities, on challenging overgeneralised assumptions 
about the social world, preferring the analysis of particular instances more 
related to everyday life. Wary about the use of dual categorisations and 
binary opposites, they believe that generalised perspectives are 
necessarily partial and remind us that, while the differences between men 
and women are significant, so are the differences among women. 
Central to the project of deconstruction is the study of binary opposites. 
Following Derrida, Olsen (1995: 473-474) states that traditional social and 
legal theory, classical liberal theory, and the dominant ideology have 
structured thinking in terms of: 
"a complex series of dualisms, or opposing pairs: rational/irrational: 
thought/feeling; reason/emotion; culture/nature; power/sensitivity; 
objective/subjective; abstract/contextualised; principled/personalised. These 
dualistic pairs divide things into contrasting spheres or polar opposites" 
(Oisen, 1995: 473). 
This system of binary opposites is, according to Olsen (1995: 473), 
"sexualised". One half of each dualism is considered masculine; the other 
half, feminine. The terms of the dualisms are considered to constitute a 
hierarchy and, in each pair, the term regarded as masculine rises as 
superior, while the other is thought of as inferior. Law is identified with the 
male side of the dualism. This sexual identification of the dualisms 
involves both a descriptive and a normative element. Postmodern 
feminists reject both the sexualisation and the hierarchisation of the 
dualism. 
Deconstruction opposes hierarchies and, by so doing, exposes the 
dualisms of our culture and disrupts the very terms of the dualisms. If we 
take the example of man and woman, deconstruction exposes inequality, 
not only interdependence. Woman is subordinate to man and, according 
to advocates of post-modernism as inequality is exposed, it is also 
subverted. Accordingly, some feminists view post-modernism as engaged 
with the subversion of what are seen as universalising or essentialising 
concepts like "woman" and "man". 
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The main accusation postmodernism levelled against the legal feminism 
that emerged during the 1970's and 1980's is that of essentialism or 
reductionism. Post modernist scholars refer to the fact that legal feminism 
from the previous phases was propounded by white, middle class women 
whose limited ethnical and cultural experience prevents them to speak on 
behalf of all women. Thus, they present deconstruction as a tool to revise 
old concepts and categories such as woman, gender or sexuality in the 
light of the different experiences of all women, including lesbians, women 
of colour and others (Barnett, 1999: 194-195). 
At the same time, scholars of this phase have contested the enormous 
power that writers of previous stages accord to the law. Third phase 
writers have tended to resist the notion that law represents masculine 
interests in a uniform way. According to writers of the third phase, the 
actual relationship between law and the patriarchal social order is complex 
and variable. While law is invariably connected to the values and priorities 
of a sexist, male dominated society, this relationship is historically 
contingent, shifting and multifaceted. To writers of the third phase such as 
Olsen and Smart, although it may seem paradoxical, law serves at the 
same time to produce consent to its way of doing things by invoking a 
rhetoric of fairness and impartiality and to stifle dissent to the inequitable. 
Smart recommends that legal theorists expose law's "overinflated view of 
itself' and work towards strengthening other institutions within society less 
inimical to the interests of women (Smart, 1989: 68). 
Yet if the search for the common characteristics of women leads to 
exclusion, the lack of a woman subject within legal feminism is not 
unproblematic. Anxiety about essentialism has generated excessive 
caution in the development of theory and its application. Thus, the main 
criticisms raised against third phase legal feminism are, firstly, that the 
consideration of diversity within the category woman may lead to breaking 
it down into "infinitely smaller groups until we end up with an analysis that 
can only effectively cover individuals" (Bender 1990, in Barnett, 1997: 
204). Secondly, lt has been criticised for iis political Implications, as it 
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upholds that no shared identity exists to unify women, it strips feminism of 
its political constituency and, thus, strips women from agency (Conaghan, 
2000; Drakopolou, 2000; Naffine, 2002: 88-91).Thirdly, as Moller Okin 
and Nussbaum (cited in Naffine, 2002a: xii and xvii) have argued, by 
giving priority to cultural relativism, writers of this phase fail to condemn 
cultural practices that exploit women. Moreover, authors like Conaghan 
{2000: 367 and Drakopolou (2000: 207) have specifically addressed this 
problem and have argued that it has led to a "crisis of subjectivity "and a 
near death" to feminist legal theorising. 
In section 2, I have briefly mapped the development of feminist legal 
theory, trying to situate cultural feminism in its context. The previous 
analysis provides a summary of the main positions in feminist legal theory, 
revealing a very prolific body of scholarship in terms of its theoretical 
contents and openness for debate and discussion. In a dialectical 
movement, these features have encouraged new theoretical and strategic 
challenges and brought about important changes in substantive law. The 
following section focuses on cultural feminism, conveys its main themes, 
its applications and influence, the debates it has originated, the criticisms 
it has raised, and explains its relevance for the ongoing research project. 
3- Cultural Feminism: 
a - Principal themes: the different voice 
The approach of American psychologist Carol Gilligan, clearly expressed 
in her seminal work In a different voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women's Development (1982), has made a profound impact on all areas 
of feminism, especially on the law. In the discussion above, an attempt 
was made to situate Gilligan's work amidst the development of feminist 
legal theory. Given that it offers a theoretical framework to study the 
potential contribution that women's participation could make to the legal 
system, in this section I will present the main themes of cultural feminism 
in more detail, explore its influence and discuss the criticisms it has 
aroused. I shall then go on to describe the work of scholars who, either 
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inspired by Gilligan's theory or reacting to it, have speculated on the 
situation of women lawyers and judges. 
The starting point of Gilligan's work was a critique of then current theories 
of moral development that took the male model of moral development as 
the norm. She particularly criticised the work of Kohlberg who, in spite of 
not having included any female subjects in his studies, had made 
generalisations about the moral development of boys and girls. Since the 
traditional theory on women's psychological development was based on 
studies of male behaviour, it invariably found that women failed to develop 
on measurement scales. 
Gilligan showed how an alternative perspective emerged when 
researchers included women in their studies and discarded frameworks 
constructed with only men in mind. The possibility occurred to her that 
girls' pattern of moral development could be different from that of boys. As 
a consequence, she purposefully did include female subjects in her 
studies on moral development and thus came to very different conclusions 
(Gilligan, 1982: 48). In her book, cited above, she attempts to describe 
women's moral development with the purpose to complement previous 
developments that had taken the male model of moral development as the 
norm. 
In a Different Voice is based on three research projects conducted by 
Gilligan. The said projects considered how women decided whether or not 
to have an abortion, how they responded to Kohlberg's hypotheticals and 
how they made important life decisions (Gilligan, 1982: 71-74,25-32, 151-
174). More than half of the subjects who participated in Gilligan's studies 
were women. Based on an analysis of the responses of her research 
subjects, Gilligan constructs a new model of moral development. This new 
model, which she labels the "ethic of care or responsibility" is associated 
with women. She contrasts this model with an "ethic of rights or justice" 
that she attributes to men and has been described by prominent male 
theorists like Freud, Erikson, Piaget and Kohlberg. 
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Through her research, Gilligan discovered differences in the ways men 
and women tend to understand themselves, their environment and the 
way they solve moral problems. She found that men tend to define 
themselves through separation, measure themselves against an abstract 
ideal of perfection, equate adulthood with autonomy and individual 
achievement and conceive of morality in ladder-like hierarchical terms. 
In contrast, she found that women often tend to define themselves 
through connection with others, interdependence and activities of care, 
and perceive morality in terms of an interconnected web. She found 
women's inner lives more complex in that they tended to develop a greater 
ability to identify with others and to sustain a variety of personal 
relationships. She located the origins of these qualities and capacities in 
women's involvement with families and the protection of human life. While 
women tended to understand moral conflicts as a problem of care and 
responsibility in relationships, men tended to emphasise rights and rules. 
From his research with male subjects, Kohlberg developed a six-stage 
model of moral development. He observed that, when this model was 
applied to women, they showed a strong tendency to remain in stage 
three, a result that would suggest that women failed to develop morally. 
Instead, realising that the moral development of men and women differed, 
Gilligan elaborated a three-stage model for women more in consonance 
with the characteristics of their moral development. In addition, Gilligan 
objected to a hierarchical ordering of men and women's moral 
development that derived from the application of Kohlberg's scale to 
women. 
In Gilligan's first stage, the individual is basically focused on caring for the 
self. This is a stage considered as "selfish" by those who have already left 
it behind. The second is the "feminine" phase, in which good is equated 
with caring for others. During this stage it is difficult to sort out the 
confusion between self sacrifice and care inherent in the conventions of 
feminine goodness. At the third stage, which involves "the transition from 
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femininity to adulthood", the individual learns how to care for herself as 
well as how to care for others and to take responsibility for moral choice. 
Gilligan suggests that many gender differences grow out of different 
conceptions of self and relationships to others. Building on the work of 
Dorothy Dinnerstein (1976) and Nancy Chodorow (1978), who studied the 
effects of the fact that children are reared mostly by women 
(psychoanalytical object relation theory), she states that women who, 
unlike men, do not need to separate from their mother for their 
development, tend to understand people relationally, as interconnected 
and mutually dependent, whereas men, who do need to separate more 
drastically from their mothers, tend to conceptualise people as more 
Independent, autonomous and ego boundaried. 
In Gilligan's view, these different conceptions of self are very much related 
to the development of gender-linked moralities and appropriate 
behaviours. Women tend to develop a tendency to solve ethical dilemmas 
that maximises the preservation of relationships and that no one should 
be hurt. This is achieved through a contextualised ethic of responsibility 
and care, while men focus more heavily on ordered hierarchies of 
principles of justice and rights to solve moral problems -hence its 
relevance for the field of law (Gillighan, 1982: 5-32). 
One of her studies addressed the interpretation of boys' and girls' different 
reactions to a moral dilemma. (Gilligan, 1982: 25-32). Two of the children 
studied, Jake and Amy, both aged 11, were of comparable intelligence 
and social backgrounds. The problem posed had to do with Heinz, a poor 
man whose wife required drugs in order to save her life. Heinz could not 
afford to pay for the drugs and the pharmacist would not lower the price. 
The children were asked whether, given the severity of the situation, Heinz 
would be morally justified in stealing the drugs. 
Gilligan demonstrated Jake's and Amy's differing forms of reasoning. 
When asked if Heinz should steal the drug, Jake answered yes, on the 
basis that although this would amount to theft, the iaw can make mistakes 
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and, should Heinz be prosecuted, the judge would take this into account 
and give him a light sentence, since life is a higher value than property. 
Jake's reasoning followed a logical, rational pattern that Gilligan calls the 
"logic of the ladder". According to her, Jake considers the moral dilemma 
to be "sort of like a· maths problem with humans" (maths being the only 
thing that is totally logical) (Gilligan: 1982: 25-32) 
Amy, on the other hand, reasoned in a totally different way. Lacking 
Jake's confident logical approach, Amy first considered whether there 
were alternatives to stealing the drug (a loan or something else). When 
asked why Heinz should not steal the drug, Amy did not consider the law 
but its effects on the relationship between Heinz and his wife (if he got 
caught his wife would not get the drug and her health would become 
further impaired). Amy's whole response to the dilemma revolved around 
a concern for relationships, a reliance on people's connectedness rather 
than pure logic. Gilligan terms this "the logic of the web" (Gilligan, 1982: 
25-32). 
Viewed from one perspective, this could be interpreted to mean that 
Amy's development is "stunted by a failure in logic" (Freud, 1977: 342 
cited in Smart, 1989: 73). That, however, would be a false interpretation 
grounded on the assumption that boys and girls must reason to a shared 
standard: a standard set by boys. In Gilligan's assessment, Amy's 
judgements contain insights central to an ethic of care, just as Jake's 
reflect the logic of an ethic of rights approach (Gilligan, 1982: 25-32). 
Gilligan also pointed out how most people in her studies, an average of 
65% across 9 studies, represented both voices in defining moral 
problems, while there was a strong tendency to focus on one or the other 
voice. About 70% of those who used both orientations concentrated on 
one. Only three out of sixty men focused on care, while 60% of the women 
did so (Marcus, Spiegelman, Du Bois, Dunlap, Gilligan, MacKinnon and 
Meankel Meadow, 1985: 47-49). Her "different voice", Gilligan so clarifies, 
refers to a voice different from traditional theory rather than to a voice that 
differs from men's. 
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More recently, Gilligan has used a fable to test the tendencies of boys and 
girls to elaborate different moral languages in solving moral problems. In 
this fable two hard-working moles have dug themselves a shelter for the 
winter. When winter arrives, a less industrious porcupine attempts to 
share the moles' shelter. In their concern, they take in the porcupine and 
then are hurt by the porcupine's quills in the small space. The subjects of 
the study were then asked what the moles should do Adolescents with a 
rights discourse, more often boys than girls suggested that the moles 
should throw the porcupine out because they had dug the shelter. Those 
using a care approach, more often girls than boys in the study, developed 
solutions like covering the porcupine with a blanket or asking the 
porcupine to dig and enlarge the shelter- in fact, the girls sought both to 
minimise the harm to all parties and meet their needs (Menkei-Meadow, 
1995: 28-29). 
Moreover, Gilligan's later research findings actually reinforce earlier 
conclusions. When asked to choose another way to solve moral 
dilemmas, boys and girls demonstrated an ability to shift from one form of 
reasoning to another, which ·suggests that boys and girls start from a 
particular focus or choice. To Gilligan this means that even if we are 
capable of both forms of problem solving, it is a moral choice we make 
when we decide how to reason and make moral decisions. (Gilligan, 1988: 
73-7 4, 80-85) 
In my view, four points stem directly from Gilligan's thought. In the first 
place, many women, out of their embodied experience to give and protect 
human life and their specialisation in child care, have developed special 
capacities for empathy and the care for others. In the second place, these 
capacities have been excluded from social discourse. In the third place, as 
Gilligan values women's culture positively, she recommends women to 
commit themselves to a mode of public discourse embedded into those 
caring capacities in order to reconstruct public life. In the fourth place, she 
argues in favour of extending the ethic of care to men through larger male 
involvement in the private sphere, since i~ is through such involvement that 
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the development of a morality based on commitment arises (Gilligan, 
1982). 
Gilligan's insights have given rise to applications and reflections in 
different fields of social enquiry such as sociology, social philosophy, 
political science and the law. Different social scientists have attempted to 
apply the "ethic of care" approach to their own fields. Jacobsen (1985), for 
instance, has wondered about its effects on gender managerial styles, 
initiating a whole debate about women's leadership styles. Political 
scientists like Elshtain (1981), Ruddick (1984), Jones (1993) and 
Sevenhuijsen (1998) have considered how the "ethic of care" might be 
transposed to the public context, and Smart and Neale (1999) applied the 
"ethic of care" to post-divorce families and reform of divorce law. Sarah 
Ruddick, in turn, has written about "maternal thinking" as a kind of political 
discourse, an approach that sets out to foster growth while allowing for 
autonomy. She presents it as an "antidote to a male dominated culture, an 
alternative vision, "a way to be in the world", applicable to both men and 
women, whether they are parents or not (Ruddick, 1980: 343-346, 1984; 
Resnick, 1988: 1916-1918). Jones (1993) writes about "compassionate 
authority" and Sevenhuijsen of "judgement and care" (1996). They all look 
at the implications of the care approach for citizenship and political 
participation and point to the family as the site where an ethic of 
responsibility may develop. Similarly, Bender has advanced that: 
"Gender difference and gender identity can be a starting point for feminist 
solidarity: Through feminist solidarity we can transform law from Its current 
design as a tool to preserve existing distributions of power, forms of 
knowledge and hierarchies of values into a tool to empower and enable all 
people" (Bender In Barnett 1997, first published 1990: 21 0). 
Gilligan's work has also initiated a specific debate around law and inspired 
many legal feminists who argue that, because the law has been infused 
with the masculine perspective, an approach to legal decision making 
based on separation, rights and abstract rules has come to represent the 
"correct" legal method, thus excluding the feminine perspective. She 
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insists on the fact that the masculine voice is not universal and that the 
feminine voice of experience and judgement should be heard alongside 
the masculine voice. Her work, therefore, constitutes the critique of any 
system of justice that celebrates the masculine voice devised by men 
(Gilligan, 1982; Smart, 1989: 74) and recommends that the "ethic of care" 
be added to the "ethic of justice". 
Thus, Gilligan's work, combined with that of other feminist legal scholars, 
provides the foundation for a theory that states that the presence of 
women lawyers and judges in important numbers in the legal system has 
the potential to bring about a new perspective and, hence, changes in the 
legal system (Menkei-Meadow, 1989, 1995). As Menkei-Meadow 
comments: 
"Gilligan never expressly sought to displace the male ethic of justice or rights, 
Instead she sought to supplement or complement it, add to it, make it more 
robust by including another level of moral consciousness in legal and justice 
reasoning. The need to establish and clarify rights, individual autonomy and 
the predictability of clear rules must be tempered by acknowledging needs as 
well as rights, minimise harms to people when making choices, and being 
certain that particular rules when applied, do not wreak havoc in particular 
situations. This is equity modifying law, mercy tempering justice, common 
law interpreting statute, discretion softening rules" (Menkei-Meadow, 1995: 
33-34). 
In a different direction, Gilligan's theories have also inspired legal critics 
who promote the creation of a whole new system of justice, laying 
emphasis on community and solidarity and focusing on conciliation, as ' 
opposed to the adversarial male system (Kingdom, 1985; Bender, 1992; 
Rhode, 1986; West, 1986). 
Robin West (1988: 1-72) has applied Gilligan's concepts to law and 
related the different women's voice to political theories like liberalism and 
critical theory. She has written about a "feminist voice" in jurisprudence. 
Unlike Gilligan, who explained how women and men differ in terms of 
psychoanalytical theory and women's cultural experiences, West's claim 
of gender difference is based on the physical experiences of being 
penetrated and of being attached to other human beings through 
pregnancy, sexual intercourse and breast feeding. Her emphasis lies in 
physical connection. West has attempted to bridge the gap between 
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cultural and radical (dominance) feminists by arguing that both strands of 
feminist thought clearly understand the central concerns of women's 
powerlessness and women's lives as physically different from men's. To 
her, all feminism rests upon the "connection thesis": "that women are 
actually materially connected to other human life. Men aren't" (1988: 14). 
According to West then, at an experiential level (whether acknowledged or 
not) all feminists are, at the same time, cultural and radical feminists in 
that they are drawn simultaneously to celebrate women's capacity for 
connection and to search for separation as a protection against invasion. 
The fact that West grounds her theory on physical connection is 
problematic for feminist thought due to its immutability. On the one hand, it 
could be argued that different meanings can be accorded to physical 
connection. On the other, one might say that some women who are not 
mothers may miss the experience of connection West refers to, and that, 
in many ways, men are also connected. 
Commenting on the differences between different strands within cultural 
feminism, Evans has distinguished between strong and weak cultural 
feminists using biological determinism as the distinguishing criterion 
between these two strands. According to Evans, separatist scholars Daly 
and Rich, for instance, who believe that women differences are innate and 
good can be categorised as strong cultural feminists. Instead, because 
Gilligan believes that gender differences are not innate but social, and 
men could deploy the qualities observed for women, Evans labels her 
work as weak cultural feminism. Following the same logic, Evans would 
call West a strong cultural feminist (Evans, 1994:91 ). This distinction is 
crucial for my later discussion of the accusation of essentialism against 
Gilligan's thought. 
As the above discussion shows, the appeal of Gilligan's work has led to a 
number of applications in theoretical and speculative forms. Some saw in 
her approach the revaluation of female qualities that had been denigrated 
by our male biased society and welcomed the valorisation of care, 
connection and nurture (Menkei-Meadow, i 989, i 995). Still, other feminist 
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writers saw in it the reinstatement of dangerous gender stereotypes which 
could continue to separate the sexes and devalue the female (MacKinnon, 
1985: 47; Greenberg, 1992: VIII- IX), and others accuse Gilligan's work of 
essentialism and ethnocentrism. The next section considers the main 
objections to Gilligan's work. 
Gilligan's work has given rise to a vast and enduring controversy. More 
than twenty years after "In a different voice" was published, the debate is 
still alive. Along the twenty years time span, various authors, surprised by 
the heat of the controversy have addressed the issue and tried to explain 
both the reasons for the popularity of the debate and its consequences for 
feminism (Davis, 1992, Drakopolou, 2000). As Davis (1992: 221) has 
argued, the attraction and popularity of Gilligan's work lies in the fact that 
she provided a surprising and novel account to explain central problems in 
feminist theory. In my view, the motive for this tremendous reaction is that 
the Gilligan debate has posed some issues that concern very important 
theoretical and political feminist dilemmas. The debate that followed the 
book's publication attempts to tackle the relationship between gender, 
care and morality. lt mirrors some of the main tensions in feminist theory 
such as the problems of subjectivity, essentialism and women's political 
agency. Although these issues may well never be solved, their discussion 
has indeed proved empowering for the development of feminist theory. 
Gilligan's work has been criticised on various grounds and from different 
stances. In this section I shall try to consider and deal with some of the 
criticism it has raised and then, in the next section, I will move on to the 
application, relevance and consequences of cultural feminism to my 
research on the different voice women might bring to judging. 
lt has been argued that women's identification with an "ethic of care" may 
have negative effects by further perpetuating their subordination and 
marginalising women who, because of their different situation regarding 
culture, class, sexual orientation or ethnicity, might not fit the "ethic of 
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care" model, which actually matches the model of the white middle class 
woman (MacKinnon, 1985: 47; Greenberg, 1992: viii- ix). 
Gilligan's work has also been criticised for making generalisations based 
on sex, for favouring a dualistic appositional view of gender and for her 
research methods (Davis, 1992: 219-220). Gilligan has been accused of 
essentialism by correlating women's social traits with their biology and for 
expecting all men and women to fall necessarily into such categories as 
"public" man and "private" woman, with all their typical set of 
characteristics. Moreover, some scholars have shown concern about the 
way she bases her work on the psychoanalytical object relation theory 
which, they argue, is not universal, but rather corresponds to white middle 
class, nuclear family life, and may be inapplicable to many other ways in 
which people are reared. Objections have also been raised to her work for 
giving too much weight to early experiences for the determination of adult 
identities. 
Although the above criticisms are actually interconnected and the 
arguments within the ensuing debate intermesh, I will try to organise the 
following discussion around three basic concerns: the question of method, 
the problem of conservatism and the criticism of essentialism. 
oa The methodological problems 
Feminist writers have been critical of the methods used by Gilligan in In a 
different voice. Her methods have been considered flawed because she 
used very small and homogeneous samples that were deemed insufficient 
to make generalisations about girls' moral development and because she 
did not include control groups. Along the same lines, she has been 
accused of defective research logic and of making unsubstantiated 
interpretations (Davis,1992: 223; Auerbach et al, 1985: 149-161) 
In response to her critics, Gilligan wrote an article (Gilligan, 1986: 324-
333} in which she explained that her argument was not statistical but 
interpretive, explaining that its value did not derive from the 
representativeness of the sample used, but instead aimed at providing 
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examples illustrating a different way of seeing a dilemma (Gilligan, 1986: 
326). However, later on, taking into account some of the comments of her 
critics, Gilligan included a more heterogeneous sample in terms of race 
and social class (Heyes, 1997: 142-163). A full consideration of the 
methodological aspects of Gilligan's research and theory building methods 
would require a greater knowledge on my part of psychology and its 
methods. lt would also be too lengthy and hinder me from considering 
other aspects of the controversy that are more central to this study. 
Gilligan's critics emphasise the methodological aspects of her work. 
Finding flaws, they have tended to overlook other aspects. Even in the 
event that there were grounds to deem Gilligan's research methods faulty, 
her claims could still have been considered. Instead, as Davis (1992: 225) 
and Heyes (1997: 142-163) have suggested, Gilligan's critics have lain 
excessive emphasis on scientific method and objectivity has had an 
obscuring effect on the real issues under discussion. Even if method is 
very important to make valid knowledge claims, methodological 
considerations should not deter feminists from the constructive possibility 
of addressing the normative aspects contained in Gilligan's theoretical 
body. 
iia The critique of conservatism in Gllligan's thought 
Gilligan's writing has been criticised for its vulnerability to co-aptation or 
appropriation by conservative forces. Many feminists fear that valorising 
women's differences will legitimate discriminatory treatment and assign 
women to conventional domestic maternal and other caring roles. Some 
feminists find Gilligan's theories reminiscent of a romanticised version of 
the 19th. century "separate spheres" ideology that has been so harmful for 
women's position within society. Mackinnon, for instance, asserts that 
gender relations are in fact power hierarchies. Mackinnon finds Gilligan's 
theories quite disturbing because, in her view, Gilligan seems to value 
voices that are the result of subordination and oppression (Mackinnon, 
1987: 38-39, in Smart, 1989: 75). 
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As discussed in an earlier section 1, MacKinnon makes a distinction 
between difference and dominance theories, emphasising that it is power 
differences that create gender differences. She claims that what Gilligan 
has called women's "different voice" is the voice men have created in 
order to suit their interests best, and that the characteristics that Gilligan 
values are those of powerlessness and not women's "true feminine 
nature". One wonders whether an epistemological standpoint is ever 
attainable (the "true" feminine nature) and whether we will ever find a 
female identity that can avoid our own secular relationship with patriarchy 
without falling into a different type of essentialism (Smart, i 989: 72-82). 
According to MacKinnon, sex is a natural attribute that has been 
manipulated and exploited to suit the interests of male supremacy. As can 
be appreciated in the following quote, for her, women are doomed to total 
predetermination: 
" .... How to get women access to everything we have been excluded from, 
while also valuing everything that women are or have been allowed to 
become ... " (MacKinnon, In Barnett, 1997:213, first published 1987). 
On the other hand, it can be argued that, even if the feminine voice that 
Gilligan identified in her work is the product of male oppression, it could 
still be used as a tool to disrupt patriarchal structures and discourses 
since, in fact, it has much to offer to the legal system. Furthermore, as a 
way to respond to MacKinnon's proposal that dominance theories offer a 
stronger analytical tool, it could be argued, together with West and Bender 
that, insofar as they acknowledge that women have been denied access 
to power, gender difference theorists, in fact, incorporate premises from 
the gender dominance theory. At least, difference theorists clearly 
understand that privileging men's narratives marginalises women's. 
Because of these power dynamics, difference theorists insist that the 
voices of those who, like women, have been silenced and excluded by the 
power structures of society should be heard. 
1 See further section 11-bii in this chapter. 
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Although one is bound to admit that there is truth in the argument that 
states that the "ethic of care" approach might make us prey to further 
stereotyping, marginalising those women who do not conform to the caring 
model (Greenberg, 1992: VII and IX), at the same time, it should be taken 
into account that such stereotyping had been going on long before cultural 
feminists identified or even celebrated woman's culture (Bender, in 
Barnett 1997, first published 1990: 208-209). Moreover, as Clare Dalton 
(in Olsen 1995: 12) reminds us, although anger and fear might seem 
legitimate reactions for women facing the care dilemma and the threat to 
fall prey to further stereotyping and to repeating very old roles, other 
options besides submission or denial of such care attributes could be 
found. As women, we can acknowledge these attributes, while at the 
same time remain aware of independence and self-realisation and 
struggle to resist claims for the exercise of care that might be detrimental 
to us. In fact, as a reply to her critics on this particular point, Gilligan 
(1984: 326-327) has argued that, far from unearthing the Nineteenth 
century image of the 'angel of the house', her work describes an active 
ethical perspective which calls into question the traditional equation of 
care with self sacrifice. 
Newer criticism has arisen from authors of the third phase of legal 
feminism. Advocates of critical race theory and post-modernism have 
claimed that Gilligan's feminine subject fits the liberal assumption of a 
white middle class heterosexual woman. Consequently, this view is seen 
as a-historical, essentialist and insensitive to class, race and sexual 
preference, ethnicity, age and motherhood. Gilligan's work has also been 
criticised for sustaining biological determinism and for reinforcing a 
dualistic appositional conception of gender. 
Without denying the importance of the consiaeration of power differences 
among women for adequate feminist theorising, I would argue that these 
criticisms originate in a misunderstanding of Gilligan's argument. In spite 
of certain ambiguities in Gilligan's discourse, it seems clear to me that she 
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does not refer to innate sex characteristics but rather to socially 
constructed roles that give rise to different styles of moral development. 
Neither does she say that an ethic of care is better than an ethic of justice, 
nor that all women are the same. In addition, it is not apparent to me that 
she sustains that all women are different to all men, as becomes clear 
from the following passage of her book: 
"The different voice I describe is characterised not by gender but by theme, 
Its association with women is an empirical observation, and it is primarily 
through women's voices that I trace its development. But this association is 
not absolute, and the contrasts between male and female voices are 
presented here to highlight a distinction between two modes of thought and 
to focus a problem of interpretation rather than to represent a generalisation 
about either sex." (Gilligan, 1982: 2}. 
I believe that in spite of the fact that different socio-cultural constructions 
of gender such as race, class and sexual orientation may render women 
very different from one another, the gendered construction of women has 
strong cultural meanings in patriarchal societies. Discrimination of women 
persists; this makes women seem very different from men and often less 
valuable. I agree with Bender (1990: 204-205) when she argues that, 
although differences among women should not be overlooked, these 
differences "ought not to serve to break down the category women into 
infinitely smaller groups, until we end up with an analysis that can only 
effectively cover individuals" (Bender in Barnett 1997, first published 1990: 
204-205). In the following quote Bender shows how difference feminism 
can integrate the anti-essentialist critique and maintain the use of the 
category "women" to the benefit of feminist solidarity. 
"Domination, subordination, exclusion, lesser status, and Interpersonal care-
giving responsibility infuse women's experiences and gender construction in 
patriarchal societies, even though these phenomena manifest themselves 
differently In different women's particularised lives. Yet we can say 
meaningful things about women that respond to the concerns, needs and 
experiences of women from different economic classes, different races, 
different privileges and statuses. Women with all our differences accounted· 
for, can achieve a feminist solidarity for social and legal transformation ... " 
(Bender in Barnett 1997, first published 1990: 204-205}. 
Moreover, as Heyes (1997: 142-163) has claimed, Gilligan is an example 
of a difference writer who has taken seriously the critique of essentialism 
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incorporating new variables such as race and class in her later work on 
girls' moral development. 
The charge of essentialism against Gilligan's work extends to her dualistic 
appositional conception of gender. Indeed, as a difference writer, typical of 
the second phase of feminist theorising, intending to bring to light 
women's differences, Gilligan tends to make broad generalisations based 
on sex. Still, as authors like Evans (1994) and Frug (1992) have noticed, 
different positions can be distinguished within difference writers in that 
respect. Evans has distinguished between strong and weak cultural 
feminists according to the role they assign to biology in the determination 
of sex differences. Along the same lines, Frug has argued that Gilligan's 
work allows for different readings. According to her, Gilligan can be read 
from both a conservative and a progressive standpoint. Frug differentiates 
between progressive and conservative standpoints in terms of the role 
they ascribe to sex differences. She identifies as conservative readings 
those that present gender traits as inherent and universal (Sherry, 1986; 
West, 1986) and romanticise feminine characteristics, while more 
progressive readings will consider sex differences to be context-bound 
and stemming from particular circumstances that vary with each person 
(Frug, 1992: 36-38, 47- 48). 
d-The problem of essentialism in difference feminism: 
Because of the strength and impact of the critique of essentialism raised 
against difference, women-centred theories (not just cultural feminism), I 
shall further discuss the issue in the next paragraphs. 
As social science and feminist analyses evolve, difference theorists can 
better understand the structures of domination and realise how, as 
persons who have been themselves excluded from power in important 
ways, they can unconsciously reproduce patterns of exclusion in their own 
theorising (like women of colour, lesbians and poor women). By so doing, 
they can incorporate newer and richer approaches about particularised 
experiences, correcting previous oversights without giving up the 
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difference approach. Since, as women, we differ from one another by 
race, class, ethnicity, sexual preference and physical challenges, our work 
to preserve all women's lives will necessarily improve the lives of all 
people oppressed because of these identities. This integrated approach 
certainly enhances women's political potential (Bender in Barnett 1997, 
first published 1990: 204-205). 
Conaghan (2000: 384)' has identified a central dilemma in legal feminism: 
that of conceding differences within women without falling into the trap of 
losing the subject of legal feminism due to our inability to speak beyond 
our own experience. Faced with this dilemma, she expresses her despair 
as a scholar intending to retain her commitment to women's issues and to · 
contribute to combat women's disadvantage without having to face the 
criticism of failing to take diversity into account. At the same time, she 
does not renounce acknowledging the strengths of the postmodern 
feminist critique. Even Harris (cited in Conaghan, 2000: 384), one of the 
main exponents of critical race theory, addresses the problem of how to 
organise politically around the notion of a shared identity and yet include 
the multiple identity claims of group members. 
Various feminist authors have attempted to escape the critique of 
essentialism by invoking the plural women and arguing that "the leap from 
deconstructing woman to repudiating the experiences of real women is 
neither necessary nor inevitable" (Conaghan, 2000: 368 referring to Fuss's 
argument). They posit that the difficulties of woman centredness can be 
avoided by remaining sensitive to the multiplicity of women's lives and 
experiences and aware of the universalising and exclusionary tendencies 
implied. 
A different response has been given by Spivak (cited in Conaghan, 2000: 
368), who urges feminists to engage in strategic essentialism in defence 
of political agency. Others have invited feminists to focus on narratives, 
positing law as a "gendering practice" and tracking the way gender 
categories are formed discursively and endowed with meaning 
(Conaghan, 2000: 370-371). 
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All these responses have, however, been subject to further criticism on 
different grounds. While it has been argued that, far from countering 
essentialism the first type of response displaces it (Conaghan, 2000: 368, 
f.72), strategic essentialism is dismissed on the grounds that it cannot 
confront the risks involved. Furthermore, the focus on narratives has been 
criticised because it privileges theoretical approaches, taking the issue 
away from the concrete circumstances of women's lives with negative 
political effects (Conaghan, 2000: 369). 
The above debate led Conaghan to come to terms with the idea that the 
category "woman of legal feminism" cannot be avoided; it just "cannot not 
be used" if the transformative aims of feminism are to be retained. 
Accordingly, she argues that anti-essentialism does not preclude 
generalised representations of women where appropriate, but rather 
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questions the range of the situations where these generalisations are 
appropriate. Thus, she recommends that instead of renouncing legal 
feminism's transformative aspirations by forsaking the use of such 
categories, one should remain aware of the dangers involved. Categories 
should be used cautiously, from the perspective of a situated subject 
(Benhabib, 1990 in Benhabib, and Cornell: 120-149) that acknowledges 
the complexity of reality and approaches knowledge as tentative, open to 
revision and criticism (Fraser, 1997: 218, cited in Conaghan, 2000: 372). 
At any rate, difference theorists have lent ears to the anti-essentialist 
warning related to the exclusion of women's multiple voices and, as a 
consequence, they are now more alert to the differences between women 
and less willing to generalise about them as a group. The theme of care 
has been lately rescued by scholars who, like Smart (1999), West (1997), 
Sevenhuijsen (1998) and Jones (1993), work in the fields of sociology, 
political science and political philosophy updating the discussion of care to 
put it in tune with the general debates within the social sciences today. 
They are now being more cautious In terms of the connections between 
gender and care, and have tended to distance care considerations from 
what might be viewed as essentialislng invocations of gender categories. 
50 
Thus, as has already been noted, West (1988), an advocate of justice with 
a female character, had already argued in her earlier work that the "ethic 
of care" involved values at least as Important and worthy of protection as 
autonomy and individualism. By 1997, she was more conscious of the 
risks involved in adopting an "ethic of care" untempered by justice, 
consistency, integrity and a universal impulse. She therefore recommends 
a middle ground: justice tempering care and care tempering justice (West, 
1997: 88-93). Sevenhuijsen (1999) is an example of a scholar who has 
moved into social philosophy to apply the ethic of care in the context of a 
normative project addressing notions of justice, morality, citizenship and 
politics, while Smart and Neale (1999) have applied the concept of the 
"ethic of care" to the consideration of post-divorce families and new 
divorce legislation. 
Heyes (1997: 142-163) frames the essentialism- anti essentialism 
controversy in an interesting way that takes us back to our previous 
consideration of the evolution of feminist legal theory. She considers this 
controversy as an example of the development of feminist thinking that 
shows "how feminist theorists have often failed to move on from an often 
dismissive anti-essentialist critique to a more nuanced, practical 
engagement with political projects" (Heyes, 1997: 242). In spite of its 
essentialist pitfalls, it is undeniable that grand theorising . within legal 
feminism has given rise to very rich and instructive debates (Naffine, 
2002, Conagahan, 2000) and, consequently its value should not be 
understated. As Heyes (1997: 242-263) has put it, the problem with third 
phase theories is that they tend "to throw the baby of political efficacy out 
with the bath water of essentialism". And thus she concludes that: 
"The challenge facing third way feminist theory lies In the observation that 
neither Interminable deconstruction nor uncritical reification of the category 
''women" Is adequate to the demands of feminist practice. The task we have 
inherited Is to take seriously the commitments entailed in anti-essentialism 
but to find ways effectively to incorporate them into resistive political projects" 
(1997: 243). 
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In spite of the fact that Gilligan's work has raised much criticism, its impact 
cannot be contested; every book or article about feminism acknowledges 
its influence. Its main contribution lies in the revaluation of the previously 
undervalued female characteristics. In spite of the objections raised 
against her work, it still poses the important question of whether the 
supposedly masculine values usually associated with good moral 
judgement should be accepted uncritically, and provides the arguments 
for a reconstruction of the public domain that encompasses different 
voices. In the next section, I shall move on to describe how it has been 
applied to interpret the effects of the massive entry of women into the 
legal profession and its consequences. 
m c Women and the practice of law 
11 Q Women ~awyers 
a Q ~ntroduction: 
Given the increased number of women entering the legal profession, it is 
important to consider the implications of the cultural feminist approach for 
the situation of women legal practitioners. The question posed is whether 
women in law will make a difference to the legal system. 
Legal scholars have been attempting to answer this question since the 
1980's when the number of women lawyers started to increase 
significantly. The progress of the debate in the twenty years that have 
gone by reflects socio-historical tendencies and mirrors academic 
production and political deliberation. I am referring both to the steady 
growth in the number of women lawyers over the years, to results of 
research on women lawyers, and to the main trends within feminist legal 
theory 
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In the mid-eighties, Carrie Menkei-Meadow engaged in the application of 
Gilligan's theories to the case of women lawyers. In Portia in a different 
voice: Speculations on a women's lawyering process (1985), which 
considers the large increase in the number of women entering the legal 
profession, the author speculates as to whether women perform their work 
in ways different from the male norm, and whether their increased 
participation in such a male-oriented field can have potentially 
transformative institutional effects. Although in 1985 when Menkei-
Meadow was first writing on the subject, women's participation in the legal 
profession was already widespread, it was also relatively recent. 
Therefore, lacking enough evidence to reach sound conclusions on 
whether women, when in sufficient numbers, would be capable of, or even 
want to introduce changes in the profession, Menkei-Meadow opted to 
wait until the number of women in the profession became significant 
enough so that more research could be carried out (Menkei-Meadow, in 
Barnett 1997, first published 1985: 196 -203). 
In the meantime, she set out to speculate on the possible consequences 
of women's entry in large numbers into the profession. She thus decided 
to assume that gender differences exist as had been documented by the 
work of Simone de Beauvoir, Carol Gilligan, Nancy Chodorow, Jean Baker 
Miller, Anne Shaef and others, and leave to others the important enquiry 
into the origins of those differences -whether biological, sociological, 
political or a combination of these. In her view "as long as such 
differences exist", studies of the world should take into account women's 
experiences (Menkei-Meadow, in Barnett, 1997 first published 1985: 
197). Building on Gilligan's thesis (Gilligan, 1982: 25-32), Menkei-
Meadow analyses Amy and Jake's talents for the exercise of the legal 
profession, as they derive from their different experiences of the world. In 
the following extract, she considers the effects of different reasoning 
styles, how they inform the law and its practices as well as how they 
fashion the ways the legal system is structured and decisions are reached: 
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" ... In conventional terms Jake would make a good lawyer because he spots 
the legal issues of excuse and justification, balances the rights, and reaches 
a decision, while considering implicitly if not explicitly, the precedential effect 
of his decision. But, as Gilligan argues, ... Amy's approach is also plausible 
and legitimate, both as a style for moral reasoning and as a style In 
lawyering. Amy seeks to keep the people engaged, she holds the need of the 
people constant and hopes to satisfy them all (as in negotiation), rather than 
selecting a winner as in a lawsuit ... 
She looks beyond the "immediate law suit" to see how the "judgement" will 
affect the parties ... 
And she Is being a good lawyer when she enquires whether all the facts have 
been discovered and considered." (Menkei-Meadow in Barnett 1997 first 
published 1985: 198) 
She also considers the impact of two different voices within the legal 
system, and the ways in which these voices can join together to create an 
integrated legal system: 
"Thus, although a "choice of rights conception" (life vs. property) of solving 
human problems may be important, it is not the only or the best way. 
Responsibilities to self and to others may be equally important in measuring 
moral as well as legal decision-making, but have thus far been largely 
ignored. For example a lawyer who feels responsible for the decisions she 
makes with her client may be more inclined to think about how those 
decisions will hurt other people and how the lawyer and client feel about 
making such decisions ... Jakes makes a choice in abstract terms without 
worrying as much about the people it affects." (Menkei-Meadow in Barnett 
1997 first published 1985: 198) 
Menkei-Meadow identifies mediation as an alternative to the prevailing 
adversarial model that has characterised the legal system and counteracts 
the logic of litigation (so similar to a sports event, in terms of two opposing 
parties in a win/lose relationship) to the paradigm of mediation, where 
communication and party's protagonism are valued together with respect 
for the legitimacy of conflicting positions as a valid means to reach 
appropriate resolution of legal conflicts (Menkei-Meadow in Barnett, 1997 
first published 1985: 202). 
Along the same lines, more recently Freyer (1995) characterises the win-
or-lose adversarial system of litigation as a system whereby the social 
ideal of justice is sacrificed. Freyer has argued that, faced with the "double 
bind", women have alternatives to offer to the legal system other than 
surrender or rebellion. Similarly to other feminist scholars such as West 
(1986) and Sherry (1986), the author parallels the "morality of rights" 
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characteristic of liberalism with the legal and judicial system's focus on 
individual achievement and personal autonomy .. To the morality of rights 
approach, more characteristic of men within the profession, she opposes 
a morality of care, more characteristic of women. Of course, this has 
profound consequences in terms of the difficulties men and women 
lawyers face to adapt to their professional roles. Inhabiting the legal realm 
is less problematic for men law practitioners. Unlike women, who often 
face a dilemma involving conflict between their personal and their 
professional morality, men lawyers rarely experience that kind of tension 
between their moral orientation and the one prevailing in their profession. 
Following Menkei-Meadow, Freyer looks to the alternative conflict 
resolution model that emphasises connection rather than autonomy as a 
more feasible alternative to add to the judicial system. She also advocates 
a more care-oriented judicial system to mitigate the setbacks of the 
adversarial litigation process. To her, the care-oriented lawyer should be 
able to find a middle ground where, without giving up completely her 
personal morality, she can fulfil her professional role by introducing ethical 
change in the professional culture. As can be seen from the following 
extract, like Gilligan and West, Freyer sustains that justice need not be 
uncaring and care need not be unfair: 
"Both the rights-oriented approach and the care-oriented approach aim at a 
just society, and each checks the faults and excesses of the other. Both have 
something vital to offer and recognise that human welfare is not complete 
without the contribution of each." (Freyer, 1995: 217) 
However, in 1985, at the time when Menkei-Meadow was writing her 
article, women lawyers, in spite of their increased presence, had been 
unable as yet to express a definite and clearly recognisable woman's 
voice. Organisational research results show that, when in token numbers 
(that is to say, in small proportions), women tend to conform to the already 
existing norms and to minimise rather than emphasise whatever 
differences exist (Moss Kanter, 1977; Menkei-Meadow, 1985; Mossman, 
1993). Menkei-Meadow relates these findings to the case of women 
lawyers and raises the very crucial issue of whether women transform 
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themselves or the profession, when their numbers are not significant 
enough. 
Many more women have entered the legal profession since 1985 when 
Menkei-Meadow was writing, and some interesting research has been 
carried afterwards, particularly in the US, Canada, Australia and the UK, 
both from the cultural feminist and from other perspectives. Recent 
research looks into the ways women have been incorporated into the 
legal system. (Jack and Jack, 1988; Mossman 1989; Harrington, 1995; 
Freyer, 1995; Thornton, 1997; McGiynn, 1998; Sommerlad, 1998, 1999; 
Schultz and Shaw, 2003: xxv-lxii). Results show that the increased 
number of women entering the legal profession has not translated itself in 
terms of women's capacity to influence substantially the prevailing legal 
ethics, nor has it automatically ameliorated their status within the 
profession. Women's position within the profession remains marginal. 
Significant barriers to equality of opportunities for women persist. 
Women are still over-represented at the lower end of the profession, and 
earning differentials in favour of men can still be observed. Research 
findings throughout the world show persistent occupational segregation. 
Women lawyers tend to concentrate on fields that are more consistent 
with stereotypic notions of what is thought of as women's work such as 
family law. Modern law firms require levels of commitment that do not take 
into account women's domestic roles and responsibilities. These same 
responsibilities.undermine women lawyers' possibilities for rainmaking and 
bringing business to the firm. This generates a situation of inequality with 
their male counterparts and deters from their possibilities to become 
partners (Thornton, ·1996; See further Spencer and Pod more, 1982; Jack 
and Jack, 1985; Menkei-Meadow, 1985,1989,1991, 1995; Mossman, 
1988, 1992; Sommerlad, 1998, 1999; McGiynn, 1998; Kay and Brockman, 
2000; Schultz and Shaw, 2003). Within such a masculine culture, family 
2 For a further, more detailed discussion of International research findings related to the status of 
women lawyers, see chapter 3, section V. 
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roles must remain invisible. A point is made that women have to prove 
commitment by working longer and harder, and that feminine ways of 
participation are not welcome. 
On the other hand, the masculinity of the legal world makes it very hard for 
women and other oppressed groups to instil alternative values into the 
legal system. This, in turn, raises the issue of whether professional context 
could do away with women's differences completely. lt might be the case 
that once women enter into the profession, they have already assimilated 
its strong masculine culture through legal education and professional 
socialisation. The following quote by Menkei-Meadow highlights this point: 
" .... Many of us feel the differences everyday. What we deplore is when they 
are used to oppress or disempower us or when they are used as immutable 
stereotypes that prevent recognition of individual variations. We do not yet 
know how many differences will disappear into a world socially and legally 
constructed so that gender is not a basis for domination. My point of view is 
that while we are observing the differences we might ask if we have 
something to learn from them. Whether or not the different voice Is 
gendered, we might look at how our legal system might take account of a few 
more voices" (Menkei-Meadow in Barnett 1997, first published 1985: 203). 
d Q Updating the theoretical debate 
A few years later, in 1995, aided by a longer historical perspective and a 
stronger and more sophisticated theoretical background, Menkei-Meadow 
attempted a new look at this issue of a feminine ethic of care in lawyering 
and told us how she had come to realise that the matter was much more 
complex than she once thought (Menkei-Meadow, 1995: 25). In spite of 
this, she expresses that she still imagines an alternative model of the legal 
profession allowing for the possibility that women inhabit the role of the 
lawyer more comfortably. This model would be more cooperative, 
contextualised, less rule-bound, more responsive to others, more 
conscious of socially just ends and able to incorporate women's 
conception of psycho-social health and family balance (Menkei-Meadow, 
1995: 47). 
The basic difference from her earlier work derives from the post-modern 
premise that we cannot make claims for women based on a universalistic 
attribution of generalised characteristics of womanhood. Therefore, room 
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should be made for diversity in terms of the identity of women lawyers. 
(Carrie Menkei-Meadow, 1995: 47). Additionally, she now asserts that . 
women are neither the only repositories of alternative values nor the only 
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source of change, and comes to the conclusion that the "ethic of care" in 
law is a complicated matter that could be studied irrespective of its 
connection to gender. Moreover, she suggests it would be most beneficial 
to the quality of legal thinking and practice if other excluded groups 
besides women were admitted (Menkei-Meadow, 1995: 38). Still, Menkei-
Meadow values the promise of an inclusive profession that allows for 
women and other marginal groups to express values different from the 
dominant ones and still be accepted within the profession. She also 
persists in her view that care is gendered in our culture, and will continue 
to be expressed in the law and legal ethics by women and other 
subordinated people (Menkei-Meadow, 1995: 27). 
Menkei-Meadow's later work also insists on the fact that women's thinking 
of legal categories in different ways does not require adherence to an 
essentialist standpoint. She argues that, if only a few women do bring 
about a shift in the way we think about law, one can still say that women 
have made a special contribution to both the theory and the practice of 
law. In terms of the causes for women's preference for the ethic of care, 
she opts for a social explanation. She points to the effects of early family 
socialisation, and to later forms of social and institutional socialisation, like 
school, peers, the media and professional context, all of which impose 
gender stereotypes on children and adults with respect to how they should 
be and behave. 
Menkei-Meadow also goes through existing research in order to trace the 
ethic of care in women's lawyering. Her conclusion is that research results 
are inconclusive. Some studies show no connection between lawyering 
style and gender, while in other cases they substantiate the claim that 
women prefer less confrontational styles for the resolution of legal 
conflicts. As an example of this, she considers the case of sociologist 
Fuchs Epstein who, after a lifetime studying women lawyers, reached the 
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conclusion that "difference is in the eyes of the beholder", in that those 
wanting to find difference will find it, while those wanting to find equality 
between men and women also will. Moreover, Fuchs Epstein sustains that 
there is more variation in lawyering orientations inside each gender.than 
between genders (Fuchs Epstein, 1988: 72-98, cited in Menkei-Meadow, 
1995: 35). 
In spite of these findings, and facing at the fact that quantitative 
feminisation has not brought about a change in gendered practices and 
culture within the profession, legal scholars have continued to work on the 
issue of the difference women could make to the legal system. A very 
interesting, recently published collection of writings on the issue by 
Schultz and Shaw (2003) stands as a very good and comprehensive 
example of this line of work3• In the same way as the later Menkei-
Meadow, contributors to the collection, aware of the current debate within 
feminist legal theory, acknowledge the theoretical problems involved in the 
subject matter and take the anti-essentialist critique seriously. Thus they 
consider the issue in a renewed light, bringing more complexity and 
caution into their work. With different results, they all engage into an 
enquiry that incorporates new variables and considers different social 
forces besides gender. They tend to set up their research projects in 
specific environments and search for results that are applicable to 
particular contexts. Their enquiry into the changes women could bring into 
the legal system is more sceptical and cautious with respect to the care 
orientation in lawyering and considers many other aspects with reference 
to women's impact on the legal profession (Shultz, 2003: liv-lvii and 307-
318, Bothelho Junqueira, 2003: 437-450; Felstiner, 2003: 23-30; Boigeol, 
2003: 415-416; Sommerlad, 191-218; Hunter, 2003: 103-120; Mather, 
2003: 38-45 ). In the light of these articles, the effects of women's 
increased numbers in the legal profession remain contentious in terms of 
making a distinctive contribution to the legal system. In the introduction to 
the collection, Schultz concludes that women lawyers (2003: lix) 
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" ... have at least succeeded in softening the rigid contours of the life model 
of the male breadwinner and in bringing about a flexibilisation of workplace 
structures. And there Is an undeniable fact: women have changed the very 
tool of lawyer's work - they have changed the law. They have enforced 
legislative measures which take Into account modern notions of equality, 
equal rights and (now) equal standing and have created the legislative base 
for women's participation in all social functions and in the exercise of power." 
(Schultz, 2003: lix) 
In fact, as more women come to occupy positions of power in the public 
sphere as decision and policy makers, more and more emphasis has 
been laid on the fact that women should be represented in positions of 
power both on grounds of fairness and for the special capacities they 
could bring to public office (Malleson, 2003:15-21; Hale: 2001: 493-504; 
L'Heureux-Dube,2001: 15-30) Various authors have shown special 
interest in exploring their characteristic forms of participation -if any- and 
its consequences (Sherry, 1986; Martin, 1993; Davis, 2003; Alien and 
Wall, 2003; Davis, Haire and Songer 1993; Graycar, 1998; Boigeol, 2003; 
Bothelo Junqueira, 2003). As members of one of the branches of 
government, women in parliaments and in the judiciary, have not escaped 
this trend. The next section explores the relationships between gender 
and the activity of judging. 
2 a The impact of more women in the judiciary 
a a Introduction 
Questions similar to those raised above for the case of women lawyers 
have been posited for the case of women judges, namely whether women 
judges bring a different perspective to their professional tasks and 
whether the presence of women makes a difference to the administration 
of justice .. In various countries, the recent increase in the number of 
women judges, above 'token' numbers, justifies the theoretical enquiry by 
feminist scholars into the impact of more women judges on the profession 
and facilitates empirical research studies on gender differences in judging 
(Sherry, 1986; Martin, 1993; Davis, 1993; Alien and Wall, 1993; Davis, 
3 The book also brings a collection of articles from different countries that present a statistical 
description of the situation of women in the law. 
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Haire and Songer, 1993; Graycar, 1998; Boigeol, 2003; Bothelo Junqueira, 
2003). 
As McGiynn (1999: 95) has noted, the analysis can be broken down into 
two different themes. One has to do with the impact of the entry of women 
judges in large numbers in the legal profession. The other relates to the 
perspectives they might bring to bear on their roles as members of the 
judiciary .. 
Closely related to the issue regarding the potential impact of more women 
judges is a general consensus on the desirability of an increased number 
of women in the judiciary. This interest has been substantiated on different 
grounds such as democratic legitimacy, fairness, equity, representation, 
responsiveness to diversity, shattering of gender stereotypes and 
openness to different cultures and perspectives. As Malleson (2003: 15-
22) highlights, there is today considerable consensus that these are the 
values inspiring modern democracies. lt is also generally agreed that men 
should not retain a near monopoly of one of the branches of government. 
As such, arguments based on these values have been used to justify 
proactive equal opportunity policies and positive actions aiming at a 
judiciary that reflects the differences existing within society. 
b 0 The advantages of having more women judges 
i R Democratic legitimacy, diversity and cultural representation 
This section covers the various arguments put forward by different authors 
in favour of having more women in the judiciary. There is first a proposition 
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resting on democratic principles such as equality of opportunities and 
fairness. lt is argued that, in a society that purports to be democratic and 
egalitarian, the participation of women and other excluded groups in the 
judiciary should be welcome as a matter of principle (Malleson, 2003: 2 
and 2003a: 175-188; Hale: 2001: 493-504). 
A different type of argument in favour of the increase in the number of 
women judges also connected to democratic legitimacy refers to cultural 
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representation within a diverse society. Various authors have argued 
extensively in favour of a diverse integration of the judiciary and insisted 
that there is a doctrinal justification for the appointment of more women 
and members of minorities to the judiciary (Griffiths, 1977, cited in Wilson, 
1990-1991: 361; Shetreet, 1998: 183). This proposition rests on the 
principle of the "reflective judiciary" which calls for the judiciary to be 
reflective of society. Implied in the argument there is an appreciation of 
diversity and democratic fairness and a recognition that women are an 
excluded group. Consequently, the argument extends to other excluded 
groups. In this context, the process of judicial appointment appears as a 
crucial mechanism capable of ensuring that people from diverse social 
origins gain access to the bench (Malleson, 2003: 15-17 and 2003a: 175-
188; Hale, 2001: 491-492; McGiynn, 1998: 172-193). 
Moreover, senior judges such as Judge Abrahamson (1998: 20.0) in the 
USA and Lady Justice Hale (2001: 499) in the UK have argued that a 
reflective judiciary that includes substantial numbers of women and 
reflects the racial and ethnic diversity of the population is essential to the 
public perception of justice as fair, impartial and representative. In addition 
this would build up public confidence in the judiciary (Malleson, 2003: 20-
21 ). 
Legal scholars have also highlighted the cultural aspects of 
representation, adding a new facet to the democratic representation and 
legitimacy argument; namely, that it is advantageous to welcome the 
voices of the excluded and the different. On those lines, Karst (1988: 
1957 -1958) alerts us to the problems raised by the fact that in 
multicultural, class-divided societies, the judges and those who are judged 
are often acculturated in different environments and, consequently, inhabit 
different communities of meaning. Karst argues that judges, mostly white, 
male and upper class, will most probably have a vision of life quite 
different from that of most of the people being judged, like women, poor 
people, people from other races, ethnicities or religions. Similarly, Minow 
states that " ... the very presence of different voices at the judgement table 
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is important on the context of a participative and democratic vision of 
society and of justice -even if they do not prevail in particular 
circumstances" (cited in Harvison Young, 1998: 351 ). And, in Hale's 
opinion, a system of justice "will be richer for diversity of background and 
life experience" and it "might well be expected to bring about some 
collective change in empathy and understanding for the diverse 
backgrounds, experience and perspectives of those whose cases come 
before them"( Hale, 2001: 504). 
Likewise, Jennifer Nedelsky has advocated a more diverse judiciary as a 
means to expand the judge's individual perspectives. Inspired by the work 
of Hannah Arendt, she conceives of judging as a collective discursive 
process which acquires public validity as it transcends individual 
limitations and enters into an imaginary dialogue with others to win their 
consent. Through this imaginary dialogue with diverse perspectives, the 
judge's own perspective broadens. Thus, she invites judges to adopt the 
perspectives of the "other" in order to deepen and broaden their own 
perspective. She recommends various critical exercises for judges to be 
able to glimpse the perspective of "others", avoid "false impartiality" and 
accept the "other" as "us". The first exercise proposed is to explore one's 
own stereotypes and attitudes towards the "different"; the second is to 
search for differences and celebrate them, constructing new bases for 
connection, and the third is to cherish difference and welcome anomaly, 
trying to understand the self conceptions and perceptions of others, which 
might seem initially strange (cited in Minow, 1987: 79- 81 and in Harvison 
Young, 1997: 348-351; Neldesky, 2003:1-21, originally 1997). 
ii ~ The shattering of gendei" stereotypes 
An additional argument in favour of more women as role models in 
authoritative positions stems from the recognition that women are an 
excluded group. Sherry states that the sole presence of women judges 
occupying authoritative positions will shatter the stereotypes about 
women's social roles and make it easier for other women to follow suit 
(Sherry, 1986: 160). Referring to the symbolic role of more women in 
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authoritative positions, Justice Abrahamson (1998: 199) has rightly 
suggested: 
"As pioneering women in the field, women lawyers and judges challenge the 
conventions that for so long defined 'lawyer' and 'judge' as male. The mere 
presence of women conveys the message that women can be an important 
part of the legal profession and government" (Abrahamson, 1998: 199). 
In the context of a society where women occupy senior positions in the 
public realm, children will be socialised with the knowledge and 
expectation that both men and women are capable of developing 
prestigious, empowering careers and women lawyers will probably feel 
more comfortable within a woman-friendly environment. This, in turn, will 
encourage the entry of more women to the legal system (McGiynn, 1999: 
98; Durham, 1998: 218). 
This is, of course, relevant to most men-dominated fields, but especially 
important for the legal field, with its impervious masculine character and, 
in particular, for the judiciary since, even in countries where the proportion 
of women judges is quite high, most of them are situated at the base of 
the judicial hierarchy and only very few reach the top of the pyramid. 
Without dismissing the symbolic benefits of having women in senior and 
authoritative positions within the judiciary, it must be pointed out that 
having one token woman at the Supreme Court is far from sufficient. 
Substantive numbers of women must reach top positions within the 
judiciary if gender representation is to be achieved4• 
c ~ 'fhe differrence women judges could make to the adlmonlstration of 
justice 
u ~ CarD women effect changes wottlhlnn tlhle ju.ndUcoall'y? 
The last section discussed the reasons for the desirability of having more 
women judges. The more institutional aspects related to democratic 
representation and legitimacy were examined first. The next section deals 
with the difference women judges could make to the legal system. As 
4 This is particularly relevant with reference to equal opportunity policies where, of course, the 
quota must be seen as a floor and not as a ceiling. 
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McGiynn (1999:1 00) has noted, this discussion entails the consideration 
of other topics that were examined extensively in previous sections on 
difference theories. The issues concerned were whether it could be said 
that women reason differently from men, whether it is true that all women 
are different from all men, and how gender and other aspects of identity, 
such as class, race or sexual orientation might affect judging. 
Since these points were discussed at length above5, in this section I will 
just state that, in my view, posing the question of whether women bring 
any differences to the judiciary does not imply that all women reason in 
the same manner, nor does it overlook differences among women. In spite 
of the differences existing among them, women whose social and ethnic 
identities differ widely, do nevertheless share a number of experiences. 
While allowing for individual variations due to other aspects of identity, 
commonalities may have a potential to foster certain general tendencies 
on the way women may approach judging. Although a more diverse 
judiciary would be highly desirable, it must be remembered that, since the 
role of the judge implies holding academic qualifications, expert 
knowledge and work experience, judges are mainly recruited among elite 
groups belonging to the upper and middle classes that, in most societies, 
are quite homogeneous both in terms of class and race. 
The difference women judges could bring to judging is a very complex 
issue that has given rise to a heated debate. The argument that justifies 
enquiring into the impact of more women judges on the bench (Wilson, 
1990) relates to the understanding that the application of the law is not· 
mechanical, but implies an interpretation on the part of the judge. Clearly, 
when judges come to the bench, they bring with them their own 
perspectives and life experiences {Kennedy, 1997; Resnick, 1988: 1926). 
Thus, interpretation is mediated by the judge's understanding of the law, 
his/her appraisal of the facts .brought before him/her, his/her biography 
and worldview. Considering that women's lives and experiences are, in 
many ways, very different from men's, it seems plausible that these 
6 This chapter considers such issues in depth in section 11 and Ill, above. 
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different life experiences influence the way women judges interpret the 
law, reach their decisions and exercise their professional activities. 
Gilligan's work, combined with that of other authors within the difference 
paradigm in feminist jurisprudence, provides the basis for a theory stating 
that the presence of women judges may bring different perspectives to the 
judiciary, particularly in terms of infusing the values of care and 
connection, presumed as more typical. of the ways of women, with some 
potential to promote changes in the legal system. Moreover, women's 
different life experiences could shape not merely the way they interpret 
the law and reach their decisions but also their working styles. 
Three basic aspects dominate the debate around women's different voice 
of care in judging. The first relates to the very existence of the different 
voice and its content. The second has to do with the likelihood that women 
judges could bring their supposed caring tendencies into their activities 
and whether this different perspective has the capacity to effect changes 
within the judiciary. The third relates to the challenges a feminist approach 
would pose to the traditional masculine ethic of the profession and to the 
ways this different voice in judgement relates to impartiality as a universal 
aspiration for judges. 
Various authors have developed on Gilligan's argument further to reflect 
upon the relationship between gender and the activity of judging and on 
how the alleged perspective of women could manifest itself in judging. 
Their argument proceeds from the assertion that, because the law has 
been so thoroughly pervaded by the masculine perspective, an approach 
to legal decision-making based on separation, autonomy, individual rights, 
freedom from interference, procedural fairness and concern for correctly 
applying the appropriate legal rules has prevailed. In contrast, the different 
feminine voice in judging would speak about connection, care, response 
to needs, substantive fairness, communitarian values and context. 
Along the same lines, drawing on Gilligan's work and on political 
philosophy, Sherry (1988: 543-615) relates a feminine perspective in 
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jurisprudence to the classical republican tradition in political philosophy. In 
contrast to the modern paradigm, which is masculine, liberal, 
individualistic, atomistic, non-teleological, and rule- based, the classical 
model is communitarian, holistic, teleological, contextual and more 
consistent with the female way of moral reasoning (Sherry, 1988: 579). 
The author identified the characteristics of a feminine jurisprudence -one 
that emphasises connection in contrast to autonomy, context as opposed 
to fixed rules, and responsibility in contrast to rights (Sherry, 1988: 579). In 
her view, a feminine jurisprudence encompasses aspects of personality 
and relationship that are independent from political views -whether liberal 
or communitarian/feminist (Sherry, 198.8: 583). To her, the influx of large 
numbers of women into the legal system might, at least, contribute to alter 
the tensions between the two paradigms. 
From this perspective, the entry of more women judges into the legal 
system in considerable numbers would be advantageous in terms of 
introducing the values of care and connection. Thus, for instance, in 
Caring for Justice, West (1997: 88-93) argues for an integration of care 
and justice into judicial decisions. West advocates the reconceptualisation 
of legal justice to include both the principles of the ethics of care and the 
ethics of justice, two aspects that she sees as mutually dependent. She 
appropriately suggests that judicial decisions will not be just if they are not 
caring and will not be caring if they are not just (West: 1997: 88). 
In addition, women judges' potential contributions to the judiciary could 
manifest themselves both in style -how they do things- and in substance -
what they do- (Hale (2001: 498). I find this distinction most useful for 
purposes of orienting future research, since it facilitates the identification 
of women's possible contributions to the judiciary beyond those that could 
manifest themselves in their judgements. Women judges might, for 
example, promote changes in the procedures to be followed, which might 
make a difference to the service of justice without necessarily implying a 
different outcome to their judgements. A care-oriented judge might, for 
instance, make a point of creating the conditions that would make those 
67 
who come to court feel at ease with the system and thus improve the 
administration of justice, without changing the criteria inspiring his/her final 
decisions. 
The problem seems to be that the impervious masculine character of law 
views all deviation whatever outside the framework of law as illegitimate 
(Sherry, 1988; West, 1986, 1997and Resnick, 1988). Taking this into 
account, it makes sense to wonder whether legal education, with its strong 
masculine bias does not blur these supposedly feminine characteristics. 
Without completely ruling out the possibility that women judges could 
make a difference to the administration of justice, Malleson (2003: 13-15) 
expresses strategic concerns with respect to founding the argument in 
favour of more women in the judiciary on the difference they might make 
in terms of improving the judge's decision-making. Malleson rightly alerts 
us against the possibility that the basic argument in favour of gender 
equality could be undermined in the event that gender difference in the 
judges' decision-making might not emerge from the observation of judges' 
decisions. She thus relates the present discussion to the previous debate 
on the desirability of having more women judges. 
In addition, it has been suggested that, apart from bringing a perspective 
of care and connection to the judiciary, feminist women judges might, 
through their activity, strive for the advancement of women in general 
(Bothelho 1995:5,2003: 446-449). Along those lines, Wilson (1990-1991: 
364-371) sustains that, while there are whole areas of the law such as 
corporative, commercial and property law on which there is no feminine 
perspective, there are other areas of the law that further impinge on 
women's lives where the masculine perspective sets the rules. I am· 
specifically thinking of tort law, criminal law and family law where the 
masculine bias bears such force that judicial revision from a feminist 
perspective should be given serious thought. I think Wilson is right in that 
it is in those areas where women could make and have in fact already 
made a special contribution. Legal matters such as those involved in 
sexual discrimination, domestic violence; rapo, sexual abuse, 
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pornography, sexual offences and custody, alimony and property issues in 
divorce cases are just some cases in point. 
In fact, since equality is one of the basic values of democracy and the 
most important constitutional principle in democratic nations, it would be 
legitimate for democratic judges to strive for equality in every respect, not 
just in terms of gender. The problem with reference to gender inequality is 
that, due to its lack of visibility, many women judges are not aware of it. lt 
must be noted that only a few of the women appointed to the bench are 
feminists. This suggests that it it is not enough to appoint more women to 
the bench. As Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dube (2001: 30) has 
convincingly argued: "What is needed is a change of attitudes, not just a 
change in chromosomes". 
Many senior judges such as Madam Judge. Wilson, Justice Abrahamson, 
Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube and Lady Justice Hale have tried hard 
to promote changes in the attitudes of women judges in this respect. 
Justice Abrahamson (1998: 211}, for instance, upholds that the time has 
come for each woman judge to play her role in infusing feminist 
jurisprudence into the judicial system, positing alternative solutions to 
procedure and evidence that take into account how gender impinges in 
the process of litigation and hence contribute to the construction of a fair 
society, improving all people's access to the system. Similarly, Judge 
Gladys Kessler, president of the American National Association of Women 
Judges has drawn our attention to the collective attitudes adopted by 
members of the NAWJ towards acts of discrimination. She emphasises 
that individual judges who are subject to such great restrictions would 
never have been able to take such stances without being accused of 
judicial activism (cited in Resnick, 1988: 1931 ). 
Feminist legal academics have, however, been more sceptical about the 
actual capacity of women judges to effect changes within such a 
masculine institution. Authors such as Berns (1999) and Rackley (2002) 
have contested the assertion that women judges might bring the ethic of 
care into judging and thus make a difference to the administration of 
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justice. Their argument is that, even if we came to the conclusion th~t 
women judges, with their different gender identities and social experiences 
have actually something to offer to the legal system, there remains the 
uncertainty as to whether they will be capable of promoting change in 
such a masculine branch of the legal profession (Berns, 1999: 3; Rackley, 
2002: 611; Hale, 2001: 501; Malleson, 2003: 13-14). Furthermore, it has 
been argued that expecting women judges to effect such a difference 
might be too much of a burden upon them (Hale, 2000: 501). 
Thus, Berns {1999: 3) wonders about the very possibility that women as 
non-subjects could speak the law in a different voice. She doubts that a 
negation can speak at all and that she can speak a voice that denies hers. 
She distrusts that a woman judge can speak with authority and power as 
she wonders what happens to subjectivity when the subject is a judge, 
and reframes the question: 
"What it might mean to be a woman and to act as a judge and as a woman in 
a world in which woman remains a negation- now that is a topic worth 
pursuing". (Berns, 1999: 3) 
To Rackley, the woman judge is entrapped in a paradox. Given the 
difficulties involved in being recognised as a judge and at the same time 
remaining loyal to her own identity, the author fears that a woman judge is 
a contradiction in terms. As the traditional model of the judge is male, in 
order to become a judge she might have to forego her own voice and 
adopt that of a man, leaving the non conforming woman judge with the 
role of the other (Rackley, 2002: 603-624). In Rackley's view, the woman 
judge becomes a paradox in need to shed her difference and, at the same 
time, conform to the prevailing image of the judge. On the one hand, the 
presence of women is seen as desirable to bring their perspectives to the 
bench and making the judiciary more representative. On the other hand, 
as the judge is supposed to be without perspective, women's presence 
becomes pointless. 
Both Berns and Rackley emphasise the difficulties women judges might 
~mcounter to shed their alleged difference amidst a masculine institution. 
Still, Rackley is persuasive when she invests women judges with the role 
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of disrupting the current culture within the law. According to Rackley 
(2002: 621-625), because of her otherness, the woman judge cannot help 
but disrupting and exposing the previous homogeneity and uniformity of 
the bench, showing the unavoidable gender dimension inherent to judging. 
From the tensions originated in her otherness, she can start a movement 
towards challenging the paradox involved in the construction of the 
woman judge as the other, imagine counter images of the judge that 
women and other underrepresented groups can comfortably occupy. 
Rackley convincingly suggests that through her corporeality and the 
expression of the contradictions implied in being a woman and a judge, 
the woman judge has the capacity to question the prevailing model of the 
judge and project alternative images. In spite of its strong masculine 
culture, the judiciary, like any other social institution, is neither completely 
monolithic nor immutable. Some of its members can accord different 
meanings to the role of the judge, and have different visions with respect 
to the activity of judging, sometimes in contradiction with the prevailing 
culture. 
To me, the expression of these contradictions has the potential to disrupt 
the conventional image of the judge and propose alternative stances. As 
suggested by Needelsky (2003: 1-21, originally 1997), such a process 
might initiate a discussion encompassing both competing views on the 
role played by judges and of different interpretations of the law, and has 
potential to bring about institutional change. As an illustration of the latter 
point, let me bring into the discussion an event narrated by Justice L' 
Heureux-Dube (2001: 24-27), a member of the Canadian Supreme Court. 
Her narrative provides an example of the sort of change a senior woman 
judge in a position of authority can contribute to the system by resisting 
claims of partiality for not fitting the white male paradigm. 
In Outsiders at the Bench, Madam L' Heureux-Dube (2001) gives an 
account of a controversy in which she was involved with a member of the 
Alberta Court of Appeal over "implied consent" in a sexual assault case6 • 
6 Re. Ewanchuck (1999) I.S.C.R.330 (cited in L'Heureuz-Dube, 2001: 24). 
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The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously overruled a split decision of 
the Alberta Court of Appeal authored by Justice McCiung. The lower court 
judge had argued that, under Canadian Law, implied consent constituted 
a defence in a case of sexual assault. The contents of Justice McCiung' s 
decision, highly coloured "by myths and stereotypes" led Madam Justice L' 
Heureux-Dube to write separately (L'Heureux-Dube, 2001: 25), exposing 
the lower court judge's sex stereotypes. Feeling personally offended by 
Madam Justice L' Heureux-Dube, Justice McCiung wrote a letter of 
complaint to the National Post, a local newspaper. This debate 
transcended the Courts to reach the media, through which other members 
of the Canadian legal community became involved in the issue. Even an 
organisation of conservative women and an American judge joined in the 
argument . 'Real Women' accused Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dube 
before the Canadian Judicial Council of using the Supreme Court of 
Canada to promote her own feminist bias, and Judge Kozinsky from 
California came to her defence. Consequently, the case and the debate 
that followed acquired public status. The final outcome of the ordeal was 
that Justice McCiung was reprimanded by the Judicial Council due to his 
extra judicial statements to the press and Real Women's complaint 
against Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dube was dismissed. The interest of 
the above case lies in the fact that it shows the difference a feminist judge 
can make in terms of the outcome of a specific judicial case. Moreover, 
it shows the impact that a discussion taking place in a court can make on 
the public debate. When the issue in question relates to gender inequality, 
it contributes to render women's subordination more visible to society. 
In the next section I move on to consider the challenges posed by the 
assertion that women could bring different perspectives to the activity of 
judging poses to conventional theories of adjudication, in particular to 
impartiality and objectivity as universal aspirations for judges. 
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In this section I discuss the interplay of central aspects of the role of the 
judge such as impartiality, neutrality and objectivity as seemingly opposed 
to care, connection and bias. 
Authors such as Resnik (1988: 1885-1944) have reflected upon the 
possible convergences between the language of judges within the liberal 
tradition and the language of feminism. In her view, the feminist stress on 
connection and the judicial aspiration for disengagement seem to preclude 
any possibility of convergence. Often used interchangeably when related 
to judging, terms such as disinterest, neutrality, disengagement, 
impartiality, objectivity and independence are words that denote a deep 
suspicion of relationship. In her analysis, Resnick draws our attention to 
the fact that other cultures do not require such qualities from their judges, 
and that the western legal tradition may be impoverished by the absence 
of feminist insights. Her opinion is that: 
" ... we could demand that those who hold power do so with attentive love, 
with care, with nurturance, with a responsible sense of one's self as 
connected to and dependent upon those who are being judged" (Resnick, 
1988: 1922). 
Still, Resnick argues that adding a bit of connection and responsible 
nurturance into the pot of disengagement and stirring is far from the 
transformative response feminist insights pose. In her view, what is 
needed is a revised list of judges' qualities. This involves much reflection 
on the desirability of such qualities as connection and care on the part of 
judges and the consequences to which these might lead; on whether 
these qualities are in need of contextual examination and finally, on 
whether all bias and interest should be disqualifying. Feminist revision 
can, according to her, lead to the recognition of the "tugs, the pulls and the 
burdens of judging", and serve as an antidote to the culture of hierarchy 
and objectivity prevailing within the profession (Resnik, 1988: 1926). 
Accordingly, the author advocates the consideration of the subjective 
elements in judging: 
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"Perhaps if we learned to speak of judging as a terrible and terrifying job, as 
a burden of inflicting pain by virtue of judgement, we might develop modes of 
resolution different from those so readily accepted today. We might seek 
more communal modes of decision making, insisting upon groups of two, 
three or more judges to share the honour, the obligation, and the pain of 
decision. When we recognise the burden and the pain of judging, we might 
uncover one element of adjudication that exists but is relatively 
unacknowledged. Much "adjudication" is not a win/lose proposition but an 
effort at adjudication with judges and juries responding to both sides, but 
currently without vocabulary or permission to express empathy to competing 
claims. Many verdicts allocate victory to both sides, but our tradition is to 
mask that allocation rather than to endorse the practice of seeing multiple 
claims of right. Feminism can help bolster our trust in practice and permit us 
to remove the facades of total victory and defeat." (Resnik, 1988: 1926) 
Resnick's (1988: 1928-1940) view is that feminist theories on judging mu;;t 
build from the practice of judging. She draws our attention to the work of 
feminist judges who, like Judge Abrahamson, acknowledge that, when 
they come to the bench, judges bring with them their life experiences, 
which affect their views of life and law. Judge Abrahamson values the 
judge's capacity for empathy, and encourages other judges to participate 
in community activities and visit other Courts unrobed, in order to get the 
feeling of what ordinary people experience when they have to appear 
before the Court (in Resnick, 1988: 1928-1929). 
The interplay of central elements of the judicial role such as objectivity, 
neutrality and impartiality on the one hand, and empathy and bias on the 
other is most crucial to the ongoing discussion (Cain, 1988: 1946). lt 
entails a consideration of women judges' loyalties towards the law and 
towards their gender, and of whether these loyalties may compete with 
each other (Hale, 2000: 499). The following extract reyeals the complexity 
of the issue: 
"We want our judges to be affectionate, but we do not want our judges to be 
prejudiced. We want to have the good bias but not the bad one. Then, if 
there is good and bad bias, there is the difficulty to distinguish between the 
two, plus the difficulty to maintain the good bias (good connection) in the 
process of judging". (Cain, 1988: 1946). 
The idea that impartiality does not mean that the judge has no prior 
conceptions or experience is not a feminist invention. lt has been 
circulating for some time now, starting with the realists in the 1920's and 
following the Critical Legal Studies in the 1960's (L'Heureux-Dube, 2001: 
28). Thus, Lord MacMillan remarked: 
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"Impartiality is not easy of attainment. For a judge does not shed the 
attributes of common humanity when he (sic) assumes the ermine: The 
ordinary human mind is a mass of prepossessions inherited and acquired, 
often none less dangerous because unrecognised by the possessor". 
(MacMillan cited in Wilson, 1990-91: 361 and in Harvison Young, 1997: 
346) 
Along the same lines, as early as 1943, in one of his decisions while in the 
Second Circuif, Frank commented: 
"If however, bias and 'partiality' be defined to mean the total absence of 
preconceptions in the mind of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial 
and no one ever wiii ... Only death yields complete dispassionateness, for 
such dispassionateness signifies complete indifference" (Frank, 1943, cited 
in L'Heureux-Dube, 2001: 27) 
Cain has argued that, together with their legal knowledge, judges naturally 
bring with them a point of view to the courtroom (Cain, 1988: 1946). Thus, 
when considering neutrality and disengagement as aspirations for 
American judges, Cain presumes that the expectation is not that judges 
should act like robots, with no particular point of view, or that they should 
cast aside their life experiences during the entire process of judging. To 
her, the answer is rather that the legal system might change, so as to 
include more judges with a broad life experience, judges who mix with the 
people, identify with them, with a true ability to listen with connection to 
people's stories, without prejudging, before they engage in the necessary 
separation that judging involves (Cain, 1988: 1946). 
A similar point is put forward by Kenneth Karst (1988: 1966-1967), who 
speaks of the judge's double capacity for empathy and principled 
detachment as "essential elements of the successful practice of the 
judicial art". Within the framework of a multiracial, multiethnic nation with a 
constitutional ideal of tolerance for difference, far from seeing empathy 
and impartiality as opposites, he conceives of them as complementary. He 
defines empathy as the readiness to be engaged in the experience of 
others, as the judge's capacity to approach all parties contending positions 
with due consideration, while he conceives of objectivity and impartiality 
not as "devotion to some sel.f-applying mechanism that eliminates 
7 1n re J.P:Linahan, Inc., 138 F2d 650,651-52 (2d Clr.1943). 
75 
judgement from judging", but rather as "an effort to decide from an 
independent standpoint, as opposed to the point of view of one of the 
parties" (Karst, 1988: 1966-1967). The following quotation reveals his 
integrated conception: 
"The same empathy that permits the judge to imagine the parties' 
experiences and thoughts and feelings also underlies his or her capacity for 
principled detachment - that is the only kind of objectivity we can properly 
expect" (Karst, 1988: 1966 -1967). 
In short, as discussed above, the feminist revision of traditional elements 
of the adjudicating role does not relinquish impartiality. Far from posing a 
threat to judicial impartiality, it rather leads to a more encompassing view 
that sees empathy and impartiality as complementary. 
dl ~ CorochJslon 
The above section examined the relationships between gender and the 
activity of judging. I started by reviewing the arguments in favour of having 
more women in the judiciary: democratic legitimacy, equal opportunities, 
representation, diversity and cultural representation. The proposition that 
women judges could bring a difference to the administration of justice was 
analysed together with the challenges posited by feminist insights on 
traditional understandings of judging and women judge's capacity to effect 
changes in the legal system. 
The contribution women judges could make to the administration of justice 
was examined in the light of the very tension between difference and anti-
essentialism underlying the current controversy within legal feminism. As a 
consequence ·of this analysis, I came to the conclusion that, while no 
universal claims should be made in terms of the difference women judges 
can make to the legal system without falling into essentialism, it could at 
least be asserted that the presence of more women judges at the judging 
table serves to disrupt the conventional images of judging within a 
masculine profession. Accordingly, the issue of the effects of the entry of 
women in large numbers to the profession of judging seems well worth 
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investigating, albeit in specific contexts and bringing other variables 
besides gender into the analysis. 
Chapter one aimed at providing the foundations for my research on 
gender differences in the family judiciary of the City of Buenos Aires. 
Given the "spiral relationship" existing between legal practice and legal 
theory (Grant Bowman and Shneider, 1998: 249), the chapter starts with 
an overview of feminist legal theory. In this outline I identified three major 
strands or phases of feminist legal theory: liberal feminism represents the 
first phase; the second phase comprises two different strands, difference 
and dominance theories, and the third phase, characterised by anti-
essentialism, is inspired in the postmodern critique. 
Whereas liberal feminism argued that women and men should be treated 
the same, second phase authors within the difference approach 
emphasise the need to understand the differences between them. 
Dominance theories within the second phase of feminist legal theorising 
focus on the embedded structures of power that make men the norm from 
which difference is constructed and the theories informed by the 
postmodern critique assert that there is no single female category, 
pointing out to the need of looking into the intersections of gender and 
other categories like race and class. 
The latter approaches grew out of the incapacity of the first phase (the 
liberal paradigm) to bring about equality in practice. In particular, second 
phase authors within the difference approach addressed their efforts at 
understanding women's unique experiences of pregnancy and 
motherhood, while second phase writers who favour the dominance 
approach offer a framework to understand the harms of violence against 
women in areas such as domestic violence, rape, sexual harassment and 
pornography. Third phase writers articulate the need to account for the 
wide range of feminist perspectives. 
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Because of its relevance for the current research, cultural feminism, an 
exponent of difference theory, was situated within these strands of 
feminist legal theory, and within the prevailing debate within legal 
feminism. Cultural feminism revalues "the ethic of care" as expressed 
mainly in women's narratives relative to their moral choices. Cultural 
feminists recommend that this ethic based on care and connection, 
developed through women's involvement with the private sphere of 
society, be transposed into the public world to complement the prevalent 
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masculine ethic of rights or justice characteristic of the legal system. In 
spite of the fact that it has given rise to much criticism, it has made a 
tremendous impact on feminist thinking on the law. 
The work of scholars who applied the ethic of care to the study of the legal 
profession was then examined, as exemplified by the writings of authors 
such as Menkei-Meadow (1988, 1995), Sherry (1986), Bender (1992) and 
West (1988, 1997) among others, who drew on cultural feminism to reflect 
upon women's potential to bring the values of care and connection to the 
legal profession, so deeply infused with the masculine values of individual 
rights, autonomy and objectivity. 
The last part of the chapter considers the arguments in favour of having 
more women in the judiciary and examines the ways in which different 
authors have treated the potential impact of the increasing number of 
women in the judiciary, a men-dominated branch of the profession. lt 
introduces the main themes around which the issue revolves, the 
relationships between gender and judging ; the very existence of the 
different voice of care in the activity of judging and its content; the main 
challenges feminism poses to traditional conceptions of the judge and the 
capacity of this allegedly different perspective of effecting changes within 
such a masculine area of the profession. 
The above analysis aimed at providing a theoretical framework for my 
research on gender differences in the family Jaw judiciary of the city of 
Buenos Aires. The current theoretical discussion of the issue of gender 
differences within the legal profession was examined and the literature 
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relative to the particularities of women's participation within the legal 
profession was reviewed against the background of feminist legal theory. 
This aided me to identify the many theoretical problems to be addressed 
in this endeavour. Nevertheless, the personal interest that originally 
inspired the choice of my research topic remains vivid and the 
perspectives women bring to the activity of judging seem to me worth 
exploring and theoretically sound. Having understood that there is no 
universal answer to this question, and that each situation justifies an 
enquiry of its own with its corresponding conclusions, I have set myself the 
task to explore gender differences among the judges of the Family Law 
Courts of the city of Buenos Aires. 
In the next chapter I trace and describe the development of the process of 
women's entry into the professions in Argentina, looking particularly into 
the legal profession -women lawyers and judges. I situate women's entry 
into public life as one aspect of the general process of institutional 
modernisation of Argentine society, examining, among other trends, the 
evolution of women's situation, their public participation, entry into higher 
education and the characteristics of the country's legal and political 
system. In the third chapter, I trace the entry of women into the legal 
profession and describe their participation in its different areas. To know 
the situation of women in the legal professions and the options open to 
them seems an essential step to be fulfilled before exploring gender 
differences in the way family judges approach their work and the possible 
effects that the increasing number of women judges may have in the 
family judiciary of the City of Buenos Aires. 
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Chapter 2 ~Women's entry o~n~o ttoe pro~essocms am:llpiUlblic me urn 
Argentina 
I ~ Introduction 
Chapter presented an analysis and discussion of the theoretical 
framework to be used in this research. Chapter 11 provides the socio-
historical background necessary to understand women's entry into the 
legal profession and, as such, Jays the foundations for my analysis of the 
Family Law judiciary. 
This chapter gathers information coming from various sources with the 
purpose of tracing and describing the process leading to women's access 
to the professions in Argentina. As such, it sketches the evolution of 
women's growing participation in higher education and in public life, their 
general situation in the context. of the country's socio-legal and political 
system, and the characteristics of women's social and political 
participation within the family and in public life, including the women's 
movement. 
Section 11 situates women's entry into public life as one aspect of the 
general process of institutional modernisation of Argentine society and 
examines the evolution of women's participation in public life. Section Ill 
provides an overview of the current legislation regarding women, children 
and the family. Section IV traces recent developments within the family in 
Argentina. Section V looks at women's process of incorporation into higher 
education in general and into law in particular. 
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1- The lhostoll'ica~, social andl lega~ baclkgrrouund qo Uie en~ry of women 
onto tlhle professions in Argentina 
In this section I refer briefly to the process of incorporation of women into 
Argentina's public life during the 20th. century as the backdrop against 
which I will then trace the progress of women within the legal profession. 
From its very beginnings in the 1?'h century, the university was the site for 
the education of the ruling elites. lt was only in 1918 that this elitist 
tendency started to shift under the influence of secular education and the 
pressure exerted by emerging middle class groups that gave rise to a 
movement aiming to reform and democratise higher education. If 
anything, what this movement showed was that obtaining a university 
education and credentials already constituted an inescapable step along 
the road leading to social and political power. 
Unlike what happened with primary and secondary education, the 
conquest of higher education for Argentine women was a difficult and slow 
process, which started later, towards the end of the 19th century. Only in 
1889 did the first woman medical doctor graduate from university: her 
name was Cecilia Greerson. Her entry to university met great resistance 
among her men peers and she had to wait for three more years after her 
medical education was over to obtain her degree, and to be allowed to 
practice as a doctor (Maglie and Frinchaboy, 1988: 29). The first women 
lawyers -Celia Tapia and Marfa Angelica Barreda- who obtained their 
degrees in 191 0 had to overcome similar obstacles to practise their 
profession. 
Women's marginal participation in the process of incorporation into higher 
education can be explained in terms of the prevailing general social 
context of female exclusion at the time. Until quite well into the 
1 For references on the women's movement In Argentina published in English,see: Pescatello. 
1972; C. Jeffress Little, 1978: 235-253; Feijoo and Gogna, 1990; Feijoo, 1993; Jaquette J. and S. 
Wolchlk Eds, 1998, Ardittl, 1999. 
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201h·century, women were denied civil and political rights, long awarded to 
men. Until 1926, the Civil Code considered women to be incompetent, 
together with children and the mentally handicapped. Living first under the 
guardianship of their fathers and later of their husbands, married women 
were not allowed to inherit, or manage their own property; they could not 
enter into professions, legally binding contracts or join civil organisations 
without permission and were denied legal standing. They were banned 
from participating in elections. Married women only acquired civil rights 
forty years later. Women had to wait until 1947 in order to obtain the right 
to vote, since the 1912 Law of Universal Vote", paradoxically, did not 
include them. 
The general context of exclusion and subordination of Argentine women at 
the time explains the involvement of these pioneer professional women in 
the struggles for the vindication of the rights of women characteristic of the 
feminist movement at the beginning of the 201h Century (Feijoo, 
1994: 128). The inclusion of a brief consideration of the situation of these 
early forms of women's movement is justified in the belief that they 
constitute an important precedent in terms of the incorporation of 
Argentine women into public life. After a brief comment on the atmosphere 
of the times, my attention turns to the characteristics of Argentine 
women's early forms of public participation. 
a - The evolution of women's situation in Argentina 
I - The participation of pioneer professional women in the early 
feminist movement 
The early and advanced, though scarce2, entry of these pioneer women to 
university in the first years of the 201h century highlighted the socio~legal, 
economic and political contradictions of the actual social situation of 
2 According to the 1914 National Census, among the professionals there were 59 medical doctors 
and 6 lawyers. 
See Henault, 1982: 45. 
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women at the time3• In fact, the vindication of civil rights for women was at 
the heart of the Argentine feminist movement for the first quarter of the 
twentieth century until the reform of the Civil Code in 1926, as was the 
vindication of women's political rights until 1947, when women obtained 
the vote. From 1902 on, numerous law projects were presented proposing 
legal reforms such as divorce and property rights for women4• The history 
of these 50 years of struggle to obtain civil rights, access to higher 
education, entitlement to participate in different economic activities and 
the vote, can, in fact, serve to portray Argentina's transition into modernity. 
At the same time, the sole existence of these few professional women, 
very active within the women's movement, challenged one of the myths 
that sustained the subordination of women in their intellectual inferiority. lt 
also introduced alternative models for the development of women's lives. 
At the beginning of the 20th.century, it is surprising to discover the 
presence of a few women who were so far ahead from the stereotypical 
woman of the times, and so much in tune with the suffragette movement 
in Europe. lt is all the more surprising indeed because these women have 
been kept invisible by traditional historical accounts, to the extent that they 
are unknown even to their own descendants5, who have lost all record of 
their lives (Feij6o, 1978; Henault, 1982; Jeffress, 1978; Barranco, 2002). 
The advanced ideas of these pioneering women can be explained in 
terms of their international connections and their knowledge of French and 
3 The very exceptional case of Julieta Lantieri is paradigmatic of this contradiction. Julieta Lantleri 
was a young feminist medical doctor appointed as associate professor of the Faculty of Mediclfle 
by a foreign professor in 1911. In order to practice as a faculty member, however, she was 
required to hold civic rights. Thus, she asked the government to make an exception and grant her 
Citizenship Papers. Being a woman, she was not supposed to obtain citizenship, but eventually 
she got her papers. Once she obtained citizenship, she developed a strategy to include the 
question of women's political rights into the public debate. Once a citizen, she was elected for 
Congress. After she had her citizenship papers she claimed to be eligible a representative, and, 
although she faced great resistance she would not cease In her attempts to become one. Finally, 
in 1920, long before she could vote, she was elected for congress (Maria del Carmen Feijoo: Las 
Luchas Feminlstas, 1978: 16). 
4 Especially by the Socialist Party, but their proposals were strongly opposed and sidetracked Into 
committees for further consideration. 
5 Barreda was the first Argentine woman lawyer. I approached her niece in order to obtain more 
information about her, and found that she was not aware of the fact that her aunt had been the first 
woman lawyer. 
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English. In fact, they were very well connected internationally, their 
debates paralleled those of the feminists in Europe and the United States, 
a fact that made the Argentine movement more progressive6• For 
instance, Cecilia Greerson, the first woman doctor, who was of British 
descent, used to travel to London to contact the British feminist movement 
and imported both their ideas and tactics into Argentina. She participated 
in the Second International Women's Council Conference in London, 
where she decided to create the Argentine branch of the Council, which 
she did in September 1900 (Feij6o, i 978; Henault, i 982; Jeffress, 1978; 
Barranco, 2002). 
From the very start, however, the .Argentine women who participated 
actively in public life at the beginning of the century were clearly divided 
into two groups: one with a Catholic orientation and a more philanthropic 
agenda, aiming at improving women's and children's life conditions 
without questioning masculine supremacy, and the other, with a clearly 
critical and feminist standing advocating social reform aimed at ending 
women's oppression (Feij6o, i 978; Henault, i 982; Jeffress, 1978; 
Barranco, 2002). 
The differences within the Argentine branch of the International Women's 
Council that ended in the expulsion of Cecilia Greerson from the 
organisation she had created nine years before, and the events around 
the organisation of the Centennial Celebration of Argentina's 
independence in i 910 are paradigmatic of this division. By 1910, 
Greerson objected to the fact that the Argentine Branch of the 
International Women's Council refused to include the universal vote 
among its objectives. The Council was already divided around the issue 
when, in 1910, Greerson publicly declared her adherence to feminism7• 
Her announcement led to an internal crisis that ended with Greerson's 
6 An event that shows how well connected they were with their European counterparts was the 
mockery of elections they organised in 1920, in coincidence with the national elections. The 
mockery was actually a copy of what the Parisian feminists had organised a year before. 
7 She defined as "the evolution of the woman towards superior ideals and her participation In the 
progress of humanity" (Jeffress, 1978: 244) 
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expulsion from the International Women's Council and the creation of a 
new institution. Together with her fellow professional women, Greerson 
created the Feminist Socialist Centre in 191 0 (Feij6o, 1978; Henault, 
1982; Jeffress, 1978; Barranco, 2002). 
As was mentioned above, the first group of the women's movement, 
whose members belonged to the Buenos Aires bourgeoisie, was very 
much influenced by the Catholic Church and oriented towards 
philanthropy. While aimed at promoting improvements in women's life 
situation and education, it did not question male supremacy. Its origins 
could be traced to the early national period when Bernardino Rivadavia, a 
Minister of Government, created the "Society of Beneficence of Buenos 
Aires". In its very long history, the society, established in 1823 and 
disintegrated in 1948, expanded from its original function of creating a 
school system for girls, encompassing the whole spectrum of social 
services for women and children. The "Society of Beneficence" made a 
significant contribution to Argentine society in terms of providing social 
services for the relief of poverty and sickness in a period of rapid 
urbanization and growing immigration. Moreover, it also served as a model 
for many other women charitable groups and as an outlet for the energies 
and social capacities of many non-working educated women. Inspired in 
thinkers such as Alberdi and Sarmiento8, who had drawn on American and 
European modern ideas with respect to the role of women in society and 
the benefits of women's education, these groups and societies had a 
significant and lasting impact well into the period of Argentina's 
modernization (Jeffress Little, 1978: 235-248). Their most salient 
contribution relates to the introduction of "normal"9 (1870) and then 
secondary education (1900) for girls. Both types of education were 
instrumental in terms of raising Argentine girls' educational expectations 
8 Both Alberdl and Sarmiento were thinkers of the '37 generation who eventually became 
presidents of Argentina. They were convinced that women should be educated to acquire the full 
duties of citizenship and thus contribute to societal development. Sarmiento, who was an Inflexible 
advocate of universal and secular education,, firmly believed that intelligent women had a special 
ability to educate young children. · 
9 
"Normal" school trains students to become teachers 
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and in creating the conditions for the later incorporation of women into 
higher education. Moreover, by strongly promoting women's access to 
secondary education, this more conservative strand laid the grounds for 
women's entry into the professions as from the late 1960's and early 
1970's. 
The second group, instead, had a clearly feminist and class position and a 
much stronger appositional standing. lt strongly advocated social reform 
as a means to bring women's oppression to an end. lt was very 111uch 
influenced by socialist and anarchist ideas brought by the strong migratory 
current coming from Europe that Argentina received, over a few decades 
at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay were the Latin American countries where 
feminist ideals and movement were most advanced at the turn and the 
first decade of the century. Although many of these early pioneering 
women came mainly from middle class families, they had strong libertarian 
and socialist ideals and struggled for equal civil and political rights, 
universal vote and full autonomy for women (Feijo6, 1978). 
The Centennial celebrations of Argentine Independence in 191 0 gave 
women's groups the opportunity to publicise women's contributions and a 
time to stress the need to expand education and to reform the Civil Code. 
The celebrations found women divided into two strands. The internal 
division of the early women's movement precluded the possibility of a joint 
women's conference reuniting them both. The result was the simultaneous 
organisation of two conferences: a more conservative women's gathering 
organised by the Argentine Branch of the Woman's Council, and a more 
radical women's meeting, the "International Feminist Congress of 191 0", 
sponsored by the Federation of University Women (Feijo6, 1978; Jeffress, 
1978; Barranco, 2003). 
The content of the discussion at each of the meetings reflected their 
opposing agendas. While the themes of the more conservative 
conference concentrated on women's possible contributions to society, 
they strongly objected to equality between the sexes on the grounds that it 
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might lead to chaos and disruption. They also upheld the belief that 
women's most significant contribution to society should come from civic 
education rather than from political participation on equal grounds with 
their men counterparts. On the other hand, the main focus of the "Feminist 
Congress" was how to achieve sex equality. Examples of recurring themes 
that appeared in the conference presentations were divorce, mixed and 
non-confessional education, joint custody, illegitimate children, the traffic 
of women and prostitution. Labour demands were very important because, 
at the beginning of the century women and children's working conditions 
were very bad. In spite of the prevailing ideology of domesticity, women, 
especially those from the lower classes, joined the labour force quite early 
in Argentina10 (Feijoo, 1978: 20). Among the women who organised the 
congress, there was a constant preoccupation with children's and 
women's health issues related to their workplace as well as prostitution 
and the traffic of women. 
My interest in the Feminist Congress comes precisely from the centrality 
given to legal reforms to improve the situation of women. In spite of the 
fact that there were only two women lawyers11 at the "First International 
Feminine Congress of Argentina"12, the Rights Commission was a very 
popular one. Men and women coming from other disciplines submitted 
interesting papers referring to legal reforms. This showed early feminists' 
strong belief in the power of the law to bring about reforms in the situation 
of women13• 
1
'Women joined the local industries very early, In the late 191h century. With the emergence of 
Buenos Aires as a major trade and commercial canter in the 1880's, women inundated the lower 
echelons of office workers and sales clerks, tolling for long hours and receiving minimal pay and 
few benefits (Jeffress, 1978: 241). The 1914 census showed that women constituted an Important 
(22%) part of the economically active population, 7% of agricultural laborers, 30% of Industrial and 
manual workers, 83% of domestic workers, 7% of commerce workers, 50% of teachers and other 
workers In education, 20% of those professions related to the Arts, 10% of those professionals 
related to the sciences and literature and 5% of public officials. See Marla del Carmen Feljoo, 
1978:20. 
11 They were Barreda, the first Argentine woman lawyer and Paraguayan Serafina Davalos, who 
closed the Congress with her presentation. 
12 These records can be found at the documentation canter of the Allcia Moreau de Justo 
Foundation. 
13 As Cynthla Jeffress put it: 'They put too much faith in the power of law and reforms to change 
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Educated and determined women who, in spite of their middle class 
background, supported socialism and many of the strikes organised by the 
lower classes then created many women organisations. Some of their 
demands were on the feminist agenda until a few years ago. Examples of 
these are the divorce law (passed only in 1986); equality in the workplace; 
maternity leave; the 8 hours' workday; and equal pay for equal work. This 
last demand is still one of the basic claims of the present feminist 
movement in Argentina. 
lt should, however, be emphasised that, although emblematic, these 
pioneer professional women were quite exceptional14• The number of 
professional women would have to wait for a few decades to become 
numerically significant15• 
The feminist movement in Argentina underwent different phases. lt was 
very active in the first decades of the century, focusing in attaining civil 
rights for women. After the new Civil Code was approved in 1926, it went 
then through a long period of stagnation. Again and again the early 
feminist movement for the right to vote met the resistance of the 
Conservative Party. The Socialist Party proved to be a strong ally for the 
feminists, especially from the second decade of the 201h century. Once the 
party got into parliament, with little success, its representatives would 
repeatedly propose laws to grant women civil and political rights. 
Influenced by social and historical circumstances, the movement would 
unfold later in the century. 
age old customs and deep seated psychological attitudes toward women " op cit, 1978: 249. 
14 By 1900 only one woman had enrolled at a university level. In the 1901-1910 period the changes 
were slight, with two or three women at Medical School and no more than seven at the School of 
Architecture. Other schools had even fewer women recruits. Only after 1916 was there a clear 
increase In the number of women in Argentine universities, with 38 women in Medical School a,nd 
more women entering fields such as Law, Pharmacy and Education (Ministerio del Trabajo, Oficlna 
de la Mujer, 1970: 82). 
15 For the Incorporation of women into higher education see section V in this chapter. 
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As a result of the presidential elections of 1946, President Per6n came to 
office and, in September 1947, with a favourable parliamentary situation, 
he granted women the right to vote. Argentina was the 8th country in the 
region to give women the right to vote in national elections16. The strong 
presence of Evita Per6n furthered the process of women's inclusion in the 
political life of the country. Evita created the "feminine strand" ("rama 
femenina") of the "Peronist" party and stimulated women's participation in 
party politics. In 1951, on the occasion of the first presidential elections 
after they had acquired the right to vote, women did very well. There was 
a very good female turnout and a very important number of women were 
elected. Almost 4 million women voted in the national elections. More than 
60% voted for Per6n, women got 6 seats in the Senate and 23 
representatives. In the next two elections, in 1953 and 1955, their 
positions became even stronger, with 8 senators and 37 representatives, 
corresponding to 25 % and 16%, of the Congress respectively. Women 
would not recover this position even at the end of the century when quotas 
were established (Navarro Marisa, 2000). 
These advances ceased when, in 1955, Per6n was overthrown by the 
Armed Forces and the "Peronist" party was proscribed for almost two 
decades, during which democratic rule was frequently interrupted by 
military coups. 
When, the Armed Forces called for elections, in 1958, various political 
parties updated their policy towards women. While they reversed their 
policy of exclusion of women from their lists, they put women in the last 
places within the list, which made it virtually impossible for them to get 
elected. As a result, only 4 women got elected that year. 
Again, when in 1973 the military regime put an end to the proscription of 
the Peronist party, women came back to Parliament, gaining three seats 
16 Actually, in the provinces of Santa Fe and San Juan women participated in local elections well 
before that date. 
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as senators and 20 representatives (Navarro 2000: 12 -14). In spite of 
this, the Peronists followed an erratic policy regarding women. After Juan 
Peron's death in 1974, the Peronist right wing struggled to control the 
administration led by his wife, lsabel Peron, and adopted anti- feminist 
measures. The free use of contraceptives was prohibited, and the 
executive vetoed a programmed reform of parental rights aimed to replace 
the Roman inspired law of "Patria Potestad". 
Although unfavourable to women, these measures did not draw the 
attention of the public within the context of a nation that was suffering from 
political polarization, guerrilla warfare, right wing terrorism, economic crisis 
and the ever-present threat of a military coup (Feijoo and Nari, 1994: 112). 
In March 1976, a military junta took power. The Junta implemented a 
repressive policy of State terrorism and a set of nee-liberal economic 
measures of structural adjustment that heavily weighed on the poorest. 
The military regime that ruled the country for 7 years suffocated all 
democratic activity. In spite of this, women resisted the dictatorship in 
various ways. They basically joined three kinds of groups in their struggle 
for emancipation. On the one hand, there were the women in the human 
rights movement. A second and very different mobilisation involved 
women who were struggling to obtain the minimum resources for their 
families to survive and, thirdly, there were the groups that gathered to fight 
for women's interests from a feminist perspective. All these groups 
participated in the opposition and resistance to the dictatorship, creating 
and helping shape the transition to democracy after Argentina's military 
defeat in the Falklands and the end of the military regime (Feijo6 and Nari, 
1994). 
With the recovery of democracy in 1983, women came back to Parliament 
again, though in very small numbers. Only 12 women were elected to 
Congress. The next parliamentary and national elections in 1985, 1987 
and 1989 did not bring about changes in the position of women. This was 
a symptom of what was happening to the women's movement. In spite of 
the significant contributions women had made to the restoration of 
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democracy, the new democratic regime was limiting their political 
participation. The women's movement failed to become an important 
political actor in the democratic interplay and remained more of an 
intellectual reference point. lt is not clear whether this was due to 
discrimination on the part of the government, to the failure of political 
parties to include a significant number of women among their ranks, or to 
women's own political attitude and discourse. Probably, the situation was 
the result of the interplay of all these factors. The inescapable fact was 
that they were demobilised and far from sharing political power or 
receiving the benefits of democracy (Feijoo and Nari, 1994). Maria del 
Carmen Feij6o explains this in terms of the women's movement's failure 
to adapt to the dynamics and requirements of the new democratic politics, 
which call for negotiation and bargaining. She argues that, out of fear of 
being eo-opted, women continued to use the confrontational discourse 
developed while they were part of the opposition to the dictatorship (Feij6o 
and Nari, 1994). 
The very severe economic crisis and the growing male unemployment 
prevailing during the whole period of transition and consolidation of 
democracy threw women from all classes into the labour market to satisfy 
basic needs. Feijo6 rightly suggests that the fact that they left behind their 
traditional roles to participate actively in the labour market may have had a 
potential effect in terms of empowering women in the redefinition of their 
private and public roles and in the pursuit of full citizenship. 
During his presidential campaign in 1982, President Alfonsin had 
promised to bring about important changes in legislation with the capacity 
to improve women's lives. He spoke of the ratification of the United 
Nation's convention against all forms of discrimination against women 
(CEDAW), the divorce law and the restoration of reproductive rights. 
Consequently, President Alfonsin initiated an institutional process aimed 
at integrating women in equal terms into public life; President Menem later 
followed the same policies. Official institutions for the promotion of women 
were created. Although there is a network o1 such institutions all around 
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the country, through lack of official funding and the support of the 
women's movement, these institutions have not been effectively 
appropriated by women and thus, their impact has been limited; However, 
it should be acknowledged that, together with women's NGOs, they have 
brought about changes in the perception of domestic violence against 
women as a social problem affecting society as a whole. 
The year 1991 meant a milestone to the process of women's inclusion in 
politics. Under the Menem administration of a quota system of a minimum 
30% of women for the elections in the lower house of the National 
Parliament was established. This system gave women a better 
representation in the lower house. In 2000 there were 71 women out of a 
total of 257 representatives and 2 senators out of a total of 68; many of 
them are lawyers (Navarro, 2000). 
These debates continue to this day. For example, initiatives to enlarge the 
quota to a minimum of 50%, the way it has been done in France, to make 
it extensive to the Senate and to executive posts, have occupied an 
important place in the media, giving rise to much public discussion, 
resistance and opposition. 
Ill D The evolution of legislation on women, children and 
the family 
1 Q Introduction 
Legislation on women and the family has undergone very important 
changes over the last half of the 201h·century. In this section I provide a 
brief outline of changes that constitute the legal framework within which 
the family law judges participating in this study work. The restoration of 
democracy and its institutions in 1983 allowed for the creation of new 
spaces for women's issues in the realm of the State and brought the issue 
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of equality between the sexes into public debate. lt also gave rise to 
critical awareness about the way social institutions work and of the actual 
gap between the existence of norms and their enforcement (Birgin, 1998). 
A process of legislative reform aimed at eliminating discrimination in 
legislation was initiated with the transition to democracy, especially in the 
area of family law. In 1985, two important laws were passed: the law of 
"filiation" and "patria potestad"(Law n° 23,264) 17, which establishes that 
the rights and duties over the children correspond to both the father and 
the mother and thus, in case of divorce, the "patria potestad" is exercised 
by the parent who has custody of the child. In cases of divorce or legal 
separation both parents are responsible for material provision for the 
children, independently of which parent has legal custody of the child. 
lt also puts on equal standing the children born in and out of wedlock 16• lt 
awards the mother -as the representative of her child- the possibility to 
claim for the father's legal recognition of a child born outside marriage. 
Extra-matrimonial paternity is legally established through the father's 
recognition, and can be established by a judge in court. When issuing a 
birth certificate, the Civil Registrar must not distinguish between 
matrimonial and extra-matrimonial children. In addition, law N° 23.264 
awards the right to resort to DNA tests to prove filiation. The new status 
given to children born out of wedlock challenges, for the first time in the 
letter of the law, the model of the matrimonial family as the norm. (Birgin, 
1998; Torrado, 2003: 138). 
After a 1986 Supreme Court decision 19 that declared the 
unconstitutionality of the article of the Civil Code prohibiting divorce, Law 
N° 23.515 about civil marriage was enacted in 1987, consecrating legal 
equality between the spouses and establishing divorce. When the 
17 
"patria potestad" Is the parent's or guardian's legal jurisdiction over children. 
18 Until then, children born out of wedlock were considered second class citizens. They did not 
have the same rights as the children born to a married couple. 
19 
"Sejan JB c. Zaks de Sejean, Ana, s/inconstitucionalldad del art. 64 de la ley 2393", Supreme 
Court of the Nation, 27-XI-86. 
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relationship comes to an end, the spouses have two options: either 
personal legal separation established judicially or divorce. Personal legal 
separation does not end the legal bond and consequently does not allow 
the spouses to re-marry, while divorce does. To be able to obtain a 
divorce a couple must stay married for a period of three years, which 
enables them to apply for a divorce by mutual consent. Other causes for 
divorce anticipated in the law are adultery, attack on the life of the spouse 
or children, serious offences, desertion, and being separated for a period 
of three years. 
The law also institutes that the spouses must now share certain decisions 
that were previously taken by the husband, such as the establishment of 
the family residence. Both spouses are bound to each other by identical 
and mutual obligations such as faithfulness, . mutual assistance and food 
provision for each other and for the children, even in the event of divorce. 
The reasons for losing their rights is the same for both spouses: for 
instance, the obligation to provide for food (alimony) ceases when one of 
the spouses is living with a third party or commits a serious offence 
against the ex-spouse (Birgin, 1998; Torrado, 2003: 139). 
Regulations regarding marital assets also changed as a consequence of 
the passing of the law of divorce. Thus, as from 1987, marital assets are 
made up of an estate composed by each spouse's properties at the time 
and any new properties acquired in any way except as inheritance, 
donation or legacy. Each spouse has the right to administer freely his/her 
own property and the commonly owned goods obtained through their own 
labour. Consent from the spouse is required, however, to sell, encumber 
or transfer real estate jointly owned and the house where the children live, 
even when it belongs to one of the spouses. 
A paradigmatic example of the evolution of the law regarding women in 
the family has to do with the name of married women. Law N° 18.248 
establishes that married women can decide whether they wish to add the 
husband's surname to their own. The use of the husband's surname, 
which was previously mandatory, preceded by the preposition "de", whose 
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meaning is "belonging to", has become optional. 
Although at the time some women groups carried out important 
campaigns aimed at promoting significant changes in family law that 
placed women on an equal standing to men, authors such as Birgin 
(1998) have argued that the family law reform in the Argentine case was 
the result of the process of general democratisation rather than the effect 
of the pressure exerted by the women's movement. In any case, the 
process opened up a new space for the manifestation of women's 
interests and new channels for women's participation were established. As 
a consequence, many women's organisations were eventually created, 
with a certain capacity to make an impact on the public scene, the media, 
the universities and public institutions, generating processes of social 
reform which not only affected women but the whole of society as well. 
One such example is the 1994 enactment of the Law of Domestic 
Violence (Law N° 24.417), which was a victory obtained by the feminist 
movement after many years of public campaigning. 
The domestic violence law can be seen as a State policy aimed at 
responding to domestic violence understood as a public problem. lt 
deploys a public policy executed mainly by family law judges with the 
support of other public and private agents such as the public hospital, the 
police, the social services, the school and other community associations. lt 
enables the victims of physical or psychological abuse perpetrated by a 
member of the family to resort to the Family Law Courts. The family law 
judge receiving the complaint may request an expert diagnosis of the 
family, exclude the perpetrators of violence from the conjugal home, and 
forbid their access to the home, school or workplace of the victims, order 
the return of the victims to the homes they were obliged to leave for 
security reasons, and establish provisional regimes of alimony, custody 
and visits. 
The following testimony offered by a woman judge who participated in this 
study reveals that the period of reform of family law was an extremely 
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stimulating phase both in her life and in the life of the country: 
"Aifonsin had just taken office and those were progressive times, involving 
the whole updating of the familial order based on the authority of the 
husband and on his prerogatives. lt was a time when legal scholars were 
divided; there were those in favour of the changes and those that resisted 
democratic reforms. A new more democratic order was being constructed 
lt was the stage of democratic reforms, reform of custody, filiation; 
everything was being changed. I was among those who advocated and 
welcomed changes. This involved much study and research. I enjoyed 
participating in such an important process. lt was the most stimulating and 
exhilarating phase in my whole career!" wj 
During the first years of democracy, most discrimination within the law 
was eliminated with the democratisation of family law. The process was 
completed with the introduction of changes in legislation in other legal 
areas such as labour legislation, through the ratification of international 
I LO conventions that incorporated the principle of equal pay for equal 
work to labour legislation (Birgin, 1998). The passing of such laws as the 
reform of the Electoral Law called "Ley de Cupo" -Quota Law-, which 
turns the introduction of quotas in the lists for elective posts mandatory, 
stresses the importance and legitimacy of the issue of egalitarian 
legislation during the 1980's. However, there are still important aspects of 
family law that have remained backward and will need to be addressed in 
the near future. Examples of this are the rights of the concubines, the 
rights of the partners in homosexual unions, and the problems raised by 
the use of artificial reproductive techniques. 
2 D The Constitutional Reform 
The 1994 Constitutional Reform constitutes a turning point in that it 
extends rights and guarantees to women. lt consecrates the rights to 
equality, equality of opportunities and treatment for women and men, and 
introduces the legal tools and mechanisms for the enforcement of all 
rights recognised by the Constitution and all the International Human 
Rights Conventions. lt also establishes measures of positive action to 
make the law effective (art. 75, inc. 22 and 23). With respect to family law 
in particular, the incorporation of the Human Rights Conventions 
introduces into national law democratic principles that reinforce tho reform 
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in family law analysed above. 
a ~ Women's Rights 
By incorporating the CEDAW into Argentinean law (International 
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women) the Convention can be applied directly, with the same hierarchy 
as the Constitution. The road was therefore opened for women and 
women's organisations to use the Courts (Argentine Courts, those of the 
United Nations and of the lnter-American System) to demand the 
enforcement of their right to equality. The demands presented before the 
Inter American Court have been however, few. By way of example, there 
was a case in which a woman filed a claim against the Argentine State 
arguing that her representation rights had been violated by the order in 
which women candidates had been included in the electoral lists on the 
occasion of the 1993 elections. The lnter-American Court admitted her 
claim.20 
Newer and more progressive, the Constitution of the City of Buenos Aires, 
adopted in 1996, went further in the process. lt gr~mts the right to be 
different and does not admit any kind of discrimination that could 
encourage segregation in terms of race, ethnicity, gender or sexual 
orientation. lt dedicates a whole chapter to sex equality and establishes 
the following duties: 
a) To guarantee equality in the public domain through the establishment 
of positive actions and to promote it in the private sphere. 
b) To compel political parties to adopt positive actions to guarantee 
equality in the access to public posts and the management of financial 
resources at all levels and areas. 
c) To forbid the inclusion of more than 70% of persons of the same sex, 
and of more than three consecutive persons of the same sex on lists of 
20 lnforme n°102/99, caso 11.307, Maria Merciadri de Morini, Argentina, September 27, 1999. See 
further: http:Uwww.cidh.org/annuairep/99span/Admisibie/Arqenlina11.307.htm 
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candidates for elective posts. 
d) To establish a quota for the conformation of collective bodies 
composed by three or more members. 
e) To confer the Legislature and the Chief of Government the function of 
legislating and promoting positive actions to ensure equality among 
women and men, and to carry out educational programmes. with a gender 
perspective, especially in the areas of human rights and sexual education. 
Regarding reproductive rights, the Constitution promotes responsible 
parenthood, establishes the right to decide about issues of reproduction 
and the obligation of the State to offer information on the available 
methods of family planning, as well as actual provision of legal 
contraceptive methods -abortion is illegal in Argentina. lt also compels the 
State to provide integral health care during pregnancy, delivery and 
"puerperium". 
Inspired in the above egalitarian principles, three laws have recently been 
passed by the Buenos Aires legislature. These laws have the potential to 
improve the quality of life of the women in Buenos Aires: a Law on 
"Equality of Opportunities and Treatment" (n° 474), a "Reproductive Rights 
Law" (n° 418) and a "Childhood Law" (n° 114). To date, the enforcement 
of these laws has been uneven .. With respect to the enforcement of the 
law on Reproductive Rights, budgetary provisions have been made 
available for the purpose of its activation, which seems to be running quite 
smoothly. The main criticism levelled against the local government is that 
no new professional appointments have been made in order to satisfy the 
increased demand21 • 
Similarly, following the provisions of the "Childhood Law", a new agency 
has been created with the purpose of adapting all government 
programmes to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child: it 
21 Internal unpublished report of the Women's Office of the Ombudsman of the City of Buenos 
Aires, 2002 
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is the "Council of the Rights of the Child". The local government is 
gradually taking the steps leading to its full enforcement This is, however, 
a very complex task involving a shift from old to new criteria, namely from 
patronage or guardianship to a conception based on the child as a subject 
of rights. 
Of the three, the enforcement of the law of "Equality of Opportunities", 
which established among its objectives the launching of an Equal 
Opportunities Plan by the local government, seems to be the slowest in 
terms of its enforcement. Two aspects seem to hinder the enforcement of 
this law. One is related to the fact that it does not establish the allocation 
of the necessary funding or the creation of a body responsible for its 
enforcement. The other obstacle lies in the very complexity of the task, 
which involves a deep change of orientation to be set up in all ten areas of 
the government of the City. 
While the road was already paved in terms of the measures related to 
democratic representation and the establishment of gender quotas, the 
opposite seems to be the case with other governmental areas such as the 
measures aimed at improving the conditions for the participation of 
women in the economy. The fact that the latter also involves the 
participation of the private sector makes the task more complex and its 
implementation difficult. 
lt is necessary to acknowledge that, although it would now be difficult to 
find discrimination in the text of the law in Argentina; there is a wide gap 
between rights that are granted and rights that are effectively protected 
and vindicated. One thing is to proclaim rights; a very different one is to 
effectively satisfy them (Birgin, 1998). Although quite a few years have 
passed since the Constitutional Reform, women's groups do not seem to 
have appropriated the lt;)gal mechanisms offered by the Constitution; 
hence, there have been only few cases before the Courts demanding 
these new rights to equality. Lack of information about the law, the 
difficulty to gain access to the justice system, especially for poor women, 
and an endemic lack of confidence in the justice system can be 
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highlighted among the main obstacles. 
Today, at the beginning of a new century, while most legal barriers to 
women's equality have been overcome, much has changed in terms of 
women's access to higher education. In spite of the fact that women have 
succeeded in obtaining equality with men in relation to legal rights and 
access to education, they still face invisible barriers and discrimination in 
terms of opportunities to reach the highest positions of power and prestige 
within society. Women have been and still are excluded or have had very 
marginal roles in both the administration government and the private 
sector (GELS et al, 2002). 
b - Children Rights 
Like CEDAW, the Convention of the Rights of the Child was formally 
incorporated into the Constitution when the 1994 Constitutional Reform 
was carried out. This meant both a general change in the political 
conception of children and a change in the their status before the courts. 
In the light of this democratisation of the law, children came to be 
understood as persons; subjects who, in view of their vulnerability, are not 
only entitled to protection but also to some specific rights that ought to be 
enforced (Grosman, 1994). 
As the family judge must consider the child's rights and interests against 
the rights and interests of the parents and other members of the family, 
these new rights are crucial to my research into family law judges. Among 
the most important ones, I would stress on the child's rights to enjoy a 
family life, to grow, develop, and receive education in an atmosphere that 
will respect his/her autonomy in accordance with the stage of development 
he/she is undergoing, and the child's rights with respect to the vicissitudes 
and changes a family may suffer, such as the family break-up after 
parental divorce and the creation of new families after divorce. The 
legalisation of divorce and the incorporation of the criterion of the best 
interests of the child into law have made parental separation less 
dramatic. The concept of guilt has been removed from divorce procedures 
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and negotiated arrangements are favoured as opposed to more litigious 
solutions. Similarly, the law gives legitimacy to new forms of family life, 
different from the traditional nuclear family model, and has eliminated 
discrimination between children. Children born inside and outside 
marriage and legally adopted children are now given . the same rights. 
Likewise, the voice of the child is more and more often being heard by the 
judge in cases having to do with the placement of children after divorce, 
the correction of parents and caretakers, child abuse and adoption 
(Grosman, 1994). 
Nevertheless, as was mentioned with respect to the changes in legislation 
concerning women22 , the gap between proclaimed rights and actual 
practices should not be underestimated (Birgin, 1998; Grosman, 1998: · 
19). The old order, based on the subordination to the authority of the 
father/ husband within the family, is reluctant to give way to a new culture 
based on individual rights. Poor socio-economic conditions also 
undermine the impact of this new legislation informed by a vision that 
conceives the child as a subject of rights. 
IV A The evolution of the family in Argentina 
1 A Introduction 
Following the previous discussion on Family Law in Argentina, this section 
considers the main trends in the recent development of the family. This 
section provides essential background analysis for my study of family law 
judges and the context within which they are working. 
In its more classical conceptual version, the family's biological basis is 
closely linked to sexuality and reproduction. The family is the social 
institution that regulates, channels and confers meaning to these basic 
needs. lt comprises daily cohabitation (living together) expressed in the 
22 See section lll-2a of this same chapter. 
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idea of the household, a shared economy, a collective domesticity, the 
daily sustenance that goes together with legitimated sexuality and 
procreation. Amidst the wide variety of family and kinship organisations 
conformed by different societies, the family, as a constant, is organised 
around three basic needs: cohabitation (living together), sexuality and 
procreation (Jelfn, 1998: 15). 
In Argentina, until quite recently, the Western model of the nuclear family 
composed by a monogamous couple living together with their children, 
with the father going out to a job for the maintenance of the family and the 
wife staying at home to take care of the children and domestic chores, 
was considered the ideal and normal family. As modern historiography 
shows, however, the naturalization of this family stereotype that has 
dominated western society for two centuries has served to hide both the 
fact that there have always been different ways to organise family ties and 
that this archetype of the patriarchal nuclear family, characterised by the 
concentration of power in the head of the family and the subordination of 
the wife and children is far from democratic (JeHn, 1998: 15-20). 
Intense societal change, added to the feminist critique based on the 
gender perspective and the disruption of the distinction between the public 
and private domains, has come to question this idealised form of family 
life. This has given rise to new conceptualisations that recognise the 
multiplicity and complexity of family forms and the dilemmas and tensions 
implied (JeHn, 1998: 15-20). 
The fact is that the three dimensions -cohabitation (living 
together)/sexuality/procreation- that conform the classical concept of the 
family have undergone profound changes. Monogamous marriage has 
lost the monopoly of legitimate sexuality, and procreation and childcare no 
longer necessarily occur under the same roof or on the basis of daily 
cohabitation (Jelfn, 1998: 15-20). 
In our days, this homogeneity of the ideal family coexists and contrasts 
with a plural reality where divorce, the creation of new stepfamilies, a 
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more aged population, unmarried mothers with their children, fathers who 
take custody of their children after divorce, adults who live alone but are 
still immersed in family networks and homosexual couples compose the 
more complex reality of family life (JeHn, 1998: 15-20; Torrado: 417-452). 
The new heterogeneous reality of the family in Argentina inspires both 
regrets and sympathies: those who dislike it frequently speak of the "crisis 
of the family", while others tend to view it as an opportunity and as a result 
of a process of democratisation of the family in which intimacy, affections 
and pleasure acquire new and alternative meanings. 
In the classical model, the family is very much identified with the private 
and domestic domain of women. In spite of the recent changes, 
evidenced, for instance, in the decay of the patriarchal authority of the 
husband and father, by the fact that women go out to work and may 
become heads of household, or by the fact that men keep the custody of 
their children after divorce, the realm of affection -domesticity- is still 
considered as the sphere of women. lt is thus very important to be alert 
about the possible long-term impact of these new trends on gender 
relations (JeHn, 1998; Wainerman, 2003; Torrado, 2003). 
lt is clear that in the western world the family centred on patriarchal 
authority is decaying. The search for personal autonomy initiated by 
children wishing to escape paternal authority has now extended to the 
relations between the genders. In that respect, women's participation in 
the labour market provides opportunities for increased personal 
autonomy. This generates conflicts around who should have the 
responsibility for domestic work. Time budget research results show that, 
in general, if the time dedicated to domestic work is added to the time 
spent on paid employment, women work much longer hours than men 
(Kritz: 1986, cited in CELS et al, 2002: 14, ft. 46). This has become a 
matter for vindication of the women's movement both at the societal level 
and at the personal level in the private sphere of the family. 
At the personal level, however, the situation remains ambiguous. While it 
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is true that women now demand recognition of their individuality and a 
more egalitarian distribution of the burden of domesticity, it seems that 
many are reluctant to resign the power that originates in their maternal 
roles, like those in charge of the welfare of the family (JeHn, 1998, 
Shmukler and Di Marco, 1997). 
In the next few paragraphs, I will outline the basic trends of what has been 
occurring in the Argentine family in the last twenty years in order to 
provide a context for the research on the family law judges. As Catalina 
Wainerman (2003) puts it, in the last twenty years, the Argentine family 
changed more than it did in the whole first half of the twentieth century. 
a a Main trends in marriage and cohabitation after the passing of the 
law on divorce 
According to the office of Statistics and Census of the city of Buenos 
Aires, when the law of divorce was passed in 1986, 13,056 couples turned 
to the Courts. In most cases they wanted to legally formalise separations 
that had taken place long before. In the next year, 18,112 couples (66.3%) 
resident in Buenos Aires attended the Courts in order to get a divorce. 
This is the year that will be remembered as a record for the number of 
divorces and legal separations. In 1989 the number of divorces started to 
decrease, with 11,740 couples (48%) turning to the Courts to get a 
divorce. From then on, the average number decreased greatly to remain 
constant at a level of 36%. (Victoria Mazzeo, 2000; Torrado, 2003: 276) 
The high peak in the number of marriages right after the passing of the 
law on divorce is explained in terms of the regularisation of the marriage 
situation of the divorcees. After 1990, the rate of marriage started to 
decrease steadily, showing a social tendency for legal marriages to be 
replaced by cohabitation. During the 1990's, cohabitation without marriage 
became more and more frequent. Between 1990 and 1995 the number of 
cohabiiing couples (in consensual unions) increased at a rate of 29%. In 
1999, the number of couples in consensual unions represented 11% of 
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the number of married couples (Victoria Mazzeo, 2000). 
According to the 1991 census, the number of divorcees was 180,704, 
whereas the number of separated persons who had been in cohabitation 
was 705,567. The number of married persons was 11 ,086,191 and the 
number of people in cohabitation was 2,423,479. These figures should not 
be interpreted as a crisis of the couple, since the tendency to live in 
couples has remained constant all along Argentine history. What these 
statistics actually reflect is the crisis of civil marriage as an institution. 
Cohabitation is chosen mainly by Argentine young couples as a 
transitional trial stage, especially in first unions, and as a more lasting 
strategy for couples going for a second chance (Susana Torrado, 2003: 
241 and 313). 
As Wainerman (2003: 12) explains, from the 1980's to the present, the 
Argentine family has undergone a radical and extremely rapid 
transformation. In this transition, it is hastily following the course chosen 
by more developed societies. A bird's eye view of the changes occurring 
within the Argentine family spots the following trends: a drop in the 
number of children; an increase in cohabitation or consensual unions as 
opposed to civil marriage; the tendency to postpone the age of marriage 
and a great variety in terms of the composition of the households. There is 
a proliferation of pregnant brides, extra-matrimonial children, separation 
and divorces, of households composed by single mothers or single fathers 
and their children, homosexual households, couples who decide to remain 
childless, households headed by women, and stepfamilies composed by 
couples who have divorced and remarried, bringing along their children by 
former spouses. 
Moreover, the processes of growing individualisation of the young and of 
women have weakened the traditional family structure and rendered it 
unstable, leaving more space for alternative individual options and for new 
patterns of family life. Divorce and remarriage or new unions have 
generated different and more complex households (stepfamilies), with 
new constellations of family bonds where the kinship ties characteristic of 
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the nuclear family are acquiring new meanings. Today it is often the case 
that the members of the original nuclear family may not live together under 
the same roof, while, persons who are not related by blood ties have 
come to live together (Jelln, 2000: 55-104). 
According to Wainerman, (2003: 12-13) this wide array of changes has 
been taking place under the inspiration of an ethic that emphasises 
individualism, autonomy and personal realisation over community and 
tradition. Under the influence of this new atmosphere, ideology has come 
to be replaced by psychology, homogeneity by diversity, duty by feeling, 
and obligation by pleasure. While the 1970's and the early 1980's 
witnessed the positive aspects of individualism, of which the women's 
liberation movement can be seen as a consequence, the economic crisis, 
later in the eighties, was accompanied by all the evils related with the 
crisis and the fall of the welfare State: growing unemployment, labour 
flexibilisation, social exclusion and the loosening of the bonds of solidarity. 
Towards the end of the 20th. century and the beginning of the new century, 
as the crisis became more and more acute, social bonds in Argentine 
society turned increasingly precarious and fragile, though flexible both in 
the realm of the labour market and of the family. 
b - WomeB1l's employment and! ~ami~y life 
As is clearly shown by statistics, one of the main characteristics of 
Argentine society today is the presence of mothers with domestic 
responsibilities in the labour market. While at the end of the 1980's both 
parents worked in only 2 out of every 1 0 families with children, at the end 
of 1990's the number had doubled. Following into the footsteps of more 
developed countries, where women's entry into the labour force coincided 
with the expansion of the welfare State and the provision of facilities for 
working women, Argentine women's growing incorporation into the labour 
force from the post war years to the mid 1980's was also associated with 
the process of modernisation that offered enhanced occupational 
opportunities for women. However, from the mid 1980's onwards, the 
acceleration in terms of women's participation in the labour market can no 
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longer be associated to modernisation since, in fact, the period was 
characterized by economic restructuring, structural adjustment and the 
loss of the bargaining power of the working population. Thus, in this 
context, women's growing participation in the workforce must be explained 
in terms of the unprecedented increase in the rate of masculine 
unemployment, particularly among men head of households (Cerrutti, 
2003: 106). 
As a consequence, women have gone into paid employment in order to 
maintain a certain level of family income to mitigate the deterioration of 
men's income and to resist downward social mobility within a context of 
structural adjustment. If we consider the unemployed population, 
amounting to 17% of the entire economically active population, the 
proportion of households where the woman worked and the man was 
unemployed grew from 0.4 % in the 80's to 4% in 2000 (Wainerman, 
2003). In the 1980's, most of the women in the labour market were aged 
between 20 and 24 since, after marriage, they abandoned paid 
employment to dedicate to the home and children. Today, women who are 
economically active remain in paid employment until retirement, 
irrespective of the number of children and their ages. 
However, while economic crisis is a very important reason for the massive 
participation of women in the labour force, Argentine society has 
undergone other changes that have influenced the social division of 
labour. The period has also seen a significant transformation in terms of 
cultural patterns that define gender roles and gender relations, especially 
around the acceptance of mothers' work outside the home (Cerrutti, 2003, 
106-1 07). 
On the basis of the household surveys carried out twice a year by INDEC, 
the National Survey and Census Institute, Wainerman (2003) examined 
the changes in the structure of the households composed by a nuclear 
family -a conjugal couple and their children- in the City of Buenos Aires 
and its metropolitan area, from 1980 to 2000. From the data in the 
following tables, we can understand the revolution in the realm of the 
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nuclear family in the last twenty years. As can be seen from table 1 , in the 
20 years between 1980 and 2000 the proportion of households sustained 
by a man has dramatically decreased and the proportion of households 
sustained by a woman has increased noticeably. 
Table ~ ~ Household$ accordill1lg ~o providers ~ 980, 
~ 99~ and 200023 
Households 1980 1991 2000 
Sustained by a man 74.5% 63.2% 54.7% 
Sustained by a man and a woman 25.5% 36.8% 45.3% 
Total number of households 1 ,069,141 1,324,629 1,320,576 
Likewise, table 2 shows an important growth in the proportion of 
households with two incomes, regardless of their socio-economic status. 
As a matter of fact, as one goes up the social characteristics of 
households, the growth in the proportion of households with two incomes 
is higher. This is relevant to this research, since as can be seen in chapter 
4 section 11 a, most of the women judges and some of the men judges in 
my sample will be found in the middle and upper social status categories 
and their participation in the labour force then appears more as a general 
trend than as an exception. 
Table 2 ~ Households with two providers according 
to socio-economic level1980, 1991 and 200024 
Socio-economic level 1980 1991 2000 
low 17.0% 22.2% 32.2% 
Middle 32.4% 45.6% 53% 
High 31.6% 56.6% 64.3% 
Total number of households 203,266 343,334 523,407 
Along the same lines, as shown in table 3, when one focuses on the 
length of the working week, it can be observed that both the proportion of 
women working part-time and full-time has increased over the 1991-2000 
23 Extracted from Wainerman, 2003: 72 
24 Extracted from Wainerman, 2003: 79 
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period. The opposite can be observed in terms of the length of the men's 
working week: there is both an increase in the proportion of men working 
part-time and a decrease in the proportion of men working full-time. 
Between 1991 and 2000, the proportion of women working long hours a 
week rose from 58.5% to 64.5% and the proportion of women working 
part-time decreased from 41.5% to 35.6%, while the proportion of men 
who work part time tripled, rising from 2.5% to 7.5%, and the proportion of 
men working full-time decreased from 97.5% to 92.5%. 
This indicates a general tendency for women to enter and for men to 
withdraw from the labour market. The implication of such a trend in terms 
of the internal arrangements inside the family cannot be overlooked, and 
this will certainly bear on the nature of the conflicts that reach the Family 
Law Courts. 
• Table 3 - Households according to length of the 
working week of the spouses 1991 and 2000 25 
Households 1991 2000 
Women - Part-time 41.5% 35.6% 
Women - Full-time 58.5% 64.4% 
Men - Part-time 2.5% 7.5% 
Men - Full-time 97.5% 92.5% 
In the 1980's, whereas in most nuclear families the husband used to have 
a higher level of educational attainment, today the level of educational 
attainment of husband and wife has !evelled. Moreover, the proportion 
where the wife's educational attainment is higher than that of the husband 
has risen from 30% to 34%. The households with two incomes are more 
frequent among those where the wife is more educated than the husband. 
Table 4 considers the level of educational attainment of the spouses in the 
households for the 1980-2000 period. There is an important decrease in 
the proportion of couples where the level of educational attainment of the 
25 Catalina Wainerman, 2003: 88 
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wife is lower than that of the husband while, at the same time, the 
increase in the proportion of households where the wife's level of 
educational attainment is the same or higher than that of the ·man is 
apparent. This shows an important tendency towards levelling educational 
attainment for men and women in the time period. Women's massive 
incorporation to higher education from the late sixties and early seventies 
is an important precedent of this trend. As will be seen in chapter 4, 
because of their average age, the judges participating in this study have 
been part of this societal trend towards the inclusion of women into higher 
education. 
Table 4 ~ Level of educational attainment of the 
spouses 1980, 1991 and 2000 26 
Wife's educational 1980 1991 2000 
attainment 
Lower than the 24.4% 23.4% 17.8% 
husband's 
Same as the 45.8% 42.6% 48.5% 
husband's 
Higher than the 29.8% 34.0% 33.7% 
husband's 
The proportion of income that women bring to the household has also 
changed: the proportion of households where the woman makes less 
money than the man decreased from 60% to 54%. The percentage of 
women who make more money than their husbands increased from 5% to 
11%. 
The families where the women make more money than their husbands are 
more frequent in households with lower socio-economic level and 
educational attainment, and among young women up to thirty. This means 
that, as compared to earlier generations, the younger couples are starting 
their lives together under very different circumstances. However; as was 
suggested above, in the context of an impoverished Argentina, the 
increase in the economic participation of women in the last two decades 
must be understood in terms of economic necessity rather than as the 
26 extracted from Wainerman, 2003: 85-86 
110 
effect of enhanced employment opportunities. 
Nonetheless, according to Wainerman (2003), these raw figures suggest 
that a revolution in gender relations may be on its way. lt would be 
interesting to know how these new arrangements are affecting gender 
relations. This requires knowledge of a great variety of aspects of family 
life such as the actual division of labour within the family among the 
members of the conjugal couple and the children; the responsibility for 
domestic work; the way decisions are made at the heart of the family; 
whether femininity and masculinity are being redefined as an effect of the 
large increase in the proportion of working mothers; how children respond 
to new gender roles that contradict the traditional stereotype; whether 
concrete men and women are capable of negotiating their new roles; 
whether the nature of the family conflicts has changed as a result of the 
new arrangements, whether the dominant stereotypes related to the roles 
of men and women in the family keep pace with societal change and 
whether they are resistant to change. Lately, some small-scale exploratory 
research regarding the domestic division of labour has been carried out 
with middle class families (Wainerman, 2003: 199-220) and with working 
class families (Cerrutti, 2003: 1 05-152) where both parents work out of the 
house. Results suggest that while the men have taken more active roles 
with respect to childcare and other activities related with children, the 
women still carry the main burden of domestic chores, which remains 
women's' privilege27• Women's actual accumulation of responsibilities -
home, children, and work- hamper. their capacities for full professional 
development. 
Apart from the need to overcome deep-seated prejudices, the attainment 
of real gender equality as proclaimed by law, would require that the State 
set in motion public policies aimed precisely at creating the conditions for 
equal opportunities for men and women. As was seen in the previous 
section on legislation, according to the Constitution, the State should 
27 A survey carried out in the City of Buenos Aires In 1999 showed that women work an average of 
7 hours out of the home and then performing domestic chores in the home for another four hours. 
Clarin, 2/12/99, cited in Gels et al, 2000: 14, ft.47. 
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adopt measures of affirmative action to promote legislative and policy 
changes aiming at changing beliefs about gender roles and domesticity, 
encouraging less traditional attitudes and increasing the provision of social 
services. However, to make all these proclaimed women's rights effective, 
as shown in the shadow report on the enforcement of CEDAW submitted 
in 2000 by women NGOs, the Argentine government has still to take 
action inspired in 'the constitutional principle (Gels et al: 2000: 14). 
In the first two sections of this chapter, I have outlined the entry of women 
into public life in Argentina. I have also referred to the evolution of the 
legislation regarding women, the family and children and to the main 
trends related to the development of the family in the last twenty years. I 
found that women's incorporation into public life in the 20th. century was a 
crucial element of the process of modernisation of Argentine society. This 
process encompassed women's massive access to the universities and 
into the labour market and was followed by important legal reforms, setting 
the scene for women's increased participation in Argentine society. I shall 
now examine the process of incorporation of women into higher 
education, 
• V-The process of incorporation of women into higher 
education and the professions in Argentina 
1 - The incorporation of women into university 
a - Introduction 
Before we move on to consider the incorporation of women into higher 
education in Argentina, it must be noted that I encountered a general 
difficulty in terms of the availability of relevant data. The few data available 
are practically inaccessible and fragmentary. Accordingly, the periodicity 
of the data used was dictated more by its availability than by a rational 
organisation of the material to be analysed. Since I was forced to use 
whatever data was available, the data in this section may appear 
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fragmentary and disintegrated. In spite of this, the data presented in the 
tables that follow give us a fair picture of the process of democratisation of 
higher education in general, and of the process of the inclusion of women 
within it. 
I will look into the evolution of women's participation in higher education 
and the professions by following basic variables such as the distribution of 
men and women among the student population of the National 
Universities, the number of degrees awarded to men and women in the 
National Universities in general, and the distribution of the men and 
women graduates in the different specialities offered by the National 
Universities. 
The data reflect a tremendous expansion in the general university 
attendance. This trend has remained steady for both men and women for 
a few decades now, particularly since the 1960's and 1970's. 
Table 5 compares the participation of men and women in the student 
population of National Universities in 1941 and 1985, showing both an 
expansion in the number of men and women students and a particularly 
significant increase in the enrolment of women. This fact accounts for 
much of the general growth in the university registration. 
Table 5 - Enrolment of the Natioll1lal Unoversmes, on 
1941 and 1985, by sex28 
Sex 1941 % 1985 % 
iVlen 34,358 72.8 361,691 54 
Women 5237 13.2 302,609 46 
Total 39,595 100 664,200 100 
Table 6 presents a comparison of the proportion of women and men in the 
28 Maglle and Frinchaboy, 1988: 31 
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population of National Universities from 1970 to 1987. lt shows both an 
important increase in the proportion of women in the total university 
registration and a steady trend in this direction. The proportion of women 
grew from nearly one third to one half of the total university enrolment over 
the seventeen-year period. 
Table 6 ~ Enrolmerot of ~!he Nationai Unlvell'smes lby 
sex 1970 'to ~ 98729 
YEAR+ %WOMEN %MIEN TOTAl 
1970 35.9 64.1 236,515 
1972 36.8 63.2 297,529 
1973 39.2 60.8 368,168 
1974 39.7 60.3 441,302 
1975 43.2 56.8 536,959 
1976 42.9 57.1 532,525 
1977 41.7 48.3 465,167 
1984 44.8 55.2 507,994 
1986 46.2 53.8 707,016 
1987 46.9 53.1 755,206 
A trend in the same direction can be observed when we look at the 
number of degrees awarded by National Universities. Table 7 presents the 
number of degrees awarded by National Universities to men and women 
for the 1900-1965 period (Ministerio de Trabajo, Oficina de la Mujer, 
Buenos Aires, 1965: 27-28). The number of degrees awarded to women 
from 1900 to 1920 amounted to 576; the number increased to 8341 for the 
twenty-year period from 1931 to 1950. This shows a slow but sustained 
trend for the period in question. However, it is only after 1950 that a 
dramatic increase in the number of degrees awarded to women can be 
observed. In the ten years between 1951 and 1960, the number of women 
increased to 14,415. As also shown in table 7, the number of women 
29 Mujeres latinoamericanas en cifras: 66. A change in the admission policy of the university in 
1973 explains the increase in the access to university for that year, while the period 1976-1983 
corresponds to the period when the country was ruled by a military dictatorship. Again the 
government's policy explains the decrease in university enrolment for those years, and the return 
of democracy in 1983 marks a trend in the opposite direction from 1983 onwards. 
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graduates became significant much later than the number of men. The 
growth in the number of women graduates was very slow for the first half 
of the century, but became exponential from the 1960's onwards. 
Between 1960 and 1965, the number of degrees awarded to women was 
11,705 (28.2%), while the amount of degrees awarded to men for the 
same period was 29,796 (71.8%) over a total of 41,501 degrees30• Thus, 
the analysis of the table reveals a tremendous increase in the total 
number of degrees awarded by National Universities. The said increase 
was largely due to the great increase of the number of degrees awarded 
to women, as the rate of growth of the number of awarded degrees is 
higher for women than for men. The proportion of these degrees rose 
from 0.79% in the five-year period from 1900 to 1905 to 29.7 % in the 
period 1961-65, while the proportion of degrees awarded to men 









Talble 7- Deg!l'ees awarded lby alhle Natioll'ila~ 
UB1lnvell'sities, lby sex 1900-196532 
Women iVlen Toial %of women %of men 
36 3,105 3,141 1.2 98.2 
540 7,261 7,801 6.2 92.8 
1,632 14,453 16,085 10.1 89.9 
2,770 19,735 25,275 10.9 89.1 
6,571 33,916 40,487 16.2 83.8 
14,515 48,896 63,411 22.8 77.2 
11,705 29,796 41,501 28.2 71.8 
30 These figures were taken from the original table, which was organised In 5 year periods and 
which I reorganised into ten year periods to make it shorter. (Maglle and Frinchaboy, 1988: 30-31) 
31 lt is Interesting to note that a survey carried out by the Foundation of the Chamber of Commerce 
in 1965 revealed the following situation with regard to men and women's opportunities in the labour 
market: The proportion of men working independently in their profession was much larger than that 
of women, while the number of professionals who work as employees of the State administration Is 
as many as twice the number of men. The opposite was true with relation to private firms, where 
the number of professional men with a professional category and better salaries doubles that of 
women. See: Henault Mirta "La incorporacion de la mujer al trabajo asalariado" Todo es Historla, 
n.128. 
32 (after a table by Maglie and Frinchaboy, 1988: 30-31. The original table was structured into 5 
year periods) 
33 Please note that this last period involves only 5 years, while the previous were ten- year periods. 
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Table 8 demonstrates 35 years later, a very different situation in terms of 
women's participation in the professions. Data published by the Ministry of 
Education show that the total number of university graduates in the 
country was 776,264, 51.7% women and 48.3% men. Thus, by 1998, the 
proportion of women among university graduates was already slightly 
higher than the proportion of men. 
After having considered the striking general expansion in the number of 
graduates in the National Universities, I move on to consider the 
distribution of the university graduates in the wide disciplinary array of 
degrees offered. The largest number of graduates comes from the area of 
Economics including those trained in Administration and Accountancy, 
adding up to 133,394 graduates and accounts for 17.2% of all graduates, 
being 56.3% men and 43,7% women. Law graduates constitute the 
second largest number of graduates corresponding to 13% of the total 
number of university graduates; namely 101,181, 50.4% women and to 
49.6 % men of the total number of law graduates (Eduardo Semchez 
Martlnez Editor, 1999: 364). 
The professions that seem to attract more women are, in decreasing 
order, Psychology, where women constitute 92% of all psychology 
graduates; Education 85.3% women; Paramedics and Medical Auxiliaries 
with 81,5% women, Biological Sciences with 75.3% women, Philosophy 
and Literature with 61.8% women; Dentistry with 60.3% women, and Law 
with a percentage of 50,4% of women graduates. Only Veterinary and 
Agronomy, with a proportion of women of 4% and the various Engineering 
degrees with 10% of women, have remained as male clusters. Degrees 
related with the Humanities are, however, still much more popular with 
women (Maglie and Frinchaboy, Argentina, 1988: 29). 
Career degrees such as Medicine, Architecture and Law, that were clearly 
male options at the beginning of the process of incorporation of women in 
the late 1960's and early 1970's, with a participation of women varying 
between 1% and 5%, became, in just a few decades, degrees where the 
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number of women at least equals that of men, thus mirroring the 
spectacular advance reached by women in higher education (Maglie and 
F rinchaboy, 1988: 30-31 ) . 
Table 8- University Graduates lby degree career and 
sex in 199834 
CAREER DEGREES %of %of TOTAL % of the aotal 
WOMEN MIEN number of graduates 
Law 50.4 49.6 101,181 13 
Economics, 43.7 56.3 133,394 17.2 
Accountancy 
Engineering 10.8 89.2 92,689 11.9 
Medicine 45.4 54.6 84,387 10.9 
Computer sciences 42.3 57.7 28,483 3.7 
Psychology 92 8 50,402 6.5 
Architecture 50 50 48,437 6.2 
Paramedlcs 81.5 18.5 33,974 4.4 
Biochemistry, 73.1 26.9 30,285 3.9 
Pharmacy 
Communication 46.6 53.4 9,863 1.3 
journalism 
Dentistry 60.3 39.7 28,721 3.7 
Education 85.3 14.7 13,065 1.7 
Philosophy 61.8 38.2 46,383 6 
Biology, Ecology, 74 26 18,167 2.3 
Natural Sciences 
Social service, 75.3 24.7 27,194 3.5 
Sociology 
Veterinary, Agronomy 4.1 95.9 5,312 0.7 
OOthers 64.5 35.5 22,323 2.9 
Total 51.7 48.3 776,264 100 
b =Women students at the UBA Law School 
After having considered the tremendous expansion in higher education 
from the sixties onwards, and having examined the distribution of men and 
34 Eduardo Sanchez Martinez Editor, 1999: 364 
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women students graduates in the different specialities for National 
Universities, I shall now concentrate on the evolution of women's 
participation in Law School. Because the UBA Law School is the largest 
and most prestigious in the country, I have decided to take it as the focus 
of this part of the study35• 
UBA is the university with the largest number of students in the whole 
country and represents 25% of the country's university students: the 
number of students for 1997 was 206,941 , with 58.3% women and 41.7% 
men (Ministerial de Cultural y Education. Secretarial de Polfticas 
Universitarias, 1997 Table 3.1.4: 27). Regarding the evolution in the 
numbers and proportions of women law graduates (information provided 
by the Ministry of Labour) in the 1900-1965 period, the UBA Law School 
awarded a total number of 19,159 degrees, being 17,064 (89%) to men 
and 2,105 (11 %) to women (Ministerio de Trabajo, Oficina Nacional de la 
Mujer, 1965: 27). The data also show that in the 1900-1960 period, the 
UBA Law School awarded a number of 827 (5.9%) degrees to women 
(Ministerio de Trabajo, Oficina Nacional de la Mujer, 1965: 27) and 13,845 
(94.3%) to men, while in the , 1961-1965 period, it awarded 1278 
(28.48%) degrees to women and 3200 degrees (71.4%) to men (Ministerio 
de Trabajo, Oficina Nacional de la Mujer, 1965: 28). 
Although in the last few years a considerable number of private 
universities have begun offering Law degrees, according to the statistics 
of the "Colegio Publico de Abogados of the City of Buenos Aires", at least 
70% of its membership comes from the University of Buenos Aires. The 
remaining 30% is very fragmentary, dividing into small private universities 
in Buenos Aires and public universities of the rest of the country. 
This shows that UBA is the most important national centre of the country 
for the training of lawyers and this justifies my decision to concentrate on 
the UBA Law School for this aspect of the study. 
35 This data draws on a number of different sources. There is no central register or database 
providing all relevant information. Accordingly, the data was obtained from different people at the 
university. 
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The total number of women law students at the various National 
Universities36 rose from 477 (4.8%) in 1941, to 27,014 (48.4%) in 197837 
(Maglie and Frinchaboy: Subsecretarla de la Mujer de la Naci6n, 1988: 
32). In 1980 this number was 15,354 and in 1987, 55,289 (FLACSO, 
lnstituto de la Mujer, 1993: 67). 
Table 9 compares the evolution of women's enrolment at the UBA Law 
School with the evolution of the general women's enrolment of UBA 
between 1964 and 1972. The situation described is one in which women 
seem to have been more numerous in the Law School than in other 





Table 9 - Womens' enrolment in UBA Law School and in 
the overall student population of UBA 1964 to 197238 





i -The training to become a lawyer at UBA 
The training to become a lawyer provides a very general education that 
allows for a great variety of activities. Since 1989 U BA has offered a 6-
year study plan divided into three sections: the CBC or one year 
introductory Common Basic Cycle followed by the CPC, a two and a half 
year period when students receive basic legal education, and the CPO, 
36 Public universities depending on the national government 
37 As the authors comment, the statistics for registration for the different careers do not go earlier 
fuan1941 · 
38Macklnson de Sorokln, Gladis: Revista de Sociologla del Derecho, No. 2 and 4 
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another two and a half-year cycle when the students receive more specific 
training. 
As part of the GPO, and for a period of one year, they work at the legal aid 
section of the Court, under faculty supervision, assisting clients who 
cannot afford to pay for a private lawyer. On average, it takes students 
between 6 and 8 years to graduate as lawyers. 
Once the students have completed the CPC, they become lawyers and 
they can further their education either going into specialised postgraduate 
courses or by doing a PhD. Lately, the offer of postgraduate courses has 
been improved and exchanges with foreign universities have been 
stimulated.39 However, since no further preparation is required to go into 
practice, most go into the profession. 
lt must be noted that, unlike England and other common Jaw countries, 
Argentina has a civil law tradition that does not differentiate barristers from 
solicitors and that there is no program of "in training" (training contract) 
after law school, as one could find in those countries. The fact is, 
however, that most law students work either in the courts or in private law 
firms while they study, in order to gain experience and mitigate the lack of 
practical training characteristic of their professional education. To be able 
to litigate, lawyers must become members of the "Colegio Publico de 
Abogados" (Bar Association) of the jurisdiction where they want to litigate; 
membership is a compulsory prerequisite to enter in the profession40• 
39 A newspaper article in "La Nacion", one of the most widely read newspapers in the country, 
recently remarked that the CBC (the one year introductory Common Basic Cycle) of the Law 
School at UBA had been by far the largest choice among the students entering UBA in 2000. The 
Law School at UBA Is densely populated, with more than 27000 students. Dr. Dalessio, the Dean 
of the UBA Law School explains the attraction of the Law School in terms of the variety of activities 
a law training allows for its graduates, who can go into public service, private law firms, the 
judiciary, or business companies. According to him, this makes a career In Law particularly 
attractive for the young people who are not very enthusiastic about a specific field of study, or do 
not have a strong vocation, but still want to go through further education. Moreover, the Dean 
points out that, compared to other careers, the study of law has always been more flexible, with 
fewer time requirements in terms of classes, in spite of the fact that it demands a lot of time of 
personal study. The Dean also explains that this flexible system allows students to concentrate the 
times and days of the classes and this mode makes it easier for law students to work. In fact 2/3 of 
the students work. La Nccl6n on·· line 06/07/00 
40 See chapter 3, section 11. 
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According to a study by Agulla, in 1989, women constituted 51% of the 
students of the UBA Law School. In the same study, Agulla pointed out 
that, in 1989, women tended to stay on and earn their degrees more than 
did men at UBA Law School. Agulla also highlighted that women 
constituted a larger proportion of the postgraduate students, a proportion 
that in some courses reached 90%. Socio-economic and cultural 
explanations about the roles of men and women account for this situation. 
In 1989, like nowadays, men were still seen as the main economic 
providers, while women retained the main responsibility for childcare and 
homemaking. Accordingly, while men may feel urged to abandon the 
University in order to make a living, women can afford to stay on and 
further their education. Postgraduate studies seem particularly convenient 
during certain phases of a woman's life cycle when domestic demands are 
very strong, especially in those cases in which women's income is not so 
crucial for the family budget. 
In 2000 the total number of law students at UBA amounts to 27,568, and 
is made up of 16,790 women (61%), and 10,778 men (39%)41 • In 2000, 
Law is the school with the highest enrolment in the Common Basic Cycle 
Course (a yearly initial introductory course every student must undergo), 
with 7231 students enrolled, or 11% of the total enrolment of UBA. This 
number has been increasing steadily for the last few years. A recent 
article published by "La Naci6n"42 mentions some preliminary findings of a 
pilot study according to which the student population of UBA Law School 
is largely made up by women (67%), under 30, attending the first years of 
the Law School and working while studying. 
The analysis of the hundreds of courses offered by UBA Law School each 
term shows that there is no course on gender and the law at the 
undergraduate level, and there are only two chairs -Family Law and 
41 Information provided by Dr. Brodsky, Academic Undersecretary of the UBA Law School in 2000. 
42 La Nacl6n is the most widely read national daily newspaper, See "La Nacion on line", 06/07/00 
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Constitutional Law- offering courses that take gender into consideration. 
This means that, if students do not choose these particular chairs among 
the number of existing chairs, they may become lawyers without receiving 
any instruction in such matters. 
m~women un postgraduate legal educaiioO'il 
From the 1980's onwards, postgraduate courses have flourished at the 
UBA Law School. These postgraduate courses could be assimilated to a 
postgraduate diploma, as they are less prestigious than a Master's 
degree. The UBA Law School does not offer Masters in Law. These 
postgraduate courses have become particularly popular with women 
students. 
As can be seen from table 1 o, except for the postgraduate course in 
Criminal Law (53.1% of men and 47.8% of women), where there are more 
men than women, the percentage of women is everywhere higher than 
that of the men. In Family Law women are a majority, with a proportion of 
81.2%. Women lawyers' preferred areas of specialisation after Family Law 
are Labour Law, with 60.5% and Natural Resources with 60.4%. In the 
rest of the specialisations, although the proportion of women is slightly 
higher, the number of women is very similar to that of men. This reality 
contrasts with that of the U K, where there are more men than women 
among the postgraduates (McGiynn, 1998: 24-26). 
As show in table 1 0 listing the topics of the postgraduate programmes. 
offered by UBA Law School, unlike what has happened in other schools 
within UBA, the Law School has made no attempt to develop 
postgraduate programmes. on gender, whereas the School of Psychology 
and the School of Philosophy have done so. However, some of the 
courses in the Family Law postgraduate program work with a gender 
perspective. Although not surprising, it is rather striking that the massive 
increase in the number of women entering into the study of law has not 
had a significant influence on the contents of legal education in UBA. 
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Table i o ~ Sltudlenlt partocopailolrll nlrll ltlh® posltgrradliUlalt® 
col!.!lrses alt the UIBA law Schooi ilrll1999 by se}{43 
ORIENTATION WOMEN MEN TOTAl %of 
women 
Criminal law 153 167 320 47.8 
Natural Resources 52 34 86 60.4 
Family Law 151 33 . 184 81.18 
Socio-legal studies44 16 14 30 53.3 
Administrative Law 55 48 103 53.3 
Labour law 43 28 71 60.50 
Corp_orative Law 68 54 122 55.73 
Ta){ation law 80 81 161 49.68 
TOTAL 618 459 1077 57.38 
Thus far I have considered the situation of women postgraduates 
undertaking postgraduate courses. In relation to PhDs, it is possible to 
trace the number that have obtained a PhD in Law from a list of the 
approved PhD Law theses published by the Postgraduate Office (Facultad 
de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, Departamento de Publicaciones, 
November 1999). Given that the names of the authors of the theses 
appear year by year according to the year of presentation of their PHD 
theses, an examination of the list provides an idea of the evolution in the 
female participation among the PhDs and whether gender plays any part 
in the choice of topics. 
As can be appreciated from Table 10, in 1999 women in postgraduate 
courses outnumbered men by almost 14%. The examination of Table 11 
shows, however, that the number of approved PhD theses presented by 
women has always been low and does not follow the general tendency 
towards the large increase in the registration of women that has taken 
place in university education since the 1960's. The titles of the theses do 
not suggest any noticeable tendency in terms of subject matter choice or 
43 Table provided by the Graduate Office of the UBA Law School In 2000. 
44 In spite of the name of the orientation, the course offered is Economic Law. 
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specialisation that could be accounted to gender. 
On the other hand, the number of PhD theses in general decreased from 
1974 onwards, especially in terms of PhD theses presented by men, while 
the number of PhD theses presented by women has remained low all 
along the fifty-year period. This could be partly explained as an effect of 
the military dictatorship that ruled the country between 1976 and 1983, 
and froze university life for quite a few years. Another possible explanation 
could be the availability of postgraduate courses from the 1980's, which 
the UBA Law School did not provide before. In the nineties, the expansion 
in the offer of postgraduate degrees such as Masters and PhDs in private 
Universities could be a factor explaining the low number of PhDs at the 
UBA. Law School. The main point to be taken into account is that, until 
recently, holding a PhD in Law did not make much of a difference in terms 
of enhancing employment opportunities. The existence of a new system 
for the selection of judges that has implied the introduction of a new 
rationalized selection procedure to account for and compare the 
candidate's merits might possibly change this State of affairs. In that 
sense, holding a PhD might make a difference for individual candidates 
applying for a post in the judiciary. Accordingly, there might be an increase 













• Table 11 o PhiD thleses for the period 1949a1999 
by year and! sex (in totals) 
Women Men Total Year Women lVI en 
0 13 13 1975 1 11 
0 12 12 1976 0 6 
2 22 24 1977 0 6 
4 42 42 1978 1 3 
0 40 40 1979 0 3 
0 25 25 1980. 4 3 
2 13 15 1981 3 6 
2 18 20 1982 1 4 
1 35 36 1983 2 8 


















1960 0 16 16 1986 0 1 1 
1961 1 18 19 1987 3 7 10 
1962 2 5 7 1988 1 10 11 
1963 3 11 14 1989 2 6 8 
1964 1 8 9 1990 2 7 9 
1965 0 14 14 1991 5 8 13 
1966 0 6 6 1992 3 4 7 
1967 0 14 14 1993 1 7 8 
1968 3 35 38 1994 4 6 10 
1969 10 68 78 1995 1 1 2 
1970 4 41 45 1996 1 0 1 
1971 3 18 21 1997 1 9 10 
1972 2 28 30 1998 2 8 10 
1973 2 16 18 1999 2 3 5 
1974 4 5 9 Total 90 697 787 
• VI ~ General Conclusions 
In this chapter, I presented an outline of the advent of women into public 
life in Argentina, described the main characteristics of the women's 
movement, the evolution of the family and of law regarding women and 
the family. In the second section of this chapter, an attempt was made to 
chart the process of incorporation of women into higher education, 
describing the massive entry of women into university education and the 
professions from the late sixties and early seventies, as the background 
for the study of the evolution of women in the legal professions in 
Argentina. Thi.s issue will be developed in the next chapter. 
Women's incorporation into public life in the 20th. century was a crucial 
element of the process of modernisation of Argentine society. This 
process encompassed women's massive access to the universities and 
into the labour market and was followed by important legal reforms, setting 
the scene for women's increased participation in Argentine society. 
In terms of political participation, the 20th century saw the advent of the 
women's movement, characterised by strong variations in terms of its 
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impetus and capacity to make an impact on Argentine society. The 
feminist movement was very vigorous at its early stages, from the turn of 
the century until1926, when civil rights for women were finally obtained. lt 
then entered a long period of lethargy, sporadically interrupted by 
relatively isolated campaigns. The early 1980's were somewhat of an 
exception in terms of women's activity. During the period of the transition 
to democracy the women's movement gathered strength vigour in the 
defence of human rights and women's demands. Following the restoration 
of democracy, the movement participated in campaigns leading to legal 
reforms to then fall, once again, into relative stagnation. Today, the 
Argentine women's m~>Vement could be described as quite marginal, weak 
and fragmented, lacking organisation and political presence at the level of 
party politics and non-governmental organisations. 
Although women from the lower classes had always worked outside the 
home, enlarged educational opportunities strongly influenced middle class 
women's prospects for employment. From the 1960's onward, a growing 
and steady tendency can be observed for women to obtain qualifications 
and participate in the labour market in positions that had previously been 
mainly occupied by men. 
Women's growing participation was particularly felt from the 1980's 
onwards, when the economic crisis and changes in the male labour 
market, such as growing male unemployment, promoted an increased 
participation of married women in paid work in order to compensate for the 
impact of structural adjustment and male unemployment on the family 
budget. This tendency had a significant effect on the family, with dual 
career families becoming more common, as well as families where both 
the husband and the wife participate in paid employment, apart from the 
professions. 
The pace of legal reform was unequal. Women were granted civil rights in 
the 1920's and political rights in the late1940's. The restoration of 
democracy in the 1980's brought profound changes in legislation 
regarding the family and women's labour law that marked a peak in terms 
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of the updating of the Argentine legal system. In particular, the fact that 
divorce became legal legitimated changes that were already taking place 
within Argentine society and gave visibility to alternative family structures 
such as stepfamilies where newly formed couples cohabit with their 
children and children from previous marriages. Towards the late 1990's 
and the beginning of the new century legal reforms mainly centred around 
quotas for political participation and reproductive rights. 
The striking expansion of higher education in the last fifty years 
encompassed significant changes in terms of the distribution of university 
enrolment along sex lines. With the massive entry of women into 
universities, many of the disciplines that had been male dominated 
exhibited dramatic changes in terms of the sex composition of their 
students, becoming gender-neutral or even female-dominated. Law 
appears as an example of the latter. The proportion of women among law 
students rose from 4.8% in 1941 to 61% in 2000. From the 1980's on, this 
high women participation in the enrolment of the UBA Law School 
expanded to the postgraduate levels. This growth in the proportion of 
women law students is the first cause for an increased participation of 
women within the legal professions. Its impact on the legal professions 
needs yet to be fully evaluated. lt is nevertheless striking that this 
enhanced feminine presence in the law School has not resulted in the 
inclusion of gender in the curriculum, has not produced a substantive 
critique of the law from a feminist perspective, and has definitely not 
brought about important changes in terms of the use of the courts to claim 
for women's issues. 
The societal changes overviewed in this chapter provide the backdrop for 
the study of women within the legal profession and contribute to explain 
the complex reality of the contemporary family, providing useful 
background information to understand the context within which the family 
judges work. The situation of women in the legal profession is the subject 
of the next chapter. lt is going to be of particular interest to explore the 
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effects of the massive entry of women into the study of Law and into 
different strands of the profession. 
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Chap~efl' 3 Q Woman ~awyefl'~ oii'D !Ba.nera~s Aofl'~es ~oday: ac~nvoaoes, 
specia~isaiioras and statlllls. 
This chapter represents the first comprehensive attempt to describe 
women's participation in the legal profession in Buenos Aires. 
In order to understand the participation of women within the judiciary it is 
essential to have a picture of the overall participation of women in the legal 
profession; to know about their opportunities, choices and preferences, 
about the options that are open to them and about how they are received 
by the professional community. This context can help us to understand the 
reason for such a relatively high proportion of women judges. 
A short digression will be necessary, however, in order to briefly situate 
the issue in the context of the main characteristics of Argentina's legal 
system, the structure of the legal profession and the role of lawyers in 
society. lt is not my intention to provide a complete picture of the Argentine 
legal system, but only of those aspects that are relevant to this study 1• 
!I a Argentina's legal system and the characteristics of 
the legal profession on Buenos Aires 
1· Argentina's legal system and its judiciary 
Argentina is a federation; as such, its justice system is extremely intricate. 
lt is divided into various levels that correspond to the different jurisdictions: 
federal, provincial and municipal according to a hierarchy corresponding to 
the three instances: the First Instance Courts, the Courts of Appeal and 
the Supreme Court. lt is also split into sections related to the subject 
matters involved: -Criminal, Labour, Administrative, Civil, Family and 
Electoral Courts, among others. There are no lay magistrates, or juries in 
Argentina. 
1 For more details on Argentina's legal system, see Cueto Rua, 2000 
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Unlike the UK's, with a common law legal system, Argentina's legal 
system lies within the civil tradition. Being a judge in a common law legal 
system is presumed to be very different from being a judge in a continental 
or civil legal system. This presumption comes from the fact that 
comparisons between the two are usually made with ideal models rather 
than with real life judges in mind. 
In the next few paragraphs, I present the stereotype of the judge and 
his/her activity within each legal tradition. Within a civil legal system judges 
are not supposed to create and mould the law to treat similar cases alike 
according to judicial precedent in the way judges in a common law system 
do. Instead, they are meant to be scholars who interpret the statutes 
following strict procedural and logical rules. As Merryman puts it, in a civil 
system the judges speak the law, they are "the mouth of the law". In that 
context, the judge operates a machinery designed by the legislator, 
someone who performs the "very important but mechanically, narrow, 
uncreative function of applying the law to the concrete facts of each case" 
(Merryman, 1969: 34-38). 
In a common law system, the judge's appointment comes relatively late in 
life as the crowning of a very successfullegalcareer. They are well known, 
very powerful and prestigious persons who do not belong to the State 
bureaucracy, but are seen as mediators between the State and the public. 
This is especially so in the United States, where judges may have an 
active political stance in public matters, although not in England, where the 
tradition is for judges to be non-political, 
In a civil law system, instead, the judicial career is one of the choices a 
lawyer can make early in his/her career when he/she finishes law school. 
They usually start at the lower echelons in the judicial career and then 
work up into senior levels. In a civil law system, judges constitute a power 
within the nation and they are civil servants, a part of the State 
bureaucracy enjoying the prestige any high ranked official does. Yet 
130 
his/her role is not thought to be so very important as that of a judge within 
the common law. Under this ideal model, and unlike the American 
common law judge, the civil law judge should not become involved with 
political matters or interfere with the other republican powers. He/she 
should only speak through his/her Judgements. 
The two models epitomise the tensions between formality, modernity, 
rationality, and security on the one hand, and with antiquity, irrationality, 
contextuality and discretion on the other. The previous description 
describes orthodox theoretical models rather than actual judges within one 
or the other legal tradition. As Merryman puts it: "The important distinction 
between the common law and the civil law judicial processes does not lie 
in what the courts in fact do, but in what the dominant folklore tells them 
they do" (Merryman, 1969: 47) 
In fact, both systems have evolved to incorporate new characteristics. 
More and more statute law is promulgated in the common law countries, 
counteracting the judge's discretion, and even judges interpreting statute 
in the civil law system must exercise discretion. Furthermore, new courts 
allowing for judicial review of the statutes are being created in countries 
with a civil law tradition and, more and more often, the judges see 
themselves in need to interpret written statutes -not always a self-evident 
process- in the light of the facts of the cases. lt has by now become quite 
clear that, irrespectively of the legal tradition -common law/civil tradition-
the judges do not often find all the answers in the statute. The need to 
interpret the law arises again and again. Thus, if one considers that the 
application of the law is not mechanical, but implies an interpretation and 
is mediated by the worldview of the judge, as Mackinson and Goldstein put 
it "Apart from implying the interpretation of the law, in a broad sense, each 
Judgement transcends the ideology of the judge" (Mackinson, 1987: 78}, it 
becomes obvious that the judge's worldview, personality and culture come 
to play a very important role in the process of interpretation. Seen in that 
perspective, neutrality on the part of the judge becomes another myth 
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sustaining both legal systems2 . This is particularly important in the context 
of this research, given that I intend to explore gender differences in the 
way the judges perform, think and speak about their work3. 
Fucito (2002: 92) conducted a survey among judges looking at Argentine 
judges' actual practices and at how they situate themselves in terms to the 
antinomy between the judge "scholar" and the judge "hero". He came to 
the conclusion that the law performs a very vague role amidst the mosaic 
of interpretations that constitute the judges' daily practices. As a matter of 
fact, Fucito's study showed that, irrespectively of the section of the 
judiciary they belonged to, most of the judges in his research manifested 
to resort comfortably to equity, understood as the faculty of the judge to 
mitigate the harshness of the written law, depending on the individual 
case. The law, within which they move with relative freedom, appears as a 
general outline that orients their action. To Fucito, Argentine judges' 
empirical homemade approach to decision-making is far from the 
formalistic ideal of the civil law judge. Given that the judges make 
decisions with important effects on the lives of those involved in legal 
conflicts, and these decisions are not only based on the law, but also on 
their own values and worldviews, it becomes relevant to enquire into the 
values underlying these decisions. Later in the thesis4, my own analysis 
focuses on this aspect of adjudication highlighted by Fucito. 
3 - The system of judicial appointment 
Until 1994, the president appointed judges with the agreement of a senate 
committee. They were elected for life and could only be removed through 
a senate impeachment. There was only one case of a judge's 
impeachment in more than 140 years. The old system of appointment of 
judges, consisting of the executive nomination of a candidate and its 
appointment by the senate, had often been highlighted as one of the 
2 See further chapter 1, section 111-2- b ii, for a feminist theoretical discussion of neutrality 
3 See discussion on gender in adjudication in chapter 1 , section Ill of this thesis. 
4 See Chapter 5, section lll-2.c.iv. 
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reasons for the traditional dependency of the judiciary on the executive. 
Such a system, which prevailed for over one hundred years, was highly 
politicised and damaged the reputation of the judiciary. As Fucito (2002: 
62-63) argued, to become a judge, the candidate needed to have political 
influence. Likewise, the processes of both nomination and appointment of 
judges were themselves political. "Ciientelism" -understood as political 
patronage- and nepotism flourished within the judiciary, jeopardizing 
technical and ethical competences, the two basic requirements to occupy 
a public post. 
The National Constitutional Reform of 1994 brought about a change in the 
system of appointment of the judges5• A new collegiate agency was then 
constitutionally introduced for the selection, nomination, sanction and 
removal of judges. The "Consejo de la Magistratura" (Judgeship Council); 
an institution constituted by members of the executive, the parliament, the 
legal academy and the associations of lawyers and judges was 
established. The proportion in which each of these sectors should be 
represented within the Council of a total of 20 members was not specified 
in the National Constitution, so it took various years to reach a consensus 
about the constitution of the new agency. For a few years, this left the 
country without a system to appoint judges with the consequent problems 
such a vacuum brought about. Today, the balance within the "Judgeship 
Council" is made up in the following way: The president of the Council is 
the President of the Supreme Court and there are 4 representatives of the 
judges, 8 of the legislature, 4 of the lawyers, 2 of the academics and 1 of 
the executive. 
In the new institutional organisation, the "Judgeship Council" has to 
organise the process of selection of candidates to become judges. For 
each vacant post, it presents the President with three candidates, among 
whom he chooses one. A Senate committee then approves the 
nomination. The new system is supposed to bring about transparency into 
the process and eventually make the judiciary more independent from the 
5 National Constitution, art. 114. 
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government. The Council has been in operation for over two years now, 
but it has been very much criticised for its very low performance in terms 
of both nominating and removing judges. Since the new system 
maintained . the roles of the executive and the senate in the process of 
appointment of the judges, its discretionary character was not fully 
eradicated. lt just rendered the previous process of selection more rational 
and professional and set some limits on overt political discretion. 
A lawyer must practise for five years before becoming eligible to be 
nominated as a judge. No special training is required in Argentina to 
become a judge. Recently, some private and public universities have 
started specialised courses for those who wish to go into the judiciary. 
Such courses, although by no means compulsory, offer an option for those 
who wish to further their education and the possibility to obtain an 
advantage in the process of selection of candidates that the "Judgeship 
Council" should hold. 
4 a The role of lawyers in Argentine society 
In Argentina lawyers play an important role in political life and participate 
actively within the three powers of the State. The judiciary is made up 
exclusively of lawyers, who are also present in important numbers in the 
executive and the legislatures. The three democratically elected presidents 
after the recovery of democracy in 1983 were lawyers, as are more than 
half of the members of Congress. Undoubtedly, this is a profession with 
close ties to political power. 
As Ralph Dahrendorf argues, lawyers and jurists make 60% of all the 
important decisions in a society with rule of law. In the process of 
democratic reconstruction, during the transition to and reconstruction of 
democracy in the country, lawyers in the various fields of law have 
certainly played a very important role in Argentina (Dahrendorf, 1982 cited 
by Agulla, 1990: 19). Given that the rule of law, equality before the law and 
an enhanced citizenship should be among the basic tenets of an aspiring 
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democratic order, the relevance of lawyers in contemporary Argentine 
society should not be understated. 
After the terrible human rights violations typical of the period of the military 
dictatorship that the country underwent between 1976 and 1983, lawyers' 
participation has been crucial in the process of re-establishing respect for 
human rights and the rule of law within Argentine society. How to cope 
with the horrors of that obscure period was a political matter that involved 
the whole of society after democracy was recovered. Lawyers certainly 
proved to be very influential within this process that is still under way. 
On the other hand, as public deliberation and political circumstances led to 
the b·elief that a Constitution promulgated 150 years ago had proved 
inadequate and did not provide enough guarantees to safeguard a truly 
democratic society, a process in favour of constitutional reform originated. 
That process finally led to the 1994 Constitutional Reform and there, 
again, lawyers played an important role. 
Ill a Women in the ~aw in Buenos Aires 
1 a Introduction 
At the end of the previous chapter, I examined the representation of 
women among law students at UBA. In this chapter, I examine the impact 
of the increased participation of women Law students in the legal 
profession. I consider women as legal academics and in legal practice and 
study women in the judiciary. This will provide the essential background to 
my research on women judges. 
This endeavour and the difficulties it poses should be seen in the context 
of a country with a culture and tradition of neglect regarding information 
and access to it. Accordingly, Argentina has not invested many resources 
or energy in building a good national statistical system. Thus, it is rather 
lacking in terms of keeping historical anal statistical records in general. The 
situation is even more precarious with respect to statistics disaggregated 
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by sex and referring to small numbers of relatively privileged middle class 
women. Unlike the circumstances current in more developed countries 
such as the UK, Australia, Canada and the United States, where there is a 
great wealth of studies and, consequently great availability of quantitative 
data on women in the legal professions, the matter has not aroused much 
interest in Argentina and thus statistics are practically non-existent. This is 
not peculiar to the legal professions. Actually, the status of women in the 
professions in general does not seem to have drawn much attention 
locally. 
As a matter of fact, this chapter is the first comprehensive attempt to 
describe women's participation in the legal profession in Buenos Aires. 
Neither the various lawyers' associations nor the university have ever 
attempted such an undertaking. Ideally, a study of this type would require 
data referring to all the areas in which lawyers work. However, this is not a 
straightforward endeavour since, as mentioned, most of the relevant data 
are not available. Thus, in spite of my exhaustive efforts to obtain as many 
data as possible from secondary sources and to produce my own, it was 
not possible for me to bridge some of the gaps in the information obtained. 
Fortunately, this culture is already changing towards a larger inclusion of 
sex disaggregated data in national statistics, as a result of the 
engagements assumed by the Argentine government in the International 
Women's Conference held by the United Nations in Beijing in '94 in terms 
of reporting to the United Nations the advances on the enforcement of the 
CEDAW6. Additionally, Argentine women NGOs (Non Governmental 
Organizations) are preparing their own "shadow reports" on the 
enforcement of the CEDAW7• Hopefully, following this trend towards the 
production of gender indicators, in due course, the culture will change and 
the lawyers' associations and universities will care to go beyond the record 
of the gender composition of their membership. In the meantime, however, 
research on the issue needs to start from a very low base, since there are 
6 http://www.cnm.gov.arLarcolnterv/particpolit(lugdedecls.htm 
7 See, for Instance: Gels et all: CONTRINFORME, 2000. 
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few previous studies that refer only partly to some of the issues relevant to 
this research. 
2 ~Women Faculty at the UBA law School 
Having examined in the previous chapter the representation of women 
among law students, this section will move on to consider the position of 
women legal academics. This is a very important realm of activity for law 
graduates. In Argentina, full-time university law teachers are very rare. 
Most teach on a part-time basis while also working in private practice or in 
the judiciary. Law teaching is therefore mainly a part time activity that 
provides great prestige and little money. Being a law teacher is 
undoubtedly regarded as a strategy for lawyers to ascend in the 
occupational ladder into other branches of the profession (Mackinson and 
Goldstein, 1978: 80; Agulla, 1990). 
a ~ Structure of the Law School faculty 
Clearly, the professional structure of universities varies considerably from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In this section I attempt to provide a rough 
explanation of the UBA Law School faculty structure. In the UBA Law 
School there are 8 departments: 2 departments of Public Law, and one of 
each of the following departments: Criminal Law, Private Law, Philosophy 
of Law, Labour Law, Socio-legal Department and Corporate Law. Related 
subject matters are organised under one department. Each department 
offers various courses and hosts more than one chair for each course. 
Table 12 illustrates this structure and shows the courses offered by each 
department. 
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Tab~e ~2 ~ Coi!Jrses offered by department at UBA 
law School 
Department Number of Courses 
chairs 
Public Law (2 departments) 6 Theory of the State 
8 Constitutional Law 
4 Human Rights 
6 Administrative Law 
4 International Public Law 
Criminal Law 14 Criminal law and procedure 
Private Law 7 Civil law (chairs), 
6 Civil and Commercial duties 
8 Civil and Commercial Contracts 
5 Property law 
8 Family Law and Inheritances 
4 International Private Law 
Philosophy of Law 8 General Theory of Law 
labour law 7 Labour Law and Social Security 
Soclo-legal 5 Economic and Financial Analysis 
Corporate Law 12 Commercial Law 
Each Chair is headed by one "Profesor Titular" (Professor). This post is 
followed in the hierarchy by the "Profesor Asociado" (Associate Professor), 
who, in turn, is followed by the "Professor Adjunto" (Adjunct Professor). 
The "Profesores titulares" (Professors) correspond to the highest post in 
the teaching hierarchy. They are in charge of the chair, followed by the 
"Asociados" (Associate Professors) and then by the "Adjuntos" (Adjunct 
Professors). In the lower ranks of the faculty hierarchy come those going 
through the teacher training scheme: the "Auxiliaries" who work assisting 
in practical work and tutor the students in small seminars, but do not 
normally lecture. 
Traditionally, until quite recently, faculty members were appointed to 
occupy their teaching posts without going through a contest. However, in 
the last 8 years, and particularly after 1995, as the result of the process of 
reorganisation of tho Law School, there has been a movement within the 
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academy towards making these posts obtainable through a selection 
contest. This process has been gradually put into practice and, given the 
high number of faculty members, it is taking a very long time. The new 
rules apply to all faculty members. All new appointees need now to go 
through a selection involving an open public contest. Even those faculty 
members who have held their posts for years have now to go through the 
process to be ratified in their posts. The same applies to those who want 
to proceed in the hierarchy. In addition, all members of the law faculty 
need to go through a selection contest every 7 years to retain their posts. 
The fact that there are so few full-time university teachers accounts for the 
very high numbers of faculty members, since the large majority work only 
part-time. As mentioned above, faculty members fall into three categories 
in terms of hierarchy. Additionally, each category breaks into two 
categories according to whether the faculty member has already gone 
through the selection process and his/her post has been ratified. In that 
way, if the faculty member has gone through the process of selection, 
he/she is a "regular" member of the faculty. If he/she is still waiting to go 
through the process of selection, he/she is an "interino" (provisional) 
member of the university staff. The whole process of holding those 
selection procedures is taking a few years. Consequently, there are still 
many faculty members who have not gone through the selection process 
and have not yet become "regular" faculty members. 
In addition, faculty members can hold a full-time, a semi-exclusive or a 
part-time position. Faculty who work full-time have a 45-hour working week 
and are excluded from working as lawyers. Faculty who have a semi-
exclusive position have a 15-hour working week and, unlike those who 
work full-time, can work privately as lawyers. Finally, part-time faculty 
members have only a three-hour working week and no restrictions to their 
private practice. 
Similarly, the situation of faculty auxiliaries has changed. A training 
scheme has been organised for those who wish to become faculty 
members at the USA Law School. To do so, once the candidate obtains a 
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law degree and hence becomes a lawyer, if he/she wants to go into 
teaching he/she has to pass an examination to enter into the teacher-
training career or "carrera docente" and thus becomes an Auxiliary to a 
faculty member. The lower rank of the teaching career is the "ayudante de 
2a." or "2nd class auxiliary". Once he/she has taken some special courses, 
assisted in teaching for two years, he/she needs to pass another exam to 
then become a 151 class Auxiliary. He/she has to go through some further 
courses, assist in teaching for another two years and pass a new exam to 
become a "Chief of Practical Work" or "Assistant professor", who again 
goes through a similar process involving teaching and passing another 
exam: After that, if there is a vacancy for a post as an "Adjunto" or Adjunct 
professor, he/she can participate in a selection contest and eventually 
become one. During the 6 years of the Teacher Training Scheme, aspiring 
university teachers dedicate a lot of time and energy to this training, 
making hardly any money. Although transiting the teacher-training scheme 
is not the only way to enter the teaching career, it is certainly the most 
common one. Yet, a faculty member coming from another Law School or 
from another country, could, for instance, aspire to participate in a . 
selection contest. 
b a Women's situation within the law faculty in 19898 
The first study of legal academics was published by Agulla in 1989. I will 
first examine the situation for 1989 as discussed by Agulla before 
considering the changes that have taken place since then (Agulla, 1990: 
26). 
Table 13 shows the distribution of women and men faculty members at the 
USA Law School according to the hierarchy of their teaching posts in the 
horizontal axis of the table and to the condition of their activity in the 
vertical axis of the table. 
8 The lack of a central statistics office at UBA.made it impossible to obtain information from a single 
source. This explains slight differences in the figures corresponding to the same data. Time 
differences within the same year and different measurement criteria could be made accountable for 
such diHerences. Whenever possible, an effort was made to check the data and to establish 








Tab~® 13Q UIBA law Sclhoo~ ~ac{l.O~fty, ~ccor((j]ong ft© 
selt, ca~egoH)f and stat® o~ acttivity on 19899 
"TITULARES" "ASOCIADOS" "ADJUINTOS" 
w i\ll w IVi w M 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
0 0 2 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 8 0.6 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0.4 70 5.6 1 0 21 8 58 4.6 192 15.4 
4 0.3 36 2.8 1 0 9 0.7 251 20.1 585 46.9 
9 0,7 116 9 2 0.1 33 2.6 309 24.7 777 62.3 
In 1989, faculty members added up to a total of 1 ,246 between men and 
women, comprising 320 women and 926 men. Women were 24.8% of the 
faculty and men, 75.3%. As can be seen from tables 13 and 15, women 
concentrated on the lower ranks of the teachers' hierarchy: "Adjuncts" and 
"Auxiliaries", who were pursuing the teacher-training scheme. The 
proportion of women was almost zero at the highest levels of the hierarchy 
and quite high among the lower ranks. There were no women among the 
"Emeritus10" or the "Consultos"11 in 1989, which was not surprising, given 
that there were very few women lawyers aged between 65 and 70 at the 
time. Agulla also suggests that in 1989 there were more women than men 
in full-time teaching and that, in general, women usually worked longer 
hours than men. In 1989, law teaching was more of a central activity for 
women than for men. This has usually been associated with the fact that, 
in Argentina, men are still the main economic providers and women the 
ones who retain the main responsibility for homemaking and childcare. 
Teaching schemes allow for more flexible timetables but pay lower 
salaries. Women's being the second salary, they can afford to dedicate 
more time to teaching. This explanation is very similar to the one provided 
in the previous chapter to explain the reason for the larger numbers of 
9 After Agulla (1990: 26). 
10 
"Emeritus" are "profesores titulares" or "professors" past the age of retirement (60) who have 
gone through the category "consultos" for five years and remain as "honorary" members of the staff. 
11 The category "consulios" corresponds to "profcsores titulareo" or "professors" past the age of 
retirement (60) who still remain at the University for 5 more years with fewer responsibilities and 
lower payment. 
141 
women undertaking postgraduate degrees. 
In addition, Agulla remarks that in 1989 women tended to participate in 
greater numbers in the more formative areas of law teaching, that is to say 
in those courses that related less to the technical specialities. Accordingly, 
we see that in 1989 women were under-represented among the senior 
levels of the university teaching staff and segregated according to 
specialities. 
The tables shown below were produced by myself on the basis of the 
information gathered. Table 14 shows the distribution of the UBA Law 
faculty according to their sex and position for 2000. I will compare the 
present situation with the situation described by Agulla for 1989 in order to 
trace the evolution in women's participation within the Law Faculty. Most 
posts have been the object of competition, and nowadays faculty members 
who have not gone through the process hardly reach 5%, while, as shown 
in table 13, they were a large proportion of the faculty in 1989. 
Talbie ~4 - UBA Law Schoo~ facl!.llii~ by seJt 
and category in 200012 (rregiUIIsur Sllllldlllllollll rregularr13) 
Category Men Women o/ooi 
Women 
Emeritos 15 0 0 
Titulares consultos 24 3 12.5 
Asociados consultos 2 0 0 
Tltulares 95 17 17.8 
Asociados 8 6 43 
Adjuntos 333 159 47.7 
Total 477 185 38.7 
As explained above, regular faculty members are those who have gone 
through a selection contest to obtain the ratification of their posts. 
Compared with the numbers mentioned by Agulla in 1989, the number of 
faculty members that has not gone through the process today has 
12 Information provided by Dr. Lilia Freire of the Board of Directors of the Law School at the UBA 
13 As was eltplained above, the regular members of the faculty are those who have already gone 
through a selection process in order to be confirmed in their posts, whereas those who have not are 
"lnterinos", non-regular or provisional faculty members. 
142 
diminished greatly and amounts to no more than 5% of the total number. 
As already mentioned, in 2000 the regular faculty of the UBA Law School 
amounted to 670 (100%), 485 (72.38%) men and 185 women (27.61%)14• 
If we compare this table with that of 1989, we can see that, although there 
are still no women "emeritus professors", there are some (3) "consultos" 
and the number of women among the "professors" ("titulares") has 
increased considerably, together with the number of "adjunct professors" 
("adjuntos"). While not on equal terms yet, women are certainly 
participating more actively within the UBA Law School than they did in 
1989, and have gone up in the university hierarchy. Still, in spite of the fact 
that women's participation has ihcreased considerably since 1989, table 
14 clearly shows that, in general terms, the proportion of women still 
decreases as one goes up in the university hierarchy, showing an 
important degree of hierarchical gender segregation. My findings coincide 
with those of a recent survey (mentioned in chapter 2) that found that, in 
2000, the majority of the faculty members of the UBA law School were 
men under 40, ranked as "adjuntos" (adjunct professors) and 94% of them 
also worked privately as lawyers (San Martin, 2000: 12) 15• 
As explained above, those who want to become faculty members at the 
UBA Law School undergo a long process of preparation or "carrera 
docente". The "Auxiliaries" play a very important role in teaching, marking 
exams and other related activities. As Table 15 shows, according to Agulla 
(1990: 41), in 1989 the number of women was 799 (44.3%) and the 
number of men was 924 (55.7 %). Women constituted a large proportion 
of those who were undergoing the teacher-training scheme; still, the 
number of men was higher. At the same time, in 1989, considering that the 
faculty members added up to a total of 1 ,246 between men and women, 
320 women (24.79%) and 926 men (75.31%), it can be observed that the 
proportion of women in the teacher training scheme was much higher than 
the proportion of women among faculty members. Given that the teacher-
training scheme is the main way to become a faculty member, this 
14 Information provided by Dr. Brodsky, Academic Undersecretary of the Law School at the UBA 
15 San Martin: La Naci6n, July 10, 2000: 12. 
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suggests that in 1989 women were already pushing their way into the law 
faculty, anticipating a future increase in the proportion of women in the 
UBA Law faculty. However, the rise in the proportion of women within 
those attending the teacher-training scheme is not reflected on the 
numbers or proportions of women within the faculty members in 2000, with 
485 men (72.38%) and 185 women (27.61 %) out of a total number of 
67016• 
Category Men Men Women Women Total % 
% % 
Chiefs of 240 63.32 139 36.67 379 100 
practical work 
1st. class 172 58.70 121 41.29 293 100 
auxiliaries 
2"d·class 512 48.71 539 51.28 1051 100 
auxiliaries 
TOTAl 924 53.62 799 46.37 1723 100 
In table 16, I look into the gender composition of the teacher-training 
scheme for 2000. This should provide an indication of the gender 
composition of the future faculty. Compared to the proportion of women in 
the teacher-training scheme in 19891 the proportion of women has risen 
considerably (from 46.3% to 52.5%). This would suggest that, in the future, 
there could be a quantitative feminisation of the Law faculty. 
Table 16 ~Auxiliaries by hierarchy and sex in 200017: 
Category Men Men Women Women Total % 
% % 
Chiefs of practical work 321 47.7 352 52.3 673 100 
19t. Class auxiliaries 190 42.1 261 57.8 451 100 
2"d.class auxiliaries 1120 48.4 1191 51.5 2311 100 
Total 1631 47.4 1804 52.5 3435 100 
16 lnformatlon provided by Dr. Brodsky, Academic Undersecretary of the Law School at the UBA 
17 Information provided by Dr. M6nlca Pinto, the Academic Secretary of the Law School 
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As stated above, faculty working full-time have a 45-hour working week 
and work exclusively for the university. Faculty in the intermediate 
category, with a semi-exclusive work position, work a 15-hour week, and 
those in the part-time category work only three hours weekly. Neither of 
the two latter categories have any work restrictions. 
The vast majority· of the faculty members, 453 men corresponding to 
93.4% of the men and 154 women corresponding to 83.4% of the women 
work part-time. As is clear from table 17, out of the 670 members of the 
Law faculty in the UBA Law School, only 15, (7 men and 8 women) work 
full-time at the university. 
• lable 17 a Fullatime faculty by sex and category16 
Category· Men Women 
Tltulares excluslvos 4 1 
Ad]untos exciuslvos 3 7. 
If we consider these numbers in terms of the percentage of the total faculty 
members, we can see that the proportion of full-time faculty is very low, 
representing only 2.2% of the whole faculty. Women and men working full-
time represent 1.2% and 1% respectively of the total law faculty1 9• 
However, when we look at the proportions within genders, we can see that 
men full-time faculty represent 1.4% of the total men faculty while women 
full-time law faculty represent 4.5% of the total women faculty. This means 
that, considered against the total men/ women law faculty, the proportion 
of women from the law faculty working full-time is larger than the same 
proportion for the men faculty members. Three main reasons can be 
invoked to explain the very small numbers of the full-time law faculty 
("profesores con dedicaci6n exclusiva"). In the first place, there are 
budgetary restrictions. The university cannot afford to pay many full-time 
18 Same as 12 
19 Same as 12 
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teachers. On the other hand, the low salaries offered by the university do 
not stimulate full-time participation, especially since the faculty members 
with full-time dedication are not allowed to work as lawyers. As noted 
when analysing the same trend for 1989, the sexual division of labour 
inside the family may determine that, while men remain the main economic 
providers, women retain the main responsibility for homemaking and 
childcare. In such a context, due to the low salaries in teaching, men 
cannot afford to teach on a full-time basis while, compared to professional 
practice, teaching schemes allow for more flexible arrangements that 
seem to suit women's domestic roles better, even when they choose to 
teach on a full-time basis. 
There is a third category called "semi-exclusive", between the full-time and 
the part-time type positions in terms of the working hours faculty members 
dedicate to the university. Table 18 shows the proportion of men and 
women within this category. 
• Table 18~ Faculty members with semi-exclusive 
dedication by category and sex in 2000 
Category Men Women 
Titular 16 7 
Asociados 1 2 
Adjunto B 14 
Total 25 23 
The numbers in table 18 suggest that, for the same reasons invoked to 
interpret the higher proportion of women among the full-time members of 
staff, when men are not required to relinquish the profession, they 
maintain a high participation in teaching. 
Table 19 examines the salary levels according to category and to 
employment position in terms of working hours. Even if men and women 
faculty members are paid the same, the examination of the low salaries 
awarded to all teaching categories supports the above hypotheses related 
to gender segregation in the law faculty, associated with differential roles 
for men and womon within the family. 
146 
• Table ~9 = Month~y Sa~arue$20 at tlhe UBA law 
School, by categorry and type of position in 2000 
(in US$)21 
Type of position 
POST Full-time Semi- exclusive Part time 
Titular 1042 576 225 
Asociado 955 540 211 
Adjunto 850 446 178 
e =Women's role withiD'll the University power structure 
Table 20 organises the authorities of UBA Law School according to their 
hierarchy and sex. Of the 1 0 key posts of the of the University of Buenos 
Aires Law School, the two higher posts are occupied by men, and only 
three are occupied by women. Neither the Dean nor the Vice Dean are or 
ever were women. 
The Executive Board at UBA Law School is made up of representatives of 
the faculty, of the legal profession and of the students. In 2000 there were 
only 3 women among the 16 members of the Executive Board of U BA Law 
School: 2 of the 8 representatives of the faculty, none of the 4 members 
representing the legal profession and 1 of the 4 members representing the 
students. lt is interesting to note that although men are the majority among 
the authorities of the UBA Law School, most of the posts occupied by men 
are honorific and prestigious but require less time and actual work. In 
contrast, the three posts occupied by women are crucial from the 
organisational point of view, and require full-time work. In terms of their 
functions, each of the three posts occupied by women require academic 
expertise and organisational skills, particularly in a period of reorganisation 
of the institution. The Academic Secretary is the person in charge of the 
co-ordination of all the courses provided by the university each semester, 
and of the relationship with the faculty members teaching those subjects. 
20 Salaries increase with seniority, up to 120% after 30 years of service 
21 Information provided by Or. Mackinson, vice-director of ihe Giojei Socio-legal Research Institute 
of the UBA Law School. 
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From 1995 on, this post currently held by a woman, has also to deal with 
the organisation of the recently implemented faculty selection contests. 
The woman in charge of Postgraduate, Research and PhDs secretariats 
with a huge task to perform has produced significant changes in the 
organisation of the postgraduate area. The Secretary of Institutional 
Relations is in charge of all the grants and of all the national and 
international institutional relations of the Law School. She has to take care 
of foreign students and Argentine students sent to study abroad by the 
university. Additionally, these women have continued with their teaching 
responsibilities. These findings coincide with research results in many 
jurisdictions that show that women academics tend to concentrate on this 
kind of ~~housekeeping" jobs (McGiynn, 1998: 46; Thornton, 1997: 106-
129; Wells, 2003). 
Table 20 Q UBA AUJtholl'ities on 1999 by se:u:22 
POST WOMAN MAN 
DEAN X 
VICEDEAN X 
ACADEMIC SECRETARY X 
UNIVERSITY EXTENSION SECRETARY X 
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION X 
SECRETARY 
SECRETARY OF RESEARCH AND PhD X 
SECRETARY OF INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS X 
ACADEMIC UNDERSECRETARY X 
TECHNICAL UNDERSECRETARY X 
The question remains contentious whether it could be expected that, 
eventually, the tremendous increase in the number of women law students 
is going to even out men and women's participation within the Law faculty. 
As table 20 shows, men still hold the most authoritative posts within the 
university structure. The aspiration to equality requires more than just 
increasing the number of women. Although this is a necessary condition, it 
is nevertheless not a sufficient one. Women still have to advance much 
farther to share authoritative positions within the university organisation. 
22 Source: Unlversldad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Derecho y Cienclas Soclales. Ofarta de 
Cursos de Posgrado 1999, Segundo Semestre Depto de Posgrado. 
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f - Areas of specialisation of women and men within the university 
In this section I trace the number of men and women in each department 
of the CPC, Common Professional Cycle23 in order to be able to examine 
the preferred specialities by sex24• 
Table 21 - Regular faculty members of the CPC by 
department and sex in 200025 
Department Men Women T %W 
Public law"11 94 28 122 22.9 
Criminal Law"' 48 14 62 22.5 
Private Law"11 120 79 199 39.6 
Philosophy of Law"11 43 15 58 25.8 
Labour Lawau 19 7 26 26.9 
Soclo-le~al 23 4 27 14.8 
Studies 1 
Corporate Lawa" 68 20 88 22.7 
Total 423 167 590 28.3 
23 The Common Professional Cycle corresponds to the first three years of study, common to all law 
students irrespectively of their later specialisation. 
24 See section 111-2 a and table 12 for a description of the organisation of the departments. 
25 See Table 12 above 
26 The two departments of Public Law offer the following courses: Theory of the State {6 chairs) 
Constitutional Law (8chairs) Human Rights (4 chairs) Administrative Law (6 chairs), International 
Public Law (4 chairs) 
27 The department of Criminal Law offers the following course: Criminal law and procedure {14 
Chairs) 
28 The department of Private Law offers the following courses: Civil Law (7chairs), Civil and 
Commercial duties (6 chairs), Civil and Commercial Contracts {8 chairs), Property Jaw (5 chairs), 
Family Law and Inheritances (8chairs), International Private Law (4chairs) 
29 The department of Philosophy of Law offers the following course: General Theory of Law (8 
Chairs) 
30The department of Labour Law offers the following course: Labour Law and Social Security (7 
chairs) 
31 The Socio-legal Department offers the following course: Economic and Financial Analysis 
(5Chairs) 
32 The Department of Corporate Law offers the following course: Commercial Law (12 Chairs) 
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Table 21 shows the distribution of men and women among the different 
departments. The average participation of women law faculty is around 
28%, the department with the highest proportion of women within its 
faculty is by far Private Law, and the department with the smallest 
proportions of women is Socio-Legal Studies. Considering that most 
faculty members also work as lawyers this suggest that women, in fact, 
must work in the area of private law and that, although the Department of 
Private Law is not just Family Law, this seems consistent with the belief 
that many women lawyers practise family law. This is of particular 
importance for this research, since the high proportion of women in Family 
Law at the University coincides with the high proportion of women family 
law judges and with the very high proportion of women taking up the 
Family Law postgraduate specialisation. 
Along the same lines, there are 8 possible specialisations for postgraduate 
courses in Law; with a director each. Three out of the eight directors are 
women, the directors of the Family Law, Socio-legal Studies and 
Administrative Law specialisations. This suggests that, among the 
specialities, whether by preference or because they are pushed into these 
areas, women tend to be more numerous in Family Law and in the more 
politically oriented courses. 
g a Women in the teaching hierarchy 
Table 21 shows how women faculty participate in the different specialities 
at the UBA Law School In this section, I compare the different departments 
in order to examine the women's participation As can be appreciated from 
tables 22 and 23, the departments with the largest proportions of women 
in high positions are Private Law, Labour Law and Public Law which, as 
we were just observing, are the departments with the largest proportions of 
women. McGiynn has noted a similar tendency in the UK for women to 
hold more senior posts in those departments with more women overall 
(McGiynn, 1998: 47). This is interesting since, as shall be seen later in 
section IV where I consider the participation of women within the different 
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branches of the judiciary, the sections of the judiciary with the highest 
proportions of women are also the Family Courts and the Labour Courts. 
Table 22- Faculty members by category, department and 
sex, for 2000 
Department WOMEN MEN 
Tltu- Aso- Adjun~ Tltu- Aso- Adjun- T 
Lares cl ado tos lares clados tos 
s 
Public Law (28 4 1 29 20 3 87 144 
chairs) 
Criminal Law 2 12 5 7 36 62 
(14 chairs) 
Private law (38 4 3 59 28 2 98 194 
chairs) 
Philosophy of 1 14 6 36 57 
Law (8 chairs) 
Labour Law (7 2 5 5 14 26 
chairs) 
Soclo-legal 4 4 1 18 27 
Studies (5 
chairs) 
Corporate law 1 19 9 2 57 88 
(12 chairs) 
Total 11 7 142 72 16 346 594 
Table 23- Faculty members by category, department 
and sex for 2000 
Department WOMEN% MEN% 
Tltula Asocla Ad)un Tltula A so Ad T 
-res Tos res cl a- jun-
Dos dos tos 
Public law 2.7 0.6 20.1 13.8 2 60.4 100 
(28 chairs) 
Criminal Law 3.2 19.3 8 11.2 50.5 100 
{14 chairs) 
Private Law 2 1.5 30.4 14.4 1 50.5 100 
(38 chairs) 
PhiiOSO!]hy 1.7 24.5 10.5 69.2 100 
of Law {8 
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chairs) 
labour law 7.6 19.2 19.2 53.8 100 
(7 chairs) 
Soclo-legal 14.8 14.8 3.7 66.6 100 
studies (5 
chairs) 
Corporate 1.1 21.5 10.2 9 64.7 100 
Law (12 
chairs) 
h a Conclusion 
The previous sections examined the situation of women within the faculty 
of the UBA Law School. lt was observed that although women have 
entered the UBA Law School in large numbers, when looking at their 
participation as faculty members, their numbers are still less significant 
than the numbers of men. 
Moreover, women tend to concentrate on the lower echelons of the 
university hierarchy. Unlike that of men, the proportion of women is higher 
among those faculty members working full-time. I have argued that, most 
probably, this is related to men's and women's family roles in terms of the 
main responsibility for material family provision and of the result of the low 
teaching salaries. Again, women tend to cluster in certain areas of law 
teaching such as Private Law and Labour Law, which, as a matter of fact, 
are the areas where women enjoy a higher status in terms of the post 
hierarchy within the faculty. 
In terms of the positions of women within the administration of the Law 
School, it has been seen that, while men occupy the more authoritative 
and prestigious posts women tend to occupy the positions that are more 
time-consuming and less prestigious. 
The increased numbers of women now progressing through the teacher-
training career would suggest that in the future women may make up a 
larger proportion of the faculty. lt cannot be affirmed, however, that this 
participation will necessarily tend towards a more egalitarian participation 
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since, as has been shown, women still have a long way to go in that 
respect. 
IVo Women lawyers in Argentina today 
a Q The statistics 
Currently, the number of women lawyers has almost equalled the number 
of men lawyers. To find out the number of women lawyers was not difficult 
since data published by the Ministry of Education show that in 1998 law 
graduates of both sexes constituted the second largest number of 
graduates in Argentina, 13% of the total university graduates, with 101,181 
women corresponding to 50.4% and men to 49.6% of the total number of 
law graduates33• 
If we consider the actual contingent of women law graduates, we will note 
that there are more than 52,300 women lawyers; it is one of the largest 
groups of professional women. We will find women lawyers working in 
every field of law, in the judiciary, at the university, at law firms, in 
legislatures and in public offices as civil servants. 
The "Colegio Publico de Abogados" or "Lawyers' Public Association" is the 
equivalent to the Bar Association that lawyers have to join if they are to 
litigate before the Courts of the city of Buenos Aires. The "Colegio Publico 
de Abogados" provided me with a list of its active members by the end of 
1998. According to a 1987 previous measurement of the number of 
associates, 35% of its members at the time were women. 
33 Mlnisterlo de Cultura y Educaci6n. Secretarla de Polltlcas Unlversltarlas. La Educacl6n Superior 
en la Argentina. Eduardo Sanchez Martlnez Editor, 1999. 
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• Table 24 a Members of the "Colegio Publico de 
Abogados"34 by sex and year of graduation (1914 
to 1987) 
Years of Men Women 
raduation 
1914-24 100% 0% 
1925-35 99.9% 0% 
1936-46 95% 4.5% 
1947-57 91.1% 8.85% 
1958-68 76.9% 23.1% 
1969-79 63.2% 36.7% 
1980-87 51.7% 48.9% 
This list, provided by the "Colegio Publico" for 1998, has been organised 
by year of birth and sex of the members. The heading of the list reads 
"Number of active members" (45,265), and the corresponding date is 
December 31, 1998. Given that the "Colegio Publico de Abogados" 
requires a monthly fee, the institution regards as active members those 
who are not in arrears with the said fee. 
The difference between the total number of lawyers and the number of 
active members within the "Colegio Publico de Abogados" may be 
accounted for by those lawyers who litigate locally in their provinces, but 
do not do so in Buenos Aires; those lawyers who work in other branches of 
the profession that do not command membership of the mentioned 
association, like the judiciary, the legislature, the executive, "in house", or 
do not work professionally as lawyers. There are also lawyers who though 
still appearing as active members of the institution must have long been 
dead or retired. 
The "Colegio Publico de Abogados" also provided me with the list of the 
universities from where its members graduated, which included the 
percentages of degrees given by each university. lt showed that 70% of all 
members obtained their degrees from the UBA Law School. The remaining 
30% had studied in private universities, many of them Catholic, or in either 
34 Molinelll, 1989: 3, note 3. 
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public or private local universities of the rest of the country. A few 
members were awarded degrees by foreign universities.35 This means that 
the UBA Law School covers the majority of lawyers. 
The list provided by the "Colegio Publico de Abogados" gives the total 
number of men and women members organised by year of birth and sex 
for those members born between 1897 and 1975. As common sense 
indicates, it is highly unlikely that anyone born before 1920 might still be 
an active member of the bar association by the end of 1998, and this is an 
indication of the weakness of the data obtained. 
To account for this setback, I decided to start by the members who were 
born from 1920 onwards. So, a number of 940 members born between 
1897 and 1919 made up of 53 women and 887 men were subtracted from 
the total number of members as they appear on the list of the "Colegio 
Publico de Abogados", leaving 44,378 men and women lawyers. Since the 
number of members dropped dramatically for those born after 1970, 
simply because they are too young, I decided to subtract those members 
as well. The remaining number of graduates is then 40,004. 
I then constructed a new table for the members of the association born 










Table 25 - Members of the "Colegio Publico de 
Abogados de la Capital" by sex and year of birth 
December 1998 
Age Men Women Total %women 
69-78 1235 180 1415 12,7 
59-68 2588 855 3443 24,8 
49-58 5596 2910 8506 34,2 
39-48 6388 5642 12030 46,9 
29-38 7313 7297 14610 49,9 
23,120 16,884 40,004 42,20 
35Extracted from table provided by the "Colegio Publico de Abogados de la Capital" in August 1999. 
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Clearly, tables 25 and 26 show that as age decreases there is an increase 
in the percentage of women. This tendency, which starts more slowly for 
those born in the 1940's, and who presumably were awarded their law 
degrees between 1965 and 1975, becomes sustained for the following 
decades. For those born after 1950, the number of women members 
almost equals the number of men. This is quite in tune with the 
spectacular increase in the number of women registering at university, 
particularly UBA. Table 26, where the blue represents men lawyers and 
the pink women lawyers accurately shows this tendency. 
Table 26: Members of the "Colegio Publico de 
Abogados la Capital" by sex and year of birth in 
December 1998 (graph) 
Distribution of the members of the "Colegio Publico de 
Abogados de la Capital" according to age and sex. 
(December 1998) 
69-78 59-68 49-58 39-48 29-38 
age 
b- Women lawyers and the labour market in general 
There is no previous study of the labour market for women lawyers in 
Argentina. Considering the fragmentary nature of the information available, 
it was necessary to devise alternative strategies to approach the issue 
regarding women lawyers' professional practice; namely, the actual 
activities and areas of specialisation of women lawyers within the 
profession. Thus, I decided to interview some key informants in order to 
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obtain some information that, albeit a poor substitute for valid data could 
partly orient my enquiry regardless of the purely anecdotal nature of the 
data thus obtained. 
Still, the general perception shared by Dr. Pila Minyerski36, president of the 
Lawyer's Association and by other lawyers37 I interviewed as key 
informants in order to compensate for the lack of available data, is that 
women work mostly as civil servants, at the university, in the judiciary -
either as judges, or as part of the bureaucracy of the judiciary-, as 
mediators, in large law firms and in small law firms or solo firms doing 
family law and general practice. 
The lack of available data made it impossible for me to investigate women 
lawyers' participation in the State bureaucracy and in the small and solo 
practitioners firms where women seem to concentrate The participation of 
women lawyers in law teaching has been discussed in the previous 
section. Women's participation in large law firms will be examined in the 
next section. 
With respect to women lawyers as civil servants, although the actual 
figures are not available, we can say that a large proportion of the women 
elected as members of the national and the city legislatures are lawyers. 
There also many women lawyers among the consultants who assist the 
members of Parliament and local Legislatures to write the law projects 
they submit and to examine those submitted by other members. Also, the 
ministries and other important offices of the executive have a legal 
department where, presumably a considerable number of women lawyers 
might work. At least, this is the common impression expressed by people 
related to the law, based more on experience than on actual statistics. 
On the other hand, as Molinelli explained in 1989, by that time, legal 
departments in large business companies had grown less and less 
frequent and this has become a sustained tendency ever since. The 
36 Interview with Dr. P Minyerski on July 13t"· 2000 
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current tendency is for companies to engage the service of Jaw firms, so 
legal departments in business firms have disappeared or become very 
small and, even if they employed women, their numbers would be 
negligible 38• However, the head of a firm that selects personnel for large 
law firms, a woman who asked for her name not to be disclosed has 
suggested to me that, in the last few years, large business companies 
have retained a small legal department to attend to internal matters such 
as labour claims and insurances. According to this key informant, these 
business firms tend to hire young women lawyers for these purposes. 
A very large number of women lawyers have gone into mediation. At 
present three quarters of the more than 3000 mediators authorised by the 
Ministry of Justice are women. About five years ago the Ministry of Justice 
decided that in order to streamline the already extremely overburdened 
justice system, all civil cases should go through a process of compulsory 
mediation. A law was passed39 that created the figure of the mediator 
"authorised" or qualified by the Ministry of Justice. lt established who could 
become a mediator, the courses they should attend, and the hours of 
mediation they were supposed to have carried out in order to be allowed 
to mediate in civil cases. By then, two women judges from the Higher Civil 
Court 40who could be considered responsible for the introduction of 
mediation in Argentina had already started a large school of mediation and 
lobbied for the passing of the law with a strong support from the USAID, 
(the Cultural Service of the American Embassy). At present, 2250 out of 
the 3500 mediators authorised by the Ministry of Justice are women41 • The 
37 See methodological appendix for more Information on those interviews 
38 Mollnelll, : "Los departamentos Legales de empresa en la Argentina" La ley, jueves 15 de junio 
de 1989: 3, ft. 3. 
39 Law n° 24.573, October 25, 1995 
40 I am referring to Dr. Helen Highton and Dr. Gladys Alvarez, who, in the early nineties, created an 
NGO named LIBRA with the purpose of promoting the use of alternative methods of conflict 
resolution as a way to decongest the already overburdened justice system and to train lawyers and 
other related profe!i!iionals in mediation. 
41 Data sent by fax by the Department of Mediation of the Ministry of Justice, in August 2000. 
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number of mediators is very large and I was unable to trace how many of 
them are actually active. 
Although some of the mediators come from different backgrounds, like 
psychology or sociology, the Department of Mediation from the Ministry of 
Justice states that most of them are Jawyers42. In any event, the large 
proportion of women mediators is significant. lt could be explained either in 
terms of women's preferences or as a "niche" within the profession offering 
a possible way out to women that did not feel fulfilled working within the 
profession. 
The judges who participated in this study found that this was mainly a 
consequence of the difficulties associated to making a career within a law 
firm. They also pointed to the fact that men are still given more room in 
certain areas of the profession and that men are not interested in 
mediation because of the low pay. Also, in their view, mediation appears 
as a viable alternative occupation for women who only want to work a few 
hours. 
In addition, the judges attributed the very large number of women 
mediators to what they viewed as a feminine tendency to agreed-upon 
solutions over more adversarial ways of conflict resolution. Thus Menkei-
Meadow's thesis (Menkei-Meadow, 1989), according to which women 
would tend to prefer less adversarial methods of conflict resolution, could 
be sustained in this context. 
With respect to the areas of the profession with a higher feminine 
participation, both the key informants and the judges that participated in 
this study 43 argued that their impression was that women lawyers largely 
concentrated on family law, a choice that they explained in two main ways. 
On the one hand, they thought that working as a family lawyer was an 
easier task to combine with domestic responsibilities than other areas of 
the profession. On the other hand, they stated that, in their view, women 
42 Data sent by fax by the Department of Mediation of the Ministr.y of Justice, In August 2000 
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seemed to prefer the family law subject matter and that their larger 
involvement with families prepared them for such an endeavour. 
c a Women's participation In law firms during the period 1975a2000 
o a Women in large law firms 
The study of the position of women in law firms was made through the 
analysis of the Martindale-Hubbell Directorl4, a yearly international 
directory of the most important law firms all over the world. A comparative 
analysis of the Directory for different years will give us an idea of the 
evolution in the situation of women in large law firms45• 
The Argentine entry for year 2000 lists law firms and lawyers working 
within each firm and organises the lawyers in terms of their relationship to 
the firm, that is to say, whether they are "of counsel", "members" and 
"partners" or "associates". The Directory also lists the areas of the law 
firm's expertise. Given that it does not define the categories used, I had a 
few conversations with people in large law firms to produce a definition. 
My conclusion was that the words "partners" and "members" are used 
interchangeably to refer to the partners of the firm, those lawyers who 
have full responsibility for the firms' assets, duties and liabilities and who 
divide between them the profits generated by the firm. The partners are 
those who decide on the commercial strategy of the firm. Clients are 
usually taken care of by a partner who is in charge and a group of less 
senior lawyers who attend the daily enquiries. Sometimes the partners are 
divided into senior and junior members or partners; the senior partners are 
usually the founding members, and these are internal divisions that relate 
to the way profits are divided and decisions taken. The associates, on the 
·other hand, are the employees of the firm. They can also be· divided into 
senior and junior, depending on their degree of responsibility and 
43 See chapter 6, section 11 of this thesis. 
44 Martlndalo ond Hubboll Law Directory for 2000, 1992,1984 and 1975. 
45 In Argentina firms with more than 50 lawyers are considered large law firms. 
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autonomy, and usually start as junior associates and ascend on the 
hierarchy to the cat~gory of senior associate to then become partners. 
Sometimes they do not achieve this final goal. Some lawyers may remain 
in this category indefinitely, while others ascend. The "of counsel" category 
names lawyers of a certain age who, having been partners, continue to 
have a link with the law firm but do not share in either the profits or the 
responsibility of an active partner. 
A brief explanation about the shortcomings of using the Martindale and 
Hubbell Directory need be given. In the first place, being a paid service, it 
is not an all-inclusive list. A mention on the Directory will depend on the 
law firm's willingness to pay so as to be included in it. Still, it appears that 
it has gradually become a common practice, since it is the place where 
prospective international clients might look for a law firm. A further setback 
of using the Martindale-Hubbell Directory is its international business bias. 
This means that the areas covered tend to emphasise those areas of law 
more related to international big business to the detriment of other 
specialities such as family law, where we might hypothesise that women 
tend to be more active. Moreover, the categories related to the job titles 
used in the Martindale and Hubbell Directory correspond to the model of 
the American law firm, which may often differ from the organisation of local 
firms. 
In spite of these shortcomings, and given the lack of alternative sources of 
information, I believe that the Directory can provide valuable information in 
relation to the position of women lawyers within large Argentine law firms. 
What seems more difficult, though, is to envisage the situation of women 
in smaller law firms and as "solo practitioners" where, in fact, we might well 
find more women. 
Moreover, since the Directory is published annually, the analysis of 
previous Directories enables us to trace the increasing number of women 
trough a comparison with earlier Directories46• As a matter of fact, it has 
46 I was able to obtain some odd numbers of the Martindale Directory on a visit to the office of Dr. 
Lynch, the President of the "Colegio de Abogados de Buenos Aires", one of the two voluntary 
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been used before for similar purposes, and a 1986 article published by 
Serra in the business section of the Argentine Playboy Magazine47 
provides a good example for this48• In it Serra shows how, according to the 
Martindale Directory for that year, the 34 largest law firms in Buenos Aires, 
which totalled 363 lawyers, employed only 23 women, amounting to 6.3% 
of the total number of lawyers in the 34 law firms. 
The article also suggests that of the 34 firms only 5 were located in the 
area of the principal courts. This might indicate that such firms do not 
specialise in litigation. (The headquarters of most law firms that specialise 
in litigation can be found in the "Tribunales" or Court's area). As Serra 
remarks, the firms studied presumably specialise in patents and 
trademarks which is quite consistent with a period of great international 
economic expansion, at a time when the economy opened up to 
international trade as a consequence of an official economic policy that 
focused on joining international markets and on the privatisation of public 
services, mainly sold to big international corporations. His analysis 
suggests that women were clearly underrepresented in Buenos Aires big 
law firms in 1986. This is a trend that I will further investigate by comparing 
both earlier and later Martindale Directories. 
The examination of four Directories between 1975 and 2000 (1975, 1984, 
1992 and 2000 Directories) depicts the evolution of women's participation 
in law firms during the period under study. The 1975 Martindale Directory 
was the first I could trace containing data about Argentine law firms; it 
certainly shows a very different picture from the one that prevails a quarter 
of a century tater. In 1975 there were only 15 law firms in the Argentine 
section of the Martindale Directory for the City of Buenos Aires. Their 
sizes, measured by the total number of lawyers working in the firms, 
lawyers' associations in Buenos Aires. The numbers for 1975, 1984, 1992 and 2000 (which was on 
the Internet) were examined in order to trace some sort of evolution of the participation of women 
lawyers within the large law firms that appear in the Martindale Directory. 
47 Serra , 1986. 
48 Bothelho Junqueira (1999) also analysed the Martindale Directory for her study on Brazilian 
lawyers 
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ranged from 6 to 38. The total number of lawyers working in these 15 law 
firms amounted to 202, only 1 0 of whom were women. Men represented 
95% and women 5% of the total number of lawyers. Eight out of the ten 
women belonged to the category of members and partners, while 2 were 
associates. This shows that, in 1975, law firms employed few women, 
since 80% of the women were members and partners, thus ranking high in 
the firm's hierarchy. 
The analysis of the 1984 Martindale Directory for the City of Buenos Aires 
shows that the number of large law firms rose to 30, with a total number of 
366 lawyers, 341 men and 21 women. The proportion of women was 
5. 7%, demonstrating a marginal improvement in the ten-year period 
following 1975. 
In 1992, the number of law firms published in the Martindale rose to 46. 
From then on, for the sake of our analysis, the 40 largest firms were 
ranked by size and measured by the number of lawyers in the firm. The 
percentage of women was then 5%. In 2000 the total number of law firms 
in the Martindale Directory for· Argentina shows a total of 165 law firms 
located in the City of Buenos Aires and the rest of the country. There are 
women in 137 out of the 165 firms and this amounts to 83%. 28 law firms 
are men-only firms; four of them are not located in Buenos Aires. 2,300 
lawyers, 1,632 men (71%) and 668 women (29%) work in the total number 
of 165 law firms The 40 largest law firms congregate a number of 1387 
lawyers, 68.2% men and 31.7% women. In fact, the period has seen a 
tremendous growth of the sector of business law firms and, at the same 
time, a considerable increase in women's participation has also taken 
place. Table 26 shows a slow yet sustained growth in the participation of 
women within the law firms with its highest peak in 2000. We can then 
conclude that, however slowly, the large increase in the number of women 
lawyers is making itself felt within Buenos Aires law firms. However, given 
that the number of women and men lawyers today is very similar, I feel 
bound to point out that women lawyers are underrepresented in large law 
firms. 
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Since it is my purpose to focus on the city of Buenos Aires, the firms 
located were separated and ranked by size, using the number of lawyers 
in the firm as the size criterion. The 40 largest law firms located in the City 
of Buenos Aires that appear in the Martindale Directory for the year 2000 
add up to a total of 1,387 lawyers, 947 (68.2%) men and 440 (31.7%) 
women. This proportion is slightly higher than the one for the whole 
country. Its size varies between 208 and 8; the largest law firm in the city 
has 208 lawyers and the smallest, 8. The firm in the second place in the 
ranking has only 85 lawyers, thus one can observe a dramatic drop in the 
number of lawyers between the first and the second firm in the ranking. 
From then on, the distribution of the firms in the ranking is smoother in 
terms of size. Firms with more than 80 lawyers are rare. Today, a firm that 
has around 50 lawyers can be considered large. 
In the following tables (27 to 31), we can see the characteristics of the 40 
law firms in terms of the participation of women in general first, and then in 
terms of the positions they occupy within the firm hierarchies. Tables 26 
and 27 show the very important increase in the proportion of women in 
large law firms in the last quarter of the 20th. century, particularly from 1984 
to 2000. In most firms the large boom in the number of women lawyers 
has taken place over the period 1992-2000. 
o Table 27- Evolution on tlhe gender composmc:m on ~he 
largest law firms (~ 975 ~ 1984 ~ ~ 992 ~ 2000) 
SeJC 1975 1984 1992 2000 
Women 5 5.7 13 32 
lVI en 95 94.2 87 68 
o Table 28 - Lawyers !n tthe 40 largest ~aw 11rms o1 
the city of Buenos Aill'es by seJt on 2000 
SeJC T % 
Men 947 68.2 
Women 440 31.7 
Total 1387 100% 
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Tables 29 to 31 show the positions women occupied within the law firms' 
hierarchies according to the 1984, 1992 and 2000 Martindale Directories. 
Tables 28-30 indicate that over the period under study, despite the 
numerical increase in the number of women in large law firms, women are 
not only underrepresented on the whole, but also make up a larger 
proportion of its lower ranks. As table 30 shows for 2000, the proportion of 
women decreases as one goes up the hierarchy of the firm, where they 
constitute 42% of the associates, 24% of the members and partners, with 
only one woman of counsel. 
Table 29 - Lawyers by position and sex in 1984 
Categories Men Women %of men %of women T 






35 6 85.3 14.7 41 
15 0 100 0 15 
341 21 93.1 6.9 366 
Table 30- lawyers In the 40 largest law firms 
in 1992 by position and se::c 
Men Women %of men %of women Total 
Partners and 404 46 89.7 10.3 450 
members 
Associates 95 25 79.1 20.9 120 
Of counsel 33 3 91.6 8.4 36 
Total 532 74 87.7 12.3 606 
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• Table 31 ~ lawyeli"S on Uu~ 40 ~argest law firms, by 
position and sex i1111 2000 (in numbe.rs and %) 
Categories Men Women %off %of Total 
men women 
Members/partners 532 171 76 24 703 
Associates 373 268 58 42 641 
Of counsel/advisors 42 1 98 2 43 
Total 947 440 68.2 31.7 1387 
In Tables 32-34 I look into the combined effect of age and sex on the 
positions held by the lawyers within the firm hierarchy in 2000. Thus, as 
can be seen from table 32, a very large proportion of men (82%) among 
the members and partners, are over 30, whereas the situation of women is 
quite different. While the proportion of men members and partners under 
30 is quite small (18%), the percentage of women members and partners 
under 30 (52.6%) is a little larger than the proportion of women over 30 
(47.6%). 
An optimistic reading of this table could lead us to interpret that this 
difference is an effect of the rapid and more recent increase in the number 
of women lawyers who might be pushing towards a more egalitarian 
participation within the large law firms. The same sort of argument; namely 
that only the recent entry of women in large numbers in the legal 
profession and their relative youth might explain the negligible number of 
women among the of counsel (Table 31). A more pessimistic interpretation 
would be whether young women are getting the lowest posts within the 
category- which, of course is not homogeneous, something that cannot be 











Table 32 ° f?arr~ll'ilers ta~Inld memlb>®ll'$ lb>y age and! ~®){ 
ors2ooo 
Men Men Men Women Women Women 
30+ 30- N/S 30+ 30- N/S 
43B 94 0 BO 90 1 
82% 18% 0% 46.7% 52.6% 0.5% 
Table 33 ° Of counsel by age and sex in 2000 
Men Men Men Women Women Women 
30+ 30- N/S 30+ 30- N/S 
37 0 5 1 0 0 
BB% 0% 12% 100% 0% 0% 
lt is regrettable that the high number of unspecified ages for the 
associates category, as seen from table 34, does not allow for 
comparisons or conclusions. However, looking at the age and sex 
distribution of the associates for whom we do have the ages, we can find 
the larger proportions of women among the associates under 30 that 
correspond to 38.8%. 
Table 34- Associates by age and sex in 2000 
Sex Men Men Men Women Women Women 
Age 30+ 30- N/S 30+ 30- N/S 
Total 104 95 174 50 104 114 
% 27.B 25.4 46.4 1B.6 38.8 42.5 
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iii ~ Women's participation within the ~urms with tlh® ~arrg®sit growitlh 
be1tw®®li1l ~ 975 and 2000 
No clear association can be observed between the size of the firm and the 
proportion of women within it. In fact, the firms with the larger proportion of 
women tend to be middle-sized ones within the ranking of the larger firms; 
that is, approximately 50 lawyers, with a proportion of women around 
40%. There is only one firm with a percentage of women exceeding 50%, 
(53,5%), and only one firm without a woman in it, which is the smallest 
one with eight members only. 
There does not appear to be an association between the proportion of 
women and the specialities offered by the law firm. However, firms with 
the largest proportion of women within them are those that offer the widest 
range of specialities. 
In spite of the assumption that more women lawyers practise family law, 
the few large firms that offer family law are not those with the larger 
proportions of women lawyers. At any rate, it must not be forgotten that it 
is not in the Martindale that one would either look for or advertise a family 
lawyer. 
. As can be observed from tables 35 and 36, an examination is made of the 
law firms with the largest growth within the various Martindale Directories 
considered. There does not appear to be a very strong relationship 
between the growth of the firms in the 25-year span and the growth in the 
number of women within them. In most firms the large boom in the number 
of women lawyers has taken place during the 1992-2000 period. 
Furthermore, in some very large firms a considerable number of women is 
only remarkable in 2000, when the number of women increased in all the 
law firms. One can appreciate that the rate of growth in the number of 
women lawyers was much higher than that of men for the same period. In 
the firms with the largest increase in the number of women, the total 
number of lawyers doubled, while the number of women among them 
multiplied nine times. 
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Tabie 35 = Womell1l'$ pall'aDcipaUon in ~he 1 il ~aw 
firms with the !arges~ growth ffrom il975 ~o 200049 
1984 1992 2000 
















19 1 5 22 2 9 34 7 20.5 208 80 
0 .7 0 0 21 5 24 55 15 
11 0 0 8 0 0 17 0 0 82 17 
9 2 22 11 1 9 19 1 5 51 17 
7 0 0 20 2 10 12 3 25 28 12 
0 17 0 0 37 4 11 59 16 
25 0 0 28 0 0 29 1 3 85 24 
0 11 2 18 16 4 25 35 12 
17 0 0 9 0 0 14 3 21 43 23 
38 2 5 45 4 8 48 3 6 67 18 
13 0 0 15 0 0 12 0 0 20 5 
Table 36 ~Relationship between law firms's 
growth and the Increase In the proportion of 
women within them for the firms with the largest 
growth between 1975 and 2000 
FIRMS Total %of women 
Growth 
1 - Marval & 0' Farrell 995% From 5% to 38% 
2-Baker & Mckenzie 686% From 0% to 27% 
3- O'Farrel 645% From 0% to 21% 
4 - Abeledo-Gottheil 467% From 22% to 33% 
5 - Klein & Malral 300% From 0% to 43% 
6 - Cardenas, Cassagne & Asociados 247% From 0% to 27% 
7 - Beccar Varela 240% From 0% to 28% 
8- Nlcholson & Cano 218% From 0% to 34% 













9 - M& M Bomchill 152% From 0% to 53% 
10- Allende-Brea 76% From 5 %to 27% 
11 -_Severgnini, Robiola, Grinberg & 54% From 0 % to 25% 
Larrechea 
ova Wometnl n111 small law firms 
An examination was next made of the smaller firms in the Martindale 
Directories. In 1984 there were three law firms that practised family law, 
composed of 5 lawyers in total, all men. In the Martindale for 1992, 50% of 
the small firms are men-only firms and the remaining 50 %, only have a 
maximum of two women within them. 
In the 2000 Martindale, the number of firms with 8 lawyers or less is much 
higher, about 75% of the total number of firms. There is also a "solo 
practitioner" firm with a woman as its only lawyer, and 2 firms where the 
number of women is higher than the number of men. However, the 
founders of the firms are mostly men: one is composed of 2 men and 3 
women. In just two of the cases there are women among the founders. 
If we take the men and women firms, 7 comprised the same number of 
women and men. But the usual situation is that there seldom are more than 
one or two women, only occasionally three. However, if we consider that 
we are talking of firms with 5, 6 or 7 lawyers, the number of women 
represents a proportion that is higher than that found in large law firms. 
The interesting finding about small firms, either with or without women in 
them is that whereas the large law firms rarely did family law, the small 
firms tend to do civil and family law. This is absolutely consistent with the 
fact that large business firms tend to serve business corporations and thus 
need a much larger number of lawyers within the firm. 
V a Women's trajectories within law firms 
A further investigation was made of individual women who appeared in the 
various Directories. I have found 39 women lawyers whose name 
appeared at least twice, usually between the 1984 and the 2000 
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Directories. Their ages range between 29 and 66, but most of them are 
over 50. Many have changed firms along their careers: 3 appear as 
partners in the 2000 Directory, all three in the same law firm. One appears 
as of counsel, 27 as members and partners and 8 as associates. Thus, 15 
out of the 39 whose names appear repeatedly in the directories 
considered (38.6%) have gone up in the hierarchy, while 22 (or 41.4%) 
have kept the same position. In the 2000 Directory there were 8 small 
firms headed by women. Following backwards in the Directories the 
names of the women who headed those firms along the period, I found 
that two of these women had left larger law firms to establish their own 
businesses in smaller firms as they appeared as founders in new women-
only firms. 
vi ~ Conclusion 
The previous sections examined the situation of women working in law 
firms through the analysis of the Martindale Directory to conclude that 
there was a tremendous expansion in terms of women's presence within 
law firms, rising from 5 to 32% in the twenty-five year period under study. 
This increase in the number of women lawyers occurred mainly between 
1992 and 2000 and encompassed a phase of great expansion of the law 
firms in general. lt must be noted, however, that the rates of growth for the 
women lawyers were much larger than those for men over the same 
period. 
Nevertheless, considering that in 2000 the numbers of women lawyers 
equalled the numbers of men lawyers, it must be concluded that women 
are, as a whole, underrepresented in the large law firms. Additionally, they 
stand for a larger proportion of the firm's lower ranks. The proportion of 
women decreases as one goes up the hierarchy of the firm. Women 
constitute 42% of the associates, 24% of the members and partners, and 
there is only one woman of counsel. Given that the global number of 
women lawyers equals the numbers of men lawyers, some degree of 
gender discrimination cannot be discounted. 
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To obtain a better picture of the positions women occupy within law firms, I 
explored possible links between the proportions of women lawyers within 
firms and the size of the firms and with the firm's different growth rates 
during the period under study. I looked into the specialities offered by the 
various firms and the lawyers' ages. In addition, I tried to trace the 
trajectories of the women that appeared in various editions of the 
Martindale Directories. Thus, I discovered that the firms with the largest 
proportion of women tend to be the middle-sized ones within the ranking 
of the larger firms, with approximately 50 lawyers, and a proportion of 
women around 40%. I therefore suggested that, although there does not 
seem to be a clear association between the proportion of women and the 
specialities offered by the law firm, the firms with the largest proportion of 
women within them are those that offer the widest range of expertise. 
A very large proportion of men over thirty were found among members 
and partners in 2000, whereas the situation of women is quite different. 
While the proportion of men members and partners under 30 is quite 
small, the percentage of womeri members and partners under 30 is much 
larger than the proportion of men for the same age category and a little 
larger than that of women over 30. 
I argued that this age difference could be interpreted as an effect of the 
rapid and recent increase in the number of women lawyers, pushing 
towards a more intense and egalitarian participation within the large law 
firms. Likewise, the recent entry of women in large numbers into the legal 
profession might explain the negligible number of women among the of 
counsel (Table 30). Although the family stream in the postgraduate course 
of the UBA Law School seems to be made up mainly of female lawyers50, 
and the department of Civil Law and, within it, the Chair of Family Law 
.seem to be the ones with the largest number of women, the six most 
important large firms doing family law are headed by men, and the 
professors in Family Law are also men. Hence, we find that, even in an 
50 See table 1 0 in chapter 2. 
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apparently feminised area of the profession, men occupy the higher status 
posts. 
In spite of the assumption that most women lawyers do family law, the few 
large firms that offer family law are not those with the largest proportions of 
women lawyers. lt must not be forgotten, however, that it is not in the 
Martindale Directory that one would either look for or advertise a family 
lawyer. At any rate, when looking at the smaller firms in the directory I 
could observe that whereas the large firms rarely advertised civil and family 
law, small firms certainly did. lt is indeed very difficult to evaluate the 
number of small and solo law firms that do family law. Solo practitioners 
are usually called "generalistas" (non-specialised lawyers) and practise in 
various areas of the profession. 
I also followed up the careers of those women lawyers whose name 
appeared more than once in the directories examined. Their number 
added up to 39, with 15 (38.6%) having gone up in the hierarchy, while 22 
(or 41.4 %) had kept the same position. In two of the eight firms headed by 
women, I could trace women lawyers who had left their law firms to found 
new only-women firms. The number of women that failed to develop a 
career within law firms is rather high, and this is suggestive of a situation in 
which women are at a disadvantage in law firms. As a matter of fact, the 
judges who participated in this study thought that women were not given 
much room in large law firms and argued that this might be an important 
factor in their decision to go into the judiciary. 
4a Women's participation in the professional associations 
Apart from the "Colegio Publico", with mandatory membership, there are 
two voluntary lawyers' associations. The "Asociaci6n de Abogados" is the 
more progressive, with a history of 65 years. In 1999, a woman was 
elected president for the first time. I will examine below the gender 
composition of the membership and evolution of women's participation 
within the Board of Directors of the association. There is also another 
voluntary association called "Colegio de Abogados de la Capital". lt is 
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highly anti-Peronist and the smallest and most conservative of the 
associations. Women's participation has not been particularly active in 
either of the associations, reflecting a general situation that is common to 
all Argentine professional associations (AIIegrone, 2000). 
a o The "Co!eguo Publico" or Bar Association 
Apart from being the only association with mandatory membership, the 
Colegio has another very important function, which is the disciplinary 
control of its members through the Discipline Tribunal. This is an elected 
body, its members are totally renewed every two years, and some of its 
members are renewed through elections every year. 
The Board of Directors of the "Colegio Publico de Abogados" is the 
governing body of the Bar Association. lt is composed in the following 
manner: a president, a first vice and a second vice president, a general 
secretary, a treasurer and a vice treasurer, 7 regular members of council 
and 12 substitute members, renewed every two years by elections. The 
analysis of the evolution of the gender composition of the main authorities 
of "Colegio Publico" can give us a picture of the evolution of women's 
participation within the institution. I will examine the gender composition of 
the various Boards of Directors as from the creation of the "Colegio 
Publico". Table 37 shows a slow but increasing tendency towards a 
growing participation of women among the authorities of the institution, 
especially among the lower ranks. One can observe a tendency for women 
increasingly participating among the highest authorities of the institution 

























Table 37~ Sex ~omposo~!oll'il o~ ~ll1le IBloaJrd o~ 
IDorec~om of tlhe "Colegio Publoco d~e Albogados" 
from 1986 to 1999 · 
1%-1988 1~19':n 1!ID-1992 1992-1994 1994-1996 1996-19111 1~ 
M w M w M w M w M w M w M w 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7 7 5 2 5 2 7 6 1 5 2 
10 2 10 2 9 3 9 3 8 4 7 5 7 5 
In 2000, when the last elections for the authorities of the "Colegio Publico 
de Abogados" or Bar Association were held, the failure to include women 
on the lists originated a campaign that transcended the boundaries of the 
institution. On the one hand, a group of women filed a claim before the 
City of Buenos Aires' Ombudsperson, who issued a recommendation for 
the Bar Association to revise and update its electoral statutes to reflect the 
prevailing legislation regarding women's representation in public 
institutions within the City. On the other hand, some of its women 
members initiated a lawsuit against the association51 • As a result, the 
Administrative Court of the City assisting in the case ordered the bar 
association to include a minimum quota of 30% of women on the lists, in 
accordance with law 24012 of the City of Buenos Aires. The work of the 
active members of the "Colegio Publico de Abogados" is organised into 
51 Causa 1 0958/2000: "Martha Paz y otros c/Colegio Publico de Abogados de la Capital Federal 
175 
commissions according to subject matter. lt hosts a women's commission, 
whose political profile within the bar association is very low, for it just 
organises a lecture every now and th~n. This demonstrates that women's 
issues are not of paramount importance for the institution. In fact, the 
group of women that campaigned for an increased participation of women 
among the authorities of the association did not belong to the women's' 
commission. 
b ~The Lawyers' Association 
With a membership of 5000, the Lawyer's Association of Buenos Aires is 
the largest and most representative voluntary association in the city and 
one of the largest in America. Its aims and objectives are firmly associated 
with the consolidation of democracy, the observance of the rule of law and 
progressive social ideals, and has incorporated in its statutes the defence 
of the democratic institutions consecrated in the National Constitution and 
its complementary laws. Its activities involve the association's contribution 
to the progress of legislation and the good functioning of the justice 
system, influencing a transparent nomination of judges. lt organises a 
service of free legal aid for the poor, promotes comradeship among its 
members, has set the rules for a professional code of ethics, watches over 
its observance, and punishes transgressions. The Association also 
organises academic activities and publishes and circulates documents of 
legal interest. During the years of the dictatorship, the institution fought for 
the recovery of democratic institutions and the defence and respect for 
human rights. lt has a pluralist perspective independent of any party 
allegiance, and is oriented to stimulate participation and the free 
confrontation of ideas. There has been a very low profile women's 
commission in the Lawyer's Association for many years now. 
In 1999, for the first time in 60 years, a woman was nominated President 
of the Association. Dr. Minyersky is a senior university professor and a 
prominent family lawyer who leads one of the six most prestigious family 
law firms. 
176 
Table 38 and 39 show how, over a period of thirty years, the Lawyers' 
Association, a previously men-dominated association, has become an 
institution where the proportion of women has outnumbered the proportion 
of men. 
Tab~s 38: Gendleli" cormpo~otoon off Qlhle lawy®w~' 
Assocla~ooll"' Dli"d 2000 
lawyer's Associations of Buenos Aires 
Members Number % 
Women 1,406 54.6% 
Men 1,169 45.4% 
Total 2,575 100% 
Table 39a Membership o~ the lawyers' Assocoaiioll1l by 
decades from 1950 by se)( 
Year %of %of 
Women iVien 
1950 3.9 96.1 
~960 20 80 
1970 30.4 69.6 
1980 49.8 50.2 
1990 59.2 40.8 
2000 54.6 45.4 
CaTihle "Colegio de Abogados die ~a Capita~" 
The oldest and smallest of the lawyers' associations, the "Colegio de 
Abogados de la Capital", is also the most conservative one, both in terms 
of its politics and in terms of the inclusion of women within its ranks. lt has 
a membership of 1 ,345, with a vast majority of men totalling 1, 123. As 
from the time of its creation in 1913, the "Colegio de Abogados de la 
Capital" has had 35 presidents, all men. Only very lately has it 
incorporated a woman among its authorities as a vocal, which is the last 
post in the hierarchy. There is nothing that would indicate any interest in 
women's issues. There is no commission on gender or women's issues. 
Its membership is composed mainly by prominent men lawyers of the 
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establishment, with very high profiles, very often founders of large law 
firms52• The relatively marginal participation of women within the 
professional associations mirrors women's situation within the legal 
profession. 
~V~ Women on ~he judiciary 
1 ~Introduction 
I have examined above the characteristics of women lawyers' professional 
participation within the City of Buenos Aires, both within private practice 
and academia. In order to complete the picture I shall now look into their 
participation within the judiciary. Although I provide some data on the 
country as a whole, I shall concentrate on the courts whose site is the city 
of Buenos Aires. 
A Federal State with 24 provinces, Argentina has a judicial system with a 
very complicated structure, characterised by the coexistence of various 
organisational dimensions or levels, i.e., jurisdictions -the Federal Courts, 
the Provincial Courts and the Municipal Courts-; instances - the First 
Instance, Courts of Appeal and Supreme Courts-; and specialisations or 
branches - for example, the Civil and Commercial Courts, the 
Administrative Courts·, the Family Courts, the Criminal Courts, and the 
Labour Courts. 
As a consequence of the 1994 Constitutional Reform, Buenos Aires 
acquired a new status, similar to that of a province. This meant that the 
city adopted its own Constitution or Statute in 1996, chose its governor 
and legislature through local elections and, later on, was gradually to 
acquire its own institutions, such as local police and local judges. 
The resulting local Constitution is particularly modern and progressive 
when compared with the ideology of the average Argentine citizen. There 
52 See http: //www. Colabogados.com.ar 
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is a whole chapter (chapter 9) on sex equality with a strong emphasis on 
promoting equal opportunities for women. Article 36 introduces a 30% 
quota for women in every collegiate government agency. Accordingly, two 
of the five members of the recently nominated Higher Tribunal of the city 
are women, and one of them is the President of the Court. The same 
holds true for the "Judgeship Council", the institution in charge of the 
nomination of judges for the city of Buenos Aires. The Courts sited in the 
city of Buenos Aires include the Supreme Court of the Nation, the recently 
created Superior Tribunal of the city of Buenos Aires, the Federal Courts 
of the city of Buenos Aires, and the National Courts of Buenos Aires. 53 
2 Q Women's participation in the judiciary !n the city of Buenos Aires 
There are two previous research studies on women in the judiciary in 
Argentina54 published in 1989 and 1991 respectively. The former is a 
general study of the judiciary in Buenos Aires with a chapter on women 
judges. The latter is a study on women in the judiciary in Buenos Aires55. I 
shall outline their findings so as to provide some comparative data. 
In 1989, Mackinson and Goldstein56 carried out their research into all the 
1st and 2"d instance Courts of the City of Buenos Aires, collecting 
information about the judges' social origins, general education, legal 
education and social and cultural activities. Table 39 was constructed 
following the data provided by Mackinson and Goldstein57• 
As is shown in table 40, in 1988 women constituted only 19% of the Courts 
of the City of Buenos Aires. Of the 66 women judges, 60 belonged to the 
1st instance Courts and 6 to the Courts of Appeal. There were no women 
53 With the autonomy of the city the National Courts of the City should become the Ordinary City 
Courts but the issue of the transference is still under discussion. 
64G.Mackinson and Goldstein M., 1988 and Gastron A, 1991. 
56 G.Macklnson and Goldstein M.: La Magistratura de Buenos Aires. Un estudio sociologico, 
litoraria Jurldlca Buenos Aires, 1988 
57 Mackinson and Goldsteln, Op.cit: 63-64. 
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at the Supreme Court. Mackinson and Goldstein's main findings were that 
gender discrimination among judges exhibited the same pattern to be 
found in other occupations; namely, that women in the judiciary became 
less numerous as one went higher in the hierarchy, they worked longer 
hours for the same salary, were required to have more training for the 
same position, more seniority to attain promotion, and participated less in 
the cultural, political and scientific realms. 
Table 40~ Constitution of the Judiciary oil the City 
of Bueroos Aires in ~988 by sex58• 
Section Men Women %of Total 
women 
Federal Justice 46 3 6.1 49 
Civil Courts 43 8 15.6 51 
Criminal Courts 52 12 18.7 64 
Commercial Courts 36 5 12.1 41 
Special Civil and 42 16 27.5 58 
Commercial Courts 
labour Courts 4 21 30.3 25 
Economic Criminal Courts 14 1 4.1 15 
Electoral Courts 1 0 0 1 
Total and% 238 66 21,7 304 
(100%) 
In 1991 A. Gastron59 published a research on women judges of the City of 
Buenos Aires, whose purpose was mainly to update data about the sex 
composition of the Courts of the City and explore the perception women 
judges had about discrimination against women within the judiciary. 
Gastron examined the sex composition of the Courts of Buenos Aires. As 
table 41 indicates, Gastron's findings corroborate those previously 
obtained by Mackinson and Goldstein in terms of the observed horizontal 
and vertical segregation of women in the judiciary of the City of Buenos 
Aires. 
68 In this table the first and second instance are considered together. 
59 Andrea Gastr6n: "Situaci6n actual de la mujer en el poder judicial", Premio Coca Cola en las 
Artes y las Ciencias, Buenos Aires, 1991. 
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Through her research, Gastron60 reaches the following conclusions (tables 
41-44): in terms of the location of women judges within the judiciary of the 
city, she observed that the sexual stereotypes prevalent in society at large 
relating to the role of women were reproduced within the judiciary, a 
traditionally masculine realm. She found both vertical and horizontal 
occupational segregation: women concentrated in the lower instances 
(table 41) and in those sections of the judiciary more easily assimilated to 
the roles women perform in society as wives and mothers (tables 41-42). 
Women were to be encountered more frequently in the Civi161 and Labour 
sections of the judiciary (tables 41-42). Along similar lines, the number of 
women within the criminal courts and the number of women judges acting 
in sections where the legal conflicts involved important amounts of money 
' 
was very small (tables 43-44). 
Table 41 a National Courts of 1st. Instance of the 
City of Buenos Aires by section and sex In 1991 62 
SECTION WOMEN % MEN % TOTAL 
Civil 34 33.6 67 66.3 101 
Commercial 4 16 21 84 25 
Criminal. and 11 17.4 52 82.5 63 
Correctional. 
Labour 31 50.8 30 49.1 61 
Econ. Crlmln. 1 14.2 6 85.7 7 
TOTAL 81 31.5 176 68.4 257 
Table 42 a National Courts of 2nd instance of the 
City of Buenos Aires by section and sex in 1991s3 
SECTION WOMEN % MEN % 
Civil 5 12,8 34 87,1 
Commercial 3 21 2 11 78,5 
Criminal and 3 13 20 86,9 
Correctional 
60 Gastr6n Op cit: 42- 43. 
61 The Family Law Courts, created in 1990 constitute a part of the Civil Courts. 
62 Gastr6n, op cit : 25. 






labour 2 8,3 22 91,6 24 
!Econ. Cll'lmln. 0 0 6 100 6 
Social Sscurlay 1 11 '1 8 88,8 9 
TOTAl 14 12 1 101 87,8 115 
Tab~® 43 a IFedera~ ColUioitS off ~ sft ~IT1lS~~IT1lC® off ftlhle 
Co~y off Bue1111os Aoll'es by sec~oorrn a~rrndl selt orrn ~ 99~ s4 
SECTIO~ WOMEN % MEN % TOTAL 
Civil andl Com. 0 0 10 100 10 
Admlnlstratlvs 0 0 5 100 5 
Crlmln.andl corr. 2 40 3 60 5 
TOTAL 2 10 18 90 20 
o Table 44 a Fedell'al CoiUIIlitS o~ 2nd! oros~ance of ilhle Cl'ty of 
BlUienos Aires by sectoorrn and! selt nll1l i19911ss 
SECTION WOMEN % MEN % TOTAL 
Civil and Com. 1 11.1 8 88.8 9 
AdonlnlstraUive 1 10 9 90 10 
Crlmln.and corr. 0 0 6 100 6 
TOTAl 2 8 23 92 25 
Table 45 summarizes Gastr6n's findings in 1991 for the Courts sited in the 
City of Buenos Aires. 
Tab~e 45 - Coull'ts soied oll1l ~lh~S Co~y of IBIUiell1los Aill'es 
Dll1l 119911 by irustalf'Dce aurudl selt 
64 Gastr6n ,op cit: 29. 
65 Gastron ,op cit: 29. 
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Courts Women % Men % TOTAL 
181 unsiance 81 31.5 176 68.4 257 
National Courts 
2nd. Instance 14 12.1 101 87.8 115 
National Courts 
1 at. Instance 2 10 18 90 20 
!Federal Courts 
2"d·lns'tance 2 8 23 92 25 
Federal Couois 
Supreme Court 0 0 5 100 5 
of the Nation 
TOTAl 99 23.4 323 76.5 422 
I will now move on to my own analysis stemming from the examination of 
the judicial guide for 1999 of the sex composition of the Courts whose site 
is the City of Buenos Aires. The judicial guide is a directory of all the courts 
in the country, issued yearly by the FACA (Federation of the Argentine Bar 
Associations) and published by Rubinzai-Culzoni. Apart from listing all the 
courts it states the address of the court, the name of the judge and of the 
judge's secretary. When attempting to describe quantitatively the 
participation of women within the legal profession, the number of women in 
the judiciary is the easiest to measure. Although no public agency or the 
Judge's Association has ever produced complete statistics about the 
number and gender of the judges, an analysis of the judicial guide can 
provide such information. Various publications give us a partial picture of 
the participation of women in the judiciary, but none provides the whole 
picture. 
Table 46 portrays the summary of this analysis. In tables 46 to 51 I present 
the sex composition of the different instances and sections of the judiciary 
sited in Buenos Aires in 1999. 
Tab~e 46 ~ Selt Composmon~ off ~he cour~s siaedl in~ 
tlhe Cliy o1 Buenos Alrres on ~ 999 
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Courts Women % Men % TOTAl 
181 instance 116 39.6 177 60.4 293 
National Courts 
2"d·lnstance 43 22.6 148 77.4 191 
National Courts 
1 81' instance 37 24.2 116 75.8 153 
Federal Courts 
2"d·Jnstance 5 13.9 31 86.1 36 
federal Courts 
Supreme 2 40 3 60 5 
Tribunal of the 
city of Buenos 
Aires 
Supreme Court 0 0 9 100 9 
of the Nation 
TOTAL 203 29.6 484 70.4 687 
Taking into account the Supreme Court of the Nation, the Higher Tribunal 
of the City, and all the Federal and National Courts in the City, in 1999 
there were 203 women judges and 484 men judges. The figure for women 
is equivalent to 29,6% of the total number, which means that it increased 
from 21.4% to 29.6% of the total number of judges in the ten years 
following 1989, when Mackinson and Goldstein carried out their research. 
However, _when looking at the participation of women at the various 
instances, a different, less optimistic picture transpires. While in 1999 
women were 0% of the members of the Supreme Court and 40% of the 
members of the Superior Tribunal of the City, they constituted only 13.9% 
of the Federal Courts of 2"d Instance, and 24.2% of the Federal Courts of 
first Instance, while in the National Courts of Second Instance, the 
participation of women judges was 22.6% and 39.6% in the National 
Courts of first Instance. 
In 1991 the overall proportion of women judges was 23.4% (table 45) -
while in 1999 it was 29.6% (table 46). The total number of judges grew 
from 422 to 687. This means that the growth in the proportion of women 
judges was not made at the expense of the participation of men judges. 
Although there has been an important increase in the proportion of women 
in the judiciary over the period under study, the situation remains the same 
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in terms of vertical segregation, since the proportion of women decreases 
as one goes up in the hierarchy. As can be seen from table 46, apart from 
the case of the Supreme Tribunal of the City, appointed with a system of 
quotas, the general tendency is for the proportion of women to decrease 
as one goes up in the hierarchy; that is to say that vertical segregation is a 
fact. 
In table 47 I examine the increase in the proportion of women in the 
different sections of the judiciary by comparing the results obtained for 
1999 (table 46), with those obtained by Gastron in 1991 {table 45). Table 
4 7 shows that the increase was higher in the lower and less important 
courts (the National Courts of First instance) with an increase of 14.2%, 






Table 47 a Evolutlolnl 11111 tltue prroporalon of women in the 
Courts of Uoe coty (»i/ Buenos Aor®s betwe~m 199"i and 
1999 
Sections of the Judiciary Ill Change In the proportion of women I 
Federal Courts of second instance Ill From 12.1 o/o to 22.8% I 
Federal Courts of first Instance Ill From 31 .5% to 39.6% _I 
National Courts of second instance Ill From 12.1% to 22.6% I 
National Courts of first lnstanceoo. I I From 1 Oo/o to 24.2% _I 
Tables 48 to 52 enable us to identify the sections of the judiciary with the 
highest proportions of women. 
66 Note that two new sections were added to the First Instance National Courts: the Social Security 
Courts and the Oral Courts (criminal) 
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lable 48 a Natooll'ila~ Co\UIIIitS off 1st. on stance IO)f tlh~ city 
of Buell'ilos AD!rss by sectiorn a1111dl S®){ in ~999.67 
SECTION WOMEN % MEN % TOTAL 
Civil 40 40 60 60 100 
Commercial 7 27 19 73 26 
Criminal and 21 34.4 48 66.6 69 
Correctional. 
ll..abour 42 52.5 38 47.5 80 
Economic . 0 0 8 100 8 
Crimes 
Social Securl~ 6 60 4 40 10 
TOTAL 116 39.6 177 60.4 293 
Table 49 a National Courts of 2nd Instance of the city of 
Buenos Aires by section and sex In 1999 
SECTION WOMEN % MEN 
Civil 9 23.1 30 
Commercial 3 20 12 
Crlm.and Corr. 21 26.5 59 
labour 6 20 24 
Higher Crime 3 25 9 
Court68 
Econ. Crime 0 0 6 
Soc.securlty 1 11.2 8 
TOTAL 43 22.6 148 
67 Tables 46 to 52 were constructed using tho .Judicial Guide for 1999 











Tab~e 50 a Se){ Composmoll'il o~ ~lhl® IFre<dl®ll'al Cou.nll'~s (Off il st 
orostance o~ tlhle city of Buerrnos .Air®$ by sec~oon In i1999 
SECTION WOMEN o/o MEN o/o TOTAL 
Civil and 0 0 11 100 11 
Commercial. 
Administrative 7 59.4 5 41.6 12 
Social security 6 60 4 40 10 
Oral courts 23. 21.3 85 78.7 108 
Criminal and! 1 8.4 11 91.6 12 
correctional. 
TOTAL 37 24.2 116 75.8 153 
Table 51 m Federal Courts of 2"d instance off tlhle city 
of Buenos Aires by section in il999 
SECTION WOMEN o/o MEN o/o TOTAl 
Civil and! Com. 1 11.2 8 88.8 9 
Administrative 3 20 12 80 15 
Crlmln.and corr. 1 16.7 5 83.3 6 
TOTAL 5 13.9 31 86.1 36 
Table 52m Higlhest Courts sited !n tlhe city of Buenos 
Aires in 2000 by se){ 
Highest Courts Women % Men o/o 
Supreme Court of the Nation 0 0 9 100 
Superior Tribunal of the City 2 40 3 60 
If we look into each instance at the sections of the judiciary in terms of 
specialities, the sections of the judiciary with the highest proportions of 
women, in 1999 are as follows:. 
-For the National Courts of first Instance: the Social Security Courts (60%), 
the Labour Courts (52.5%) the Civil Courts (40%) and the Criminal and 
Correctional Courts (34.4%), 
-For the National Courts of second instance: The Criminal and 
Correctional Courts (26.5%), The Higher Crime Court (25%) The Civil 
Courts (23.1 %), the Labour Courts (20%), and the Commercial Courts 
(20%). 
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-For the Federal Courts of first Instance the Courts with the highest 
proportion of women are the Social Security Courts (60%), the 
Administrative Courts (59.4%), and the Oral Courts69 (21.3%). 
-For the Federal Courts of Second Instance, the Administrative Courts 
(20%), and the Criminal and Correctional Courts (16.7%). 
The above data confirm vertical segregation since it is mainly in the 
National Courts of First Instance and in the Federal Courts of First 
Instance that we can find proportions of women reflecting the considerable 
increase in the number of women lawyers. In some cases the values 
reached outnumber the proportion of men, as is the case with the Social 
Security Courts (60%) and the Administrative Courts (59.4). The recent 
increase in the number of women in the latter sections is quite surprising, 
since neither Security Law nor Administrative Law could be considered 
traditional women areas within the legal profession. The large number of 
women within the Social Security Courts might be explained by the fact 
that they are relatively new courts and thus were created at a time when 
the number of women lawyers was already quite high. Instead, the 
Administrative Courts of first instance have been in existence for a long 
time. If one looks at previous Judicial Guides, it is possible to observe that 
these women administrative judges were court secretaries before 
becoming judges in 1999 after having developed a long career in the 
judiciary. These two examples suggest that at least at least in those 
sections, some change has been taken place regarding gender horizontal 
segregation within the judiciary. 
The Higher Criminal Court created in 1992 is another example of a newly 
created court where the proportion of women is quite high (25%). The fact 
that both the Social Security Courts and the Higher Crime Court were 
created in the early nineties and are thus relatively new courts could be a 
common element explaining the high proportions of women within them. 
69 Until 1992 every proceeding In the ArgenUne judicial system was written. In 1992 a judicial reform 
introduced oral proceedings In some criminal cases. As a consequence, both the Oral courts and 
the Higher Criminal Court were created. 
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If we move on to consider women's participation in the judiciary for the 
Nation as a whole, the latest measurement published by an official source 
was provided by the "Secretarfa de la Mujer del Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores, Comercio y Culto"70 in 1999. According to these figures, taking 
into account the First Instance Courts, the Second Instance Courts, and 
the public prosecutors71 in all sections of the judiciary (Criminal, Family, 
Civil, Administrative and Commercial Courts), the representation of women 
is 20% for the Federal Courts. 
The distribution of women within the federal jurisdiction as a whole is 19% 
for the first instance and 13% for the second instance. Women constitute 
19% of the Federal Courts of First Instance, increasing to 31% for the 
Federal Courts of Fir-st Instance located in the city of Buenos Aires72, while 
the proportion of women for the Federal Courts of second instance located 
in the city of Buenos Aires is 15%. For the Provincial Jurisdiction the 
percentage of women is much higher: 35% for Mendoza, 26% for 
Cordoba, 38% for Catamarca, 37% for Chubut, 45% for Chaco, and 28% 
for the City of Buenos Aires. 73 
While there are no women among the nine judges of the Supreme Court 
of the Nation, there are women at six of the provincial Supreme Courts 
located in Chaco, Corrientes, Cordoba, Mendoza, Misiones and Santiago 
del Estero74• At the highest level there are only 12 women over a total of 
129 judges, with a proportion of 1 0%. 
70 The Women's Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This section in charge of producing 
information with regarding the advance of women to be presented at the International United 
Nations Conference Beijing +5, held In New York in July 2000. 
71 Note that I did not take Into account public prosecutors in my own analysis. 
72 Subsecretarla de la Mujer Ministerlo del Exterior, Comercio lnternaclonal y Culto, 1999. Comlsi6n 
Ad Hoc para el Seguimlento de la IV Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer: 95. 
73
"Mujeres en Argentina. Estado de situaci6n a 5 alios de Beijlng" Subsecretarla de la Mujer 
Ministerlo del Exterior, Comercio lnternaclonal y Culto, Repca. Argentina, 1999. Comlsl6n Ad Hoc 
para el Seguimiento de la IV Conferencia Mundial sobre la Mujer, p.95. 
74 Subsecrel~:~rla de la Mujer Mlnlsterio del E}{terior, Comerclo lnternacional y Culto, Repca. 
Argentina, 1999. Comisi6n Ad Hoc para el Segulmiento de la IV Conferencia Mundial sabre la 
Mujer, p.94. 
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lt can be then concluded that, as holds true for other sections of the 
women lawyers' labour market, women judges are more frequently 
occupying the most junior positions within the judiciary and that, although 
some change is starting to take place in terms of women's presence in 
new areas of the judiciary, their participation is far from egalitarian and 
does certainly not reflect the massive entry of women into the legal 
professions. 
In 1989, a group of Argentine women judges who were members of the 
International Association of Women Judges (IAWJ) created the Argentine 
Association of Women Judges (AAWJ) 
For the celebration of the tenth year anniversary, the American 
Association of Women Judges decided to invite women judges from all 
over the world to a Conference held in Washington. The creation of the 
IAWJ originated at that conference. The idea was supported by 50 women 
judges from 26 countries, among which was Argentina, represented by Dr. 
Carmen Argibay, a judge from the Criminal Oral Court. 
The main objectives of the IAWJ are75: 
-To encourage the international creation and growth of associations of 
women judges to serve their members and increase efficiency of the 
judiciary through training and other support schemes. 
-To promote collective actions undertaken by women judges from all over 
the world aimed at sorting the obstacles impeding real equality for all. 
-To fight gender stereotypes in the legal system through the exchange of 
information, research, and training schemes. 
-To foster cooperation among women judges. 
75 See the web page of the Argentine Association of Women Judges: www. amja.org.ar 
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-To contribute to the development of laws on human rights and their 
enforcement and to discuss issues related with improving women's 
relationship with the legal system. 
From then on, the IAWJ grew exponentially in terms of the number of 
countries and women judges that joined its ranks. In 1992, the IAWJ held 
its first conference, named "Catalysts for Change", in San Diego. The 
second IAWJ conference took place in 1994 with domestic violence as its 
main topic. Later conferences were in held in Manila in 1996, focusing on 
"Equality through the Law"; and Ottawa in 1998, and in Buenos Aires in 
2000, on 'Women on the margins". 
With very similar objectives to those of the IAWJ, the Argentine branch 
was created in 1993. lt has since enjoyed a growing membership and 
organised various national and international conferences and seminars 
aided by the financial and technical support of the National World Bank 
and the IAWJ. The conferences addressed basic issues such as Domestic 
Violence, Child Abuse, Children's Rights, Access to justice, Women and 
Marginality, Poverty, Bioethics, the Law and the Female Body. In 2000, 
the AAWJ hosted the biennial International Conference ofthe IAWJ with a 
participation of nearly 300 women from all over the world. That year, Dr. 
Argibay, an Argentine judge, presided over the IAWJ. 
The AAWJ has also organised 16 seminars. The purpose of these very 
intensive weekly seminars is to incorporate a gender perspective into the 
judges' framework and to foster the use of the human rights international 
conventions and the inter-American system of human rights focusing on 
the CEDAW, with special emphasis on women's and children's rights. 
Members of the judiciary from Argentina and other Latin American 
countries have thus been trained by members of AAWJ and other 
professionals under their guidance. 
As opposed to the marginality of the women's sections of the various 
lawyers' associations, the AAWJ's activism and vigour cannot be 
underestimated. The importance of the existence of such an organisation 
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and its full impact are yet to be seen. Its aim -to disseminate a gender 
perspective among the judges- could, in fact, bring about important 
changes in the judges' professional practice. The mere possibility for the 
judges to reflect upon the ways gender impinges on the administration of 
justice will probably generate changes in their world vision with the 
capacity to influence their decisions and impact on the lives of those 
involved in legal conflicts. 
V= Comparison with other local, Latin American and 
international research studies on women lawyers 
In previous sections I reported my quantitative research findings with 
respect to the positions of women law students (chapter 2 section V) and 
to the situation of women in three different areas of activity for women 
lawyers: law teaching (chapter 3, section Ill), law firms (chapter 3, section 
IV) and the judiciary (chapter 3, section V). In this section I relate my 
findings to other international quantitative research results on women in 
the law, including the Latin American region and the more developed 
nations in North America and Europe. I then go on to outline the 
justifications put forward by the various authors to explain their findings. A 
report of results obtained through more qualitative research projects 
intending to trace women's specific contributions to the judiciary can be 
found at the beginning of chapter 5 of this thesis. 
I will first consider students and academics. Although in Latin America the 
situation of women lawyers has not aroused much attention in general, two 
research studies on women in the legal professions have been traced, one 
Brazilian76 by Botelho Junqueira, and another Venezuelan77by Roche. 
76 Ellana Botelho Junqueira"A professionalizacao da mulher na advogacia. Relatorio Final" 
Fundacao Carlos Chagas, 1999 /Mulheres Advogadas: Espacios ocupados In "Horizontes Plurals, 
Novos Estudos de Genero no Brasil" Fundacao Carlos Chagas, 2001:187-216/ Women in the 
Judiciary: a Perspective from Brazil in Schultz and Shaw (eds) 'Women In the World's Legal 
Professions", 2003: 437-450. 
77Carmen Lulza Roche: "The Feminlzatlon of the Legal Profession In Venezuela: it's Meaning for 
the Profession and for Women Lawyers" University Central of Venezuela. Paper presented at the 
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Neither of these authors has specifically studied the participation oi 
women law students. However, they both report that the number of women 
studying law has risen dramatically, to reach equal numbers of men and 
women students and even a larger proportion of women over the last ten 
years (Botelho Junqueira, 1999; A oche, 2001 }. Research carried out in 
England (McGiynn, 1998: 7-25, 2003: 144-145}; in New Zealand (Murray, 
2003: 130}; in Germany (Schultz, 2003: 276); Poland (2003: 372} and in 
France (Boigeol, 2003: 403-404) shows very similar results in terms of the 
participation of women in the study of law, often outnumbering the 
proportion of men. According to Shultz (2003: xxxviii), parity in terms of the 
numbers of men and women law students has been achieved in most 
countries and women's academic qualifications seem to be just as good or 
even better than those of men, both in terms of the results obtained and in 
terms of the level of the academic qualifications achieved (Shultz, 2003: 
xxxviii; McGiynn, 2003: 146}. As was noted in chapter 2, section V, my 
findings with respect to women's participation among law students follow 
the same tendency. The proportion of women among the law students in 
Argentina rose from 4.8% in 1941 to 61% in 2000, revealing a global trend 
towards quantitative feminisation among law students. Moreover, in 1999 
women amounted to 57.3% of all the postgraduate law students at UBA. 
With respect to women legal academics, the two Latin American authors 
mentioned above did not study the gender composition of the law faculty 
(Botelho Junqueira, 1999; Roche, 2001). However, very much in tune with 
my own findings, authors such as McGiynn (1998: and 39-57and 2003: 
146) and Wells (2003: 225-246) in the UK and Thornton (1997: 106-129) 
and Hunter (2003: 99) in Australia have come across a similar difficulty for 
women teaching law to reach senior positions within the university 
hierarchy, as well as a tendency to concentrate in housekeeping types of 
jobs and pastoral roles within the university (Wells, 2003: 231-233). Thus, 
internationally, the number of women academics has increased mostly at 
the lower levels of the teaching hierarchy since glass ceilings are frequent 
2001 Joint Meeting of the Law and Society Association and the Research Committee on Sociology 
of Law (ISA) July 4 -7, Budapest Hungary. 
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at the higher levels (Schultz, 2003: xl; Wells, 2003: 226). In Argentina, it 
can be observed that, as is the case for women students, in spite of the 
fact that important progress has taken place in terms of women's 
participation in the academy, women academics' participation in the USA 
law school follows the international tendency to concentrate on the lower 
echelons of the university hierarchy (in 2000, women constituted 17.8% of 
the professors, the highest post within the hierarchy and 43 and 47.7% 
respectively of the lower posts in the hierarchy; namely associate and 
adjunct professors) and to perform roles associated with gender 
stereotypes, involving a considerable load of administrative work. 
As a result of the opening of new opportunities for women in higher 
education, in the late sixties and seventies there was a massive increase 
in the number of women lawyers in most western countries. Schultz (2003: 
xli) has argued that the large increase in the number of women lawyers 
creates the illusion that women have attained significant levels of 
achievement within the profession, while a closer look reveals major 
barriers to equal participation for women within the profession. Rhode 
(2003: 3) point to the persistent lack of acknowledgement of the fact that a 
"woman problem" still remains. This results in women lawyers' 
marginalisation within the profession 
With respect to women's participation in law firms, international evidence 
would seem to support the hypothesis that, in spite of the fact that more 
women have entered legal firms, these firms are not friendly places for 
women (Jack and Jack, 1988; Mossman, 1989; Harrington, 1995; Freyer, 
1995; Thornton, 1997; McGiynn, 1998 and 2003; Sommerlad, 1998, 1999, 
2003, Kay and Brockman, 2003: 61; Botelho Junqueira, 1999; Roche, 
2001 ). Replicating the results of international work, Botelho Junqueira 
(1999: 20-41, 2001: 199) and Roche (2001: 1 0-19) have identified law 
firms as the main locus of discrimination for women lawyers in Brazil and 
Venezuela. 
Although in most jurisdictions the number of women entering the legal 
profession continues to increase dramatically, this has not automatically 
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improved their status. Women's position within the profession remains 
marginal. Significant barriers to equality of opportunities for women persist. 
Women are still over-represented at the lower end of the profession and 
earning differentials in favour of males can still be observed (Mossman, 
1989; Rhode, 2003; Shultz, 2003). Demographic work on the location of 
women lawyers throughout the world demonstrates continued 
occupational segregation, with women working disproportionately in fields 
that are either devalued by men or more consistent with stereotypic 
notions of what is thought of as women's work, such as family law 
(Menkei-Meadow, 1989, 1995; Shultz, 2003). While men tend to dominate 
in commercial and property work, women are more often found in fields 
where prestige and financial gain are low but more emotional labour78 is 
required. Moreover, their domestic roles and responsibilities appear to 
prevent many women lawyers from following the masculine path of total 
commitment and availability to their professions that modern law firms 
require and men lawyers exhibit. Generally, this would seem to limit their 
partnership prospects. In addition, commercial lawyers are expected to 
bring business to the firm through ways that are basically masculine ways 
of networking, through golf, clubs and bars. Such expectations exclude 
women with domestic commitments. As Thornton puts it, "women remain 
fringe dwellers in the jurisprudential community" (Thornton, 1997; see also 
Spencer and Podmore, 1982; Jack and Jack, 1985; Menkei-Meadow, 
1985,1989,1991; Mossman, 1988; Sommerlad, 1998, 1999, 2003; 
McGiynn, 1998 and 2003) As Shultz (2003: xlii) has suggested, the 
important question is whether this distribution of labour is perceived by 
women lawyers as resulting from their own choices or from structural 
constraints. 
In terms of women lawyers' participation within law firms, there is an 
inverse relationship between the hierarchy of the post and the number of 
women. In addition, only few women reach the top levels of the profession 
78 Referring to this gendered division of labour In law ~rma vmious authors have mentioned the 
existence of "hard and soft" (Cone fly and Hllliard , 1993 cited in Botelho, 2001: 188} areas of the 
law and of "pink and blue files" (Sommerlad, 1994:31-53, cited in Botelho 2001: 188) 
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(Botelho Junqueira, 1999: 20-35; A oche, 2001 : 7-11). As Shultz (2003: 
xxxv) has noted: 'While gaining initial access to the legal professions was 
one thing, achieving equal participation for women within them proved to 
be quite another". Different and subtler forms of discrimination have 
survived with the effect of excluding, rejecting and discouraging women 
lawyers. The result is that, while women today make up an important part 
of' the legal profession, significant differences remain. As seen earlier in 
this chapter79, between 1975 and 2000 the proportion of women in large 
law firms rose from 5% to 31.7%. 
My findings for the Argentine case coincide with the results of research 
carried out in other jurisdictions. In 2000, in spite of the massive entry of 
women into the legal profession the proportion of Argentine women 
lawyers working in large law firms remained relatively low, at 31.7%, quite 
below the proportion of women who have been obtaining law degrees 
(31.7%). Moreover, women tended to concentrate at the lower end of the 
firms' hierarchy and had great difficulty to become partners, constituting 
42% of the associates and 24% of the members and partners80• 
Interested in women's integration to the profession and in their potential 
for achievement, authors such as Menkei-Meadow (1989 and 1995) and 
Harrington (1995) in the United States; Thornton (1997) in Australia; Kay 
and Brockman (2003: 60-64) in Canada; McGiynn (1998 and 2003) and 
Sommerlad (1998, 2003) in the UK have attempted to discover what 
stands in the way of equal professional authority for women lawyers within 
the different scenarios where they develop their professional activities. 
Research findings show almost universally that partnerships are less likely 
to go to women than to men (Schultz: 2003: xliii), that women remain 
marginalised, underrepresented, underpaid and tend to be retrenched in 
segments of the legal service market dominated by women (McGiynn, 
2003: 139; Schultz, 2003: xlii). Women lawyers are constantly subject to 
79 See chapter 3,oecllon IV of this thesis. 
80 See chapetr 3, section IV of this thesis. 
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discriminating practices or, as Schultz concludes on the basis of 
international research findings: 
'We have noted that due to the continuing gendered division of labour 
between the sexes in the family, female jurists work harder but stand fewer 
chances of professional success. There are Intentional and unintentional 
mechanisms that produce professional hierarchies and persistent social 
forces that cause gender discrepancies. To name but a few: conscious and 
unconscious stereotyping (men as breadwinners while women work to meet 
the bill of the child-minder); the effects and notions of motherhood and even 
of femininity as damaging to professional commitment and efficiency; 
structural barriers in selection procedures and workplace arrangements; a 
male symbolic order based on homo-social bonding; male networks and 
style of working; a "hegemonic masculinity" with a fixation on male cultural 
capital as opposed to women's academic capital. This leaves women with 
no choice at all or with choices taken under pressure, thus belying rational 
choice theory'' (Schultz, 2003: I) 
Moreover, the prevailing masculine culture in the legal profession requires 
women to abide by the rules of the game, which are, of course, masculine. 
Women must learn that feminine ways of participating are not welcome. 
This implies objectivity, emotional detachment, neutrality and conservative 
dress. In short, anything that the masculine culture would find 
unprofessional should be avoided, family roles must remain invisible, and 
women have to prove commitment by working longer and harder 
{Mossman: 1992, Jack and Jack: 1989; Sommerlad: 1998; Roche: 2001; 
Rhode: 2003). As Jack and Jack have discovered through their early 
research on American lawyers: 
"The safest way to success is emulation of males, even to the extent of 
speaking louder and louder and actively becoming and intimidator'' (Jack 
and Jack, 1989: 207) 
In different countries and at different times, different authors seem to have 
come to similar findings in relation to women's marginal positions within 
the legal profession, and this carries substantial consequences in terms of 
the contributions women lawyers have been able to make to the legal 
system. If women occupy the least powerful positions within the 
profession, how could they, from the very margins, affect change within 
the profession? {Mossman, 1988, cited in Mather, 2003: 34). Authors such 
as Freyer have pointed to the fact that in countries like the US, Canada, 
Australia and the U K, women wanting to become successful lawyers often 
face a dilemma, a conflict between their own values and the adversarial 
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ethics prevailing within the profession that excludes feminine 
characteristics. If they adopt a care orientation they will be overtly 
undervalued (as too feminine); conversely, if they adopt a male assertive 
and aggressive orientation, they are judged as failing to conform to the 
feminine model (too tough). This phenomenon, called "the double bind", 
has been observed for other professions and especially for women 
managers, but I think it is more dramatic in the case of lawyers, given the 
strength of the masculine culture prevailing within the profession in spite of 
the large number of women in it (Freyer, 1995: 212-217; Rhode, 2003: 8-
1 0 and 11 ). Thornton (1996: 97-121) and Harrington (1995: 3-5) have 
pointed to women's bodies as a source of dissonance that tends to 
marginalise women within a profession with a masculine culture. Our 
culture associates masculinity with rationality and femininity with 
corporeality and emotions. Thus, the idea that because the law has 
developed over the centuries as a masculine activity having more to do 
with the mind (reason), than with the body (sexuality) serves to explain 
why women in the law, mostly outsiders, have great difficulty in attaining 
authoritative positions. As men have been the ones who have traditionally 
wielded power both within society and the profession, rationality has come 
to dominate the ethos of the profession. Women's marginality within the 
profession is explained in terms of culture and of the power relationships 
between the genders. 
As I move on to consider women's participation in the judiciary it seems 
clear to me that the situation of women in large law firms may serve as an 
explanation of some women's preference for the judiciary. Both Roche 
(2001: 19) and Bothelho Junqueira (1998: 211-214; 2001, 187; 2003: 441) 
in their respective studies on the participation of women in the legal 
professions in Venezuela and Brazil have come to the conclusion that law 
firms are the greediest sector of the profession in terms of accommodating 
women within them. Accordingly, they have tended to explain women's 
incorporation to the judiciary in those countries as a consequence of the 
difficulty for women to enter and progress in the business sector of the 
profession. In fact, Latin American and French research shows that the 
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participation of women in the judiciary tends to be relatively larger 
countries that have adopted the civil law system81 than in common law 
countries (Schultz, 2003). 
However, in countries such as Brazil and Argentina, where women 
constitute around 20% of the judiciary, and even in countries such as 
France (Boigeol, 2003: 401-418) and Poland (Fuszara, 2003: 374-376), 
where the number of women is larger than the number of men, women's 
participation in the judiciary is concentrated in the lower courts, very often, 
in the sections of the judiciary with less prestige. There are, in fact, very 
few women in the higher posts of the judiciary. Such a tendency has been 
observed by Boigeol (2002: 412-413) in France and Fuszara (2003: 376) 
in Poland. I could detect a similar trend in Argentina, where women judges 
are found more often in the civil and labour courts .of first instance82, 
although some women may be found at the second instance courts83 and 
at the provincial supreme courts, but there are no women at the Supreme 
Court of the Nation. Venezuela is an exception in that respect, since for 
some time now, there have been various women members of the Supreme 
Court and women's participation in the upper courts is quite important 
(Roche, 2001: 7-8). 
This tendency towards a higher participation of women in the judiciary 
within the civil law world has been related to various factors, among which 
the use of open examinations as a method for recruiting the judges has 
been particularly highlighted as a feature that tends to favour the entry of 
women and other excluded sectors to the judiciary (Boigeol, 2003: 405-
406, Bothelho Junqueira, 2003: 440). The situation in the above-
81 According to Schultz, 2003: xxvli, there is great variation In terms of women's participation In the 
judiciary, ranging from quite high in Poland (63.6%) and France (54%) to quite low In the USA (10-
12%), the UK 11 ,8%. See Schultz 2003: xxxvii-xxxviil. 
82 As seen In the previous section, the proportion of women for the National Courts of first instance 
In Buenos Aires Is 40% for the Civil Courts - the Family Courts are part of the Civil Courts- and d 
52,5% for the Labour Courts . 
83 The proportion of women for the National Courts of first instance In Buenos Aires Is 39.6%, 
22.6% of the National Courts of second Instance; 24.2% o1 the Fed~ml Courts o1 13,9% o1 the 
Federal Courts of Second Instance 40% of the Supreme Court of the City of Buenos Aires- a new 
court elected with a system of quotas, and 0.% of the Supreme Court of the Nation. 
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mentioned countries within the civil law tradition is, in fact, very different to 
that detected in the common law countries. As opposed to the current 
experience of countries with a civil legal system, in the common law world, 
nomination as a judge usually comes with seniority as the culmination of a 
long and successful career as a lawyer. In the civil law countries, a judicial 
career can be initiated quite early in the working life of a lawyer (Malleson, 
2003: 177). Given that the massive incorporation of women to the legal 
profession is relatively recent within both legal traditions, in the common 
law countries only very few women have developed such long and 
successful careers. lt has been argued that in countries such as the US 
and the UK (McGiynn, 2003: 155; Hunter, 2003: 91-92; Malleson: 2003: 
175-180; Schultz, 2003, xxxvii and xlvi-xlviii) this has kept the proportion of 
women within the judiciary quite low and that, in due time, the proportion of 
women is eventually going to rise to proportions mirroring the proportion of 
law students (citing Sir Thomas Legg, Permanent Secretary of the Lord 
Chancellor's Department in 1996, Malleson, 2003: 178). 
However, as both McGiynn (1998 and 2003) and Malleson (2003) have 
demonstrated that it is not just a question of time, the 'trickle up' argument 
mainly used by government and by conservative sectors is not borne out 
by evidence. As statistics on women judges show, there has been a 
considerable number of judges for sufficient years now to bring about 
changes in terms of an increase in the number of women in senior posts 
within the judiciary, but this change has not occurred. 
Thus, Malleson warns us against taking the "trickle up hypothesis" too 
seriously, as· she demonstrates that the general tendency has actually 
gone quite in the opposite direction (Malleson, 2003: 177 -180). 
Accordingly, the author has recommended the introduction of proactive 
measures in the processes of selection and appointment of judges in order 
to ensure better opportunities for women and members of minorities to 
obtain posts in the judiciary (Malleson, 2003: 185-189). 
Women's increased entry into the judiciary has been also explained as a 
consequence of the lessening in men's interest in judicial work, as has 
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been observed for France (Boigeol: 2003: 406-407) and the United States 
(Berger and Robinson: 1992-1993, cited in Botelho Junqueira, 2003: 440). 
The fact that women are often more numerous in the judiciary than in the 
law firms has also been related to women's domestic responsibilities. As 
opposed to what happens in law firms, a career in the judiciary may be 
easier for women to juggle the demands of family and profession (Boigeol, 
2003: 409; Botelho Junqueira, 2003: 441 ). Additionally, the possibility to 
wield power from an early stage in one's career (Boigeol, 2003: 408; 
Botelho Junqueira, 2003: 440) and to obtain equal pay and stability have 
been used to explain women's attraction to the judiciary. The latter 
becomes particularly significant at times when women take maternity leave 
(Boigeol, 2003: 409; Botelho Junqueira, 2003: 441). 
As mentioned earlier, my own findings in terms of women's participation 
within the judiciary suggest the existence of both a vertical and a 
horizontal segregation on the basis of sex. There are no women at the 
Supreme Court of the Nation, while there are women in 6 of the 24 
provincial Supreme Courts. The proportion of women increases as one 
goes down in the hierarchical ladder: while the overall proportion of 
women in the judiciary is about 27%, in the Federal Courts the proportion 
of women decreases, constituting 13,9% of the Federal Courts of second 
instance and 20,5% of the Federal Courts of first instance. The proportion 
of women rises when one considers the local courts, where women 
constitute 18% of the local courts of second instance and 26% of the local 
courts of first instance of the city of Buenos Aires. 
After having considered the situation of women among law students and 
academics in UBA Law School, in Buenos Aires' law firms and in the 
judiciary and compared my findings with the international trends for the 
participation of women in the legal professions, I am in a position to 
conclude that women's participation in these branches of the legal 
profession in Argentina tends to coincide with the international trends 
observed by various authors within both legal traditions, with the caveat 
that the proportion of women judges is slightly higher than the average. 
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Thus, as a whole, in spite of the increase in the number of women entering 
the legal professions, women's positions remain marginal. 
In this chapter I presented a picture of various sectors of the labour market 
for women lawyers in the city of Buenos Aires, the law faculty, legal firms 
and the judiciary. Unfortunately, the lack of available data has prevented 
me from investigating other sectors where women lawyers work, such as 
the State bureaucracy, where women lawyers work as government 
officials, or the small firms where women work as solo practitioners or with 
a few other lawyers that do not advertise in the Martindale Directory. 
This is the first original research showing that the large increase in the 
number of women obtaining law degrees has not yet made itself felt in any 
of the areas investigated. In spite of the obvious advances women lawyers 
have made in the last decades, the phenomenon of the glass ceiling 
common to many professional activities all over the world is a reality 
shared by women lawyers in Buenos Aires. lt remains contentious whether 
this situation will change over time. 
My findings very much coincide with other Latin American (Botelho 
Junqueira, 1999 and 2001; Roche, 2001), North American (Freyer, 1995: 
199-218; Harrington, 1993; Menkei-Meadow, 1989: 196-255 and 1997: 
196-203; Mossman, 1988: 567, Rhode, 2003: 3-21); Australian (Thornton, 
1997; Hunter 2003: 87-1 03) and European studies (Boigeol, 1999 and 
2003. 401-418; McGiynn, 1998 and 2003: 139-158); Sommmerlad, 1998, 
1998a and 2003: 191-224; Schultz, 2003: xxv-lxii and 295-321). lt is 
striking to observe the persistence of gender discrimination against women 
in the legal professions in societies with very different levels of 
development and diverse cultural and institutional backgrounds. 
Although in the last decades women lawyers have advanced considerably 
in all areas, for the time being, all legal fields are characterised by a high 
dogree of vort!ca! und horizontal segregation. The main locus of 
discrimination against women seems to be the large law firms, while the 
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conditions of participation in the law faculty and the judiciary seem to be 
less restrictive. This reality for women within professional associations 
mirrors the general situation of women lawyers: their participation is low at 
the highest levels and increases at the lowest levels of the lawyers' 
associations. 
Nevertheless, the Argentine levels of participation of women within the 
judiciary can be considered relatively high, even when compared with the 
reality of more developed nations. Particularly in areas such as the Family 
Law Courts where the proportion of women judges does not go unnoticed. 
This chapter has set the scene for my work with family law judges. In the 
next chapter, I consider the nature of the Family Law Courts of the City of 
Buenos Aires, which will be followed in the subsequent chapters by the 
examination of gender differences among the family law judges. 
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ClhajpieD' 4 a Tlhle !Family law COLIID'tS og the city 0~ !BIUieno~ Aires, ~heir 
!history, dlescroptoolnl anldl consmutoon 
I a Introduction 
In the two previous chapters I considered the background to wom~n's 
entry into public life in Argentina, concentrating on women's advance in 
the legal profession, and described their participation in the various fields 
of activity within it: the academy, the private practice of the profession, and 
the judiciary. 
Chapter 4 initiates part 11 of the thesis, where I report the findings of my 
research with the family law judges. The chapter starts with a review of 
international research on women judges that situates my own enquiry in 
the context of existing research. The chapter then moves on to describe 
the Family Law Courts in terms of their history, competence, constitution 
and sex composition. lt describes the judges that comprise the family law 
judiciary according to their personal, social and educational characteristics 
and closes with the consideration of the family law judges' career 
trajectories and motivations. 
11 - Review of previous International research 0111 women 
judges and difference 
1 a Introduction 
The great increase of women in the legal profession particularly, in the 
judiciary in proportions that go well beyond "token" numbers -more than 
20%- in certain jurisdictions justifies the initiative to test the proposition 
that women judges could make a difference to the administration of justice 
(Moss Kanter, 1977: 228). Some research has been carried out to depict 
the population of women judges, to find connections between gender and 
adjudication and investigate the differences and similarities between men 
and women judges. As is the case with women lawyers, however, 
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research on the subject is rather scarce, preliminary and relatively 
inconclusive in its results. 
Research of a statistical nature describing the numbers and locations of 
women in the judiciary was considered in chapter 3, section V. lt 
constituted essential information to be obtained before attempting further 
analytical research. Its findings showed that, although the number of 
women in legal education has risen dramatically for most jurisdictions, this 
increase has not made itself noticeable in the different areas of the legal 
labour market, including the judiciary. Although in countries with a civil law 
tradition the proportion of women in the judiciary is higher than in common 
law countries, in countries within both legal traditions women tend to 
concentrate in the lower ranks of the judiciary and are underrepresented at 
its higher echelons. 
At the end of chapter 1, I discussed the more speculative and theoretical 
work on women judges. The issues covered were, among others, the 
desirability of having more women in the judiciary and the discussion of 
the differences women could make to the administration of justice.· I shall 
now consider the more empirically based kind of work, frequently related 
to concrete judicial discourses. Bearing in mind that this is a review of a 
relatively new research field, I am interested both in the methodological 
strategies deployed in order to carry out the research and in its findings, 
since the consideration of both aspects provides important information and 
insights to reflect upon my own work. 
2 oTWO research styles 
Some studies have been carried out, mainly in the US, on a large-scale 
basis, attempting to trace the "different voice" in women judges from a 
quantitative methodological standpoint, using a posltivistic methodology 
and rigorous and highly sophisticated research methods, often collecting 
and/or producing new data that allow for generalisations. Most research 
studies in this group have looked into the outcomes of judges' decisions, 
namely, at their judgements. Thus, these studies have attempted to find 
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indications of the presence of different approaches in women judges' 
judgements (Gruhl, Spohn and Welch, 1980; Davis, Haire and Songer, 
1993; Davis, 1993; Alliota, 1995; Alien and Wall, 1993). This kind of 
research has a highly predictive value but, on the whole, when compared 
to research based on more qualitative methodological criteria, its analytical 
power is poorer, not subtle enough and less in-depth. Instead, there are 
some research studies that, while relying on empirical evidence to draw 
conclusions on the relationships between gender, adjudication and other 
aspects of the activity of judging, have deployed a qualitative exploratory 
methodological strategy. Such studies have either gathered existing data 
(Sherry, 1980; Abrahamson, 1988; Durham, 1988;) or collected new 
information in an attempt to seize the judges' attitudes with respect to the 
issue of gender difference in the judiciary by means of surveys or 
interviews (Martin, 1993; Botelho Junqueira, 2003). This type of enquiry 
seldom works with the entire population or with a representative sample. 
Consequently, the conclusions reached through this type of investigation, 
though more nuanced and richer in terms of quality, cannot be 
generalised; hence they have poor predictive value. The results obtained 
by both types of research are, however, as contentious as the research 
carried out with respect to the potential contribution women lawyers 1 could 
make to the legal system. 
In the following paragraphs, I categorise some research studies that 
examine the difference women judges could bring to the administration of 
justice in terms of their objectives and of the methodological strategy used 
to investigate. Thus, I start by considering the large scale quantitative 
studies aimed basically at comparing the voting behaviour of men and 
women judges and by analysing women's voting behaviour. Then I move 
on to consider the large sale studies using survey data to analyse the 
attitudes of women judges and the more conceptual analysis of women's 
collective contributions to the legal system and end by examining smaller 
scale qualitative research studies. I conclude by justifying my decision to 
opt for a small scale qualitative study set up in a particular context. 
1 See chapter 3, section V. 
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i R S~IUidlies compa11ri1111g Uue vo~i1111g lbelhlaJvloiUIIl' o~ ma1111 aJndl wome1111 
j!Uidlges 
Among the first type of research study mentioned above, there are some 
studies that have compared the decision making of men and women 
judges to find slight differences among men and women in terms of their 
judgements. Such is the case of an early study by Gruhl, Spohn and 
Welch (1980: 308-322) that examined the convicting and sentencing 
behaviour of men and women trial judges in a large metropolitan city in the 
United States, in 30,000 cases decided between 1971 and 1979, where 
male and female defendants were involved in felony cases. They 
proceeded by means of statistical analysis of judges' convicting and 
sentencing decisions, on the basis of a typology of charges. Starting from 
previous research on the different interests of men and women policy 
makers, their analysis showed that women were slightly more liberal than 
men in issues of crime control, and that women defendants were accorded 
a protective and chivalrous treatment by men judges, they started from the 
hypotheses that women judges would be slightly more lenient than men 
judges when convicting and sentencing. Accordingly, they expected that 
women judges would be less likely to convict and to incarcerate 
defendants when they did convict them, and less likely to incarcerate 
defendants for long periods of time. They also expected that men judges 
would treat women defendants more leniently (Gruhl, Spohn and Welch, 
1980: 308-322). 
Their findings showed that the actual convicting and sentencing behaviour 
of men and women judges did not differ significantly. Although women 
were slightly less likely to find defendants guilty in general terms, they 
were more likely to send defendants to prison and they tended to give 
slightly stiffer sentences than their male counterparts (Gruhl, Spohn and 
Welch, 1980: 308-322). 
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Their results were much more conclusive with respect to the testing of 
their second hypothesis, which showed that, although men and women 
judges tended to convict women defendants at a similar rate, women 
judges were considerably more likely than men judges to sentence female 
defendants to prison (twice as often). Women judges tended to treat men 
and women offenders with greater similarity than did men judges. While 
men and women judges treated men offenders similarly, women 
defendants were treated much more severely by women judges. 
Davis, Haire and Songer's (1993: 129-133) research on the voting 
behaviour on the U.S Courts of Appeals constitutes a second example of a 
study using a quantitative approach to compare men and women judges' 
decisions. The authors started from the hypothesis that women judges 
might vote differently from their male colleagues in ways that would reflect 
a tendency to emphasise rights that are interdependent, like the right to 
full membership in a community, rather than rights against the community. 
They examined voting behaviour in cases related to employment 
discrimination, criminal procedural rights and obscenity, and were not able 
to fully prove their hypothesis on a different voice for women judges. They 
analysed the votes of all the judges that had served in the Courts of 
Appeal from 1980 to 1991. In all cases, the number of women judges was 
very small as compared to the numbers of male judges (always under 
10%). 
Votes in the different types of cases were categorised and connected to 
the gender of the judge. The results showed statistically relevant 
differences between men and women judges in two of the three areas 
considered. Employment discrimination cases revealed that women 
supported plaintiffs more often than their male counterparts, whereas the 
analysis of search and seizure cases showed that women judges were 
slightly more likely to support the claims of criminal defendants. In 
obscenity cases there were no significant differences between men and 
women judges. 
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Among the studies that look specifically at women judges' decisions, there 
is Sherry's early analysis of the decision making of Sandra Day O'Connor 
(Sherry, 1986: 543-615). Although Sherry used a theoretical, rather 
qualitative methodology, I am considering her work at this stage because 
she initiated a controversy that gave rise to many studies of a more 
quantitative nature. As was seen in chapter 1 section 111-2, Sherry 
developed a theoretical framework drawing on Gilligan's theory and on 
political philosophy that she applied to the legal field. Sherry related the 
classical republican communitarian tradition in political philosophy to a 
feminine perspective in jurisprudence and looked for support of her theory 
in O'Connor's judgements in two areas: "religious establishment clause" 
and civil rights. As a result of her analysis, Sherry claimed to have 
observed a contextual approach and a tendency to reject rigid rules as 
well as "a uniquely feminine perspective" in O'Connor's decision making 
(Sherry, 1986: 579). From her research, Sherry concluded that O'Connor 
had tended to support individual rights when they involved community 
membership (Sherry, 1986: 604). The fact that she studied a single 
woman judge, did not work with all her decisions, and did not explain how 
the decisions were selected have earned her a well deserved criticism of 
essentialism. Moreover, further research has questioned O'Connor's 
different voice and reached exactly the opposite results (Davis, 1993: 134-
139; Alliota, 1995: 232-235} 
Davis (1993: 134-139), in turn, analysed all of O'Conilor's votes in 
religious establishmenf, civil rights and criminal procedure cases from 
1981 to 1991. Using scalogram analysis and other quantitative techniques, 
she found little support for Sherry's thesis. Suspicious of the effectiveness 
of the analysis of case outcomes to test Sherry's hypothesis on the 
different voice in O'Connor's' jurisprudence, because it obscures the 
reasoning and the criteria used to reach these decisions, Alliotta (1995: 
232-235) proposed an alternative methodology: "fact pattern analysis". To 
her, this alternative method seemed more useful to explore differences 
2 By religious establishment cases Davls refers to the US Supreme Court Jurisprudence of cases 
related to establishment clause (tha part of the First Amendment on the separation ofchurch and 
State). · 
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between men and women judges, because it compares not only the 
substance of judicial selection, but also the arguments involved in the 
discussion that led to the decisions, and bring the judge's social attributes 
into the analysis. 
In her sophisticated study of 40 Supreme Court Justice's decisions on 
E:qual protection cases {346 votes cast from 1981 to 1985) Alliotta {1995: 
232-235) brings gender along with other social attributes. She introduces 
class, education, and the judge's political party identification into the 
analysis, together with certain fact characteristics of the cases, the nature 
of the right presumed to be violated, whether the defendant was the 
national, the state or the local government, and whether the vote was cast 
by O'Connor or another Justice. Alliota reasons in the following manner: if 
Sherry's thesis was correct, Justice O'Connor's votes in equal protection 
cases would depend on the way she balanced the claimant's request for 
inclusion and the community's request for exclusion. Thus, it would be 
expected that Justice O'Connor be more willing to accept a claim that 
condemned an individual to outsider status when the criterion involved 
affected the individual tie to the community, such as race, gender, 
legitimacy, or cases of reverse discrimination, where the claims were 
generally brought by insiders. Her findings, like David's (1993: 134-139) 
did not provide, however, support for the different voice in O'Connor's 
jurisprudence. 
Alien and Wall (1993: 156-161) analysed the role orientations of State 
Supreme Court Justices. They tested four possible judicial roles for 
women judges: "representatives", "tokens", "outsiders" and "different 
voices"~ The authors examined voting behaviour in three issue areas: 
women's Issues, criminal rights and economic liberties. They found the 
strongest support for their construct of the "representative" and "outsider" 
roles, some support for the different voice role and virtually no support for 
the token role. They concluded that women judges were more likely to be 
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the most pro-women member of their court on women's issues3 
("representatives"), to occupy positions at the extreme liberal or 
conservative wings of their courts: ("dissenters") and to engage in both 
extreme and dissenting behaviour in criminal and economic cases 
("different voices"). Although many of the large-scale studies reviewed 
borrow the "different voice" expression from Gilligan, it seems to me that 
their studies do not coincide with Gilligan's theoretical approach. In their 
effort to work with quantitative methodologies, they seem to void the 
concept from its original theoretical content. 
As Malleson concluded from her assessment of the overall research 
findings on decision making outcomes: 
" ... it would seem that in terms of sentencing and general adjudication there 
are no clear or consistent differences between men and women on the 
bench. Only when the issue is one directly related to sex discrimination do 
any differences emerge and even here the findings are mixed. Moreover, 
where there are differences, these do not necessarily fit with expected 
gender patterns according to theories such as Gilligan's ethic of care/ rights 
dichotomy. (Malleson, 2003: 7) 
The general inconsistency and inconclusiveness of the findings point to 
the fact that research on the subject is still embryonic, and in need of both 
theoretical and methodological refinement. The basic problems involved in 
this type of enquiry revolve around the theme of whether, given the strong 
masculine culture that prevails in the profession, there can be a different 
voice among women judges and if so, whether and how it is possible to 
systematically observe it. Should priority be given to behaviour or to 
discourse, and what is the relationship between them? Should one expect 
to find differences in the judge's attitudes and values, in case outcomes or 
on the ways judges write their decisions? How to apprehend the 
processes leading to these decisions? 
3 Alien and Wall (1993: 161) explain that sex discrimination, sexual conduct and abuse, medical 
malpractice, property settlements and the relationship between child and parent all appear as 
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b a Qu.namatlve studies on tlhe impact of gender on ihle Judllciarry 
i -large-scale sUJrveys on the attltiUides o~ women judges 
Large-scale studies were also conducted in the U.S. to examine women 
judges' attitudes. The strategy to ask the judges themselves about their 
role orientations seems to me much more interesting than that of analysing 
case decisions, since it enables the researcher to analyse data of a 
qualitative nature that is more focused and less mediated by presumed 
theoretical correspondences between the judges' orientations and their 
voting behaviour. 
Martin (1993: 166-172} broadened the scope of the difference enquiry to 
include the "off the bench" and collective behaviour of women judges by 
using survey data rather than voting behaviour. Focusing on members of 
the National Association of Women Judges, Martin found that the 
organisation acted as a support group to promote a representative role for 
its members, that members of the NAWJ were more likely than non 
members to support the notion of representative roles for women judges, 
and that many individual members of the NAWJ sought to play an active 
role in their communities. 83% of the judges who were members of the 
NAWJ and 63% of those who were not agreed with the statement that 
"women have certain unique perspectives and life experiences, different 
from those of the men that ought to be represented on the bench by 
women judges" (Martin, 1993: 169} However, Martin found little support 
among women judges for the different voice theory and concluded that the 
representative role as seen for women judges by NAWJ members was 
relatively moderate, in accordance with the general conservatism of the 
profession. 
In the same category, a large recent survey was carried out in New 
Zealand comparing the judges' perceptions on gender issues (Barwick, 
2000 cited in Malleson, 2003: 3). One of the findings of this study showed 
that women would seem to believe more often than men that gender was 
----~--------------------
Integral parts of a pro-women agenda. 
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an important factor in the judges' decision making and 70% of the women 
as opposed to 39% of men judges agreed with the proposition that "judges 
judge by what they think is right and proper and that necessarily involves a 
particular set of values and standards influenced by gender". 
In the Netherlands, a large survey carried on by Josten and Van Tijn 
(1991, cited by Schultz, 2003: 249) among members of the Dutch judiciary 
found that, while both supporters of difference and supporters of equality 
were to be found among the respondents, supporters of equality 
outnumbered supporters of difference. Thus, while 12% of the judges 
agreed with the idea that female judges treated family matters differently, 
54% held a different view. Moreover, while 11% of the respondents 
believed that female members of the judiciary had a different approach to 
crime, 63% disagreed. 
11 c Analysis of women judges' collective contributions 
Two studies can be said to stand out among those choosing a more 
qualitative approach: one by Judge Abrahamson (1998: 200-206) and one 
by Judge Durham (1999: 217-237). Both give an account of the impact of 
women judges on gender bias in the courtroom in the United States. They 
have examined the work of various women associations like "The National 
Association for Women Judges" and "The National Organisation of 
Women Legal Defence and Education" which, in the early eighties, formed 
an umbrella group named "The National Judicial Education Program to 
Promote Equality for Women and Men in the Courts". 
Abrahamson. and Durham examined reported results on gender bias in the 
courtroom to find that they were quite uniform in showing that gender bias 
affected women in all the roles they played in the judicial system; that is to 
say, as litigants, witnesses, attorneys, judges, jurors, defendants and court 
employees. Whatever their roles, women were mistreated, accorded less 
dignity and given less credibility than their male counterparts. In other 
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words they were harassed and discriminated against, both by men and by 
other women4• 
Findings showed that women judges were more willing than men judges to 
intervene to stop gender biased behaviour in their courtrooms. They had 
campaigned for judicial education programs to educate judges about 
gender bias, had fought against discursive discrimination in language, and 
worked to make sure that the Courts had transparent, stereotype-free 
hiring policies to ensure equal opportunities to all groups. In both the views 
of Judge Abrahamson and Judge Durham, these women judges were 
making an important contribution to changing the atmosphere of America's 
courtrooms through increasing sensitivity to gender issues by means of 
discussion, scholarship and judicial education (Abrahamson, 1998: 200-
206; Durham, 1999: 217-237). 
Moreover, Durham argued that, in spite of their traditional legal training 
and their wide diversity in terms of political and social experiences, women 
judges had become more progressive on issues involving women. She 
stressed that these judges influenced women through their own votes and 
also by adding their perspectives to the debate and to the decision making 
process. These perspectives, in turn, gained legitimacy and became 
incorporated in case law and precedent, thus helping to build sensitivity to 
the pervasive attitudes to gender that consistently inform the law. 
Durham also found various very interesting pieces of evidence showing 
how women judges could make and, had, in fact, made a difference, 
particularly on "women's issues", in such areas as domestic law (divorce. 
alimony and· custody cases), and in areas of medicine law (surrogacy, 
maternal foetal conflicts, life support treatments) (Durham, 1999: 233). 
As I overview existing research, my impression is that the more qualitative 
the studies, the richer the findings, particularly as one considers the 
novelty of the phenomenon under investigation, which calls for detailed 
and careful exploration of the situations of women as newcomers to public 
4 Bogosh oboen10d o similar tendency fn hor otudy of the Court Interactions In the loraeli Judiclailf 
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settings such as the circumstances of women in the bench, and for a close 
examination of their experiences and perceptions. 
Studies such as the ones reviewed in this section offer very 
powerful insights. As part of a general strategy to eliminate gender bias in 
the courts, these studies are less academic and more focused than 
scholarly research. Their findings are fairly specific and serve as a basis 
for policy decisions and programmes. As such, they offer a very interesting 
model to study women in the judiciary in other nations. 
lii - Other strategies 
Different qualitative strategies have been deployed to evaluate women 
judges' specific attitudes. Fuszara, Jar instance, examined the opinions of 
30 women litigants in maintenance cases to test the contention that the 
increase of women judges reduced gender bias in the courtroom. She 
found that women litigants complained of women judges' lack of 
impartiality and accused them of siding with the men (Fuszara, 2003: 376-
377). 
Schultz (2003: 313-314) drew on testimonies collected in the context of a 
small-scale qualitative study of women in the judiciary carried out in 1987 
in the federal state of Hess to articulate a "catalogue of female qualities 
and behaviour in professional work". Schultz thus highlighted four 
categories. Each of these categories summarises different aspects of 
women's distinctive attitudes. Thus, "emotional climate" involves 
"understanding, nurturing, patience, warmth, showing one's feelings"; "eo-
cooperativeness" stands for "less litigious attitudes, less aggressiveness, 
more mediation; non-authoritarian style" implies "greater openness, less 
formality, no excessive self-esteem, readiness to admit to having made a 
mistake", while "less set on competition" is suggestive of "less statute 




3 - laio!l'1l Amerrlcaun reseall'ch on womell'1l jiUidiQJes 
Research on judges in Latin America is quite profuse but rarely takes 
gender as a variable. Its main focus is the administration of justice and 
takes mainly the form of very extensive diagnoses to serve as a basis for 
eventual systemic reforms of the judicial system, which appears to be 
slow, bureaucratic, expensive, inefficient, corrupt and often dependent on 
political power (Mackinson, 1987; Mackinson and Goldstein, 1988; Fucito, 
1999, 2002; Bielsa and Brenna, 1993; Morello y Berizonce, 1994; Quiroga 
Lavie, 1998, Cueto Rua, 2000). I was able to identify three Latin American 
studies about women judges, two of them from Argentina and one from 
Brazil. In neither of the Argentine studies did the difference that women 
judges could make to the system appear as a focal point of interest. 
Mackinson and Goldstein (1988) analysed the judges of the City of 
Buenos Aires and included a chapter on the women judges for the same 
jurisdiction. Aires. lt was the first study on the judiciary in Argentina to 
include gender as an important variable. The authors examined the 
participation of women within the judiciary in quantitative terms. They also 
collected information about the judges' social origins, their general and 
legal education, and socio-cultural activities. Accordingly, while this work 
was the first to examine the specific situation of women judges, it is mainly 
quantitative and is now out of date. In addition, it did not consider whether 
women exercise a "different voice". As can be seen in chapter 3, section 
IV, I used their findings on the location of women in the judiciary of Buenos 
. Aires as a basis to compare them with my own data on the participation of 
women in the judiciary ten years later. 
In the early 1990's Laura Gastr6n (1991) published a book on the 
participation of women in the judiciary. She analysed women's 
participation within the judiciary in numerical terms. As with the Mackinson 
and Goldstein study, I used her data to draw comparisons with my own in 
order to assess the changes occurred in the meantime. From her 
statistical analysis of women's participation within the judiciary, the author 
concluded that women were discriminated against in the judiciary 
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(Gastr6n, 1991: 96) She observed that sexual stereotypes about the role 
of women, prevalent in society at large, were reproduced within the 
judiciary, a traditionally masculine realm. She found both a vertical and a 
horizontal occupational segregation: women concentrated on the lower 
instances and on those sections of the judiciary more easily assimilated to 
the roles women, as wives and mot.hers, perform in society. Women were 
to be encountered more frequently in the civil and labour sections of the 
judiciary, with a small number of women within the criminal courts and 
very few women judges acting in sections where the legal conflicts 
involved important amounts of money. Gastr6n also interviewed a small 
sample of five women judges to explore how they experienced their 
participation in the judiciary, asking particularly whether they thought 
women were discriminated against within the judiciary. The judges' 
perceptions confirmed her quantitative findings. Again, while this was a 
very important study, it did not further explore the differences women 
judges might bring to the judiciary. 
Instead, Botelho Junqueira {2003: 437-450), a researcher from Brazil, 
used a qualitative methodology to study whether women judges made a 
special contribution to the administration of justice in the city of Rio de 
Janeiro. Unlike her U.S. counterparts, Botelho used a small sample and 
worked with a qualitative in-depth interview, on the basis of the discourse 
of women judges from different sections of the judiciary. Her work is of 
particular relevance to my own because of its regional location and 
because of the methodological strategy deployed, which bears some 
similarities to my own5• I think that, in the Latin American context, one of 
the factors determining the use of a small sample could be the lack of 
material resources prevalent in Latin America as compared to the U S. 
However, I am under the impression that, in Botelho's case, this choice 
relates to her focus on values and attitudes rather than on decision 
outcomes. 
6 The most Immediate differences in our approaches are that she Includes only women In her 
sample, while I Include both women and men, to be able to observe gender differences In the 
discourse of the judges. While she works with judges from different sections of the judiciary I only 
work with Family Law Judges. 
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Botelho Junqueira examined women judges' opinions and attitudes on a 
great variety of gender related issues such as the way in which they 
juggled work and family responsibilities, their motives for choosing the 
judiciary, their opinions on feminism and the contributions women judges 
made to the administration of justice, among others. 
Botelho Junqueira's (2003) most significant findings with respect to the 
judges' perceptions about gender differences in the judiciary are a 
tendency on the part of women judges to be harder on women in 
maintenance cases and a propensity to be more attentive with the details 
regarding the facts of the proceedings. The author also observed that, in 
order to mitigate discrimination, women judges found that they needed to 
emphasise similarities with their men counterparts and thus, they tended 
to deny any gender differences (Botelho Junqueira, 2003: 449-450). 
As Malleson (2003: 7) wrote with respect to the overall research findings 
on the judges' decision making: "The best that can be said on the basis of 
the research to date is that there may be some differences of decision 
making in some areas". However, qualitative research has brought to light 
some attitudinal differences among men and women judges (Bogosh, 
2003: 251-252), although these might not affect the outcome of their 
judgements (Schultz, 2003: lv). 
Malleson suggests that the explanations of the findings tend to vary 
according to the subject's epistemological position with respect to 
difference. This point is very similar to that made by Epstein with respect 
to women lawyers when she argued that "difference is in the eye of the 
beholder" (Fi.Jchs Epstein, 1988: 72-98, cited in Menkei-Meadow, 1995: 
35). While supporters of gender difference tend to believe that these 
findings mask differences, those against gender difference argue that, on 
the contrary, differences are overemphasised (Malleson, 2003: 8). Thus, 
those in the first group explain that the lack of difference observed is due 
to the token status of women judges, to the strength of the masculine 
culture of the law that does not allow for the expression of the feminine 
qualities and to the fact that women who make successful careers in such 
218 
a masculine environment are not typical (Malleson, 2003: 8). Those on the 
opposite side of the controversy attribute the differences to the various 
kinds of expertise that women developed in the areas where they 
concentrated within the legal profession before they came to the bench, 
rather than to any socially constructed gender differences (Malleson, 2003: 
9). 
Hopefully, in due time, as the number of women in the judiciary increases 
and research on the issue becomes more prolific, its conceptual and 
methodological tools will be improved and refined. Although a researcher's 
epistemological position is always an important factor in the research 
process, it is likely that, eventually, results may become more conclusive 
and their interpretation less dependent on the researcher's vision. 
4 D Conclusion 
In my view, most of the quantitative research studies that I have reviewed 
work with an operational definition of the "different voice" of women judges 
that does not coincide with the general conceptual framework of the legal 
scholars that have speculated on the basis of Gilligan's theory discussed 
in chapter 1. I would suggest that, in their attempt to work with a very large 
sample and quantitative methodologies, those researchers have tended to 
reduce and oversimplify the "different voice" approach. 
Moreover, gender differences are ,a very complex issue. There is great 
difficulty in translating the concepts involved into easily measurable 
variables without diminishing its conceptual content. This is why I favour a 
more qualitative approach to the study of gender differences in the 
judiciary. Studies involving the explorations of women judges' perceptions 
on gender difference in the judiciary seem to be a better tool for that type 
of complex enquiry. 
The decision to apply a quantitative or a qualitative methodology to the 
study of complex social phenomena can be framed in terms of different 
cultural traditions. While American studies presented first would be in line 
with a positivistic approach that intends to reach conclusions with large 
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population coverage on very specific issues such as the judges' voting 
behaviour, a qualitative research strategy is in keeping with a 
phenomenological approach. As opposed to the sophisticated quantitative 
methodologies used by American researchers, the qualitative approach I 
favour prioritises analytic refinement and aims at a thorough exploration 
and description of the representations, attitudes and values underlying 
judges' practices, attaching foremost importance to the subject's own 
explanations about their experiences and practices. A smaller scale 
qualitative study facilitates this kind of exploratory research and, 
consequently, I find it more appropriate at this stage. Qualitative findings 
throw light on the multiplicity of aspects involved besides gender, and 
could contribute to generate an agenda of issues to be further investigated 
on a larger scale. 
The choice of a specific context such as the Family Law judiciary of the 
city of Buenos Aires relates to the understanding of the need to consider 
situated social subjects as opposed to invoking universalising categories 
of men and women judges. As , explained at the end of chapter 1, 
attempting to draw conclusions for women judges in general might expose 
my work to justified criticisms of essentialism, for overlooking other 
aspects that should be taken into consideration such as class, race, 
culture, sexual orientation and handicap, among others. Having 
overviewed the incipient existing research on women judges and 
difference, and situated my research strategy in its context, I now move on 
to the analysis of the Family Law Courts that constitute the site of my 
research. 
m -The history, competence and constitution of the 
Family Law Courts 
1 = Introduction 
In the Introduction to the thesis, I stated the reasons that led me to choose 
the Family Law Courts as the site of this research. I explained then that 
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Family Law Courts are relatively new courts that have not yet been 
studied. They have a high proportion of women within them and attend to 
matters that are very much related to gender. The purpose of the next 
sections is to describe the Family Law Courts in terms of their history and 
competence and of the evolution of their sex composition in order to 
provide a framework for the analysis that will ensue. I examine the family 
law judges' social and academic backgrounds, their career trajectories and 
their motives to become family judges. 
2 -The Family law Courts 
No attempt has yet been made to write the history or study the working of 
Family Law Courts in Argentina. Given the lack of documentation, in order 
to provide a very basic background for this study of gender differences 
within the family law judges, I had to examine the letter of the law that 
created the courts and reconstruct their history on the basis of the 
testimonies of the judges and other key informants. 
Law 23.637 was passed in September 28, 1988, creating the Civil Courts 
specialized in Family matters. These Courts were created out of a split 
between what had constituted up to then the general Civil Courts under 
which the family competence and the civil patrimonial competence were 
subsumed. Until then, there had been 30 civil courts in the City of Buenos 
Aires with a certain degree of specialisation inside each court: the judge_ 
had two Court Secretaries: one took care of cases involving fami.ly matters 
and the other, cases related with civil patrimonial issues outside the family. 
The Family. Courts, as they are commonly called, started to work 
separately in 1989 to attend to matters that had to do with "family law and 
personal capacities". Their competence involves divorce, child custody 
and visits with the non-custodial parent, maintenance, allowances, 
adoptions, insanity, legal incapacities, estates and inheritances.6 
6 As deflned by the text of the law, the family matters to be dealt by the specialized courts are: 
"1-Authorization to contract matrimony and opposition to its celebration 
2- Inexistence or nullity of matrimony 
3- Divorce and personal separation 
4- Dissolution of tho maritul assets without divorce 
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At the end of 1988, an invitation circulated among all civil judges to opt for 
the family specialisation. Twelve judges accepted the invitation. Among 
those, eight were selected by the Ministry to become civil judges 
specialised in family law and appointed in 1989. Within the next two years 
the number ofcourts with special competence in family matters tripled, 8 
more judges were designated the next year, and another 8 one year later. 
So, in 1989 there were 8 Family Law Courts then, in 1990 their 
membership increased to 16 and, in 1991, their number rose to 24. Since 
then, the courts have had one secretary instead of two. Today there are 
24 Family Law Courts that still constitute a sub-section of the Civil Courts. 
The Upper Civil Court does not specialise in family matters; Its 
competence has remained generaL 
Apart from the judge, the Court staff includes two lawyers, the Secretary 
and the Pro-secretary, who usually want to progress in the judicial career. 
They prepare the files and are entitled to sign certain resolutions within the 
process of divorce. They participate in the Court hearings and can lead 
and manage cases until the final judgement is written and signed by the 
judge. Each Court has two social workers among its staff. Experts such as 
medical doctors, psychiatrists or psychologists designated by the judiciary 
can be summoned by the judge to provide technical advice when required, 
at the expense of the people involved in legal conflicts. Whenever parties 
cannot afford payment, they are forced to use the lower quality public 
social services provided by the State and civil society organisations mainly 
dependent on the Catholicchurch and usually overburdened by the 
excessive demand. 
5· Liquidation or partition of the marital assets except when the dissolution is caused by death 
6· Filiation claims or filiation lmpugnatlon 
7- Adoption, Its nullity or revocation 
a-Deprivation, suspension and restitution of "patria potestad" 
9- Minor custody and visits 
10- Declaration of incapacity, disqualification and rehabilitation 
11- Designation and dismissal of guardians and everything related with guardianship. 
12- Granting guardianship of minors 
13- Alimony among spouses, or derived from patria potestad or kinship 
14- All other matters related to the name, civil status and personal capacities" 
Source: Boletln Oficlal 2 de dlciembre de 1988, Art. 7 to 15. Biblioteca Digital, Mlnlsterio de 
Justlcla, Segurldad y Derechos Humanos. http/www.jus.gov.ar 
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In the Court staff there are also various non-professional employees, and 
a private secretary of the judge. These posts are often taken by law 
students. The Courts open at 7.30 and close at 13.30 each weekday. 
According to the statistics department of the judiciary, each court takes 
care of an average of 3000 cases yearly, and the average time for a case 
to be solved is approximately three years. The participation of the Family 
Law Court in divorce cases can be very lengthy, since it starts with the 
initiation of divorce proceedings, but might not end until the younger child 
comes of age. The whole process at the Family Courts seems very 
outdated and bureaucratic. Hand-sewn legal files are stored in collapsing 
shelves in the Court's Hall where lawyers and clerks wait to be attended 
to. There are very few computers at the Courts. 
The various Family Courts are situated in three buildings in the proximities 
of the Palace of Justice. Only one of them seems to have been specially 
built for the use of the Courts. The two other buildings seem to be 
apartment buildings converted into Courts. None of them seem 
comfortable to those coming to court, for there are no special lounges or 
sitting rooms for people waiting to be attended to or spaces prepared for 
children. The atmosphere in the three buildings is very busy and rushed. 
Long lines of professionals 7 and clerks can be observed all morning long, 
waiting for the lifts. In contrast, in consonance with the high prestige 
accorded to the judicial office in Argentine society, the judge's offices are 
solemn, spacious and very formally furnished. Apart from the working 
space for the judge, there is a sitting space where the judge usually holds 
hearings, a key element in family processes. 
As Macklnson and Goldstein have argued following Lautmann, the poor 
material infrastructure and the inadequacy of the buildings expresses the 
place given by politics to the administration of justice and is an indicator 
that it does not view the judicial system as a matter of paramount 
importance (Lautmann, 1974 cited in Mackinson and Goldstein, 1988: 80). 
7 On a vlsit to the Family Law Courts one can note a marked women's presence among the 
professionals, while ii ono violto the criminal courts, women are very rare both among the 
professionals and the litigants. 
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In addition, the inadequacy of both technical and material resources has 
been pointed out as one of the main obstacles for the efficient 
administration of justice by all the judges who participated in this research. 
3 - Tlhe constitution of the Family, Law Coull"ts 
Table 53 represents the gender composition of the Family Law Courts in 
2001, at the time when the interviews with the judges were held. The 
family section is composed by 24 courts, but at the time the research was 
carried out one of the courts was vacant because the judge had resigned 
more than two years before and his replacement had not yet been 
nominated8 . Table 53 shows that, in 2001, in the Family Law judiciary 
women judges outnumbered men judges. 
Of the 23 remaining courts, occupied by 10 men and 13 women judges, 
two judges, a man and a woman, were on sick leave, thus leaving 9 men 
and 12 women. The 3 vacant courts were being temporarily occupied by 3 
men judges who managed the vacant court in addition to their own. I 
should think that the fact that women judges outnumbered the men judges 
in the Family Law section, as can be seen from tables 53, 58 and 59, 











Table 53a Constitution of the Family'law Courts, by sex 
and standing In 2001 
Judge's name Sex Standing 
Sllvlo Man In charge 
Pestalardo 
Omar Cancela Man Also In charge 
of Court 104 
Laura Servettl Woman In charae 
' 
Vacant 
Uliana Woman In charge 
Fllguelra 
Marcela Perez Woman In charge 
Pardo 
Jorge Noro Man In charge 
Villaara 
Lucas A6n Man Also In charge 
of court 9 
8 As was explained In chapter 2, the delay in constituting the" Judgeship Council" left the country 
without a system of appointment of judges for a few years. See further chapter 2 
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26 NormaAbou Woman In charg_e 
38 Mirta llundain Woman In charge 
56 Miguel Man In charge 
Guiraldes 
76 Ricardo Man Also in charge 
Sangiorgi of Court 102 
77 Marta Mattera Woman In charge 
81 Ana Woman In charge 
Perez Cat6n 
82 lrene Martrnez Woman In charge 
Alcorta 
83 Patricia Woman In charge 
Zabotinsky 
84 Teresa Woman In charge 
Berzosa de 
Naveira 
Gustavo Man In charge 
85 Smuclir 
86 Victor Man In charge 
Carrasco 
Quintan a 
87 Graciela Woman In charge 
V are la 
88 Hernan Coda Man In charge 
92 Marfa Boslo Woman In charge 
102 Julio lrigq~en Man On sick leave 
106 Mvrian Rustan Woman On sick leave 
Tables 54, 55 and 56 show the evolution in the constitution of the Family 
Law Courts. As explained above, the creation of the Family Law Courts 
was completed in three consecutive years, 1989, 1990 and 1991. While in 
1989 men judges outnumbered women judges, during the three year 
period in which the creation of the Family Law Courts was completed, the 
proportion of women rose from 37% to 48%, to reach a percentage of 56% 
in 2001, as can be seen from tables 54 to 57. 
Table 54 Q Family law judges nominated In 1989 
Court Judge's name Judge's Sex Changes 
number 
7 Cancela Man None 
8 Gatzke Woman 
9 Card en as Man Vacant since 1998, 
the judge was not 
replaced after 
.____ __ __,_ _________ _ resi nation 
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10 Filguelra Woman none 
12 Perez Pardo Woman none 
23 Noro Vill€lQI"a Man none 
25 A6n Man none 
26 Repetto Man For a woman In 1994 
(Abou) 
Table 55- Family law judges nominated in 1990 
Court Judge's name Judge's Sex Changes 
number 
81 Perez Cat6n Woman none 
82 Martfnez Alcorta Woman none 
83 Mora Woman For another woman 
In 94 (Zabotinsky) 
84 Berzosa woman none 
85 Smuklir Man none 
86 Carrasco Quintana Man none 
87 Varela Woman none 
88 Cod a Man none 
Table 56- Judges nominated in 1991 
Court Judge's name Judge's Sex Changes 
number 
4 Pestaiardo Man none 
38 Ocampo Man For a woman In 
1992(11undaln) 
56 Guiraides Man none 
76 Sangiorgi Man none 
77 Mattera Woman none 
92 Boslo Woman none 
102 lrigoyen Man none 
106 Gonzaiez Pomez Woman For a woman in 
1992(Rustan) 
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The rise in the proportion of women judges within the Family Courts can 
be accounted for both by the appointment of women to the new courts and 
by the replacements occurred between 1989 and 2001. Six judges 
resigned to their posts during the period. Five of them had been replaced 
by women, and the 6th. had not been replaced. In table 57 I look at the 
evolution of the proportion of women among the family law judges in the 















• Table 57 ~ Evolution in the gender composition of the 
Family Law Courts between 1989 and 2001 
Number Number of %of Total number 
of men women of judges 
women 
3 5 37 8 
8 8 50 16 
11 13 48 24 
12 12 50 24 
12 12 50 24 
13 11 54 24 
13 11 54 24 
13 11 54 24 
13 11 54 24 
13 10 56 23 
13 10 56 23 
13 10 56 23 
13 10 56 23 
• Table 58 a Constitution of the Family law Courts 
by sex of the Judge (1989-2001) 
Creation Total 
Year Courts Woman% Changes Courts Woman% 
1989 8 37 
- 8 37 
1990 8 50 - 16 50 
1991 8 48 - 24 48 
1992 
- 50 2 24 50 
1993 - 50 - 24 50 
1994 
- 50 3 24 54 
1995 
- 54 - 24 54 
1996 - 54 - 24 54 
1997 - 54 - 24 54 






- 56 - 23 56 
- 56 - 23 56 
- 56 - 23 56 
Table 59: Constitution of the Family Law Courts by sex 
of the judge 1989-2001 {graph version) 
Constitution of the family taw courts by sex of the judges (1989-2001) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1900 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
• IV- The family law judges of the City of Buenos Aires: 
their social and academic backgrounds 
1 - Introduction 
Before ~tarting with the qualitative research into the family law judges of 
the city of Buenos Aires, it seemed essential to have a description of the 
judges that comprise the section. Since there is no general central 
register, the information on the judges was not available. Thus, in order to 
obtain relevant data, I distributed a questionnaire that included questions 
regarding their age, civil status, number of children, educational and social 
background, social and religious affiliation and work trajectories. The 
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following analysis is based on the answers provided by the judges9. In this 
section I proceed to analyse the responses to the questionnaires, holding 
sex as the independent variable. 
In general terms, the analysis of the responses to the questionnaires 
shows a considerable uniformity in the constitution of this section of the 
judiciary: the judges that responded the questionnaires are mainly native 
of the Buenos Aires area, and are all white and able bodied. All but one (a 
man judge, whose father had been an almost illiterate manual worker) 
came from middle class backgrounds and received a Catholic upbringing -
although not all of them are practising Catholics, all were or had been 
married at some point and all but one (a woman) had children. 
2 Q Personal data: 
a ~ Age and clv!l status 
The age of the judges ranged from 44 to 63. The average age of the 
judges that responded the questionnaire was 53; the average age of the 
women judges was 49, while the average age of the men judges was 58. 
As can be seen from tables 58 and 59, in such a homogeneous context, 
the sex of the judges seems a strong criterion for differentiation within the 
section. Thus, in addition to sex, age appeared as a possible 
discriminating factor to be investigated when relevant. Other remarkable 
differences between the men and women judges relate to their civil status 
and to their class origin: while all the men were married, only half of the 
women were. 
9 All the judges from the Family Courts were approached, asked to fill in a questionnaire with 
personal data and invited to sit for an interview of approximately an hour to an hour and a half. Of 
the 21 Courts that received the questionnaire, fourteen judges (8 women and 6 men) completed the 
questionnaire. If we consider the number of courts vacant (3 two men and one woman) at the time 
when the questionnaire was distributed, the questionnaire sample corresponds to 66,6% of the 
population under study, while twelve judges, (6 men and 6 women) were available for the interview, 
corresponding to 57,1% of the population under study. Technically speaking this sample cannot be 
considered representative, because the judges that constitute the sample were not selected at 
random; still, being such a large proportion of the population In question, it can be expected that it 
should reflect the population fairly accurately.' Unfortunately, it was not possible to compare the 
data obtained with the data on the judges that did not respond the questionnaire, as the relevant 
date wore not avallablo. 
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b ~ Social ciass all"Bdl parentage 
To a lesser extent, as shown in tables 60 and 61, the social status of the 
women judges' family of origin also appears as a differentiating factor 
between men and women family law judges: as has already been 
mentioned, whereas it is true that their social background is overall middle 
class, it is also true that women come from families with a slightly higher 
social standing 10• lt should be remembered that their family of origin was 
basically and uniformly upper middle class, while the class origin of the 
men was slightly lower and more traditional in terms of the role played by 
women in their family of origin. The same seems to apply with respect to 
the status level of the family of creation of the judges, which appears a 
little higher 11 for the women judges, with a higher proportion of dual career 
marriages. 
Overall, the men judges, had not had professional working mothers except 
for one man judge whose mother had a degree in philosophy, but never 
worked outside the home. Among the mothers of the women judges there 
was a professional working mother who also happened to be a judge. One 
could say there are none or very few modern 12 women role models in the 
families of origin of both men and women judges. This is very important 
because, belonging to the first generations of women judges, and 
occupying positions of power and prestige that result from their 
professional roles, our women judges are breaking certain patterns in 
relation with their family and social role models. 
10 lrrespectlvely of the scale locally used by social scientists to determine the social status of 
occupations, the occupations of the fathers and mothers of the women judges correspond to a 
higher position in the scale than the parents of the men judges. The data collected on the number 
of years of study and the average income and prestige of the occupations of the mothers and 
fathers provide an Idea of their relative status. 
11 lrrespectively of the scale locally used by social scientists to determine the social status of 
occupations, the occupations of the husbands of the women judges correspond to a higher position 
in the scale than the wives of the men judges, the data collected on the number of years of study 
and the average income and prestige of the occupations of the husbands provide a hint of their 
relative status the number of years of study and the average Income and prestige of the 
occupations are the data collected that provide a hint of their relative status. 
12 The word modem re113n; to th~ rolo of ths women In the judges' families of origin where most 
mothers were housewives, corresponding to the prevailing stereotype of the times. 
230 
The number of lawyers both in the family of origin and the family of 
creation of the women judges Is higher among the women judges. There 
are three lawyers among the fathers of the women judges and one lawyer 
among their mothers, and there are four lawyers among their spouses or 
ex spouses, one of them a judge at the Criminal Court. Among the men 
judges, only one had a lawyer parent, while two had spouses who worked 
In the judiciary, one as a member of the Upper Civil Court and the other a 
Court Secretary respectively. According to this data, the tendency to 
pursue the same education and opting for the same career as their mother 
or father is higher among the women than among the men judges. 
• Table 60 - Women Judges' personal data 
Average Marital Average Spouse's Father's Mother's 
age 
status n°of Occupation Occupation Occupation 
children 
49 M S/D w Between 2 u fLl P.1 u fLl P.1 .e u !:! fLl 
4 3 1 
Marital status: 
M- married 
S/D-separated or divorced 
W-widow 
and 3 2 4 
D.l nl 
2 1 3 2 2 1 6 
Occupations: 
U -Unknown H - Housewife 
P/1 -Professional lawyer 
P/nl - Professional non lawyer 
B - Businessman 
1 
Table 61 m Men judges' personal data 
Average Marital Average Spouse's Father's Mother's 
age status 
n°of Occupation Occupation Occupation 
children 
MARRIED u P/1 H T u P/nl B w u H 
58 6 3 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 4 
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3 D IEdllDcaUomn~ background 
a D Ptrlmaoy a111dl secondary edh.nca~ioll'il 
Table 62 reveals differences worth noticing about educational 
backgrounds of men and women judges. While private and religious 
education prevailed both at the primary and secondary levels for the 
women judges (50 % and 75% respectively), instead, a very large 
proportion of the men attended public institutions for their primary and 
secondary education (95% and 95%, respectively). This points to a better 
capacity on the part of the families of the women to afford the costs of 
private education and, from the educational point of view, a stronger 
religious background. lt is nevertheless surprising that some of the women 
who would later make a non-traditional option such as undertaking higher 
education and embracing a profession like the judiciary came from such a 
traditional background. Being part of the first generation of women judges, 
it would seem that the women with an upper middle class background 
entered the judiciary first. 
lb D Hoghlerr educaiion 
The tendency reverts when considering attendance to institutions of higher 
education. The proportion of women who attended private confessional 
Catholic universities is smaller than the proportion of men who attended 
private confessional Catholic universities (38.5% and 50% respectively), 
and smaller than the proportion of women who attended private institutions 
of primary and secondary education (50% and 75% respectively), and 
much higher than the percentage of men who attended private and 
confessional schools of primary and secondary education (5% and 5%, 
respectively). 
The consideration of a previous study on Buenos Aires judges seems 
illuminating for the ongoing discussion on the judges' educational 
background despite the time gap existing between the two investigations. 
The analysis of the comparison of my own findings on attendance to 
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religious/non-religious educational institutions is interesting. In 1988, at the 
time Mackinson and Goldstein carried out their research for the whole of 
the National Courts, only 36% of the judges that participated in my 
research were already in the judiciary and the Family Law Courts had not 
yet separated from the Civil Courts. lt is well worth noticing that this 36% is 
invariably composed by men, since none of the women in the Family Law 
Courts had entered the judiciary at the time. Let us remember that the 
Family Courts were created in 1989 and were filled mainly with existing 
civil judges. The comparison can only be made for secondary school 
attendance and university education, since the authors did not investigate 
primary school attendance in their own study. 
Now, the authors highlight an overall dominant tendency for the whole of 
the National judges to attend single sex, public, and non-confessional 
secondary schools (Mackinson and Goldstein, 1988: 29). A striking 
difference can be observed in terms of religious/non-religious secondary 
school attendance between the women judges in the Family Law Courts 
and the whole of the National judges. While, as seen above, the former 
tended to attend private and confessional secondary schools, the latter 
followed the general pattern observed by Mackinson and Goldstein in 
secondary school attendance. 
With respect to the university attended by the 1 06 judges that participated 
in the Mackinson and Goldstein survey, 89.6% had attended national 
public non-confessional universities, 0.94% attended a private non-
confessional university, while 7.54% went into private confessional 
universities (Mackinson and Goldstein, 1988: 33). Among the family 
judges that participated in this study we could observe a higher incidence 
of private confessional Catholic university attendance (42.6% of the judges · 
in the sample went to private confessional universities and 57.4 went to 
public non confessional universities; 38.5% of the women judges and 50% 
for the men attended private confessional universities). lt seems that the 
family Jaw judges' education Is more religion oriented than that of the 
National judges as a whole. 
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This high incidence of a Catholic university education among the family 
law judges as compared to the whole of the National judges is a rather 
interesting finding. One wonders whether the process of nomination of 
family law judges favours a Catholic education. Given that the family is 
such a cherished and crucial social institution within the Catholic 
worldview, another possible explanation could be that a Catholic education 
might awaken the interest for family issues and hence the judges' choice 
for the Family Law Courts. In any event, this would seem to be in keeping 
with the judges' responses with respect to their practice of the Catholic 
religion as can be seen from table 64 below. 
In view of the difficulty to explain the high incidence of a Catholic higher 
education among the family law judges, I hypothesised that it could have 
been related to the temporary closing of UBA during the dictatorship. 
Thus, I investigated the years when the judges pursued their legal studies 
to see whether they coincided with the years when the UBA was closed. 
The result was that all the men had finished their studies well or just before 
the coup d'etat that brought about the military regime, and half of them 
had studied law in a Catholic university. As for the women, 38.5% of the 
women studied in a Catholic university, from these, only a third pursued 
their studies of law in coincidence with the military regime, while the 
remaining 61 ,5% studied law at UBA -the national public and non-religious 
University of Buenos Aires-. 60% of them had finished their studies by the 
time the of the coup and 40% studied law during the dictatorship. My 
conclusion, then, is that the high incidence of Catholic higher education 
among the family law judges cannot be accounted for by the closing of 
UBA during the dictatorship, and therefore, the explanations presented 
above seem more plausible. 
c - Postgraduate education 
As can be seen from table 62, I also observed a tendency for a higher 
level of educational attainment among women judges. In terms of their 
educational backgrounds, as stems from the analysis of the 
questionnaires, many of the women had done the postgraduate course in 
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family law, and one of them had studied sociology, while the men, in 
general, had only attended some courses and seminars not leading to a 
particular degree. 
This aspect appeared consistently in the responses to the questionnaires. 
Although during the interviews the women never explicitly declared to have 
furthered their university studies in order to counterbalance discrimination, 
but rather explained it as a requirement of the family law subject matter, 
and to the fact that women are more studious, it may have been an 
unconscious factor in their decisions. Various possible factors may 
impinge either separately or concomitantly on the women judge's higher 
level of educational attainment. 
In their 1988 study of the National judiciary13 of the city of Buenos Aires, 
Mackinson and Goldstein observed that the number of women largely 
decreased as one went up in the hierarchy of the judiciary and that, for 
equal posts, women had higher qualifications. They also performance 
better than the men judges in terms of marks in their university trajectories. 
They interpreted this as a certain degree of sex discrimination and 
hypothesised that women might go into further studies to counterbalance 
perceived discrimination and respond to the differential demand. The 
authors reached the conclusion that the typical sexism of the larger society 
had been transposed into the judiciary. (Mackinson and Goldstein, 1988: 
63-71) 
Women's higher propensity to continue their education could also be 
explained by the increasing availability of educational opportunities. As 
women family law judges are, on the average, younger than their men 
counterparts, it might be thought that they have had more opportunity to 
avail themselves of these opportunities. If we consider that women are, on 
average, 9 years younger than the men, this variation could also be 
related to the actual increased supply of further education. Nevertheless, 
although the age difference amounts to nine years, the difference in terms 
13 From 1988, the Family Law Courto of the City of Auanos Aires have been a section of the 
National Judiciary 
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of the average time since graduation is smaller: four years only. Given that 
the large explosion in terms of the offer of post graduate courses occurred 
in the 80's, when the women in my study were around 30 and the men 
around 40, it would seem that the age of the judge could make a 
difference in terms of the availability of post graduate degrees. 
In a previous research I did on the maternal ideal of professional 
mothers 14, many of the women explained their tendency to go into 
postgraduate education as a strategy to keep in touch with the profession 
while undergoing a period of high domestic demands when they had small 
children in the house. In other words, this would be a period in which they 
would find it harder to assume professional responsibilities. However, we 
cannot be certain about this, as I have not investigated the period of 
postgraduate study of the judges. One final factor accounting for the 
different behaviour of men and women judges with respect to 
postgraduate education 'could be their class origins. Women's higher 
social status would facilitate their persistence in higher education, while 
men's lower social status -the need to work while studying, added to the 
pressure to earn a living may provide an explanation for their earlier 
departure from the educational system. Nevertheless, qualitative data 
discussed in chapters 5 and 6 indicate that many of the women also 
worked while studying, although they often expressed that they "did not 
need the money'' and worked as a means to acquire some practical tools 
to mitigate the highly academic nature of · university · training. 
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Table 62 Educational a1t1tainmen1t, women and 
men Judges iinl 200~ 
Educational Type of Women Men 
level Institution 
Primary Single sex, 50 5 
religious and 
private 
Mixed, non 50 95 
confessional 
and public 
Total 100 100 
Secondary Single sex, 75 5 
religious and 
private 
Mixed, non 25 95 
confessional 
and public 
Total 100 100 
University Private 38,5 50 
Public 62,5 50 
Total 100 100 
Postgraduate None 26,5 66,6 
Spare courses 12,8 16,6 
Postgraduate 62,5 16,6 
degrees 
Total 100 100 
4- Social and religious affiliation 
Even in the ·context of a Catholic country like Argentina, with a Catholic 
population above 80%, it seems striking to observe a Christ image 
hanging on the wall of most of the judges' offices. In a recent article15, an 
American observer has noticed that the same applied to the public 
hospitals of the country, in spite of the fact that patients may belong to 
14 B. Kohen: "The maternal Ideal of professional mothers: an ideal in transition " M.A. thesis, 
FLACSO, 1989, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
16 Pablo David Flares: La iglesia cat611ca en La Argentina. http.www.angelflre.com/ego/pdf/ 
lnde)(.html. 
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other cults. Flares understands that this is probably a residue from colonial 
times, given the very important role performed by the Catholicchurch in 
Spanish colonisation. Although the Catholicchurch has been increasingly 
losing influence since colonial times, it has undoubtedly been a very 
important political actor within Argentine Society, capable of great 
persuasion over the Argentine State, with a proved ability to interfere in the 
contents of educational curricula.(Jose Luis Romero, 1994: 337-338) 
Actually, until the restoration of democracy and for decades, ·the 
Department of Education and the Department of Justice were merged into 
a single office, the Ministry of Education and Justice. 
The homogeneity of the research sample in terms of religion is 
remarkable. lt would be desirable that other faiths be represented in the 
family judiciary not only on the grounds of democratic representation but 
also because of the way religious ideas regulate family life. Yet it seems 
worth noticing that most men judges declare that they are practising 
Catholics while, in spite of their Catholic upbringing, a considerable 
amount of the women say they are not. Accordingly, many more men than 
women judges have a religious image hanging on the wall of their office. 
This could be related to the women's younger age, a general tendency 
towards secularisation as times progresses, to their greater acquaintance 
and allegiance with the ideas coming from the "psy" professions and, 
presumably, with a different idea of religious tolerance. 
lt is frequently mentioned that the Catholicchurch exerts a strong influence 
on the nomination of the Family Judges, as a means to keep under 
surveillance certain aspects of the family that it deems important. Although 
this assertion has acquired the status of common knowledge, it would, of 
course, be very hard to prove. What can be affirmed is that, because of 
lack of transparency and objective criteria, the old system for the 
nomination of judges (applying to all the judges in this section) may allow 
for such pressures. 
Luis Alberta Rqmero, a prominent Argentine historian, recalls the strong 
opposition of the conservative sectors of the Catholicchurch when the laws 
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of divorce and the "patria pot~stad" were passed in 1987. The 
promulgation of these laws meant the culmination of the project of 
modernisation of Argentine society, where family relations were lagging 
behind the recent western trends. He discusses how the church, apart 
from attempting to exert pressure over the government and the legislature 
through the usual methods, mobilised its adherents, driving the students 
from the Catholic universities out into the streets of Buenos Aires to 
protest against the "evils" brought about by democracy- drug use, 
terrorism, abortion and pornography, The demonstration marched along 
behind a student holding an image of the Virgin Mary (Jose Luis Romero, 
1994: 337). 
lt also seems noticeable that, in spite of their family commitments, as can 
be seen from table 63, the women tend to participate in community 
associations more than the men do. This may be suggestive of a stronger 
community orientation among women. 
• Table 63-Social and rreliglous affiliation of men and 
women judges 
Affiliation Responses Women Men 
Religion Declared to practise 62,5% 83,3% 
the Catholic religion 
Declared not to 
profess any religion 37,5% 0% In spite of the fact of 
having been educated 
as Catholics 
- Declared to belong 
to the Catholic 0% 16,7% religion but not being 
a practising Catholic 
Total 100% 100% 
Presence of a 33,4% 83,3% 
religious Image In 
office 
Membership of Association of 100% 100% 
professional Magistrates 
associations Association of 62,5% 0% 
Women Judges 
Membership of 
community 50% 25% S9010:CiiiiU~OJU1l9 
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5 - The ill'ajectorues andl motives for illecomlli1g jUJdlges: 
a - The jUJcllges' call'eer trajectories 
In the previous section, the judges in the Family Law Courts were 
described in relation with their personal data, civil status, social origins, 
educational backgrounds, religious and social affiliations, with special 
attention on how these data related to their sex. In this section, I compare 
the trajectories of men and women judges and their motives for choosing 
the family section within the judiciary. 
Data on the trajectories of the judges were obtained through written 
responses to the questionnaires and appear in table 64. Testimonies from 
the interviews were used to complete the information obtained in the 
questionnaires. A question about why they had become family law judges 
was asked early in the interview and a question asking what attracted 
women to the judiciary and to the Family Law Courts, in particular, was 
posed in addition. 
The average time as judges for the men is almost twice as long as that for 
the women, twenty and eleven years, respectively. Although the women in 
the sample are considerably younger than the men (nine years younger), 
the difference in terms of the time since graduation is shorter (26 years for 
the women and 30 years for the men). 
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Table 64: Career da~a off mell1l all1J(ll wom~m !udges 
Career data Women Men 
Average time since 
graduation 26 years 30_years 
Average time as 
Judges 11 years 20years 
Work history: Went straight Into 
the judicial career 50% 50% 
Worked as 
lawyers both as 50% 50% solo practitioners 
and In law firms 
before going Into 
the Judiciary 
Teaching: University 87,5% 1 OOo/o 
teaching 
Does not teach 13 5% 0 
Career continuity: Declared to have 
had continuous 75% 100% careers 
Stopped working 
altogether 25% because of 
motherhood 
1- Women judges 
Of the 6 women family law judges interviewed 3 went straight into the 
judiciary, where they developed a career that started from the very bottom 
of the hierarchy of the courts as junior court employees and went through 
every step of the court hierarchy until they were appointed to the judicial 
post. The remaining 3 worked as lawyers before going into the judiciary, 
Of those, 2 went into the judiciary after a practice of at least 20 years as 
family lawyers and the third, after working briefly as a lawyer in private 
practice, initiated a career in the judiciary as a public defender before she 
became a judge. 
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Regarding their motives for becoming judges, two of the women entered 
the judiciary for fortuitous reasons (family ties within the judiciary that 
facilitated entry; difficulty to initiate private practice for fortuitous reasons). 
Four women judges said that their decision to enter the judiciary had been 
inspired by a strong interest in and vocation for the judiciary and/or the 
family specialisation, half of them invoked a strong vocation for the 
judiciary from the time they were students and the other half a strong 
interest in the family section arising from their practice as family lawyers. 
On the other hand, although only 25% admitted having stopped work for 
some time because of motherhood, one can clearly see the impact of 
domestic commitments in the women judge's careers. As I explored the 
issue further during the interviews, it became clear that, in spite of the fact 
that 75% of the women judges declared that they had continuous careers 
they had actually introduced changes in their career paths as a 
consequence of motherhood. The lack of acknowledgment of the impact of 
their maternal responsibilities in their career paces reveals itself in their 
claim to have had continuous careers when in fact they had not. One can 
see that, to them, to have a continuous career meant not to have stopped 
work altogether. This attitude appears to me, as a defence against 
discrimination: the women judges just did not want to appear any different 
from the men judges 16• lt is nevertheless striking how domestic duties 
become invisible even in the discourse of very clever women. 
ii - Men judges 
Four of the men judges went straight into the judiciary, where they 
developed a "career, starting from the very bottom of the hierarchy of the 
courts until they were appointed to a judicial post while the other third (2) 
worked very briefly as lawyers and, soon thereafter, initiated a career in 
the judiciary. 
In terms of their motives for becoming judges, three of the men judges 
opted for the judiciary because they did not like to work as lawyers. Of the 
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remaining three, two judges expressed a strong interest and vocation for 
the judiciary from the time they were students, and the third decided to 
stay on when offered a post as a judge after having gone through the 
whole ladder of the court hierarchy although, as a student, he had thought 
of working as a private lawyer. 
m ~ The judicial career on tlhle famtly law Couurts 
As Mackinson and Goldstein have affirmed, if nomination is a political act, 
no general pattern can be observed. What to many is the beginning of a 
professional career, for others is the culmination of a bureaucratic career 
that responds to more organisational parameters. (Mackinson and 
Goldstein, 1988: 78). Apart from the fact that the law requires 5 years 
since the time of graduation to be nominated as a judge, the data on the 
trajectories show that both men and women judges have developed 
academic careers by teaching at universities, and arrived at the judiciary 
with a considerable degree of work experience, legal knowledge and 
familiarity with the work of a court. Their experience comes either from 
having worked in a court as clerks early on in their legal studies (as 
students) and having gone through part or the whole work ladder of the 
court bureaucracy, or from having worked as independent lawyers for 
many years before becoming a judge. As a matter of fact, two of the 
women judges went straight into the judicial post and both of them had 
worked as family lawyers between 20 and 25 years, while the rest, both 
men and women, were nominated judges after having developed a career 
within the judiciary, and/or worked briefly as lawyers before entering the 
judiciary. In terms of their educational backgrounds many of the women 
had done the Postgraduate Course in Family Law, one of them had 
studied sociology, while the men in general had only pursued some 
specialisation courses that did not lead to a particular academic degree. 
Moreover, women judges frequently refer to the added benefit brought 
about by the incorporation of studies in interdisciplinary human fields such 
as sociology, psychology and anthropology to their legal backgrounds. In 
16 See Chapter 6, section lll-2a on the judges' awareness of gender discrimination within the 
judiciary. 
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their view knowledge of these disciplines dramatically enriched their 
perspective in legal matters. This appeared a real asset for family law 
judges. 
lb - Wilell'\l a111dl wome1111 judges' mo~hra~ions 
If we add up the number of women who had made a consistent choice to 
become judges early on when they were students and those who chose to 
become family judges out of a strong interest stemming from their activity 
as family lawyers, we get a high proportion -two thirds of the women- with 
a strong motivation to become family law judges. The proportion of the 
men judges in the same category is only one third, which is half of the 
proportion for women. 
Moreover, these highly vocational men and women did not only refer to 
. . 
their strong vocation and determination, they also defined their work as an 
"apostleship", a "mission", a service. With respect to the motivation to start 
a career within the Law, they expressed an altruistic orientation and a 
desire to do justice already observed by other researchers among women 
family Jaw lawyers (Maher, 2003: 37and 41) and women trainee judges (de 
Grout, 2003: 345 and 349). 
As can be appreciated from the judges' testimonies, the satisfaction that 
comes from performing a service to the community hardly outweighs the 
hardships of the job, caused by emotional stress, the tremendous work 
overload and other problems basically related to the lack of technical and 
material resources. An example of this can be seen from the following 
quotes belonging to three women judges: 
"I always wanted to become a judge and never even thought of working as 
a lawyer, so when there were openings In the civil section and then in the 
specialised Family Law Courts I consistently applied ... My drive came from 
my passion, my love for justice ... " we 
• I prepared myself from the very beginning and with strong determination 
to become a judge ... never minded the obstacles, that's the way I am, when 
I am determined to do something, nothing will stop me. I went through all the 
work scale of the judiciary; everything was good enough for me, 1 was never 
choosy, because I understood that was the path I had to take .•. To me, the 
power I have as a judge Is at the disposal of the people ... 1 see my work as a 
moano to presorvo the human rightn of thono Involved in legal conflicts." wj 
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"I always understood my work as a mission always, as a defender of the 
poor, of those who did not have a voice or legal representation. Now as a 
judge, as well as when I was a counsellor to minors, that was the orientation 
I gave to my career." wj 
At the same time, while two of the men judges expressed a similar degree 
of vocation and commitment, a high proportion of the men judges only 
chose to become judges after discarding working as private lawyers, which 
they discovered they did not like. The two following quotes belong to the 
two men judges who expressed a great vocation and enthusiasm for the 
judiciary. Coincidentally, these two men judges were the youngest among 
the men judges interviewed and those who had never practised as private 
lawyers: 
"lt is the agenda of the family courts that attracted me, its human content, 
the possibility of acting with a spirit of reconciliation. This Is particularly 
Interesting when there are children involved, you have to aim towards a 
satisfactory solution for both the parents and the children, taking the 
particular circumstances of the case into account. I always work with the 
familial imperative in mind. n mj 
"Since I was a teenager I have wanted to become a judge. What I liked best 
was the fact of being able to help people to decide when they could not 
manage on their own. I always saw myself as someone Involved with an 
activity having to do with service ... always in relation to thechurch and to 
justice ... That early and prolonged experience on social justice with 
thechurch led me to think that it was through the exercise of the power of a 
judge that one could most extraordinarily offer a service of justice. lt seemed 
to me lt was the maximum power one could aspire to in order to be able to 
do justice. Of course, one could do justice in different ways and realms. I 
have always believed that the best robe was that of the judge, and this 
explains my permanent power and vocation to become a judge ... 1 never 
considered another section. That was my vocation. The Idea of helping 
people out in their everyday problems was very attractive to me. And the 
family, it seems to me that the family holds the great secret of the evolution 
of a society: the future of a society is the future of the family. lt's all very 
connected. To me, family matters are more important than patrimonial 
matters and that Is why I oriented myself In that direction." mj 
Furthermore, ~n interesting point is raised by both a woman and a man 
judge as they explain their preference for the judiciary rather than for the 
private practice of law: they point to the judges' possibility to pursue 
justice, as opposed to the private lawyer's requirement to promote the 
interest of the clients: 
"My drive came from my passion, my love for justice, from the possibility to 
have an aseptic, uncontaminated practice of the profession. As a judge you 
can go for what Is just, fulfil this desire for justice, whereas when you are a 
lawyer you are guided by the Interest of your client." wj 
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"The judiciary allows you to arrive at settlements, to pull the persons away 
from extreme positions, while this is very difficult to obtain from the lawyer's 
role, because the lawyer is too Involved in the problems of the party he 
represents." mj 
Instead, the following comments from men judges show how they decided 
to become judges after having realised that they did not like the private 
practice of law: 
'With great sacrifice I had opened my own office, and realised that I did not 
like the profession so much. I presented my curriculum vitae at various 
courts and sections and was very lucky, I was offered a position within the 
judiciary. My wish then was to become an administrative judge, but I was 
offered a position at a civil court." mj 
"I only thought of becoming a judge once I had experienced that I did not 
like the private practice and preferred the judiciary ... it has to do with your 
personality. Private practice meant that I had to do a lot of public relations; 
you need certain qualities that I lacked, such as a certain commercial 
orientation. lt did not fit my personality. So, I thought I'd rather go into the 
justice system aiming at the judiciary, I'd rather solve cases in court." my 
These findings need to be considered both in relation with the judges' 
social backgrounds and with the traditionally prescribed social roles of 
men and women within the family. The fact that, unlike men's, women's 
salaries are often not the main source of the family income, added to their 
relatively higher social status of origin, might explain the reason why they 
approach choices related to work in a more expressive manner, as they 
can afford to be more vocationally oriented. On the other hand, because 
men come from a lower social status group and because they are under 
the pressure of being the breadwinners, they seem to make choices with a 
more instrumental orientation. 
In addition, there is a general belief that, because of their traditional social 
roles within the family and their larger involvement with it, women tend to 
prefer family matters and . to understand their work roles in a more 
"missionary" and altruistic fashion, consistent with an "ethic of care". As a 
matter of fact, the two men judges that understand their work in terms of 
service are both very much involved with Catholic groups with a strong 
community orientation, also consistent with the "ethic of care" described by 
Carol Gilligan. 
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IV ~ Conclusion 
I started this chapter by reviewing research on women judges and 
difference and situated my own enquiry within the diverse body of existing 
research. I then moved on to describe the judges in the Family Law Courts 
in relation with their personal data, civil status, social origins, educational 
backgrounds, religious and social affiliations, with special attention on how 
these data related to their sex. 
In general terms, the analysis of the questionnaires shows a considerable 
uniformity in the constitution of this section of the judiciary: the judges that 
responded the questionnaires are all white, able bodied, all but one (a 
man) came from middle class backgrounds, received a Catholic upbringing 
- although not all of them were practising Catholics. All were or had been 
married at some point and, and all but one (a woman) had children. Their 
age varied between 44 and 63, the average age of the judges that 
responded the questionnaire is 53 and %, the average age of the women 
judges is 49, while the average age of the men judges is 58. In such a 
homogeneous context, the sex of the judges seems a strong criterion for 
differentiation within the section. Their age could also be a discriminating 
factor to be investigated. 
Nevertheless, amidst this uniform tendency, I was able to identify certain 
differences with respect to the personal characteristics of men and women 
judges, the more striking ones being their age -women judges are on 
average nine years younger than men judges-; their civil status -whereas 
all the men are married, only half of the women are; the social status of 
their family of origin -that of the women judges is slightly higher, basically 
and uniformly upper middle class, while the class origin of the men is 
slightly lower and more traditional-; the social status of the family of 
creation -which appears a little higher and more modern for the women 
judges- with a higher proportion of dual career marriages. 
In terms of their feminine role models, it can be asserted that there are 
none or very few modern women role models In the families of origin of 
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both men and women judges. There are no professional working mothers 
among the men judges, and there is one lawyer among the mothers of the 
women judges. This is very important because, as they belong to the first 
generations of women judges, as pioneers who occupy positions of power 
and prestige stemming from their professional roles, our women judges 
are breaking certain patterns in relation with their family and social role 
models. 
As to educational data and career trajectories, the most interesting 
findings that emerged from the analysis pointed to women's considerably 
higher level of educational attainment, to men's longer seniority in the 
judicial post, and to men's career continuity and women's career 
discontinuity due to motherhood. 
As to religious and social affiliation, women and men judges differ with 
respect to their practice of the Catholic religion: the men seem to practice 
the Catholic religion and have a religious image hanging on the wall of 
their offices more often than the women. In spite of their domestic 
demands, women tend to participate more than men in community 
associations. 
Their career trajectories, their motivations to become family judges were 
also explored in this section. Apart from differing in their career continuity, 
the men, in general, answered that they had continuous careers and that. 
their family responsibilities did not affect their work because their wives 
were in charge of the home and children. No other important variations in 
the trajectories of the judges were found that could be accounted to their 
gender. 
Instead, there are gender differences with respect to their motivations to 
become family judges. Although highly vocational judges were found both 
among the men and the women, the proportion with a strong vocational 
orientation is higher among the women, who also expressed to understand 
their work in a "missionary" fashion more often than the men. 
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In spite of a reality that very often contradicts the prevailing stereotype 17, 
women's more vocational, expressive choices and men's more 
instrumental ones can be explained by the persistence of the traditional 
division of labour inside the family. 
Overall therefore I found that the family law judges are a relatively 
homogeneous group, where the sex of the judges can be considered a 
strong criterion for differentiation within the section. I also discovered that 
the women judges in the study belong to a first generation of women 
occupying important positions in the public sphere and that they have a 
tendency to attain higher educational levels than the men. Because of 
their child caring roles, women's careers tended to be more discontinuous 
than those of the men judges. In addition, women frequently claimed a 
strong vocation and appear as better disposed to think of their work in a 
missionary fashion. 
In this chapter the Family Section of the Judiciary of the City of Buenos 
Aires was described in terms of the characteristics of the men and women 
judges that comprise it. The last section in the chapter on the judges' 
career trajectories and motivations denoted a certain transition in that it 
involved the analysis of material of a more qualitative nature. In the next 
chapter, decidedly qualitative, I will be moving into the comparative 
analysis of the representations of men and women family judges on their 
own activity. 
------ ~. -- ~.--
17 See forthcoming section on the recent evolution of the family In the Greater Buenos Aires area . 
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In chapter 4 I described the men and women judges belonging to the 
Family Law Section of the Judiciary of the City of Buenos Aires on the 
basis of their personal data. Overall I found that the family law judges are 
a relatively homogeneous group, where the sex of the judges can be 
considered a strong criterion for differentiation within the section. I also 
discovered that the women judges in the study belonged to a first 
generation of women occupying important positions in the public sphere 
and that they had a tendency to attain higher educational levels than the 
men. Because of their child caring roles, women's careers tended to be 
more discontinuous than those of the men judges. In addition, women 
frequently claimed a strong vocation and appear as more inclined to think 
of their work in a missionary fashion. 
Following on from the above analysis, this chapter considers aspects of 
the professional identities of family Jaw judges included in this study. I first 
investigate the judges' professional values through the analysis of their 
"ideal" family law judge. I then examine their experience of the power and 
responsibility associated with their role. At every stage, I look for gender 
differences and similarities among men and women judges. 
As Toharia (1975: 1 02-1 03) explains, three distinct aspects of the judge's 
role can be descried. There is first the prescribed institutional role that 
comprises the set of norms regulating the role of the judge. There is, on 
the other hand, a distinct yet related aspect that corresponds to the way 
the judges actually perform their role. Although these two facets of the 
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judge's role may differ in some ways, there is generally a considerable 
degree of overlapping between them. A third aspect can be additionally 
distinguished, the "ideal" role, which refers to the qualities which, 
according to those who inhabit the judge's role, ought to be present in a 
judge. This last component reflects the representations of actual judges' 
on the "perfect" or "ideal" judge and, as such, its contents are subjective 
and, therefore, variable. lt reveals the judges' basic professional values 
and priorities. The exploration of the judges' ideals and the consideration 
of their responses in association with the gender of the respondent 
facilitate the enquiry into any possible gender differences in men and 
women judges' conceptions of the ideal judge 
In this section I investigate how men and women judges within the family 
law section conceive of the "ideal" family law judge. As a first step I 
pinpoint the qualities men and women attribute to the "ideal" family law 
judge and then proceed to an analysis of these qualities. The analysis will 
be centred on the qualities, abilities and capacities men and women 
judges value in an "ideal" family law judge 1• 
The next section records the items that appear on the list of qualities 
required by men and women judges from the "ideal" family judge. I then go 
on to consider the meanings judges accord to the most relevant capacities 
they attribute to the ideal judge. Although my analysis will make it clear 
that these qualities frequently appear to be interconnected, I will make an 
effort to treat them separately or, at least to organise them by categories. 
Eventually, I will come back to the qualities and to the way they come to 
bear on the judges' daily work. 
1 An open question about the attributes of the "ideal" family law judge was included in the Interview 
with the family law judges that participated in this study. The responses were analysed by means of 
a technique called "content analysis". The qualities appearing in the answers of the judges were 
listed and categorised in terms of affinity, which means that different words used to express the 
same type of quality and the qualities that were rel~ted were put in the same category. These 
categories were classified according to the sex of the respondent and then organised in accordance 
with the frequency with which they appeared in the judges' discourse. Once the final lists of 
qualities by sex was ready, the analysl~ oi differences and slmllaritfoo wao csrr!ad out. 
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According to the women judges interviewed, the most important qualities 
of the "ideal" family law judge are being ready to act timely and quickly; 
being humane, empathic, humble, culturally sensitive and able to 
understand the different cultural codes of the families that come to court. 
Women judges also stress real vocation, personal involvement and care 
for the people involved in legal conflicts, and lack of prejudice and ability to 
keep an open mind, on the other. The "ideal" judge should be capable to 
read between lines, that is to say that he/she should be able to understand 
beyond what the people who come before the court are actually saying 
and must conceive the judiciary as a public service. Women judges also 
emphasise the need for the family law judge to be knowledgeable, 
particularly of the different disciplines related to the family subject matter. 
The "ideal" family law judge should be familiar with and keep updated in 
psychology, anthropology and sociology, must be aware of the importance 
of immediacy and nurture proximity and close contact with the litigants. 
Women also point to moral characteristics such as honesty, fairness and 
earnestness. 
Among the secondary characteristics mentioned by the women judges are 
qualities such as knowledge of the law, common sense, life experience, 
emotional stability, the capacity to organise the Court's work properly in 
order to make it productive for the court to run smoothly, and the ability to 
work in connection with different social institutions2• 
2 lt Is Interesting to note that these characteristics match the catalogue of feminine qualities 
constructed by Schultz on the basis of a study of the women In the Hesse judiciary In Germany. 
Shultz constructed her catalogue on the basis of four categories: "emotional climate", "co-
cooperailvenessn, "non authoritarian style", and "less oot on competition". Each of these categories 
contains a set of qualities, which very much coincide with the qualities mentioned by the women 
judges In my study (Schultz, 2003: 313-314). 
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b m Men judges 
To men judges, the most valued qualities of the "ideal" judge relate by far 
to having or preserving a moderate, calm, sensible and controlled spirit, 
knowledge of the law, a capacity for objectivity, neutrality, equidistance 
and equanimity. With a similar emphasis, men refer to morally oriented 
behaviour -qualities such as being principled, humble, honest and morally 
sound-, and keeping an open mind, remaining free of prejudice and 
sensitive to the context 
The secondary qualities associated by men judges to the "ideal" judge are 
the power of synthesis, practicality, and a capacity for empathy, sensitivity, 
humanity, and immediacy3 (immediate responsiveness). 
c m The analysis of men and women judges' ideals 
In this section I explore the characteristics men and women judges value 
in the "ideal" family judge. I start by looking into the similarities and 
differences between men and women judges' ideals and then move on to 
consider the meanings accorded by judges to the different attributes they 
highlight. 
The analysis of the responses of men and women judges reveals that, with 
a different emphasis, a large number of qualities often appear in the 
discourse of both men and women judges. Other desired abilities were, 
however, found in the responses of the judges that clearly differentiate the 
men and the women judges' ideal. I am referring to the desired features 
stressed by the men and not mentioned by the women, and vice-versa. 
In spite of slight differences, the responses of men and women judges 
show considerable agreement on certain required characteristics of an 
"ideal" family law judge. With varying degrees, qualities such as empathy, 
immediacy, sensitivity to the context, humility, lack of prejudice, honesty, 
3 The judges Interviewed understand immediacy as a complex capacity defined in terms of the 
judges' proximity and availability to the litigants and as the readiness to act quickly when required. 
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and knowledge often appear in the discourse of both men and women 
judges. 
The qualities that differentiate the ideals of women and men judges are 
objectivity, equanimity, equidistance, composure, thoughtfulness, 
moderation, and control; in fact these are the qualities especially stressed 
by men judges. The need for the judge to be well acquainted with 
interdisciplinary knowledge, to view his /her work as a public service, and 
the ability to work with other institutions as the required characteristics of 
an "ideal" family judge are the qualities emphasised by the women judges. 
When put into practice, the qualities mentioned only by the men judges 
are consistent with an individual work style, while the abilities mentioned 
only by women judges call for the deployment of a more collective work 
style. 
Also, as I compared the model of the family law judge for women judges 
with that of men judges, I realised that the list of required qualities was 
longer among the women. Additionally, a strong reference to altruism and 
to responsibility towards others, together with an emphasis on the need to 
be timely, act quickly and think of the judiciary as a public service were 
present in their ideal. The ideal of women judges appears as more 
demanding and stressful than that of men. Women's double role, together 
with their more recent acquaintance with the profession, with its 
consequent lack of confidence contributes to make this ideal even tougher 
on women judges. Thus, one woman judge expresses this as follows: 
"I am terribly exacting in terms of the qualities required from a good family 
judge, to tell the truth, I would not know where I stand compared with my 
own ideal." wj 
The following table summarises the information given above. The 
attributes mentioned by both men and women judges are shown in blue, 
those mentioned only by women judges are highlighted in red, while the 
qualities mentioned only by men judges appear in green. The graphic 
expression of the results of this aspect of the research facilitates the 
perception of the considerable overlapping roctwoon tho ideals of men and 
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women judges as well as the priorities accorded by men and women 









• Table 65 - The qualities of the ideal family law judge 
according to men and women judges 
• 
The most valued attributes The secondary attributes 
Moderation, composure, a controlled spirit; Power of synthesis, 
objectivity, neutrality, equidistance and practicality; empathy, ability 
equanimity; sensibility; knowledge of the law; to listen, sensitivity, humanity; 
earnestness, humility honesty sensitivity to the immediacy. 
context: being principled, being morally sound, 
keeping an open mind, remaining free of 
prejudice. 
Humanity; empathy: immediacy proximity and Knowledge of the law: 
close contact with the litigants and readiness common sense, lite 
to act timely and quickly; being culturally experience, emotional 
sensitive, being able to understand the stability; capacity to organise 
different cultural codes of the families that the Court's work properly in 
come to court; lack of prejudice, ability to keep order to make it productive 
an open mind; capacity to read between lines; and tor the court to run 
real vocation , personal involvement, care tor smoothly, ability to work in 
the people involved in legal conflicts ; connection with different 
conception of the judgeship as a public social institutions. 
service; knowledge , particularly of the different 
disciplines related to the family subject matter, 
being updated in psychology, anthropology 
and sociology;. 
i-Knowledge 
I start by dealing with knowledge because it is a universal professional! 
requirement for a judge. lt is interesting to observe that, in their discourse, 
men and women judges tend to lay emphasis on different kinds of 
knowledge. 
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While men judges tend to stress knowledge of the law, women judges, 
without denying this requirement, insist on the additional need for the 
family law judge to be well acquainted and keep updated with 
interdisciplinary knowledge related to the family subject matter. Along 
those lines, women judges explain that, owing to the complexity of the 
family subject matter, the "ideal" family law judge should be 
knowledgeable of different human sciences to be able to work across 
discipline boundaries in collaboration with other professionals. 
Since knowledge of the law is a universal prerequisite to become a judge, 
and one of the essential elements of the judge's role, it seems to me that it 
need not be discussed in this context4• The situation is different with 
respect to women judges' strong tendency to highlight interdisciplinary 
knowledge as a fundamental requirement for an "ideal" family law judge. 
Let us remember that until 1988 family law cases had been subsumed 
under the general Civil Law Courts. The creation of the Family Law Courts 
recognised the specificity of family law and, hence, the realisation that 
family law cases involved the need to draw on additional tools that, in a 
way, transcend the boundaries of the law, understood in a strict sense. In 
any event, this tendency on the part of women judges is a rather striking 
finding of my research and one that is ubiquitous in the interviews with 
women judges. At this point I would like to present some very preliminary 
explanations for such a tendency, to which I will return in the next chapter 
as I consider the possible impact of the increasing number of women in 
the judiciary. 
The biographies, trajectories and educational backgrounds of men and 
women judges could partly account for this tendency. The analysis of the 
questionnaires shows that the women are on average nine years younger 
than the men judges of the Family Law section; in addition to this, they 
have been judges for a period of eleven years, while the men have been 
judges for an average period of twenty years and graduated in law four 
4 The same applies to aspects like honesty and moral competence; qualities stressed both by men 
and women judges. 
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years earlier than the average woman judge. Another relevant divergence 
in the trajectories of men and women judges lies in the fact that, differently 
from men's, the curricula of the women judges demonstrate a propensity 
to pursue post graduate education. The age difference between men and 
women judges might be a factor partly explaining the latter propensity, 
given that the boom in the supply of postgraduate courses in the Law 
Schools started in the 1980's, a time in life when women, being around 29 
on average, might have been more inclined than their male counterparts 
(around 39) to go into post graduate education. 
This certainly must have given the women more exposure to the kind of 
interdisciplinary knowledge that they consider essential for an "ideal" 
family law judge. As a matter of fact, many of the women have completed 
the Postgraduate Course in Family Law at UBA, which has a very strong 
interdisciplinary orientation, and quite a few among them teach family law 
and/or have gone into research in the field. The mentioned Postgraduate 
Course in Family Law at UBA seems to have made a powerful impact on 
their conception of what family law is about, in the manner of a strong 
interdisciplinary orientation. 
On the other hand, both the analysis of the questionnaires and of the 
trajectories of the women judges show that through their involvement with 
professional work they are actually part of a generation of women who are 
breaking with traditional models, both within the family and in relation to 
women's public roles. In this context, since women are newcomers to the 
profession, and given the masculine language of the law, it would not 
seem far-fetched to imagine that this transitional phase may be 
characterised by a certain lack of self-confidence in the exercise of the 
profession. Thus, the possibility to lean on a consistent body of knowledge 
for the exercise of their professional tasks might partly provide the security 
and assurance they might be lacking. I shall now move on to consider 
other attributes present in the ideal of the family law judge according to 
both the men and women judges in this study. 
257 
--------
ii-Empathy, connection, Immediacy and a contextual approach 
As was seen in chapter one5, in an attempt to apply Gilligan's approach to 
the legal field, Menkei-Meadow (1985, 1989, 1995) speculated on the 
possibility that the entry of a considerable number of women to the legal 
profession might make a difference to the legal system ·by infusing an 
"ethic of care" to their professional tasks as opposed to the "ethic of 
justice" prevailing within the legal system and more frequently associated 
with men. The basic argument, grounded on Gilligan's approach, was that 
women might bring with them certain tendencies towards care, connection, 
responsibility, altruism and sensitivity to needs, assumed as more typical 
of women. These features might, in turn, result in a different exercise of 
the legal professions. This different approach to the legal profession would 
bear an emphasis on relationship rather than on rules, with less 
confrontational styles of conflict resolution and a contextual approach to 
decision-making. 
In this section I intend to relate the above speculations to my findings with 
respect to the qualities of the "ideal" family law judge according to the men 
and women judges in the study. Many of the. qualities attributed to the 
"ideal" family law judge recall the· qualities Gilligan and Menkei-Meadow 
have associated with the deployment of the "ethic of care" within the legal 
field; namely, empathy, immediacy and a contextual approach (Gilligan, 
1982; Menkei-Meadow, 1985, 1989 and 1995)6• 
With a different emphasis, both the women and the men judges in this 
study value empathy (understood as the capacity to stand in the shoes of 
the people that come to court), immediacy (understood as close contact 
with the clients of the system, availability to the litigants and readiness to 
act quickly when required), sensitivity to the context and a contextual 
approach (understood as the attempt to get acquainted with the 
5 See chapter 1, section 111-1 b 
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particularities of each case) as important qualities of the "ideal" family 
judge. In the next paragraphs I analyse how judges understand this 
related set of capacities as factors that may facilitate their understanding 
of the cases before them. Additionally, especially the women also 
mentioned real vocation, personal involvement and care for the people 
involved in legal conflicts. 
As the following quotes reveal, empathy is understood as the judges' 
ability to empathise and sympathise with the situation the litigant is going 
through· and also to understand his/her cultural code and value system. 
Family law judges acknowledge that, very often, judges and litigants are 
acculturated in different communities of meaning; and hence the need for 
the judge to be able to listen with attention and be culturally sensitive. 
Sensitivity to the context appeared frequently in the discourse of the 
judges as a quality going hand in hand with empathy. The judges, men 
and women, justify their importance in the assertion that each case is 
unique. Thus, it is essential for the judge to understand the context of the 
conflicts he has to act and decide upon. Open mindedness and lack of 
prejudice also appear in the judges' testimonies as part of the capacities to 
be deployed for a full understanding of the people that come to court. 
"You need to understand that the person who comes here Is probably 
undergoing one of the hardest periods In his/her life. lt is essential to be able 
to Imagine how this person is feeling at each stage. This is very important." 
mj 
"Each family has its code ... We need to understand these codes better, 
because of the large immigration we are receiving. A Bolivian family does 
not behave like an Argentine family." wj 
As stems from the testimonies of the judges, they understand empathy as 
a capacity that can be developed and is achieved through personal effort 
on the part of the judges. In this following quote, a woman judge adds a 
new aspect to the understanding of empathy. She not only speaks of her 
effort to get into the litigants' shoes in order to understand his/her 
worldvision, but also mentions the importance of humility, tolerance, 
respect for difference and for the litigant's autonomy, and her preference 
8 See chapter 1, section lll-2b 
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for a solution that takes into consideration the specificities of each case 
and the cultural aspects involved: 
"I try hard, though, to understand the values present in each family, 
especially when those values are different from my own. I think that, 
especially in those cases, you need to be particularly respectful. I encounter 
to find their own solutions, in coincidence with their own value systems. I 
strongly believe that we should not Impose our own. As a judge, this 
requires from you a thorough work with your own self ... "wj 
In the previous section I considered the emphasis women judges lay on 
interdisciplinary knowledge. Women judges declare they draw on 
interdisciplinary knowledge in order to achieve a thorough understanding 
of the situation they have before them. Thus, in the women judges' 
conception, interdisciplinary knowledge is at the service of empathy. This 
reminds me of Fox Keller's (1985: 116-117) conception of "dynamic 
objectivity". In her study on scientific knowledge as a basis for judgement, 
Fox Keller opposes a strict notion of objectivity in which the knower is 
absolutely removed and detached from the object that she calls "static 
objectivity", to a different conception of objectivity that she calls "dynamic 
objectivity", in which the knower is included as a subject, and makes use 
of subjective experience, as she puts it, "in the interest of a more effective 
objectivity". She states: 
" I define objectivity as the pursuit of a maxlmally authentic, and hence 
maximally reliable understanding of the world around one-self ... Dynamic 
objectivity aims at a form of knowledge that grants to the world around us its 
independent integrity, but does so In a way that remains cognizant of, 
Indeed relies on our connectivity to that world. In this, dynamic objectivity Is 
not unlike empathy, a form of knowledge of other persons that draws 
explicitly on the commonality of feelings and experience in order to enrich 
one's understanding of another In his or her own right. By contrast, I call 
static objectivity the pursuit of knowledge that begins with the severance of 
subject from object, rather than aiming at the disentanglement of one from 
the other. For both static and dynamic objectivity, the ambition remains the 
same, but the starting assumptions one makes about the nature of the 
pursuit bear critically on the outcome. (Fox Keller, 1985: 116-117) 
Fox Keller's conceptual framework borrows from Schachtel the notion of 
"allocentric", other-centred perception, which requires a complete focusing 
on the object, so that it is perceived in "the fullest possible way" and 
"wants to affirm others In their total and unique being". (Fox Keller, 1985: 
119) Along similar lines, American feminist philosopher, Benhabib also 
advocates an approach that views the other, the object as a concrete, 
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incardinated subject which she calls the "concrete other'', as the 
precondition for a full appraisal of the other. To the women judges in this 
study, interdisciplinary knowledge constitutes a tool that contributes to 
reach a better assessment of the litigants as "concrete others" (Benhabib 
and Corn ell, 1990: 120-149). 
In chapter one7 I mentioned how, at a conceptual level, Karst (1988: 
1966-1967) refers to the interaction of empathy and objectivity. Karst 
speaks of the judge's double capacity for empathy and principled 
detachment as "essential elements of the successful practice of the 
judicial art" (Karst, 1988: 1966 -1967). Within the framework of a 
multiracial, multiethnic nation like 'the United States, with a constitutional 
ideal of tolerance for difference, far from seeing empathy and impartiality 
as opposites, he conceives of them as complementary. He defines 
empathy as the readiness to be engaged in the experience of others, as 
the judge's capacity to approach all parties' contending positions with · 
equal regard, while he conceives of objectivity and impartiality not as 
"devotion to some self-applying mechanism that eliminates judgement 
from judging", but rather as "an effort to decide from an independent 
standpoint, as opposed to the point of view of one of the parties". He 
writes: 
"The same empathy that permits the judge to imagine that party's 
experiences and thoughts and feelings also underlies his or her capacity 
for principled detachment, that is the only kind of objectivity we can 
properly expect" (Karst, 1988: 1966-1967). 
A similar idea is set forth by Cain when considering neutrality and 
disengagement as aspirations for American judges. Cain presumes that 
what is meant is not that judges should act like robots, with no particular 
point of view, or that they should separate from their life experiences 
during the entire process of judging. To her, judges may identify with the 
people and listen with connection to people's stories, without prejudging, 
7 See chapter 1, section lll-2bli. 
261 
before they engage in the necessary separation that judging involves 
{Cain, 1988: 1946). 
The conceptual framework outlined above integrates elements from the 
"ethic of justice" and from the "ethic of care". This is very useful for the 
analysis of the intersections of empathy and objectivity in the discourse of 
the men judges in this study. As can be seen from the following quote, this 
man judge seems to take women's presumed capacity for empathy for 
granted and to value it especially: 
"If, as I mentioned previously, one 'of the basic virtues of a family judge is to 
be able to listen and to understand what people who come to court are 
going through, then, we are very lucky today to be able to share this task 
with women". mj 
Instead, in the following quote, a man judge asserts the value of empathy. 
He expresses some concern regarding women's capacity to keep the 
necessary distance decision-making requires. He is suspicious of 
women's capacity for objectivity and reveals a sense in which objectivity is 
somehow seen as a masculine capacity: 
"Economic crisis and migration have had a serious effect on the family. The 
judge, coming from an upper middle class background, needs to make a 
special effort in order to understand very different cultural codes, like those 
of the immigrants who believe that child battering or child abuse are normal 
behaviour. Empathy is important to know what is going on, but then you 
should be able to come back to an objective position. Not everyone can do 
that, particularly women." mj 
The latter quote points to the need to consider the interplay between 
empathy and objectivity as requirements of the "ideal" judge that are 
present in the testimonies of men judges. As has been mentioned earlier, 
men judges emphasise the family law judge's need to be objective, to 
preserve equanimity and equidistance. No woman judge included 
objectivity among the main qualities of the "ideal" family law judge. Only 
one woman judge mentioned objectivity in her discourse. She thought of 
objectivity as distance and as a fundamental part of the judicial role. In 
that sense, this particular woman: judge situates herself apart from most 
women judges who, unlike her, mainly valued connection and proximity as 
essential elements of the family law judges' role. 
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Those are the qualities that differentiate the men's conception of the 
"ideal" judge from the women's. In addition, men tend to associate 
objectivity with other features of the "ideal" judge such as composure, 
thoughtfulness, moderation, sensibility and control. Acquaintance with 
interdisciplinary knowledge may lead to a relativist standpoint that 
challenges notions such as neutrality and objectivity. This might explain 
why women judges hardly mention such attributes when they specify the 
"ideal" qualities of a family law judge. 
The men judges in the study include characteristics such as sense, 
moderation, thoughtfulness, equidistance, neutrality, equanimity and 
objectivity. These qualities, related to the image of the judge as "the wise 
old" man are the paramount qualities traditionally assigned to law and its 
practitioners. The law has, in fact, evolved as a masculine discipline, with 
a strong emphasis on rationality, objectivity and distance, understood as 
emotional neutrality. Men's stronger identification with traditional beliefs in 
relation with the role of the judge can be explained in terms of their 
historical involvement with the law in general, and with the role of the 
judge, in particular. 
A parallel can be drawn between these features emphasised by the men 
judges in this study and the "ethic of justice". Qualities such as neutrality 
and objectivity, traditionally associated to individuality and autonomy, 
evoke an individual style of professional exercise that coincides with the 
liberal ideal (Sherry, 1988; West, 1988; Benhabib, 1992; Jones, 1987 and 
1993; Okin, 1992; Naffine, 1990; Sevenhuijsen, 1996). 
In the context of the interviews the men judges define objectivity in two 
main ways. Objectivity is referred to alternately as the capacity to keep 
detached and avoid getting too involved emotionally, in agreement with a 
positivistic vision of objectivity and as the capacity not to impose one's 
own ideal or image of the family and being open to diverse family forms, 
more in consonance with an interpretation of objectivity similar to that of 
Fox Kaller's, mentioned in the previous soction. 
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At the beginning of this section I quoted a man judge who clearly 
distinguished between empathy and objectivity and defined objectivity as 
the capacity to take a certain distance from the litigants. Implied in his 
testimony there was a sense of objectivity as a rather masculine feature: 
"Empathy is important to be able to know what is going on, but then you 
should be able to come back to ari objective position. Not everyone can do 
that, particularly women." mj 
Still, in the next passage another male judge seems to define objectivity as 
empathy and sensibility to the context: 
"In the family section more than in any other section, personal ideology 
plays a very important role as do other factors such as your education and 
your life experiences. There is a lot that is subjective, that has to do with 
one's personality or with the attitude you take towards family problems. 
There are those judges who share a common philosophy and can take an 
objective standpoint, who can learn to listen and to observe, and who try to 
learn how to understand the people they are attempting to help. There are 
others with a different attitude and a different idea about the way one should 
work in a family law court. I would not know whether this is good or bad, the 
fact is that there is a wide disparity of criteria within family law judges." mj 
At first sight, the mention of objectivity and neutrality alongside with 
empathy, immediacy and a contextual approach as necessary and central 
characteristics of the ideal family Jaw judge seems to involve a 
contradiction. lt raises the issue of whether imposing distance might 
preclude the possibility of contextually apprehending, understanding and 
capturing, in their full complexity, the legal conflicts the judges have before 
them. 
However, applying Karst's conceptual analysis to the understanding of 
this apparent contradiction in the context of the general discourse of men 
judges, I have come to a conclusion. When men value simultaneously, 
ideal qualities -such as empathy, immediacy and a contextual approach 
on the one hand, and objectivity, equidistance and equanimity on the 
other- rather than seeking to establish a distance with respect to litigants, 
they are actually emphasising impartiality, understood as the capacity not 
to take sides with the parties involved in family conflicts. Thus, they speak 
of a certain distance, small enough to enable them to' get a clear picture of 
what the case is about but, at the same time, large enough to avoid 
excessive emotional involvement. This speaks of different stages in the 
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process of adjudication. Such stages, in turn, require deploying different 
abilities and attitudes in accordance with the needs of the moment in the 
process. lt also reflects the judges' constant struggle to situate 
themselves in a point of equilibrium between distance and proximity with 
respect to the litigants so as to respond to the requirements at each stage. 
lt would then seem that there is an initial stage when proximity facilitates 
the judge's appraisal of the details of the case and a later stage, in which 
distance permits the judge to take a stance that helps him/her to remain 
equidistant with respect to the parties involved in the legal conflict he/she 
has to decide upon. 
iv a Conceptions of justice: contextual thinking 
As mentioned before, according to Gilligan and Menkei-Meadow, one of 
the consequences of the application of the "ethic of care" to the legal field 
would be the deployment of a logic based more on context than on rule 
concerns. This section considers the impact of contextual thinking in the 
daily practice of the activity of judging, particularly with respect to the 
extent to which family law judges are constrained by the letter of the law.· 
In fact, judges mention contextual thinking among the qualities of the 
"ideal" judge and, in their discourse, they relate contextual thinking to the 
aspiration to make fair decisions. Accordingly, it seemed interesting to 
explore the representations of the judges with respect to the interplay of 
contextual thinking and the appli~ation of the law. During the interview, I 
asked the judges whether they had ever experienced a situation in which 
they felt that the application of the law did not lead them to the just 
solution, and, if so, how they had dealt with such a dilemma. 
Only three out of the twelve judges,-two women and one _man- answered 
that if they faced such a dilemma, provided that no legal way out was 
found, they would have no other option but to apply the law, and as one 
man judge said: 
" ... hope for the Upper Chamber to find a solution better than my own." mj. 
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The rest of the men and women judges explained that the way they 
usually worked was first to become familiar with the facts of the cases and, 
from there, try reach a fair solution. Only then would they move into 
looking for the law that gave this solution legal support. In addition, most of 
them expressed that with the incorporation of the International Human 
Rights Treaties in the Constitutional Reform8 , the law had become very 
comprehensive and so they thought it virtually impossible not to find legal 
support for a just decision. The following two quotes exemplify the 
dominant responses of the judges: 
"Often what Is legal is not just. Anyway I can always resort to prioritislng 
justice or to making what Is just look legal." wj 
"lt Is a dilemma that occurs rather frequently. Still, I believe that that is 
where the task of the judge lies, In dictating a resolution in accordance to 
the needs of the case: To put it In an exaggerated manner, 'with or without 
the law'. Articles 15 and 16 of the Civil Code establish that a civil judge 
must never evade judgement because of the obscurity of the law. A civil 
judge Is forced to find a solution. I was nominated to do justice, to make just 
decisions. If by applying the statute I am unjust, then I am not doing justice; 
thus, I'd rather not apply the norm. I must not endanger the real spirit of the 
law by applying a statute too strictly. I somehow have to find the just 
solution; the possibility is always there. The law is one of the most inexact 
sciences, because each professional has his/her own interpretation, 
according to the authors one reads, etc. There are at least five different 
libraries. All this makes the law very imprecise and somehow exempts us 
from the responsibility that an exact science would impose; namely, that two 
plus two makes four. In law two plus two may make five or one, or even six, 
so I plunge into the pool and judge with equity and if the parts do not like it, 
they can always appeal and the Upper Court will decide whether to revoke 
or dictate a different resolution. What attracted me most from the judicial 
office was this faculty to apply the law according to a general conception 
that involves legal, sociological, philosophical and cultural insights." mj 
According to the testimonies of the judges, personal interpretation of the 
law plays a very important role in decisions. This means that there is a lot 
of room for discretion in the activity of the judges. Thus, the theoretical 
description of the judge's role within a civil law country9 does not portray 
the actual power he/she enjoys. In that context, who the judges are 
becomes an extremely important issue. 
8 Art. 75, incise 22 Conolituc!6n Naclone.l, 1994 
9 As seen In chapter 3, section 11.2 
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There are no significant differences in the responses of men and women 
judges with respect to this issue, they both accord great significance to the 
special characteristics of each case and agree on the importance of the 
interpretation of the law. These findings are essential mainly because they 
dispute one of the strong tenets of the civil legal system, namely that the 
judges are "the mouth of the law", civil servants that merely apply the law 
to concrete cases 10• Applying the law to concrete cases would,. in 
Gilligan's language amount to applying the "ethic of justice" approach; that 
is applying a hierarchy of abstract principles and opting for the most 
valued legal principle to solve the cases. My findings show, however, that 
this is not the case with the Buenos Aires family law judges that 
participated in this study. As stems from this research, rather than merely 
apply the statute, they tend to give pre-eminence to substantive fairness 
and to the concrete circumstances of each case. Thus, the approach to 
decision making for both men and women judges seems to be more· in 
tune with Gilligan's "ethic of care". 
v Q Conch.llsioro 
This section explored the characteristics men and women judges value in 
the "ideal" family law judge. The responses of the men and women judges 
were compared to find that a large number of qualities appeared with a 
different emphasis in both the responses of women and men judges. 
Empathy, immediacy, sensitivity to the context, humility, lack of prejudice, 
honesty and knowledge of the law often appear in the discourse of both 
men and women judges. Other abilities were found, however, that clearly 
differentiate men and women judges' ideals. Among those, I am referring 
to objectivity, equanimity, equidistance, composure, thoughtfulness, 
moderation, and control as the qualities stressed by men judges, and to 
the need for the judge to be well acquainted with interdisciplinary 
knowledge and to view his/her work as a public service as the required 
characteristics of an "ideal" family judge according to women judges. 
Those differentiating qualities were associated with a tendency towards a 
10 As was seen in chapter 3, section 11.2. 
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more individual work style among men judges and a tendency to a more 
collective work style among women judges. 
From the analysis of the differences and similarities in the responses of 
men and women judges I concluded that the ideal of the women appeared 
to be more demanding than that of the men. I suggested that the difficulty 
of living up to such a tough ideal could partly explain the more acute sense 
of discomfort manifested by the women judges with the power and 
responsibility associated with their role that will be considered in the next 
section. 
o 11 ~ Power and responsibility as a burden: 
representations of the family law judges on their own 
power 
~- Introduction · 
This section aims at understanding how men and women judges 
experience the power and responsibility associated with their roles. Quite 
early in the interviews, the judges were asked a question regarding the 
way they experienced the power and responsibility associated with the 
judicial role. Whenever they suggested that they experienced it as a 
burden, I asked them how they coped with it. Accordingly, this section 
does not only explore the way the judges experience this power and 
responsibility, but also the strategies they employ in order to mitigate any 
perceived hardships. Responses to other questions in the interviews that 
made reference to the issue under discussion were also used for the 
analysis of this section, particularly one question in which I asked the 
judges to volunteer a judgement or refer me to a published judgement11 • 
11 At the end of the interview I asked the judges whether they would agree to volunteer a judgement 
that they found particularly Interesting In the context of my research. One of the reasons for asking 
the judges to volunteer a judgment, instead of finding it myself has to do with the fact that family law 
judicial file~ are confidential. Accordingly, only the partial'! and their lawyers are entitled to read 
them. There Is, on the other hand, the procedure for publication of judgements In Argentina. First 
Instance judgements are not usually published, both because, not being final, they are usually 
appealed and because most legal actions In the family law field are not of particular academic 
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2 - Perceptions on power 
a - Against arrogance: 
In a recent book on the Argentinean judicial power, Felipe Fucito argues 
that one of the findings of his research on Argentinean judges was their 
arrogance, to which he reacts by arguing that "the judge is not a god on 
Earth" (Fucito, 2002: 68). Bothelho Junqueira observed a similar 
propensity in her own study of Brazilian judges (Bothelho Junqueira, 
1997: 27-31). 
Contrary to their findings, I observed a tendency to demystify the power of 
the judge among both women and the men judges in my study. As was 
seen in the previous section, the reactions of the judges interviewed are in 
accordance with the fact that they consider humility as a paramount 
quality of the "ideal" family law judge. Their expressions seem to go more 
in the direction of criticising the arrogance of power that is characteristic of 
the traditional Argentine judge rather than towards the denial of the power 
they actually wield since, actually, their discourse shows that they are 
quite aware of it. 
In the next quote, a man judge explains the two distinct attitudes with 
respect to arrogance that can, in his opinion, be found among the family 
law judges: 
" ... I would say that one of the aspects around which the judges divide is 
basically the attitude the judge must adopt or assume towards the case and 
towards the family. Two groups can be clearly distinguished around the 
Issue: those who think that the judge must maintain this huge distance, like 
between the powerful and the powerless, and those in favour that the family 
judge enter the family transitorily in o~der to Inject the law where it is missing 
and then leave. This is the big difference between the traditional judge, -one 
who arbitrates- and the modern judge, -one who manages. That Is where 
the main difference lies." mj 
interest and so, law journals rarely publish them. Accordingly, law journals only publish and 
comment judgements from the family law judiciary that are of particular Interest, that Is, when they 
are especially Innovative and/or refer to fundamental rights. In that ca~?e, the judge or the lawyers In 
the case send it to the law Journals to be published and commented on. Thirdly, the choice of this 
research strategy aimed at obtaining the judgments chosen by the judges themselves, which might 
reveal some of their priorities and Interests. 
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In the following quotes, a man and a woman judge present their own 
perspective on their role, taking sides with those judges tending towards 
humility: 
" There is a wide variety of styles within the family law judges in terms of the 
way authority is exercised. There are some like myself, for whom it is very 
important to realise that we judges are not the finger of God and to 
understand our own limitations. There are things we are just incapable of 
solving. My own style is trying to accept my own limitations, while at the 
same time making the effort to overcome them." mj 
"My own ideology has to do with the belief that we work as judges, we are 
not judges. The judiciary is a job like others, but with some special 
characteristics. lt is a service and, most of all, what I repeat now and again 
Is that we pay a service to the community and we are not over or above 
others. Insofar as you adopt this position and understand that one is not a 
judge but one works as a judge, it becomes clear that one is not entitled to 
judge anyone anywhere at any time. One is only entitled to judge within 
one's jurisdiction." wj 
Various reasons could be raised to explain their attitude against 
arrogance, as opposed to Fucito's findings. There is, in the first place, the 
objective fact that they are all first instance judges that belong to a section 
of the judiciary that is not regarded among the most prestigious. In the 
second place, the specificity of the family subject matter that, as the 
judges explain, requires immediacy, proximity and humility with respect to 
the litigants, could provide an explanation of such a modest approach. On 
the other hand, since humility is much valued within the Catholic tradition, 
the prevailing Catholic orientation of the judges within the Family Law 
section could also be a factor calling for humility on their part. As was 
explained in a previous chapter12, all the judges in the family law section 
that participated in this study were selected by means of the old system of 
judicial appointment. This very archaic system did allow for external 
pressures in the process of selection of the judges. Given that the family 
terrain is very dear to both the Catholic Church and the Catholic tradition 
of the Argentine State, there circulates an urban myth with respect to the 
strong influence of the church in the appointment of the family law judges. 
However, given the lack of transparency of the system, it is impossible to 
12 See chapter 3, section 11.3 for information on the system of appointment of judges in Argentina. 
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prove such an assertion. Some of the data collected in this study13 give a 
clear indication of this. I am referring to the fact that most judges 
emphatically declared professing and practising the Catholic religion, that 
most of them also had a Christ figure hanging on the wall of their office 
right behind their desk. Likewise, many of them had had a Catholic 
upbringing and had attended Catholic educational institutions at the 
primary and secondary levels and had studied law in Catholic universities. 
b Q Power as endurance 
Conscious of the impact their decisions can have on the lives of people 
involved in legal conflicts, both men and women judges tend to 
experience the responsibility and the power they wield as a burden. As 
can be appreciated in the various testimonies below, the reason for this 
uneasiness relates to the uniqueness of the Family Law Courts in that, 
differently from other courts, they deal with deep human suffering, which 
implies the stress of emotional involvement on the part of the family law 
judge, particularly because children are often involved. In the following 
testimonies, the judges simultaneously express their awareness of the 
great amount of power they wield as family law judges and the ways in 
which they experience the burden of adjudication in such a sensitive field. 
The judges are conscious of the fact that, although the higher tribunal can 
revise the decisions of the first instance, the effects of their actions and 
judgements are very often extremely difficult to reverse. This makes them 
feel extremely responsible for the consequences of their actions, which 
becomes a tremendous source of stress 14: 
''Well, I must say that the responsibility worries me a lot, sometimes I just 
cannot sleep because, in actual fact, the power one wields as a judge Is 
great. As a family law judge you could ruin many people's lives. May be this 
13 See chapter 4, section 11 for an analysis of the educational and religious background of the 
judges that participated in this study. 
14 As seen In chapter 1, section lli-2cii Resnick (1988: 1926) recommends judges to connect with 
the painful aspect of their professional roles, "to recognise the pain and the burden of judgment" 
and to "speak of judgement as a terrible and terrifying job", In order to be able to generate renewed 
forms of conflict resoluilon. 
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is true for all judges, but of course, in the family section there are many 
children involved." wj · 
"lt's a job where you worry a lot. One needs to be very careful when it 
comes to making decisions. The family law judge is very powerful and this 
implies a great responsibility because mistakes can have very important 
consequences, like when you exclude a member of the household because 
he is violent or when you decide to give a child for adoption, etc ... " mj 
"In situations when you really have power it is tough and it is very often 
lonely. But, in fact, the power is relative because the Upper Chamber 
frequently revises judges' decisions ... On the other hand, as a family law 
judge one has a lot of power in terms of the decisions one can make, the 
measures one is entitled to take (restraining orders) in limit or emergency 
situations, like when the judge has to decide whether to exclude a violent 
husband from the family home, or when you have to evaluate the risk of 
abuse a child is running and when you have to make a decision on whether 
to put a child In an Institution, or commit somebody to a psychiatric clinic. All 
these decisions can make real differences to the lives of the people involved 
in family legal conflicts and then, if you make a wrong move, it's really 
difficult to undo the harm." wj 
Moreover, proximity with respect to the litigants and the need to act 
quickly when faced with emergencies appear as factors that leave the 
family law judge vulnerable to pressure and strain: 
"Because of the proximity with the clients, family law judges are subject to a 
much stronger pressure ... Since decisions so frequently seem to be so very 
urgent, family law judges endure a lot of stress." .wj 
In fact, only one of the men judges and one of the women judges declared 
to feel completely comfortable with the power they wield. As can be seen 
in the next quote, the thought of pursuing "a job like any other job", 
although possibly unrealistic, helps a woman judge to feel comfortable 
with her role: 
"I think of the judiciary as a job, a job like any other job. I was never 
Interested In the power aspect of the judge. I think of the judiciary as a job 
whose characteristic is making decisions that affect other people's lives and 
I feel comfortable with that role; I sleep well at night." wj 
In the case of the following quote by a man judge, establishing a "healthy 
distance" seems to be the antidote against excessive emotional 
involvement: 
"I am happy being a family law judge in spite of the fact that the job 
presupposes a strong emotional involvement. I feel well and sleep well at 
night because I make a point of establishing a healthy distance, because if 
you become too Involved, then you do not sleep well at night." mj 
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What becomes clear from both quotes is that, whereas judges feel 
comfortable with the power they wield, they need to resort to some kind of 
strategy or internal negotiation to achieve a sense of comfort. 
In fact, as discussed above, most family law judges experience their high 
level of responsibility as a strong burden. In that sense, women seem to 
go one step further: they speak of suffering, of endurance. Although two of 
the men judges also talked about health problems derived from the stress 
of the job (abdominal pain-sleeping problems), the men's expressions with 
respect to the way they feel about the power they wield reflect that they 
cope better with this aspect. In the following quotes, women judges 
describe how overwhelmed and disturbed they feel by the power and 
responsibility of the job: 
"Power Is something that one endures rather than something one 
enjoys" wj 
"To me, responsibility is a burden that makes power unpleasant" wj 
"I came to a point where I found domestic violence hearings so stressful that 
I decided to delegate them to my secretary, at least for some time. I spoke 
with experts from other parts of the world and they told me that job rotation 
is common practice in family courts because the grief is so impregnating." wj 
"The job is so stressful because most of the time the resolutions a family 
judge must take in cases of domestic violence or person's protection cases, 
for instance require Immediate action. This is very stressful, if you add all 
the external pressures, power is far from rewarding ... " wj 
"I always say that when we achieve a success it is the team that has 
succeeded ... but when we fail the failure is a failure of the judge; as a judge 
you are very exposed to criticism." wj 
The strength and frequency of the women judges' own comments relative 
to the discomfort they feel about power and responsibility is striking. They 
mention health-related symptoms such as problems with sleep and the 
need to resort to personal therapy. Many of the women judges referred to 
this need to resort to psychotherapy as a means to cope with the 
excessive burden of responsibility, while none of the men did. Women's 
larger involvement with the domestic sphere and their greater 
msponsibiiity for the welfare of their own families, added to the need to 
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juggle domestic and work responsibilities15, may be a factor explaining 
this sense of being overburdened. On the other hand, these differences in 
the tolerance to the stress of power and responsibility and its expression 
may be suggestive of a greater tendency to empathy on the part of the 
women judges. The fact that they identify more with the parties involved in 
legal conflicts leaves them more exposed to the stress involved in their 
work. 
Other intervening factors must be considered, such as men's longer 
familiarity with power, which implies a different sense of authority: men not 
only are seen as more authoritative than women, but also feel more 
legitimated to exert power. As newcomers to positions of authority, 
women do not feel entitled to exert their authority and this may become a 
cause for anxiety. In the case of women family law judges that 
participated in this study, women's perceptions with respect to their own 
authority seem to reflect the societal tendency. 
Women's relationship with power has been a recurring theme within 
feminist literature. In the context of feminist theory, women's 
powerlessness has been seen as deriving from the public/private divide, 
from women's central participation in the private realm, and related to the 
hierarchical relationship existing between the public and private spheres. 
Early gender socialisation in the home and the school, added to the 
ambiguous and often contradictory feminine role models circulating in 
society and in the media -women simultaneously appearing as the "angels 
of the house" and the modern, assertive professionals- contribute to 
promote conflict and confusion with regard to women's gendered identities 
and expectations in relation to power. 
Women's increased participation in the public sphere in positions of 
authority led Jones (1987) to the study of women's relationship with 
authority, emphasising the entitlement aspect of the exercise of power. To 
analyse the relation of women with authority, Jones proceeded to 
15 This point Is further developed In chapter 6, section 11-1. 
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deconstruct the concept of authority. Her conclusion was. that, in Western 
industrial societies, authority is gendered and that women are seen as 
less authoritative than men. To her, this comes as a consequence of the 
disjunction of authority and compassion in traditional political theory. This 
dichotomy contributes to the identification of men with authority, to 
women's segregation from authority, and to the association of women with 
compassion16 (Jones, 1987: 152-168). 
Apart from the stronger discomfort appearing in the narratives of the 
women judges, there were other hints indicating that the men and women 
judges in the study related to authority in different ways. Towards the end 
of the interview, I asked the ju~ges if they wished to complete their 
testimony by volunteering one of their judgements they thought of special 
interest17• 
To my surprise, the responses of the men and women judges to my 
request were markedly different: while many of the men were willing and 
prepared to offer a judgement; in contrast, none of the women did. The 
women judges justified their behaviour by saying that first instance 
judgements are rarely published and that, additionally, they were not very 
important in the context of the family law judiciary18• To the women, the 
most important part of their task is the work they carry out with the family 
group with the purpose to generate the conditions that will enable the 
family to reach certain agreements. Then, once the agreements have been 
reached, what they do is just to homologate these agreements in their 
judgements. 
Along the same lines, a man judge also expressed that "there is no 
stronger law than the law of the family", by which he meant that the judge's 
160n this type of process, see the commentary of Olsen's work in chapter 1, section ll-2c. 
17 See note 12 
18 The local procedure for the publication of judgements (see note 12) determines that the chances 
of having a judgement published In a law journal Is directly related to the judges' social connections 
with the law journals. Rroearch on womon in iho logal pro1essloriG In oUter juiisdictlons has 
consistently found that, when compared to men, women lack social capital ( Schultz, 2003: xllv) 
and thus, lt is more likely that men get their judgements published. 
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power to impose an external solution upon a family conflict is useless if the 
family is not prepared to enforce it. In order to avoid the symbolic violence 
involved in such an imposition, many family law judges tend to promote 
the parties' empowerment in the attainment of solutions agreed upon, 
rather than force a ruling that, in the long run, the parties might not have 
the willingness or the capacity to sustain. 
The reasons women judges gave for their refusal seem credible for they 
accounted for their refusal in ways that were consistent with their other 
responses. This discourse suggests a different conception of power, in 
which the power of the judge becomes the power to empower others: 
namely, the parties involved in the legal conflict. Still, it is rather striking 
that the men were prepared to hand over a judgement while the women 
were not. I found it surprising that some of the men judges that were 
prepared to give me a judgement had also mentioned the importance of 
the hearings as a mechanism to promote agreements between the parties 
involved in family conflicts. If the judgement constitutes the judges' most 
authoritative piece of writing, the women's refusal to volunteer a 
judgement requires an explanation and an interpretation. In my view, men 
and women judges' different reactions to my request are also suggestive 
. of certain insecurity and of a different representation of their authority. 
Women judges' refusal reinforces the idea that they have difficulties 
accepting that they are legitimated to exert their power. 
The above discussion can be related to Berns's analysis of the phrase 
"woman judge" which, in her view, expresses a contradiction since 
"woman" suggests powerlessness while judge implies "authority". In her 
reflections on the woman judge, Barns expresses concern about women's 
powerlessness. The situation just narrated with respect to women judges' 
reaction to my request echoes in Bern's words. Considering that both 
judgement and the law necessarily imply some kind of force, she 
' 
considers how it is possible for a woman to speak the law: 
" .... that a negation can speak at all. Some might say that she cannot speak 
and speak the law, that to speak a law that denies her voice, that insists that 
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her speech is, ultimately, not just impossible but somewhat not law"(Berns, 
1999: 1). 
Berns also asks how it is possible for a woman to speak a law that is alien 
to her: " ... how there we speak it without becoming spoken by it and losing 
our own voices, such as they are" while at the same time " ... her 
judgement cannot be other than her own, cannot be remitted to someone 
else ... "(Berns, 1999: 2). 
Apart from the two instances already mentioned, other examples 
revealing women's difficulties with the authority side of their role were 
identified In the discourse of the judges. In fact, at various points in the 
interviews, both men and women judges depict situations that reveal the 
idea that authority is gendered. Thus, the narratives of the judges reflect 
the women judges' difficulties to exert their authority and the tendency of 
both the men judges and the litigants to view women as less authoritative. 
For instance, in the next quote a man judge expresses his opinion that, 
regardless of his/her sex, and independently of the reactions it may raise, 
a judge has no choice but to exert authority: 
"lt may be that you create certain impressions on others that may have a 
gender origin. But I do not think that this kind of thing should impress you at 
all ... May be a masculine authority generates more compliance among the 
people that come to court. Still, when you have to exert authority, lt is the 
same for men and women. May be women find it harder, but when you have 
to exert authority, there is just no way to avoid it." mj 
In the following quote, another man judge asserts the gender dimension of 
authority and claims that, as a man, he has more tools at his disposal: 
"Even though a woman has the power that comes with the judicial post, 
there are some cases that require the presence of a masculine authority. 
For instance, in domestic violence cases there Is a strategy I very rarely 
resort to, consisting in dismissing everyone in the office and staying alone 
with the violent man to talk to him, "man to man", In a strong and masculine 
language." mj 
Along similar lines, a woman judge gives two examples of strategies she 
has developed when problems related with authority arise during a 
hearing. The judge gives two examples: she tells of how sometimes she 
puts on an act with her secretary in which she leaves the room temporarily 
and then, when she comes back, the secretary says in a solemn voice: 
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"Everyone stand up, your Honour the Judge is entering the room". The 
second example refers to a different strategy she deploys when a violent 
husband looks as if he is going to get out of hand. The woman judge 
explained that she gets the Court Secretary, a man, to lead the hearing. 
on c Copong wiU11 th® discomfort 
As to the way judges deal with the stressful aspects of the power and 
responsibility associated to the judge's role, women judges mention that 
their personal therapy helps them to deal with these feelings. For example, 
a woman judge said, "therapy helps me to deal with this anxiety and to be 
able to make decisions". One of the judges also mentioned sharing his 
worries with his wife and leaning on her for emotional support. 
When asked how they coped with this problem, many of the judges, men 
and women alike, also say that, because of the multiplicity and diversity of 
perspectives present in the interdisciplinary team, being able to share the 
"loneliness of the moment of decision" with the interdisciplinary team 
eases the burden of responsibility in decision making. Thus, two men 
judges state: 
"Responsibility is heavy and, although the ultimate decision lies with the 
judge, it helps a lot to be able to discuss the case with the interdisciplinary 
team." mj 
"I tend to counterbalance this heavy burden by seeing dear friends, talking 
and sharing activities with them and sharing the loneliness of decisions with 
my Interdisciplinary team. The fact· of having discussed the case with people 
whose perspectives are different -because they have different professional 
backgrounds and belong to different genders- eases the weight of loneliness 
at the time of decision making, bringing in calmness and assurance" mj. 
One of the factors that, according to the judges seems to ease the 
malaise and renders the stress of the job more tolerable is the thought 
that they are performing a service to the community, especially for the 
women who have been socialised in a way that tends to promote a 
vocation for service. The following quotes show how, as has already been 
seen In ihe section dealing with ihe irajectories and mo'tivations o~ the 
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judges, women judges tend to understand the judiciary as a public 
service, in a "missionary" manner: 
"This Is a public service, whose aim is to preserve the human rights of the 
citizens. The power of the judge is at the disposal of the needs of the people 
Involved in legal conflicts." wj 
"The judgeship is a job like others, but with some special characteristics. lt is 
a service and, most of all, what I repeat now and again is that we pay a 
service to the community." wj 
"If you regard your work as a public service then you need to have a very 
great commitment ... you have to stay there until the problem is solved." wj 
3 ~ Conclusion 
This section focused on an analysis of the representations of women and 
men judges on the power and responsibility associated with their 
professional roles. Both women and men judges are very conscious of the 
important consequences their decisions might have for the future lives of 
the people involved in legal conflicts and, consequently, they insist on the 
very careful attention these decisions require. Although both show great 
commitment to that aspect of their job, women appear to be more 
overwhelmed by the power and responsibility implied in their position, and 
their testimonies reveal problems to acknowledge their own authority. 
V~ General conclusion 
Chapter 5 examined aspects of the judges' representations relating to their 
professional identities. lt referred to their conception of the ideal family law 
judge and to. the way judges experience the power and responsibility 
associated to their roles. 
The conceptions of men and women judges on the "ideal" family law judge 
were considered next. lt was found that although there was a considerable 
overlap in terms of the qualities attributed by men and women judges to 
the "ideal" family law judge, there were differences in emphasis as well as 
in the mention of attributes that clearly differentiated men and women 
judges·· ideals. Qualities such as empathy, immediacy, sensitivity to the 
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context, humility, lack of prejudice, honesty, and knowledge of the law 
often appear in the discourse of both men and women judges. Among the 
abilities that clearly differentiated the men and the women judges' ideal, 
were objectivity, equanimity, equidistance, calmness, thoughtfulness, 
moderation, and control as the qualities stressed by the men judges, while 
women lay emphasis on the need for the judge to be well acquainted with 
interdisciplinary knowledge and to view his/her work as a public service. 
These different abilities highlighted by men and women judges were 
associated with a tendency towards a more individual work style among 
men judges and a tendency to a more collective work style among women 
judges. 
As the ideal of the women appears to be more demanding than that of the 
men, I suggest that the difficulty to live up to such a demanding ideal could 
partly explain the more acute sense of discomfort with the power and 
responsibility associated to their role and their professed difficulties to 
exert authority, as manifested by the women judges. 
As was explained in chapter 1 , following Gilligan's model of two different 
moral orientations associated with gender, Menkei-Meadow speculated on 
the possibility that once the number of women in the legal profession 
became significant, differences might emerge on the moral orientation of 
men's and women's professional attitudes. Her hypothesis was that while 
men would approach their work by means of an ethic of justice, women 
would deploy an "ethic of care" (Gilligan, 1982; Menkei-Meadow, 1989 and 
1995). Now, when I relate my finding s in this chapter to the above 
speculations19, I cannot come to a definite conclusion. As a matter of fact, 
while some of the results of my work with the family law judges seem to 
substantiate the cultural feminist thesis, others do not. 
lt is to be noted, that the men in the sample stress on objectivity, neutrality 
and equidistance while the women emphasise vocation, care and personal 
involvement. Women also conceive their professional activity as a service 
19 See chapter 1, section 11-3 and section Ill. 
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to the community and experience the power they wield as a strong 
responsibility. All of this would seem to support the cultural feminist thesis. 
However, the fact that men as well as women value empathy, immediacy 
and a contextual approach as qualities of an "ideal" family judge would 
indicate that the men judges seem to embrace certain qualities that a 
"Gilliganesque" analysis would find more characteristic of the "women's 
voice" and the "ethic of care". This questions Gilligan's assertion with 
respect to the prevalence of either the "ethic of care" or the "ethic of 
justice" in the majority of the cases. 
The nature of the family subject matter could provide a possible 
explanation of my findings around the embrace by both men and women 
judges of certain characteristics related to the "ethic of care" along with the 
coexistence of both logics. lt might be the case that involvement with 
families fosters a particular type of approach connected to the "ethic of 
care" (Fianagan and Jackson, 1993: 71-73). Religion could also be 
considered a factor explaining the judge's adoption of an ."ethic of care" 
approach. Smart has suggested that in some ways, the different women's 
voice might have already penetrated the judicial discourse (Smart, 1989: 
74). 
A very interesting finding related to men and women judges' tendency 
towards contextual thinking that revealed itself in the way they reach their 
decisions in the solution of the cases, that is, by finding what they deem as 
the just solution first and then look for the law that gives this solution legal 
support. This points to the high level of discretion involved in the judges' 
decisions. 
The content of the next chapter will provide more evidence to throw light 
upon the discussion of these first research findings. In the next chapter, 
the axis of the analysis moves away from aspects closely related to the 
judge's professional identities, so as to examine the judge's perceptions 
and opinions on the effects of more structural trends such as the 
emergence of large numbers of women into the administration of justice. lt 
also explores the judge's awareness of discrimination and ends by 
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exploring their opinions regarding the difference women judges could 




Para 11, chaptell' 6. = IReprresentatlons of the IFamDiy law Judges o~ the 
City of Buenos Aires 11: Difference, Discrlmlnatlo~n and Genderr 
I o lntli'oductlon 
In chapter 5 I analysed my findings about the professional identities of 
family Jaw judges. Notwithstanding some differences of emphasis, 
considerable agreement was found with respect to the characteristics 
attributed to the "ideal" family law judge by the men and women judges. 
While the men tended to value an individual work style more, the women 
seemed to prefer to work collectively with other professionals. Both men 
and women family Jaw judges highly valued empathy, immediacy1, 
knowledge and honesty among other characteristics of the ideal family law 
judge; while the men prioritised objectivity, equanimity, composure and 
thoughtfulness. Being well acquainted with interdisciplinary knowledge and 
understanding the judge's work as a public service appeared as the 
attributes that differentiated the women's ideal of the family law judge from 
the men's. Additionally, the women appeared to feel less comfortable with 
the power and responsibility associated with the judge's role. This was due 
to the fact that the women's ideal seemed more demanding. 
In this chapter I analyse how the judges interpret more structural trends 
such as the large entry of large numbers of women into family Jaw and the 
Family Law Courts; the judges' awareness of gender difference and 
discrimination, and their views on the difference women judges make or 
might make to the family law judiciary. 
1 Note that the judges understand immediacy as immediate responsiveness 
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o !! ~ iP'®B'C®p~iOrB$ COl~ Riil®li'il and women BLndig]®~ on ll'®ltdi~DOII'B ~0 
ftlhe ~tdlli"g]® ll'\lUmb®ll' off womell'\l DU1l ~lh® famo~~ law nl\Jidocoall'~. 
My analysis of the participation of women in the legal professions and in 
the judiciary in Argentina2 showed the existence of sexual segregation and 
sexual segmentation within the justice system. The large entry of women 
into the judiciary is concentrated mainly at the first instance level in the 
Civil, Family and Labour Courts. Women are located more often at the 
bottom of the judicial pyramid; the sections of the judiciary that host more 
women are those held by the judges in this study as the less prestigious, 
because the cases dealt with by these courts involve small amounts of 
money and have little political impact. As can be seen from international 
research studies on the legal profession, this situation mirrors the situation 
of women jurists in many jurisdictions (Schultz, 2003: xlvii): However, more 
women are being gradually appointed at the second instance courts and 
the Supreme Courts of the provinces, but there are still no women at the 
Supreme Court of the Nation. 
During the interviews with the men and women judges, I shared with them 
my findings with respect to women's participation within the legal 
professions, with particular emphasis on the family law field and the family 
law judiciary. I then asked them for their comments and views on this 
information and any analysis thereof that they could offer. Given that 
women's family responsibilities emerged from the judges' responses as a 
' 
significant factor explaining the high proportion of women in the Family 
Law Courts. For the analysis of this section, I bring in other material from 
the questionnaires and the interviews touching on the issue. I am referring 
particularly to a questionnaire item asking the judges whether they had a 
continuous career and an interview question asking them how they 
managed to juggle professional and family responsibilities. 
2 As seen In chapter 3, section Ill 
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2 ~ 1Rea~sm11s ioli' ~lhl® ~surge ll"illUlmlblreu- (Q)~ wom®ll"il nll"il ~ta~mo~y ~talw ~mdl oll"il ~lhle 
~amo~y ~ta1w DlUidlucnaV"y: 
As a rule, no significant differences were found in the responses of the 
men and women judges with respect to the reasons for the large 
proportion of women working in family law and in the family law judiciary. 
The judges mentioned various reasons to explain the large numbers of 
women in the field of family law and the high proportion of women in the 
Family Law judiciary. I shall refer to cultural arguments first and then move 
on to consider the more structural type of argument put forward by the 
judges. 
Some men and women judges believe that women are culturally more 
prepared to choose the family law speciality. They think that women in 
general like family law best, and that because of their presumed patience, 
special sensitivity and larger involvement with family life seem to be better 
equipped to deal with family matters and work as family lawyers or family 
law judges. As Thornton puts it: 
"The correlation between women and family law reflects the public/private 
dichotomy, and the gender segmentation that has developed in legal 
practice, paralleling the gender segmentation that characterises paid work 
generally. Family law, like raising children, is understood to be based on 
experiences and practices with which everyone (particularly women) are 
thought to be familiar rather than on acquired technocratic knowledge 
(Thornton, 1996: 279) 
The following quote from a man judge illustrates this point: 
"In the past the men were reluctant to accept this Invasion of women to the 
judgeship. Even the judicial post, as it comes with the share of power you 
were referring to before, was considered more appropriate for a man, 
because of the personality structures of men and women. I will use the 
criminal section as an example; a woman was not well accepted as a 
criminal judge ... the fact that she would deal with criminals, rapists ... There 
are quite s few women criminal lawyers snd judgos but ii wss noi well 
accepted. Some time ago it was thought that being a woman was not 
compatible with the post of instruction judge or criminal judge. The fact that 
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she would need to show up in a police station at three o'clock in the 
morning, or in a prison to talk with the criminals ... This would give rise to 
rather comic situations, especially if she was young or pretty. A man was not 
at risk, even if he was young or unexperienced. The family section, yes, that 
was considered appropriate for a woman, that was the ideal!" mj 
However, for the women judges in this study, being a family law judge 
requires specialised training, and they point to the fact that women seem 
to dedicate more time to further training than men as an explanation for 
the large proportion of women among the family law judges. This is 
consistent with the analysis of the questionnaires in chapter 4, which 
showed a much greater level of specialised educational achievement 
among the women judges3, and with the importance the women judges 
accorded to specialised training and interdisciplinarity when they referred 
to the "ideal" family law judge4• 
in a Structull'al alll'guments: the gendell'edl dlhrosloll'll of labOUil' 
Most of the judges, independently of their sex, interpret the concentration 
of women in family law in more structural terms, as the result of the 
division of labour that resulted from the entry of women into such a 
masculine profession. They suggest that there is an internal segmentation 
within the legal labour market and that women get the less prestigious 
posts. Interestingly enough, researchers on the judiciary have observed a 
similar trend for France, Brazil, Germany (Schultz, 2003: xlvii and 281-282; 
Botelho Junqueira, 2003: 440-442). Moreover, they argue that the reason 
for this is to be found within the family, in the traditional gendered division 
of labour that corresponds to the societal stereotype. lt has been argued 
that as the "exemplar of the feminine", family law has become stigmatised 
and perceived as of low status because "it has to do with women, women's 
experiences, and the values associated with the feminine" (Thornton, 
1996: 276). 
According to the prevailing sexual stereotype of the nuclear family, the 
traditional division of labour inside the family has remained intact in spite 
3 See chapter 4, section Ill 
4 See chapter 5, section 111-2-a and chapter 6, section V-2e 
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of the mother's professional work. The father is still seen mainly as the 
breadwinner and the mother as the main parent responsible for the 
children and the domestic sphere. In the view of the judges, because of 
the work regime in the family courts, working in the family Jaw judiciary 
seems easier to combine with women's domestic responsibilities than 
developing a career in other areas of the legal profession. Like in other 
jurisdictions, the effects of the double shift are visible. Being in charge of 
the home and children, women "naturally" settle to work in the less 
demanding and prestigious courts such as the Family Law Courts, while 
the men prefer the more lucrative or prominent sectors of the legal 
profession, such as the large legal firms and the more prestigious 
sections and higher instances of the judiciary {Schultz, 2003: xlvii). 
iii ~ A matter of culture, choice and of social pressure 
Regardless of their sex, some judges opt for one of the above mentioned 
explanations, while most tend to combine various types of reasons in their 
account. Accordingly, in the opinion of the judges, the large presence of 
women in family law appears, in part, to be a natural tendency, a personal 
choice and, in part, as the effect of economic and social forces. As Schultz 
has written, about the women judges in the family Jaw judiciary in 
Germany: "Self selection and allocation go in tandem" {Schultz, 2003: 
282). The next testimonies illustrate this assertion. In the following quote, a 
man judge combines vocational and social arguments in his explanation. 
He refers to a natural tendency, a special interest or taste for family law 
and to the fact that there is more room for women in this sector of the 
profession because it is not very lucrative: 
"Because of their proximity to the family, due to their social roles, women 
seem to be better equipped to deal with family matters. Also, since they are 
not so much concerned with making money as men are, they can follow 
their vocation and specialise in something that interests them more, such as 
family law, In spite of the fact that it is not a very lucrative area." mj 
This woman judge emphasises the economic and labour market aspects: 
"I think that the reasons explaining the large numbers of women In 
mediation and in family law are interlinked and have a strong economic 
component. When you go to conferences on family law you mainly see 
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women, while the attendance at conferences on commercial or criminal law 
is mainly masculine. I do not believe this could be attributed to a special 
feminine interest in the family field, I would rather say it is because the 
family section is a section that does not Involve large profits, and, this is the 
reason why men are not very interested and so they leave room for the 
women."wj. 
In the previous quote, a woman judge interprets the large numbers of . 
women in the field of family law as the effect of market forces that make it 
very difficult for women to advance in other areas of the profession. In 
general, the judges' explanations relate to the way the legal labour market 
has evolved. When referring to the large number of women lawyers 
working in the family law area, the most frequent answer was that, since 
there is not much money involved in family matters, men lawyers, who 
bear the larger weight of family provision, look for the more lucrative 
sectors of the profession. Thus, they leave room for the women who, 
earning what one might call a "supporting salary .. , can afford to follow the 
dictates of their presumed vocation. 
If the judiciary in g?neral offers work stability and prestige, from the point 
of view of the salaries offered, it lags well behind a successful career as a 
lawyer. This, as happens in other civil law jurisdictions (Schultz, 2003: 
xlvii), expels men while attracting women. On the other hand, and very 
much as is the case with other parts of the world5, in spite of their 
participation in the professions, women have retained the main 
responsibility for organising childcare and the family home. As was seen in 
chapter 36, it is very difficult for a mother to develop a career within a law 
firm, they have to endure enormous personal sacrifice, put in an 
impossible number of hours and meet a very high level of commitment and 
rainmaking capacities with very few chances of reaching top positions. 
One could say that to develop a career within a law firm is not an option 
open to a young woman who wishes to start a family, or has family 
demands. Thus, a woman judge explains: 
5 See chapter 1, section 111-1 b on the international situation oV women In the legal p10fesslons. 
6 See chapter 3, section •.. for the situation of women In large legal firms In Argentina. 
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"The men seem to have retained the weight of economic provision and to be 
more ambitious in that sense, while here -meaning the judiciary- you have to 
stick to different values, because of the lack of economic Incentives, the 
economic ceiling is low. A woman that counts on the economic support of 
her husband can somehow afford the luxury to follow her vocation and 
develop a career in a field that is less profitable than the independent 
exercise of the profession. If a career as a lawyer offers a much better 
economic reward, given that the successful law firms make large profits, it is 
very difficult to pursue a career within a law firm for a woman. Whereas in 
the judiciary, with all its incompatibilities, the money is less, but it is easier 
for a woman." wj 
As a means to explain the high proportion of women among the family law 
judges, the judges referred to the working hours of the Family Courts. For 
instance, while the Criminal Courts have a full, long working day, the 
Family Law Courts are open from 7.30 am to 1.30 pm. As the following 
quotes show, compared to other sections of the judiciary, the time 
requirements of the Family Law Courts seem to fit women's domestic 
responsibilities better than the hours of other sections of the judiciary, 
since they allow women to juggle professional and domestic demands, 
and so attract more women: 
"Another factor explaining the large number of women in the Family Courts 
is the fact that it is an activity more compatible with motherhood, because of 
the working hours. The Family Courts open in the mornings, and you just 
work for a few hours in the afternoon." mj 
"... at some point, it seemed a profession easier to juggle with domestic 
responsibilities, because of the fixed hours that gave you the illusion that 
you would have time to organise all the rest, namely family life" wj 
" ... there Is this big inequality when you compare the hours with those of the 
Criminal Courts where people work much longer hours ... " wj 
0 
lt is to be noted that, the judges refer to the actual time requirements of the 
different sections of the judiciary since, in theory all courts have the same 
working hours, from 7.30 am to 13.30 pm. In fact, however, if you compare 
the time requirements in the Criminal Courts and in the Family Law Courts 
there appear important differences. For instance in the Family Law Courts, 
with some exceptions, the judges actually stop working at 1.30 am, and at 
15.00 pm there is usually no one left in the Family Law Courts. Instead, in 
the Criminal Courts, the staff rarely leaves before 18.00 pm. Due to the 
nature of the subject matter, the fact that they work with the police, the 
work in ~he Criminal Courts is much more ~ime consuming. Aciuaiiy, 1.30 
pm is the time when they stop receiving the public, but they are obliged to 
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attend to all the emergencies arriving at the court after 1.30 pm. They also 
have to take turns to be on duty on weekends and at night. The fact is, 
however, that the Criminal Courts rather than the Family Law Courts are 
the exception. In the other Civil Courts, in the Administrative and Labour 
Courts and Social Security Courts, for instance, the work regime is very 
similar to that of the Family Law Courts. This means that the justification 
the judges give to explain the large numbers of women in the Family Law 
Courts is not completely accurate, since the same argument would apply 
to any section of the judiciary apart from the criminal courts. This suggests 
that when women decide for the Family and the Labour Courts among the 
different courts that have a lighter timetable, one could presume that they 
exert some choice or that entry into the Family Law Courts is easier for the 
women. 
As a matter of fact, this type of explanation was never mentioned when the 
judges considered what attracted the men to the Family Law Courts. Men 
mostly explained their attraction for the Family Law Courts as a matter of 
special interest for the subject matter due to its human content. As an 
example, the following testimony of a man judge emphasises the 
vocational element in his choice for the Family Law judiciary7: 
"If I am here it is because of my passion for the family subject matter. If I 
wanted to I could easily apply for a post in the Civil Upper Court, or to a 
different section of the judiciary. I am here because here is where I want to 
be. I do not plan to leave, because it is from here that I want to make my 
contribution to society." mj 
lt was thus found that, in the judges' perspectives, the domestic 
responsibilities of the women judges have an important impact on their 
careers. The traditional sexual division of labour inside the family home 
acts as a strong predictor of what attracts and/or repels women and men 
members of the legal profession to and from its various fields of activity. 
This factor commands the choices that men and women members of the 
legal profession make when they opt for the sections in which they will 
7 Botelho Junqueira (2003: 439-459) reports very similar findings with respect to the reasons that 
Inspire men and women io choose the Judiciary In I:Jrazll. While meri report that they choose the 
judiciary for the challenge involved, the women report to choose it because it is more convenient 
and easier to combine with domestic responsibilities than is the private practice of law. 
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develop a career. According to the judges, in agreement with the dictates 
of the sexual division of labour within society, men tend to opt on the basis 
of their function as economic family providers and women on the basis of 
their family commitments in terms of childcare and home organisation. In 
this respect, in the view of the judges that participated in this study, 
women are driven into the family judiciary because the men prefer more 
prestigious sections and thus leave room for the women. In addition, 
women choose the Family Law judiciary because it is more flexible in 
terms of timetable and hence less demanding and easier to juggle with 
domestic demands. 
The aim of the last section was to explore how women and men judges 
interpreted the large entry of women into the legal profession and the large 
proportion of women among the family judges. In accordance with the 
traditional division of labour within the family, women's need to 
accommodate their private domestic responsibilities and their professional 
duties appeared as a very important factor affecting the choices they make 
in terms of their participation in the different areas o1 the profession. 
Therefore, I decided to ask the judges about the ways in which they 
organised housework and childrearing activities in their own families. 
The issue is, of course, much more relevant to the women than to the 
men judges, since most the men answered that they had continuous 
careers and that their family responsibilities did not affect their work, since 
their wives were or had been in charge of the home and children. As 
Epstein has written, this pattern is common to most societies: 
"lt is a ubiquitous finding that that wives' employment has only a modest 
effect on the household division of labour in all countries ... They usually 
retain responsibility for the household's daily organisation and physical 
chores, including washing, cleaning and preparing meals (Epstein, 1988: 
210). 
In spite of the fact that women have entered the labour market and 
participate in a wide array of professionsp traditional beliefs about the 
division of labour within the family persist in Argentine society, placing an 
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unfair burden on women. Actually, the analysis of the questionnaire data 
shows the impact of family responsibilities on the women's careers, but 
having no impact on the careers of the men judges. While only six women 
sat for the interview, eight women filled in the questionnaire8• The analysis 
of the women judges' responses to the questionnaire related to career 
continuity show that six out of the eight women judges declared that they 
had continuous careers, while two declared that they had stopped work 
altogether because of motherhood. The latter two were the two who did 
not volunteer for the interview in spite of having filled in the questionnaire. 
Nevertheless, when, I had the opportunity to explore the issue further 
during the interview I realised that this first response to the questionnaire 
was actually hiding the effect of family commitments on the women judge's 
careers. Of the six women who sat for the interview, two had slowed their 
work pace when their children were young; one had had her children 
before graduation and started to work only after they were of school age; 
one had studied before getting married and became a mother once her 
career was well advanced; one opted to stop teaching while her children 
were young and one did not have any children. Thus, except for the 
woman judge who did not have any children, the careers of the women in 
the Family Law Courts were affected by their domestic responsibilities, 
particularly when their children were young. 
Furthermore, the testimonies of the women judges show the interplay of 
domestic responsibilities and career duties in their lives and strategies to 
which they resort in order to make their work compatible with their family 
responsibilities. While social provision of good quality childcare is almost 
non-existent in Argentine society, there is wide availability of relatively 
cheap domestic service. Besides, the support of mothers and mothers-in-
law in childcare activities is a very 'extended social practice. 
The ways in which these women adapted their career paths appear to me 
as different strategies the women judges display in order to juggle 
professional and family responsibilities, strategies that become more vivid 
8 See chapter 4, section 11 
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as part of the women judges' narratives. The next quotes exemplify some 
of the strategies displayed by the women judges to accommodate their job 
requirements and family demands. They all found themselves in need of 
introducing some changes in their careers to leave room for ever 
increasing family responsibilities. Thus, the woman judge in the first quote 
resumed her stud.ies only after her children were of school age: 
'When I got married I gave up my studies and had my children. After my 
third child was born I came back to University. I studied law while the 
children were at school" wj 
The woman judge in the second quote postponed the birth of her children 
until the time she had resumed her professional education: 
"I made the most of it [referring to her various courses of study] while I was 
single. Now everything is becoming more difficult and complicated .... lt has 
to do with gender, how to articulate my time to be able to pursue my work 
and fulfil the homely tasks related to my family, husband and children and 
everything becomes very complicated." wj 
lt is interesting that, the woman in the third quote created the conditions 
that allowed her to combine professional work and childcare: 
"Although I never stopped work, for quite a few years I kept coming back 
home several times a day. I would mix childcare with my work. My office 
was always located in the Court area and so was my home. So when my 
child was small I kept coming and going from one to the other, probably 
more than it was necessary. I took him to school in the mornings, I then 
went to work at my office or to the Courts, then in the afternoon I picked him 
up to take him to special classes, etc." wj 
The woman judge in the last quote, a private lawyer at the time when her 
children were growing, kept her work to a minimum for a few years to be 
able to respond to family demands and went into the judiciary after her 
youngest child started school: 
"I never stopped work altogether ... When my first child was born I worked 
as a private lawyer. I had my own office, so when my first daughter was 
born at first I had my mother and my mother-in-law who took turns to take 
care of her while I was at work. Soon I realized it was a crazy arrangement, 
so I decided to close my office, kept only the cases I was most interested in 
and referred the rest to different colleagues. I had a working space at home 
with my law books and that's how I organized my work while my children 
were growing. Taking only the very interesting cases. I only came back to 
work full time when my fourth child was six, that's when I started to work at 
the judiciary as a public defender." wj 
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With respect to the internal division of labour within the families of the 
judges, only one of the women judges claimed to share domestic and 
childcare responsibilities with her husband, and only one of the men 
judges mentioned helping9 his wife with the children and the home chores. 
These two judges are among the youngest in the group of the family law 
judges that participated in the study; their relative youth might be a factor 
explaining their more egalitarian orientation with respect to domestic 
duties. Although this man judge expressed that he prepared breakfast, 
took the children to school and helped them with homework on a daily 
basis, the rest of the men judges declared explicitly never to have 
changed a nappy, and that the only activity related with childcare that they 
took charge of was taking the children out. 
In the following quotes, two men judges explain their conjugal domestic 
arrangements. In the first two quotes, in spite of the important differences 
in terms of their contribution to childcare, they both refer to their role as 
marginal. The first quote belongs to an older man judge, while the second 
belongs to a younger one. The ten years' age difference between them 
could be a factor explaining their different attitudes and their involvement 
with childcare activities. While, in the first case the judge's contribution in 
that respect appears as sporadic, in the second it involves daily practices. 
The behaviour reported by the first judge is more paradigmatic of the 
general attitude of the men family judges, whereas the daily involvement of 
the younger judge with his children could be suggestive of an attitudinal 
generation difference. This is consistent with the remark that the older 
judge makes when comparing his son's attitude to childcare to his own. 
"I would take my children out but never bathed them or changed diapers. 
Things have changed a lot now, I have a son who deals with his own son as 
his wife does: He changes his diapers, feeds him, and gives him a bath ... " 
mj 
The younger man judge has a clearly different attitude, in spite of which 
he is quite aware that the main responsibility for the home and children 
9 The use of the word "helped" by the man judge Implies the belief that it is her work and he just 
"helps". 
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lies with his wife and thus, his daily activities of childcare do not impinge 
on his work life. lt is interesting to note how, in his testimony, the 
allocation of the work involved in childcare goes "naturally" to the woman. 
He observes how women take on this responsibility without questioning it 
and, moreover, have difficulties letting the men in. His vision very much 
coincides with the testimony of the women judges in this study and with 
international research results on the subject (Bothelho Junqueira, 1997: 
48-55; Schultz, 2003: xlv): 
'We still maintain a family structure where the role of women is basic. The 
burden of the management of the family home still weighs heavily on 
women's backs. lt is not a cultural imposition, in fact culturally women 
assume this responsibility. I would not know if this is a natural or a cultural 
tendency. Sometimes I think it is rather natural, it Is fantastic how women 
assume this responsibility, in the hardest of times they find the strength to 
go on, to carry on with the household. This responsibility with the domestic 
sphere interferes with women's possibilities to develop their full professional 
capacities ... Because in my own case, for instance, I leave home early in the 
mornings. lt is true that I prepare breakfast and take the children to school, 
all this takes me about an hour, but then, I am free until the evening to 
dedicate my time to my work, and of course I can advance in my profession. 
In the evening when I come home, say from 6 to 8 I go on with my family 
functions, a bit of checking up on the kids, a bit of quarrelling apart from 
establishing some dialogue with my wife. The case is not the same for my 
wife who has to divide her time between her various roles, her mother role 
and her professional role. And of course, although it has been a frequent 
subject in our conversations and discussions, it is not a matter that she is 
being forced into. She seems to feel that nobody cooks the way she does, 
and so forth. What I see is that women tend to assume these roles without 
vacillation, they do not seem ready to abandon them." mj. 
The following two quotes account for the variations about the internal 
arrangements within the families of the women judges. While the first 
woman judge expresses distress because she is in charge of· all the 
domestic and childcare activities, she seems to take it as a given role, one 
that women have to perform on their own, without the father's help. At the 
time of the interview this woman was the youngest among the family law 
judges and the one with the strongest domestic burden. She had three 
young children and was expecting her fourth: 
'Women's work brings changes into the family dynamics and organisation. 
The need to take care of everything to do with the home and the children 
and at the same time to respond to the requirements of such a demanding 
job makes life very complicated and stressful. I have the same problems 
working women usually have with the organisation of the home. May be the 
women lawyers have the option to share their work with a partner, while 
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when I have a hearing I have to be there myself, I just cannot send a 
replacement." wj 
The second woman judge, instead, tells how, while being responsible for 
the children's care and the member of the couple who accommodated her 
work to fit her family commitments, she always counted on her husband's 
support to secure both their children's welfare and their career 
advancement: 
"I was able to rest upon the unconditional support of my husband to make all 
this possible ... We mutually support each other's personal projects a lot, as 
a means to make them come true. There was a long period, though, when I 
had to abandon teaching and research, to just dedicate myself to my family 
and the judiciary. Then, I returned to academic life, accommodating it with 
the needs of the family, I did the postgraduate course In family law. When I 
was In the process of writing the thesis, my husband would take the children 
to our house in the countryside on weekends, so that I could write, and I do 
likewise whenever he needs it. In that way, both of us were able to advance 
in our careers, avoiding any harm or deprivation to our children, and 
spending some time together at the same time." wj 
Although important differences can be appreciated in the testimonies of 
both women judges, the previous discussion suggests that professional 
work does little in the way of promoting change with respect to women's 
identities, which remain linked to a traditional definition of motherhood. 
c ~ Conclusion 
The observed sexual segregation in the profession was explained in terms 
of the traditional gender roles inside the family. The important proportion of 
women in family law and the family law judiciary was seen partly as a 
matter of preference or choice and partly as a matter of social pressure. 
According to the judges, men and women judges opt for the areas of the 
profession that are most compatible with their family roles; namely men's 
roles as the main economic providers and women's roles as the main 
responsible for home organizing and childcare. Rarely sharing such 
chores with their husbands, the women refer to the need to adopt certain 
strategies allowing them to accommodate work and family commitments. 
Although the women rarely acknowledge it, these arrangements are not 
without adverse effects in relation to their career advancement. 
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As a consequence of their breadwinning roles, the men tend to prefer the 
more lucrative sectors of the profession like the private practice of law in 
large commercial firms. They thus leave room for women in the less 
lucrative sectors like litigation in the family law area, mediation and the 
judiciary, which, at the same time, appear as more compatible with their 
central role in the domestic sphere and their presumed abilities and 
preferences. 
Although there is less economic incentive in the judiciary than in large law 
firms, women seem to prefer the judiciary because of its stability and fixed 
hours, because it seems easier to combine with motherhood. The large 
proportion of women in the family law judiciary was seen as a 
consequence of the shorter working day of the Family Law Courts as 
compared to the criminal courts. 
In the next section I will explore the judge's awareness on discrimination 
within the judiciary and the family in the context of a general discussion of 
their perceptions on gender and difference. 
Ill = Perceptions of gender difference and discrimination 
among the family law judges 
1 =Introduction: 
In this section, I examine various instances in which the judges refer to 
discrimination; I refer first to the way the judges speak about their 
personal experiences of discrimination (gender and other types) within the 
judiciary. I then consider the judges' awareness of the effects of gender 
on the lives of the persons that come to court. In the third place, I will 
examine the judges' consciousness of the potential for discrimination 
involved in their own activities 10• 
10 The analysis of the first aspect mentioned above was based on the responses to an Interview 
question aimed at exploring their awareness of discrimination within the judiciary. In particular, I 
asked them whether they had ever been subject, or heard of any type of discrimination within the 
judiciary. 
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In an article where she reported the results carried out in a historical 
research aimed at investigating whether there was discrimination against 
the Jews within the Argentine judiciary, Canceglia argues that the 
organisational characteristics of the Argentine judiciary such as its 
unwritten rules, its internal codes and customary practices, its hierarchical 
organisation and the opaque prevailing criterion for the nomination and 
promotion of its members could facilitate discriminatory practices within its 
ranks (Canceglia, 1999: 325). Accordingly, since gender discrimination is 
a reality at a societal level, one would expect gender discrimination to 
emerge within an institution such as the judiciary with a tradition and an 
organisation that may encourage discriminatory practices 
a ~ Gender duscrumonation 
As was seen in chapter 411 , the analysis of the questionnaire showed the 
family judges as a relatively homogeneous group in terms of most 
variables studied, such as class origin, class status, educational 
background, religious and social affiliation. Age and sex appeared instead 
as critical variables with a potential capacity to differentiate the family 
judges. Yet the analysis of the judge's testimonies shows little awareness 
of gender in general and consequently, a very weak consciousness of 
gender subordination and discrimination among the family judges. 
In a way, the. discourse of the judges is not surprising. lt would not be 
expected that the judges of a purportedly egalitarian society, with a 
For the analysis of the second and third points on the judge's gender awareness and their 
consciousness about the potential for discrimination in their professional activities, I used 
comments made by the judges throughout the interviews. No single question was made aimed 
precisely at obtaining this Information, although many of the comments are responses to questions 
on the changing nature of the family in Argentine society, on the ideal qualities of a good family 
judge, and on the problems that worried them most. See the interview guide at the methodological 
appendix. 
11 See chapter 4, section Ill 
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relatively new Constitution, explicitly prohibiting any kind of discrimination 
and having incorporated many International Human Rights ireaties, like 
the CEDAW, would admit the existence of any kind of discrimination 
within its ranks. Although in Argentina there is a civil legal system, the 
judges have the power to control the constitutionality of substantive law, to 
declare unconstitutional any law violating the right to equality and to 
penalise human rights violations. 
On the other hand, as has been argued in chapter 111 12, this egalitarian 
legislation came forward more as a consequence of the general 
institutional modernisation of Argentine society at the advent of the 
restoration of democracy than as a result of the pressure of the women's 
movement or the influence of feminist scholarship. lt must be 
acknowledged that, in fact, feminist discourse has hardly penetrated 
Argentine society, where feminism does not enjoy much prestige. As a 
matter of fact, none of the women judges that participated in the study 
identified herself as a feminist, and a few among them made a point in 
making it clear that they were not feminists, through remarks such as: 
" I have to confess that I am not much of a feminist." wj 
This is not an indication that these women are not in favour of the 
advancement of the situation of women in society. In fact, a few of the 
women and at least one of the men gave testimonies that prove their 
commitment to such an endeavour. Still, a linguistic obstacle seems to 
prevent the identification of Argentine women with the label ''feminist" 
which locally has a "negative" connotation. Using Cockburn's expression, 
Thornton has referred to this phenomenon as "the sustained 
'anathematising of feminism"' which, in her view, originates in the "fear it 
arouses in many men" (Thornton, 1996: 270) 
The following assertion of a man judge is emblematic of the little meaning 
gender can have in the view of the judges: 
12 See chapter 3, section 1-b. 
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"The situation of women everywhere is equated to that of men. There are no 
differences any more. I teach at University, where there are as many women 
as men ... Here, for Instance, an Association of Women Judges was created 
a few years ago. I frankly cannot see the reason for having a separate 
association. This is a discrimination that just doesn•t make sense to me, 
since we are all doing the same work irrespectively of our sex. We all 
perform the same role, work for the same people, and have the same 
academic background." mj 
Actually, as was seen in the previous section, this man judge was one of 
the judges who explained the high proportion of women in the Family Law 
Courts as a consequence of the fact that men preferred more prestigious 
sections within the judiciary and thus left these posts to the women. 
Furthermore, shortly after having voiced the above remark, he 
acknowledged that there was only one woman in the whole history of the 
Argentine Supreme Court. Nevertheless, this did not seem to him, an 
indication of gender discrimination or a reason that could justify the 
creation of a women's association which, instead, he considered an act of 
discrimination. 
Moreover, except in the cases in which the judges have undergone 
training by the Argentine Association of Women Judges, aimed 
specifically at fostering awareness of gender discrimination and promoting 
the use of International Human Rights Conventions, feminist discourse 
has had very little influence on the ideology of the judges. The three 
judges (two women and one man that had undergone the training 
mentioned above) whose discourse, without expressing an allegiance to 
feminism, denotes a certain degree of awareness of gender discrimination 
in society at large. these were the same judges that identified the 
existence of slight gender discrimination within the judiciary. 
The more salient aspects in the judges' testimonies with respect to a 
sensitivity to gender in relation to gender inequality within the judiciary 
relate to the women judges' difficulty to reach the higher posts within the 
judiciary, and to the way they retain the main responsibility for the 
organisation of the home and childcare. In any event, they rarely referred 
to these inequities as examples of discrimination. Various authors have 
observed a similar tendency among women in the professions in general 
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and in the legal professions in particular to deny gender discrimination 
and have explained it in different ways. While some favour psychological 
explanations (Rhode, 1991:1775, cited in Hunter, 2003) others opt for 
structural explanations (Kanter, 1977: 228; Cox, 1996: 13 and 125 cited in 
Hunter, 2003) and a third group explain such a tendency as a stage in a 
dynamic discursive process of identity formation and projection ·(Hunter, 
2003: 116). 
The authors in the first group assert that women's refusal to identify 
themselves as victims is a strategy to protect themselves. Authors such 
as Rhode emphasise that women may not want to pay the costs in terms 
of loss of self-esteem and efficacy implied in identifying themselves as 
victims or want to go through the unpleasantness involved in identifying 
the perpetrators of injustice, so they prefer to revise their conceptions of 
blame and merit (Rhode, 1991:1775, cited in Hunter, 2003). Crosby, on 
the other hand, applying the sociological theory of relative deprivation to 
the situation of senior women in male dominated contexts, argues that in 
spite of the existence of objective signs of gender discrimination, women 
do not register them as such because they have· never experienced a 
situation of real equality (Crosby, 1982: 7 cited in Hunter, 2003). 
The authors in the second group tend to emphasise that male hegemonic 
values foster conformity and false consciousness among these women, 
thus preventing them from relating their own experiences at work with 
gender discrimination. Kanter, who was the first author to identify the 
position of "token" within male dominated work settings, argued that token 
women showed their gratitude for being allowed in by not criticising or 
complaining about their situation (Kanter, 1977: 228). Furthermore, it has 
been put forward that women internalise the terms of patriarchal society to 
a point that they contribute to its perpetuation by restricting other women's 
alternative positions and potential claims for gender equality in the 
workplace. Thus, according to both the approaches outlined above, as 
Hunter has put it: " .. one needs both desire and a sense of entitlement in 
order to experience discrimination" (Hunter, 2003: 115). 
301 
Finally, the authors in the third group, inspired by Bourdieu's concept of 
subjectivity "as the ongoing corporeal and mental interiorisation of multiple 
social locations" see senior women's denial of discrimination in men-
dominated settings as a discursive practice; an ongoing process of 
identity formation. They pay particular attention to the narratives in which 
women situate themselves with respect to their gender, articulating 
sameness and difference (Hunter, 2003: 115-116). Hunter claims that, 
when compared to psychological and structural explanations, this last type 
of explanation of denial presents the benefit of according women "a 
considerable degree of agency". 
In my view, the three approaches are complementary and are supported 
by my research results. The third approach has the additional value of 
explaining the contradictions appearing in the testimonies of the women 
judges that participated in my study. This is discussed in more detail in 
section 5d in this same chapter, where I consider how the women judges' 
first reaction is to deny the existence of any difference based on gender in 
the context of the judiciary and then the same women fall into 
contradictions. 
Only three of the twelve judges interviewed, two women and a man, made 
straightforward comments that had to do with their personal experience of 
gender discrimination within the judiciary. Other judges referred to other 
types of inequities such as discrimination on the basis of being outsiders. 
At any rate, all of them underrated these indications of gender 
discrimination within the judiciary and thought of it as something of the 
past that was·well in a process of disappearing. As one of the groups in 
Hunter's study on the denial of gender discrimination in the Australian bar, 
that she names "the no but yes group", the women judges in my study 
tend to simultaneously deny, minimise, admit and excuse gender 
discrimination within the judiciary (Hunter, 2003: 123). 
In the following passages the judges comment on their experiences. lin 
~he iirst quo1e a woman ]udge roforrs ~o the iUllstances where she perceives 
gender discrimination in the judiciary: 
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"Access is quite difficult for women in sections that deal with issues of high 
political content or political power. In fact, historically there was only one 
woman who ever reached the Supreme Court of Justice in the 60's and 
never again... Although in the Upper Civil Court there are quite a few 
women."wj 
Another woman judge conveys how she felt prey to prejudice at various 
points in her career, first when she was first aspiring to become a judge, 
and currently having to endure humorous remarks from men judges as 
she competes in a contest for a place in the Civil Upper Court. As agued 
by Thornton: "The use of humour and jokes is a subtle reminder of the 
otherness of women in the public sphere. lt is a way of putting them down 
in male-dominated organisations" (Thornton, 1996: 251): 
"I had to show a lot of firmness to be taken seriously. Because two factors 
coincided In my own case: I was very young and I was a woman, I 
graduated very young so that was "Bingo I !I" ... 1 do not think that these 
distinctions prevail any more, since you see, nowadays the court personnel 
is largely composed by women. But a few years ago, it was different you 
could feel the resistance ... At the first Instance, one can observe that there Is 
certain equality. Just today as I was waiting for the elevator I was reading 
the board at the ground floor hall and I was thinking that the number of 
women and men in the building was quite even. lt is different in the Upper 
Court where specialization does not exist, the upper tribunal deals both with 
civil and patrimonial matters, there, and the number of men judges Is much 
higher ... l am not made to feel that there Is much discrimination nowadays, 
but, now that I am following this process of selection to compete for a post 
at the Upper Civil Court, I frequently have to face jokes like the other day, a 
male member of the Upper Court was telling a colleague in my presence: 
Beware they are going to fill up the Upper Civil Court with womeniii ... When, 
in fact, this was far from reality, I am the only woman that, according to the 
results obtained up to now, has fair chances to be nominated. The rest is 
made up by men, and I am not complaining, because all the candidates that 
reached the first places in the exams are excellent, and nobody could deny 
their professional value. But this sensation that they are going to have the 
court filled up with women when there was just another woman candidate 
apart from myselflll...l do not know yet what the outcome will be, there are 
more instances yet to go, like formal objections and such. The sole idea of 
seeing women coming seems menacing .. . lt is, of course, a masculine 
universe." wj 
Although raised by a man, the following quote refers to gender 
discrimination against a woman, his wife. Despite his personal underrating 
discrimination In the judiciary, in his testimony he comments how he 
perceived gender discrimination through her experience when applying for 
a post in the family law judiciary.: 
"I do not think there is so much discrimination today, and I would say that 
the Introduction of the Council of the Judgeship for the selection of the 
judges is probably going to eliminate that sort of problem. But we have only 
had a woman once In the Supreme Court's history. My wife Is a civil judge, 
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fifteen years ago she wanted to opt for the family specialisation, like myself. 
She was not allowed to, and you can see the discrimination in the 
argument, they said no because her husband was already in the family 
section. Now she is very happy to have been rejected because of the 
emotional stress the family specialisation involves. But then, she was very 
unhappy, and it was hard for her to accept it." mj 
A different type of discrimination was mentioned by a woman judge who 
explains how her career trajectory, the fact that she was nominated as a 
judge after having litigated for many years, instead of having followed the 
more traditional path of developing a career within the judiciary, was the 
reason for a certain resistance and discriminatory comments on her 
colleagues: 
"There is discrimination, but it has nothing to do with gender or age. If you 
do not come from inside the judicial family, if you do not get to the judgeship 
from inside the judiciary, then you will have to face discrimination. lt is 
tough, and makes itself felt. it is very hard to compete if you come from 
outside. You have to make extra efforts if you do not come from within, 
competition becomes very tough... The judicial career has a peak, a top, it 
ends when you become Court Secretary. But people here feel that if they 
have gone through the whole judicial career they should automatically 
become judges and that the Court Secretary is the more legitimated person 
to become the Court's judge. lt might be ... In my view, you can be as well 
equipped to become a judge if you come from the profession as if you come 
from the judiciary." wj 
Other judges mentioned other instances of discrimination that they 
underrated. A certain tendency to prejudice and a strong Catholic bias 
were also recognised as may be noticed from the following quotes: 
"I believe that in the judiciary there are very prejudiced people ..... The fact is 
that the Judgeship has been a very closed, difficult to access institution, with 
a great tradition of judicial families, not always with a democratic ideology." 
wj 
" ... 1 would not like to sound patronising but, because of the knowledge I 
have of all family judges, you must remember that I knew theni as a lawyer, 
before I was a judge, and that I also knew them from university. I believe 
they are all very committed to their role. Anyhow, it seems to me that there 
are groups that tend much more bent on imposing their own ideology. There 
are some groups which are extremely religious, very Catholic. I do not 
actually know if this could be avoided." wj 
"Discrimination in the judiciary?? No, I should think that it mainly occurred in 
the past... Religion yes, may be one could say that a certain degree of 
discrimination on the basis of religion persists." mj 
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Yet if some of the judges identify some instances of discrimination-, 
gender or some other type of discrimination-, for most, as can be seen in 
almost all the quotes in this section this is something that mainly occurred 
in the past, and they all seem to think that it is in the process of 
disappearing as a result of the new system for the nomination of judges. 
The following testimonies of two women judges reveal the judges' 
confidence in the new system of selection and appointment of the judges 
as a remedy to any remaining vestige of discrimination within the judiciary: 
"I believe that some vestiges of discrimination still persist, certain strategic 
posts have not yet been occupied by women, although I think this is a 
tendency that is being reversed with the change In the system of nomination 
of judges and, as a consequence of the more open selection proceedings 
that are now taking place. Women are doing very well. In fact, the first 
woman to go through such a selection Is Dr. Stella Maris Martinez, and she 
was nominated as Official Defender before the Supreme Court and took 
office on June 201h. She is not the only woman that did well in a selection. I 
do not know what is happening now with the selection processes." wj 
"My feeling is that we have progressed a lot. Whereas before women used 
to be discriminated against, they are now getting more and more respect 
and recognition. They have come to deserve the place they have achieved 
since they are professionals of great quality." wj 
In spite of the fact that most of the judges in the study acknowledged the 
gender segmentation of the judiciary, a fact which I think is a clear 
indication of gender discrimination, the judges overall do not think that that 
there is a problem of gender discrimination within the judiciary. This denial 
of gender discrimination is striking and is certainly related to the invisibility 
and naturalisation of gender subordination. As can be perceived in the 
judges' testimonies, this denial goes beyond gender and suggests that the 
judges also ignore other types of discrimination taking place within the 
judiciary. 
The following quote, in which a man judge justifies the differential 
opportunity a member of a judge's family has to enter the judiciary, 
provides an example of the ingrained and pervasive nature of 
discrimination. This is how he explains why, in his view, this should not be 
regarded as discrimination or nepotism: 
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'What you find here is the same as you find in other spheres. In the same 
way as things are easier for the son of a medical doctor who goes into 
medicine, here, it is very likely that the son of a judge starts to work in a 
court. I think these are just concrete possibilities life offers." mj 
In my view, these testimonies indicate levels of tolerance to injustice that 
should raise concern when expressed precisely by those who should be 
administering justice. 
In the last section on the judges' awareness of gender discrimination 
within the Family Law judiciary, I explained that women's under-
representation in part as a function of their lack of gender awareness. 
Conceived as the basic domain of women, the family is one of the main 
locus of gender subordination (Barret- Me lntosch, 1982). As the section 
of the judiciary that deals with family relations daily, the family law 
judiciary would certainly benefit from an increased knowledge of the ways 
in which gender makes an impact on the family and on the distribution of 
power within it since, as Graycar (1995: 262-282 and 1998: 1-21) has put 
it, through their activity the judges create reality and hence, including the 
reality of women's lives. I could appreciate, however, that the family 
judiciary has remained quite impervious to the feminist critique of the 
patriarchal marriage and the patriarchal family13• This critique suggests 
that women's responsibilities within the traditional family jeopardise their 
personal development in the benefit of the development of the husband 
and children (Shmukler, 1982). 
Moving on to the next section, I consider another aspect of discrimination, 
. . I 
namely that of the inequality between the sexes in family life. I look 
particularly at the judges' representations with respect to the family as a 
site of women's subordination in the context of the important changes 
Argentine families underwent over the last twenty years. 
13 The patriarchal marriage has been defined by Shanley as uniting a man and a woman, providing 
the foundations for a family that may Include biological or adopted children, as assigning different 
roles to m~m and women, as being Indissoluble except for the most grievous offences . The 
conservative family Is regarded as the foundation of society , as essentially good for Individuals 
and having great public benefits, preserving it from the worst Ills from crime to poverty(Shanley, 
2003: 1). 
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As a matter of fact, gender roles are naturalised and rendered invisible in 
the accounts of both the men and the women judges, to the extent that 
they hardly register women's subordination and systematic gender 
inequalities within the family. The reason for this might be found in the 
Catholic influence on the ideology of the judges14• The following quote 
from a man judge reveals the Catholic view of the family as a refuge. In 
Lasch's words, a "heaven in a heartless world"15, the family is viewed as 
the unproblematic harmonious integrated basic human cell, capable of 
protecting and fulfilling the needs of all its members. 
"To me, the family is this natural realm around which the human being can 
develop and fulfil its needs. lt is basically the space where this human being 
can meet with authentic solidarity. The space where you give and where you 
endure. The way I see it, it is the place where you can always find an 
answer to what is happening, whether good or bad. A refuge, the great 
human refuge that humanity is always seeking for. The point is that the 
family is under the attack of selfishness, of the exacerbated Individualism 
present in human nature." mj 
Along similar lines, other men judges frequently refer to the familial 
imperative, without leaving room for conflicting rights or different interests 
within the family members: 
"In that sense, it is Important to consider that the real matter in a family case 
Is the family, the family as a unity, a single entity, not the husband against 
the wife or the wife against the husband" mj 
"I have always worked with the familial imperative in mind, even before I 
was a family judge, when I worked in civil patrimonial cases, always looking 
for a solution that would suit the family as a whole" wj 
Yet if most family judges are certainly lacking in terms of a comprehensive 
critical approach towards the patriarchal family and the preservation of the 
rights of its individual members, they are aware of the consequences of 
their religious beliefs on their work as family law judges and some of 
them, particularly among the women, exhibit a less monolithic view of the 
family. Thus, a man judge highlights religious beliefs as one of the main 
differences in the way family judges approach their work: 
14 For an account of the Catholic view of the unity of the family see further: "Familia y Valores", la 
Naci6n, 17 de Abril de 1999. lt very much coincides with the definition given by Shanley in the 
previous quote. 
15 I am borrowing the expression used by Lash as the title of his book on the family . 
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"Let's not forget that in the family area there are a lot of issues that are 
deeply entangled with religious beliefs. I think that religious beliefs could be 
making a big difference in that sense, because of the way they impregnate 
family matters" mj 
And, as can be observed in the following passage of a woman judge, the 
judges are not completely gender blind: 
"I believe that what matters most is not to lose track of what constitutes the 
problem of each and every member of the family. Because if you look only 
to the women related problems or aspects, you run the risk of overlooking 
the whole net of problems of the family. Men also face very serious 
difficulties when the family breaks up, especially from the fact of being apart 
from their children. Because even if it is true that in divorce situations men 
exert their power over their wives through money, there Is no doubt that 
women use the children for the same purpose. Although most of the time 
women have to face the tremendous responsibility of the children, it is a big 
burden for the men to be separated from the children. That is why more and 
more men ask for custody." wj 
In a different tone, another woman judge expresses clearly a much more 
open view of the family: 
"I shall give you an article I wrote on the crisis of the Argentine family where 
I argue that what is in crisis Is not the family but the traditional family. And, 
this is a crisis that I welcomel!l" wj 
Some of the comments of the judges show that, to some extent, the 
judges perceive certain gender inequalities and partially register the 
impact of gender roles within the family. Still, as I could appreciate 
through their answer regarding the problems that worried them most in 
their practice as family judges, the situation of women within the family 
does not appear as a central preoccupation of the judges. This Is not the 
case when it comes to problems affecting children, 
In chapter 111 16 I considered the main changes that had taken place in the 
family in the last 25 years as a result of social change and immigration, a 
fact to which the judges are very much aware as can be seen from the 
analysis of the interview. The following comments clearly show that all the 
judges are very mindful of the important changes undergone by the family 
in the last twenty years with the large participation of women in the labour 
16 Chapter Ill, section 1c 
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market standing out as one of the main reasons for their new and 
increased autonomy: 
"The Argentine family has incorporated important changes. The man used to 
be the head of the household in every respect, he ruled over the ideology 
and the economy. Now this hegemony Is being contested. We have many 
families where the man has ceased to be the breadwinner and this causes a 
distortion in the traditional sexual division of roles. Now the men are 
sometimes the ones who stay at home in charge of the children and some of 
the chores and it is the woman who goes out to work for the family 
sustenance. And this inevitably changes the balance of authority inside the 
family. Whether you like it or not, money brings power." wj 
"I would not know whether it was for better or for worse, but in my parent's 
times I do not think there were many families with such problems for, in 
general, women's lack of economic independence and training made them 
stay married, independently of whether they were happy or unhappy ... May 
be this makes the families less stable. In my experience, In 99% of the 
divorce cases it Is the woman who makes the decision, because either she 
has fallen out of love, or because her new independence allows her to 
choose what she wants to do when she is unhappy about certain things. So 
now, she can say: 'I am going to stay on my own with the children' ... When 
the husband has been unfaithful, it is the woman who generally asks him to 
go, to leave the family home. Because even if the man has stopped loving 
his wife, even if his married life is very bad, and there is another woman, the 
man finds it very hard to leave his home and his children to become a 
visiting father, and that is why the decision is generally taken by the wife ... 
even when she is not the 'guilty party'." wj 
"The incorporation of women from the middle classes to the labour market 
has had terribly damaging and disruptive effects on family life: In my view, 
mothers should be in charge of their children while they are growing" mj 
Some of the judges have mentioned that the difficulties women have to 
obtain a good economic settlement after divorce is a consequence of their 
marginal role in the management of the family assets. They explain how, 
in the end, women are frequently left with less money than they would 
have been entitled to, as illustrated by the following two quotes: 
"But here you see in the daily practice how society buries rights recognised 
and written in statutes, because women have been too busy with the 
children to follow what has been going on with their husband's businesses. 
Because in a family, economic progress is usually slow. Very few families 
start affluent, but at a certain point economic progress takes place and very 
often, the wife has not perceived it. She has not been attentive; then If the 
couple decides to get a divorce, it becomes very difficult for the wife to 
proceed to the liquidation of the marital assets. lt Is difficult for the judge to 
proceed to take the necessary measures when, in general, women generally 
claim much less than they would be entitled to, because they do not have 
enough information, they have lost track of the family property after many 
years in which they have not been attentive enough and the men have not 
been transparent enough .... Also, because material interest is not generally 
seen as a feminine quality ... So, they very often find themselves alone, 
having to take care of their children, completely unprotected economically." 
wj 
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"There are judges who allow the ex husband to have complete control over 
the ex wife's expenses. I do not think this is right." mj 
As can be appreciated from the judges' testimonies, all of them are ready 
to acknowledge that most frequently women and children are the victims 
and men the perpetrators of domestic violence and child abuse. The 
following quote from a man judge is typical of the answers of all the 
judges to the question I asked about tend to be be the main victims of 
violence and abuse within the family. Their words show that they are 
aware that women endure certain systematic damaging situations within 
the family: 
'When we talk of abuse, the children, and when we talk of violence, the 
women."mj 
In spite of this, when asked about the most worrying and painful problems 
they have to face as family judges, their responses reveal that children 
are a paramount preoccupation of the judges, while women are not 
mentioned: 
"Basically, I would say conflictive divorces that generate family violence and 
child abuse. Not only child abuse, but also the abuse of child abuse. 
Because the false claim of child abuse is an abuse in itself. I believe 
violence is the worst thing a human being may endure. lt hinders the 
person's normal development." mj 
Thus, particularly the men judges also highlight how, encouraged by 
unscrupulous lawyers, women tend to use the children to increase their 
bargaining power in order to obtain better economic deals, even if 
sometimes they resort to claims of dubious or inexistent violence or child 
abuse. This can also be observed in the following quote of a man judge in 
response to the same question. The response also discloses a suspicious 
attitude towards women and their lawyers: 
'Women use their children to get better economic settlements. Sometimes 
they deny access to the children's father pleading that he is been abusive. 
In the past, women did not report child abuse; on the contrary, they would 
hide it because they felt ashamed. When somebody reported child abuse 
one would not doubt it, but nowadays, I am more inclined not to believe that 
it Is true, because it has become common practice for the lawyers to advise 
their women clients to claim that there has been sexual abuse In order to be 
able to negotiate better money conditions with the children's father. And you 
can see it clearly as the mother who doniod accoss on the grounds of abuse 
at one point, will allow the child to go to spend the weekend with the 
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supposedly abusive father as soon as the dissolution of the marital assets is 
readylll" mj 
As can be appreciated from the following quotes of a woman and a man 
judge, the men and women judges refer to the way men suffer from being 
away from their homes and apart from their children. This was a recurrent 
remark: 
"Men also face very serious difficulties when the family breaks up, specially 
from the fact of being apart from their children. Because even if it is true that 
in divorce situations men exert their power over their wives through money, 
there is no doubt that women use the children for the same purpose. 
Although most of the time women have to face the tremendous 
responsibility of the children, it is a big burden for the men to be separated 
from the children. That is why more and more men ask for custody." wj 
"Although after divorce the men seem to "adopt" the family of the new wife 
and see much more of her children than his own, at the beginning they 
suffer a lot from being apart from their children." mj. 
The overall impression to be gained is that, apart from certain exceptions, 
the judges' testimonies appear to be sympathetic to the men involved in 
divorce cases. The judge's tendency to highlight the suffering of the men 
in divorce cases could be explained as a tendency to redress the vestiges 
of the traditional protective attitude towards women and children that 
prevailed in the judiciary before family law reform took place. As was 
explained in chapter 217, before the reform, family law had been very 
archaic and inequitable. lt conferred the men in the family excessive rights 
over their wives and children, consequently granting them with too much 
power. As demonstrated by research that aimed at investigating sexual 
stereotypes among judges of the Upper Civil Court, by way of 
compensation for the deficiencies of the law, the judges then tended to 
approach women and children in divorce cases in a highly paternalistic 
fashion, for they were the ones in need of care and protection (Harari and 
Pastorino, 2001: 132-136). Given that the rights of the members of the 
family are now balanced, at least in the letter of the law, the judges may 
feel that men's subjectivity has acquired a different meaning. 
d ~ .Awall'eness of cli.Biiural dnffferenc®s 
~------"--" ~-
17 See chapter 2, section Ill 
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Another interesting point the judges refer to is the need for them to be 
aware of the cultural differences among those that come to court, and the 
requirement of not imposing their own personal values on the families of 
the litigants, which might lead them to discriminatory practices or at least 
into symbolic violence. lt seems interesting to note that the judges, having 
difficulties in seeing themselves as objects of discrimination, realise the 
potential for discrimination involved in their own activity. The following 
assertion from a woman judge very much represents the spirit of the 
testimonies of the judges in general: 
"I try hard, though, to understand the values present In each family, 
especially when those values are different from my own. I think that 
especially In those cases you need to be particularly respectful. I strive for 
them to find their own solutions, in coincidence with their own value 
systems. I strongly believe that we should not impose our own. This requires 
from you, as a judge, a thorough work with your own self." wj 
This same judge explains her position in relation to the presence of 
religious images in the judge's office at the Court. Just 4 of the 12 Courts 
visited on the occasion of the interview (headed by 3 women and 1 man) 
did not exhibit a Christ image: 
'When I first came to the Court there was a big Christ hanging on the wall. I 
have been brought up as a Catholic myself. This means that I went through 
Catholic baptism, communion, the whole lot. But, on the other hand, in spite 
of all this, I am not a Catholic now. I took the Image away, both because I 
did not identify with it, and because I thought that if anyone practising 
another religion came here for help, being Jewish, Islamic or Buddhist, it 
would not be fair to have this Christ hanging there." wj 
Likewise, another woman judge suggested that: 
"The legal system should respect the characteristics of each family, since I 
believe there is not just one family model. We have to make decisions here 
that have to do with facts, not only with rights. We have to be extremely 
careful not to imprint our own stereotypes on these families, not to impose 
our own views on how the children should be raised. Each family has its 
code ... We need to understand those codes better, because of the large 
Immigration we are receiving. A Bolivian family does not behave like an 
Argentine family. Of course, there are certain minimums that are untenable, 
like the sexual initiation of girls by their fathers, something that Is more 
tolerated in other cultures." wj 
The last part of the latter quote is particularly interesting because it shows 
that for this judge, imparting justice sets limits on empathy and respect for 
cultural differences. The example she gives of the sexual initiation of girls 
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by their fathers may be a practice that is tolerated in other cultures, but it 
is a taboo within Argentine culture, and just as it is in most societies, so to 
her it is untenable. She thus expresses that justice imposes limits on 
culture tolerance. To her, justice means avoiding the harm done to a 
young girl through forced sexual intercourse with her own father. This 
reminds us of the argument of Moller Okin when she warns us against the 
danger of gender discrimination implied in cultural relativism. Moller Okin 
calls for limits regarding respect for cultural differences in situations where 
justice is at stake (Moller Okin, 1998: 678). In agreement with the position 
advocated by West, she calls for a decision that is based both on justice 
and on care (West, 1997: 93). 
Similarly, as can be appreciated in the following two quotes, the women 
judges point not only to litigants of different cultures or ethnic groups but 
also to litigants from the lower classes, emphasizing what a difficult, 
confusing and traumatic experience coming to court could be for many of 
the parties involved in a family conflict. Litigants and witnesses belonging 
to the lower classes frequently do not do not know their rights, they do not 
understand how the courts work, they do not see clearly the difference 
between a criminal and a family court. All these factors can turn the 
experience of appearing before a court of law frightening, particularly as 
the courts are not a friendly environment: 
"One of the works that needs to be done is to demystify. When we summon 
people to come to court, just the sound of the word court frightens them, 
they confuse the family courts with the criminal courts and fear to being sent 
to jail. We need to explain what our work Is about, because they are scared 
of the judiciary ... " wj 
"lt is very difficult for the judge to find the adequate point In terms of distance 
and proximity but, basically, it is actually very difficult for the people that 
come to court. lt is a frightful experience; they come to court carrying their 
problems on their backs and they have no idea about what they will find 
here ... The Courts are such a confusing scenario. lt is hard to find your way 
around, the buildings are inadequate, unfriendly." wj 
As I commented chapter 518 of this thesis, it is here that the capacities for 
empathy, immediacy and contextuality advocated by both men and 
18See Chapter 5, section 111.2.c.ii 
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women judges come to bear on the judges' daily work. In the testimonies 
presented in this section it can be appreciated how, according to the 
judges, the latter abilities help to promote tolerance and respect for 
cultural differences in order to avoid symbolic violence. 
In this section I examined the judges' perceptions of discrimination within 
the judiciary and the family amidst a general discussion on their 
awareness of difference in general. I came to the conclusion that, 
although some of the judges are, to a certain extent, aware of some 
degree of discrimination within the judiciary, be it gender or another type 
of discrimination, in general they thought of the judiciary as a relatively 
egalitarian institution and referred to discrimination as something that 
mainly occurred in the past. Moreover, it was their opinion that, if some 
residues of discrimination persisted, they were going to be eliminated by 
the new system of selection and appointment of the judges consecrated in 
the Constitutional Reform in 1994 that introduced a Council of the 
Judgeship for the appointment of the new judges that would eventually 
show its effects on the composition of the judiciary. 
Similarly, in spite of the fact that the discourse of the judges shows some 
recognition of the effects of gender on the lives of the people involved in 
legal conflicts, the lack of a comprehensive critical gender perspective is 
notorious. Instead, the judges were quite aware of the potential for 
discrimination involved in their practices, of the need to make sure not to 
impose their ~wn conceptions on the families that come to Court, and to 
respect the diverse family forms. · 
The next section will focus on the analysis of the judges' opinions on 
whether the women family law judges make a particular contribution to the 
judiciary. 
• V- IDo women in the family judiciary make a difference? 
1 ~ Introduction 
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In this section I analyse the opinions of the judges on whether women 
judges bring to their work any particular attributes or capacities on the 
basis of their gender and on whether they make or will make a particular 
contribution to the judiciary. 
The analysis of this section is based on the responses of various 
questions from the interviews: a personal question asking the judges 
whether they think their sex affects the way they work; a more general 
question relating to the attributes and abilities women bring to the 
judiciary, and a question regarding the possible contributions women 
might make to the administration of justice. An additional question was 
also used for the analysis of this section. I asked the judges whether there 
exists a homogeneous or dominant culture within the family law judiciary 
and, when I received a negative answer, I asked them on what lines the 
family judges were divided. 
2 ~ Any difference? 
a ~ Dinerrent rreactnons 
Some of the men judges have pointed out that, since there is 
independence among the courts, they are in a better position to give 
opinions on the women lawyers, their court secretaries and court 
employees in their own court, rather than to the women judges because, 
as they say, they are not familiar with the way the other family courts 
work. Thus, when asked about the capacities women judges might bring 
to their work, they raise the following objections: 
"The vision of the judge is a bit isolated, I am here and have no idea of what 
happens in the Court next door ...... Occasionally we have meetings with 
other judges to discuss common problems or preoccupations; we do speak 
about such problems ... May be the lawyers or the people who come to court 
have the opportunity to compare. We judges can't ... The Courts work 
independently from each other. lt's impossible for a judge to know how the 
judge on the other side of the corridor works, or how he/she conceives of 
the family." mj 
"lt's hard for us to know, I think you should ask the judges In the upper court 
since they receive the cases that are appealed, so they might be better 
Informed on the issue. For that sort of lnformaiion, you could also contact 
the lawyers who litigate in the Family Courts." mj 
315 
While, women's first reaction tends to deny any differences in the working 
styles and decision making of the judges that could be related to gender, 
men can soon identify certain feminine traits, be they strengths or 
weaknesses. 
The reasons for such uniformity in the responses of the women judges 
could be attributed to the fact that the law has mainly evolved as a 
masculine discipline. As such, its value originates in the capacities 
generally associated with the masculine intellect; namely, the capacities 
for abstract reasoning, neutrality and objectivity, while emotions and 
corporeality are the antithetical, less valued qualities generally associated 
with femininity (Naffine, 1990: 26-27). 
As Menkei-Meadow (1996: 57) reminds us, unlike what happened in other 
professions such as medicine, for instance, where women entered the 
profession arguing that they could contribute their special feminine 
capacities, women's beginnings within the legal profession were strongly 
marked by their attempt to show that women could practice law as men 
did. This was the main argument of the "persons cases" through which 
women obtained the right to exercise the legal professions. If the women 
aiming to progress in the field feel that the law is quintessentially 
masculine, from where it follows that the capacities the law values the 
most are those usually associated with masculinity, their denial of any 
characteristic derived from their gender, and their attempt to demonstrate 
that they are the same as men, and as good as men is to be expected 
and, moreover, is perfectly understandable (Kanter, 1977; Rhode, 1991; 
Hunter 2003). 
In my view, this denial of differences accountable to gender on the part of 
the women judges must be interpreted as a defence against eventual 
discrimination, a stance that Giddens (1981: 87) may have called 
"practical consciousness"19, particularly since as the interview proceeds, 
19 In Gidden's understanding, the concept of "practical consciousness" refers to a tacit type of 
knowledge located between consciousness and the unconscious, skilfully applied to alternative 
modes of behaviour that the subject is unable to formulate discursively. 
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they will refer to differences and potential contributions. lt seems to me 
that it is interesting to elaborate on the contradictions in the discourse of 
the women judges20• 
On the other hand, the situation of the men judges in that respect is rather 
the opposite. Comfortable and secure in their posts, they seem to have 
less at stake in the answer to the questions mentioned in the introduction 
to this section. Thus, they hastily identify what they believe to be the 
feminine characteristics, or else resort to the dominant stereotype. 
Most of the men judges think that women and men are equal in terms of 
their abilities. They are actually keen to assert that women are as capable, 
intelligent and responsible as men, but, that being different from men, they 
might bring their presumed different attributes or capacities into their work. 
They also convey their belief that the feminine and the masculine 
perspectives are complementary and celebrate the coexistence of both 
perspectives within the judiciary. 
As was explained at the beginning of this section, the men judges do not 
feel that they have sufficient experience to give an opinion on the way 
women judges work, since there is independence between the courts. 
Accordingly, they feel more entitled to speak of women lawyers, with 
whom they interact daily. Thus they observe that women lawyers tend to 
become too involved with their clients' problems and thus lose the 
necessary objectivity. Still, they expressed that, in their view, the women 
judges tend to understand the resolution of conflicts more as a matter of 
interdisciplina~ity rather than as a matter of law. Because of the 
importance this last aspect acquires in the discourse of both men and 
women judges, it will be discussed separately. 
I first look at the responses of the men judges, then into the responses of 
the women judges, and end with the analysis of the women judges' strong 
emphasis on interdisciplinarity as highlighted by both women and men 
judges. 
20 See section lll-2.a in this chapter . 
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As a first reaction, many among men and women judges alike were 
surprised by my question with reference to the different contribution 
women judges could make to the judiciary. In fact, most of them acted as 
if they had never thought about the issue, as becomes clear from the 
following quote of one man judge: 
"Mmmm .... Men and women are very different, I suppose this might have 
some sort of implication on the way one works." mj 
In contrast, another man judge celebrates the incorporation of more 
voices to the judiciary: 
"This large entry of women brings with it the incorporation of different 
perspectives.This is always enriching and makes it possible to transcend the 
partial male view that prevailed before." mj 
The next man judge goes a step further. He makes a clear association 
between women and sentimentality, which evidently he thinks is beneficial 
to and lacking from the neutral realm of law: 
"I do not believe in absolute equality between the sexes. I am convinced that 
women are as capable as men but, nevertheless, there is something that 
permeates their activity. A woman judge is not the same as a man judge, 
the same applies for a school headmaster or a teacher. There is an 
externalisation of sex that some may view as given by nature or by god, if 
they are religious. We have different personalities and biological structures, 
different hormones that determine different behaviours and abilities and so, 
the women seem to be more fit than the men for some activities. Mediation 
could be considered one of these ... I also think that women judges are more 
formal, they tend to stick much more to the letter of the code ... l think we 
might observe this formalism at the beginning but, as women progress, I 
expect that some feminine traits will become manifest in their work and 
more specially, that certain aspects related with love will show. Women's 
views on childhood and the family seem different I think this is good and will 
soften the.rigidity of legal matters. Because of our personality structure we, 
[the men] do not tend to bring in our feelings and, in my opinion, this 
possibility to bring sentiment into the practice of a judge is advantageous." 
mj 
Along the same lines, another man judge highlights stereotypical qualities 
attributed to the women in the judiciary and welcomes their incorporation 
within it: 
'Women are more sensitive, more intuitive, have more capacity for empathy 
and this has brought a lass formal aimosphere Into the judiciary. Women's 
nature makes them more apt to find pacific solutions, more empathetic. In 
order to promote agreements, you need to have this capacity to connect 
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with your inner self. Just because women menstruate every month they ar~ 
more connected to their own corporal changes, they are more aware of the1r 
selves. This is not the case for men ... Aiso, women are more direct when 
they speak and their commitment is very strong ... In spite of the fact that the 
Jaw was exercised by men for centuries, the image of justice is, after all, a 
woman. Women bring humanity into the judiciary." mj 
Still, as can be perceived in the two following quotes, three out of the six 
men judges feel that these presumed feminine characteristics may 
endanger objectivity as one the basic aspirations of the judges' role: 
'Women are as intelligent as men. Here one meets good women lawyers. 
They tend to get too much involved and this is not advisable, because they 
may Jose objectivity." mj 
'Women lawyers may put in more energy, but are also less objective. They 
tend to take sides for one or other of the party in legal conflicts. All the 
women in my staff are in therapy, because in that job reality hits you hard 
and they cannot keep their distance. One of my daily fights with employees 
in my court -all women- comes from the fact that they tend to take sides and 
there I am, struggling to maintain a certain equilibrium, which is not always 
an easy matter, especially considering that I cannot be there every day and 
in every case, with the huge work overload we have!" mj 
If these men judges doubt that women can be objective and define 
objectivity as the basic characteristic of the judge, then may be in their 
minds they feel that they should not be judges. Still, it must be 
remembered that they are referring to women lawyers and not to women 
judges. As will be seen later in this section, women judges feel that the 
judge's role preserves them from the danger of lack of objectivity. 
As can be seen from the following quote from a man judge who has 
warned us that women may lose objectivity due to their tendency to get 
too emotionally involved with their cases, women are not the only ones to 
risk losing objectivity: 
"There is this case I mentioned before, where I had taken these two girls 
away from the family home because they were sexually abused by their 
Paraguayan stepfather with their mother's connivance. They appealed and 
the Upper Court in the hearing mistakenly gave the children back to the 
parents. I had a liver attack, it was the first time ever I had a sentence 
revoked by the Court of Appeal. We had been able to prove the abuse In the 
civil proceedings, something really difficult to achieve ... To make it short, I 
ended up taking the children away from the family again, with the good 
fortune that I could nominate as foster parent a woman lawyer who treats 
them as princesses, she takes them to the Colon Theatre and next year she 
is taking them on vacation to Europe: they changed the shanty town for the 
Col6n Theatre." mj 
319 
-----------
lt does not seem to me, that in the above mentioned case this male judge· 
was able to keep what he called the "necessary distance". On the 
contrary, he seemed bent on taking these girls away of the family home 
as a means to prevent their re-victimisation by an abusive stepfather and 
a compliant mother. 
As I observed in the section on the "ideal" family law judge21 , objectivity is 
understood as an ideal capacity not to take sides with either of the parties 
involved in a legal conflict. However, a woman judge explains that the 
family subject matter seems to confront the judges with situations in which 
the ideal seems really difficult to attain: 
"Family law is very special: it is the field of law that brings us closer to 
human suffering. Here we have to deal with extremely painful personal 
matters. lt is very different from other law realms where what people may 
win or lose Is just money." wj 
As Thornton has rightly argued: 
"Family law, with its vexed emotionalism, cannot be reduced to a set of 
abstract principles, for there is always a context, distraught husbands and 
wives, crying children, anger, pain and recriminations" (Thornton, 1996: 
276). 
Also, apart from the implied difficulty there are times when remaining 
distant and neutral could be morally unacceptable and thus, unjust. 
According to the testimonies of the judges, the latter is particularly true 
when children are_involved and, as this one man judge has argued: 
"Argentina has been very protective of its children." mj 
lt is interesting to see that although women judges tended to agree with 
the· men judges with respect to the women lawyers' excessive 
emotionality and their consequent lack of objectivity, they see themselves 
as judges as very different from the women lawyers. These two women 
judges express that the judge's role and the distance the judge is 
supposed to keep with respect to the litigants protects them from the 
danger of losing objectivity. Thus, as can be appreciated in the two 
following quotes, while they also complain of women lawyers' lack of 
21 See chapter 5, section Ill. 
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objectivity, they strongly deny any differences about the way in which men 
and women judges perform their tasks: 
"I think that women lawyers Identify too strongly with the client, they cannot 
avoid becoming emotionally involved; too much, I'd say. So, they tend to 
fight much more than the men lawyers do with the lawyer of the other party 
and with the other party. Men tend to keep much more distance." wj 
"As I said, the first thing I thought was that women lawyers might be more 
Inclined to conciliation. But as I mentally reviewed of the attitudes of women 
lawyers ... I changed my mind. Rather, they seem to me very aggressive. 
When they are better equipped, In terms of family law training, this makes 
them less so. But, when they do family law, without the necessary 
substantive skills ... , then it is very tough, very tough indeed." wj 
As can be observed from the testimony of the judges, this tendency of 
women lawyers to get too involved emotionally with their clients is 
counterbalanced in the case of the women judges by the definition of the 
judge's role, which implies a certain distance and the preservation of a 
neutral standpoint: 
"I believe it is different with the judges, I do not think it has anything to do 
with gender at all. The distance judges establish with the people that come 
to court depends on their personal styles and characteristics, histories, 
training ... it doesn't seem to me that it has anything to do with gender. 
Gender Is just another variable. I think that unlike what tends to happen with 
the lawyers the difference with the judges lies In the fact that keeping 
distance is an important part of the judge's role." wj 
"Being a judge implies a superior attitude where gender plays no role." wj 
In this section I examine women judges' gender awareness. As mentioned 
earlier, in that respect women judges' discourse is far more complex than 
that of their men counterparts. Women will start by denying any 
characteristic derived from gender. At the very most, accept that gender is 
a variable having the same weight as other variables such as personality, 
life history, class or ideology, as if gender played no part in the 
construction of these other variables. Yet, later in the interview, they 
contradict this first assertion. For example, when referring to the judges' 
capacity to identify with the litigants, a woman judge states that: 
"I do not think this has anything to do with gender. To me, it has more to do 
with personality. There are men and women judges who can do it, while 
others, whether men or women cannot. In that sense one can appreciate 
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differences. I have come across judges that are very sensitive, alert and 
involved with the people in Court .. As a matter of fact, I know men judges 
who seem to me more attuned to the needs of the people and many women 
who are much colder and more detached." wj 
Another woman judge expressed that she did not think that the sex of the 
judge had any effect on his or her working style: 
"In my view there are no fixed gender tendencies, but personal orientations: 
both men and women can have a great involvement with their work." wj 
But then she observed differences: 
"While women become very involved from the very beginning, men tend to 
keep more detached and do not mix work with personal matters ... Women 
tend to identify more with family matters and this leads them to get too 
involved, sometimes at the risk of losing objectivity ... Women are very 
competitive and complicated, they tend to fight a lot, to get the personal 
mixed up with the professional, something men do not do. I would rather 
not have three women in a tribunal. .. I believe that one of the reasons why 
there are more women in mediation is that they are more patient." wj 
And, when asked about women's potential contributions, she asserted 
that: 
'Women tend to work out agreements, while men are more adversarial." wj 
When asked whether she thought that women made any difference to the 
judiciary, another woman judge said that being woman made no 
difference to her work because "being a judge implies a superior attitude 
where gender plays no role". However, throughout the interview she made 
certain assertions that showed that she thought that being a woman did 
make a difference. For example, to explain the large numbers of women 
in mediation, she speaks about "a feminine essence" that would make 
women more given to agreed upon solutions and, also describes the 
application of international conventions as a "women's initiative and 
victory", due to the fact that the promotion of the use of international 
conventions was one of the aims of the educational programs for judges 
held by the AAWJ. In addition, she mentioned that being a woman has 
enabled her to sense very subtle matters related to pain and suffering. At 
the same time, she suggested that if I asked that question to the men in 
her staff I would get a positive answer, since they were always making 
comments that linked her reactions to her gender: 
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"if you asked the men in my staff, (the secretary of the court or my own 
personal secretary they would answer yes, since they often tell me I said ay 
such and so because I are a woman!" wj 
Another woman judge strongly states that: 
" ... gender does not make any difference" 
In contrast, when asked about the contribution women can make to the 
profession, she said that she believed: 
"In the long run, the fact that women are more honest and have a stronger 
commitment to basic values, will have consequences for the profession." 
This seems an interesting discursive contradiction. On the one hand, she 
says there are no differences accountable to gender and, on the other, 
she makes a statement about women being less corruptible. She also 
expressed a preference to share work with men than with women, 
because she thinks that the men are more reliable and straightforward 
than the women, but, when asked about the interaction with other family 
judges, she mentioned that she met periodically with five judges: all of 
them women! 
Similarly, two of the women judges that had first claimed that there were 
no gender differences among men and women judges then argued that 
women's involvement with family life favoured their understanding of 
family matters: 
'Women tend to have a comprehensive vision, they tend to see the other 
side of an issue. Because of their familiarity with daily life, they are aware of 
aspects that men often overlook. Their vision is different, neither better nor 
worse, but complementary and enriching." wj. 
'Women's involvement with family matters should not be overlooked. The 
fact that one is a woman and has been so much closer than the average 
man to the daily experience of child rearing makes it easy for the woman 
judge to understand what it is all about. I have a son and a daughter in their 
twenties. Being separated myself, and having experienced all the stages 
children go through, the early childhood problems, the school years, the 
relationship with their father, I personally have been much closer to my 
children than the conventional father would have been." wj 
The above testimonies clearly demonstrated the contradictions in the 
discourse of the women judges with respect to gender difference, which I 
interpreted as a strategy tending to avoid gender discrimination. As 
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shown, the women judges in this study denied gender difference but then 
referred to examples of gender difference. The mentioned contradictions 
reveal that, as Bothelho Junqueira observed for the case of Brazilian 
judges, the women judges are involved "in a constant effort not to 
perceive themselves nor be perceived as different from their men 
colleagues"(Bothelho Junqueira, 1997a: 63). 
In her research on the attitudes towards gender discrimination among 
women barristers in Australia, Hunter (2003: 114-130) found a very similar 
pattern of response among one group of women barristers that she calls 
"no-yes-but" group (Hunter, 2003: 123). Interestingly, Hunter (2003: 127) 
relates the observed denial of discrimination among Australian women 
barristers to their denial of femininity and their attempt to present the bar 
as a non-gendered scenario. Similarly, in my own study, the women 
judges, perhaps unconsciously, rehearse a strategy of denial of gender 
difference which, being an oxymoron, they are unable to sustain 
discursively. 
One of the important findings of the section on the "ideal" family law 
judge22 was that women judges valued very highly both interdisciplinary 
knowledge on the family and the possibility of counting on good 
interdisciplinary advice to understand and deal with the cases that they 
have to decide upon. So they made it explicit that it was very important for 
them to be able to work in groups with experts coming from other 
professions like psychiatry, psychology, sociology and social work. They 
think that the human sciences have a lot to offer to law practitioners in the 
field of family law, particularly to family law judges who can, in that way, 
make better informed decisions. In fact, as can be appreciated from the 
following quote of a man judge, a point on which both men and women 
judges agree is on the women judge's stronger emphasis on 
interdisciplinarity: 
22 See chapter 5, section 111.2.c.l. 
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"There is also a certain difference in that certain judges, mainly women tend 
excessively to refer all cases to the psychologist, the social worker, the 
Interdisciplinary team, thus taking it away from the field of law." mj 
His explanation goes like this: 
"women's stronger sensitivity leads them Into a closer analysis of the 
case ... when they say they would like to work more on the case, what they 
mean is that they would like to look at it from an interdisciplinary 
perspective." mj. 
Actually, women judges explain this tendency in terms of the particular 
requirements of the subject matter. The following assertion made by a 
woman judge exemplifies how judges justify the active role of the 
interdisciplinary team on the face of the limitations of the legal approach 
for the resolution of family conflicts: 
"People expect more from the law that the law can do. There are problems 
the law cannot solve, they require changes in the attitudes and positions 
people assume." wj 
In order to promote the required changes in the attitudes of the litigants, 
women feel that they need expert knowledge besides knowledge of the 
law and professional advice. 
Most judges, both men and women, are conscious of the changes 
undergone by the Argentine family, a realm where, according to them, in a 
matter of twenty to twenty five years relative uniformity has been replaced 
by a widespread diversity. The traditional nuclear family has been in part 
superseded, giving rise to new and diverse family forms among the middle 
classes as much as among the poor, largely differing from the traditional 
model of the nuclear family in terms of the size and composition of the 
households, and the prevailing values and attitudes. 
Under the pressure of increased poverty and with significant numbers of 
immigrants among the poorest, new family forms have emerged as a 
result of the formation of new stepfamilies, where children from previous 
marriages cohabit with one of the parents, their new partners and their 
own children. Single parent households and stepfamilies coexist with 
traditional nuclear families that have remained intact. For both men and 
women judges, the need to understand properly this new and complex 
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reality calls for immediacy, close contact with the parts involved in family 
conflicts and an empathic attitude on the part of the judges. Along the 
same lines, in a newspaper article an ex-family judge suggested: "The law 
and the legal academy seem to have remained unaware of the existence 
of these new family integrations, and of the particular problems and 
conflicts involved; only family psychology seems to have moved fast 
enough ... 23" Thus, he gives support to the women judge's tendency to 
emphasise interdisciplinarity and to resort to expert knowledge and advice 
upon which to base their decisions. 
Also, to many of the judges, the women, this new reality calls for an 
interdisciplinary approach, as a woman judge puts it: 
"lt is also important that family judges have specific training. They should be 
familiar with psychology, anthropology and sociology. Any judge would, of 
course, benefit from a training other than legal training, but this is 
particularly relevant in the case of family judges ... Family law is very special, 
it is the field of law that brings us closer to human suffering, here we have to 
deal with extremely painful personal matters, it's very different from other 
law realms where what people may win or lose is just money. That is why a 
family judge needs to be very much aware of the reality of the people that 
come to court. One must be interested, involved, always studying because 
we permanently find ourselves in need to resort to disciplines that transcend 
the knowledge of the law. I always say that the code establishes that the 
"best interest of the child" be pursued, but in order to know what is the 
meaning of 'the best interest of the child' you inescapably need to resort to 
other disciplines." wj 
And so, she speaks of a very fruitful work association she has with a 
researcher in the field of family law: 
'We constantly share and exchange views with Dr. Grossman, she brings in 
theory and research and I, my daily practice at the Court. We complement 
each other nicely." wj 
Moreover, to· illustrate what they thought were the benefits of the 
interdisciplinary approach, two of the women judges gave me documents 
written by themselves on related issues. One of the women judges 
handed a very long report prepared by herself, together with the 
interdisciplinary team, on the evolution of a case of a young girl who had 
been a victim of sexual abuse. A second woman judge offered me an 
23 Eduardo Jose Cardenas:"Desoues de la separacion, otra pareja y otra familia." La Naci6n 
17/4/99. 
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article on the evolution of the Argentine family and a third one, who holds 
a degree in sociology, gave me a report with the results of a survey on the 
opinions of the family judges on various issues related to their work. 
In addition, the latter woman judge stated how highly she values her 
studies of sociology. According to her, sociology is "the other side of the 
Jaw", a useful tool for the successful resolution of legal conflicts. Another 
woman judge conveyed that her interdisciplinary knowledge helped her to 
understand the very diverse cultural codes the people that come to court 
bring with them: 
"Knowing that people from different cultures have different cultural norms 
has helped me to understand, although not to justify, certain behaviours that 
are tabooed In our culture. Now that we have so many immigrants from 
Bolivia and Paraguay among us, we can see that to them, for Instance, the 
defloration of a girl by her father is a relatively common practice. Still, to me 
there are some universal principles that should not be ignored." wj 
Another woman judge stresses how important the prompt assistance of an 
interdisciplinary team can become: 
"Given the discretional power family judges wield to take some cautionary 
measures which might make important differences to the people involved, 
for instance, excluding a person from the family home, dispose the 
institutionalisation of a child, order a person's admission Into a psychiatric 
clinic, or order a blood transfusion to a child belonging to a sect that does 
not accept such a practice ... AII these measures are subject to revision by 
the Upper Court, but, in the meantime, they can imply gre~t personal costs" 
wj 
In that context, as a judge, she feels she can make better, more informed 
decisions on the basis of good expert advice: 
"If one can base one's decision on a conclusive technical report stating that 
a child is at risk or that he/she is being sexually abused, then you can feel 
more comfortable with your decision to take a strong measure." wj . 
Interestingly enough, this confidence in the "psy" professions does not 
only translate in their resort to interdisciplinarity for the resolution of cases 
that come to court but also, it extends to their personal life. Many of the 
women, while none of the men, mentioned that their private personal 
psychotherapy helps them a lot, not only to keep a balance in order to 
mitigate their constant exposure to human suffering derived from family 
conflicts, but also as a means to understand how these conflicts echo in 
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their own psyche. The following testimonies from women judges illustrate 
this point: 
"As a family judge you could ruin many people's lives. May be this hols true 
for all judges but, of course, in the family section there are many children 
involved. Therapy helps me to deal with anxiety and to make decisions." wj 
" I take good care of myself, I have my space for personal validation, I 
would not dream of losing it, I have been on therapy for fourteen years and I 
do not think I could do without. Let me tell you I think all family judges 
should be on therapy, and more, I definitely believe the judiciary should pay 
for it!" wj 
"Family matters are complicated because they have a resonance in your 
own self. One is a son or a daughter, can become a mother or father, 
husband or wife. Usually, by the time one becomes a judge one has 
transited all those roles. So there are many resonances, many unresolved 
personal aspects might arise of which one may be unaware. I believe that 
no family judge can do without a few years of therapy." wj 
Undoubtedly, women's greater familiarity with the human sciences -that 
was observed in the analysis of their educational backgrounds in chapter 
424- can explain this tendency to found their decisions on the advice of the 
interdisciplinary team. In an earlier section on the characteristics of the 
"ideal" family judge according to women and men judges it was argued 
that women's lack of assurance could partly account for their resort to 
interdisciplinary knowledge for the resolution of family conflicts25• In my 
view, the possibility to lean on a consistent body of knowledge for the 
exercise of their professional tasks might partly provide the security and 
assurance that, given their recent entry into the profession and the 
masculine language of the law, they might be lacking. 
Both women's greater acquaintance with the human sciences and the 
possibility of mitigating their lack of professional assurance seem 
plausible explanations for women's greater reliance on interdisciplinary 
knowledge. Still, I think one could appeal to a third sort of justification that 
accounts for women's tendency to view a case in its whole complexity, 
and not just as a matter of legal resolution. 
24 See chapter 4, section 111.2.c.l 
25 See·chapter 5, sec'tlon 111.2.c.l 
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If both women and men mentioned empathy, contextuality and immediacy 
as characteristics of the "ideal" judge, this stronger feminine tendency to 
resort to interdisciplinarity could be revealing a different, much stronger 
emphasis on contextual thinking on the part of the women judges. As was 
argued in the conclusion to chapter 5, Benhabib examines the Gilligan-
Kolberg controversy and argues in favour of an approach that situates the 
subject in its particular circumstances. Certainly, the human sciences can 
provide a very useful tool in such an endeavour (.Benhabib, 1990: 120-
149). 
i ~ Men and i81lterdisciplinarity 
Men judges also resort to the assistance of the interdisciplinary team, but 
this is an issue that women emphasise much more, to the point that they 
insist that the judge him/herself should be familiar with the human 
sciences. When the women spoke of the "ideal" characteristics of a family 
judge, they referred to these capacities as of paramount importance, while 
the men did not. 
In the testimony that follows, a man judge argues that, as the women 
judges tend to rely heavily on the authority of the human sciences, rather 
than being put in terms of a rights discourse, the cases seem to become 
devoid of their legal content. I would rather say that, when the women 
refer to interdisciplinary knowledge in order to fully understand the case 
they have in front of them, they are giving pre-eminence to the conflicts 
and problems that underlie the legal conflict in question. As a matter of 
fact, when asked whether there is a culture within the family judges and, if 
so, on what lines the judges divided, many of the judges identified this 
aspect as one that draws a line between different judges. The following 
quote illustrates this point: 
"There are two different schools, one of them states that this Is a Court of 
law and here we must apply the law. I do not need a social worker or a 
psychologist to come here to contaminate the work of the Court with weird 
ideas. Here everything runs according to the law, one dictates resolutions 
and once they are firm they are executed and that Is it. This is not a 
psychologist office, here we apply iha law, it'~:; not a place where you come 
for therapy ... And there are Courts that work following another model. There 
is a judge, for instance, who considers that child abuse Is not a matter for 
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the Family Courts. If there is a presumption of child abuse, then the case 
must be referred to a Criminal Court, because child abuse is a criminal 
offence ... If abuse can be proved by the criminal court then the abusive 
parent goes to jail, and If it Is not, then the case is filed. There are others, 
though, with a more flexible approach. They know that penalisation is very 
hard on the children. They prefer to Initiate an investigation with the help of 
professionals from other disciplines, and act on the case in order to mitigate 
the child's exposure and avoid the re-victimization that comes with a 
criminal action." mj 
I must say that although this type of comment was one that I encountered 
repeatedly throughout the research I have not come across any judge 
expressing such strong disagreement with the interdisciplinary approach. 
As a matter of fact, the following quote from a man judge represents the 
most critical remark about interdisciplinarity: 
"My opinion Is that channelling the cases to the interdisciplinary team Is 
good for certain cases and bad for others. There are certain cases where it 
Is necessary to set some limits to the people Involved in legal conflicts. To 
me, only the law has the capacity to set such limits. This is the reason why I 
think you do not have to channel every case through to the Interdisciplinary 
team. I'd rather say that the judge needs to carefully select which cases 
should be referred to the interdisciplinary team and which should not." mj 
In contrast, when asked about the main obstacles or difficulties they had 
to face in their work as judges in the family law judiciary, the men and 
women interviewed unanimously complained about the lack of sufficient 
human technical resources both for diagnosis and for treatment in the 
context of their tremendous work overload. As a matter of fact, and mainly 
through lack of funding, the judiciary in Argentina suffers from the same 
deficiencies as most state provided public services. This is how they put it: 
"The worst part is that we lack the human and institutional resources to meet 
the demand. This brings despair to our work, because we have only two 
social workers in our staff, and we have to count on the good will of those 
psychoanalysts, psychologists and systemic therapists that collaborate with 
us for free." mj 
ii ~ Institutional resistance 
Apart from the lack of resources, introducing psychologists as stable 
members of the court staff seems to involve more substantive differences. 
At the same time as women judges perceive themselves and are 
perceived by others as the "champions of interdisciplinarity", both men 
and women judges complain that, officially, the interdisciplinary team is 
composed by just two social workers, and no psychologist or 
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psychoanalyst is allowed into it by the Supreme Court26• This refers back 
to the discussion in the previous section on the men judges' attitude 
towards interdisciplinarity, where I recount that many judges had referred 
to some colleagues' very derogatory position touching on 
interdisciplinarity. I reported then that I did not come across any of these 
judges in the research. Thus, I think that these judges were implicitly 
referring to the position of the Supreme Court. 
In spite of the resistance they encounter, the judges resort to strategies 
that enable them to count on the work and support of the "psy" 
professions they consider so important. As for the denial of discrimination, 
I think Giddens's concept of "practical consciousness"27 can be applied 
here. Although women do not confront the Supreme Court nor question its 
authority in their practices, they deploy certain strategies that allow them 
to count on professionals who collaborate with the judge's work for free, 
helping with the assessment and evaluation of the cases. The next 
extracts from interviews evidence this: 
"At the Family Courts we have only two social workers In our staff, we do 
not have psychiatrists or psychologists. Not officially, at least, but I do have 
both psychologists and psychiatrist that have collaborated with the Court for 
years without charging any fees." wj 
So, you do not have the faculty to nominate an Interdisciplinary team? 
Yes, we do, but we do not have the means to do so. When the people 
Involved In a case can afford it, we can summon an expert from those that 
appear on the list. Still, most people cannot afford that, thus we have to rely 
on the existing social services, like the forensic medical body, the 
professionals that collaborate with us for free, the medical services from the 
hospitals ... In that sense, the exercise of power Is quite tough for the people 
involved. We are talking of children, of the sick, people to whom our 
decision makes a difference ... Thls is not something that has to do with 
money, it can cause very traumatic damage." wj 
" ... What we want and what we need Is an Interdisciplinary team. In "ideal" 
terms each court should have one." wj 
I am told that the Supreme Court wm not authorise psychologists. 
26 In June 1999, a group of Family Law judges wrote to the Supreme requesting a interdisciplinary 
team , to be able to respond to the increased demand created by the Law of Domestic Violence , 
but the Court did not approve their request (Matera, M.R., 2002). 
27 Same as 19. 
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No, it will not. Originally In the court staff included a social worker, eventually 
we had two. I then asked for a psychologist or a psychiatrist in place of the 
second social worker, but my petition was denied." wj ... 
On what grounds? 
Psychologists are more questioned than psychiatrists, but I do not agree. In 
my view, both could make a very important contribution, lrrespectively of 
their line of work, provided they are open to other lines ... We obtained the 
best results working with professionals with a systemic outlook, but we have 
also worked with people with different perspectives, and we absolutely need 
them." wj 
Undoubtedly, this is an interesting paradox. Is the system so 
schizophrenic as to forbid what a large proportion of its members claim 
for? Is it not interesting to note that that which is forbidden acquires the 
status of a demand, especially although not exclusively through women's 
voices? Has this got to do with the fact that law is a phallocentric 
discourse? Somehow this reminds me of Thornton on women's difficulties 
in penetrating the legal discourse, as she speaks of women as "fringe 
dwellers on the jurisprudential community" (Thornton, 1996: 3). Yet, in a 
way, as we have seen, women judges succeed in making an imprint on 
the administration of justice by counting on the services of "psy" 
professionals that work outside the justice system in spite of the 
resistance of the judicial authorities, showing their resilience to the 
systemic opposition they encounter. As Mary Jane Mossman, citing 
Galileo, puts in the foreword to Thornton's book: "E pur si muove"- And 
still, it moves- (in Thornton, 1996: X). 
This section explored basically two issues the opinions of the men and 
women judges in the Family Law Courts about the attributes women might 
bring to the judiciary and on whether they thought women judges could 
make a difference. In that sense, the responses of the men and women 
judges were very different. The men in general resorted to the dominant 
stereotype, and attributed to the women judges the traditional feminine 
nurturing and empathic capacities welcomed women because, as they 
said, the legal domain would benefit from those feminine attributes. 
Instead, with an attitude that was interpreted as a defence against 
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potential discrimination, women instead, initially denied any gender 
differences, admitting at most that gender played at most the same role as 
any other variable but later mentioned examples of gender differences. 
They then said they thought women judges were more patient; had a 
stronger tendency to agreed upon solutions and to see legal matters in a 
more integral way, and to rely on interdisciplinary support. Certainly the 
women judges' emphasis in interdisciplinarity appeared both in the 
testimony of men and women judges as the most noticeable difference 
women were bringing to the family law judiciary. 
• VI = General Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the reasons given by men and women family law 
judges regarding the large number of women in the family law area and in 
the family law judiciary. In the first place, to explain the large numbers of 
women in family law the judges argued that as women entered the 
profession, the men left the family area to look for more profitable sectors 
of the profession, thus leaving room for women entrants. In the second 
place, the judges argued that, through their larger involvement family life, 
women developed both the preference and the capacities that made them 
more suitable to deal with family matters. In the third place, and 
particularly women judges, related the large numbers of women in family 
law to the fact that the family subject matter requires specialised 
knowledge and that women tended to supplement their legal studies with 
specialised training on the family. 
With respect to the large proportion of women among the family law 
judges, the responses of the judges indicated that women's domestic 
responsibilities acted as a factor explaining the options women take in 
terms of the section of the judiciary for which they apply. When asked 
about the reasons for the large numbers of women in the Family Law 
Courts the fact that these courts work only in the mornings, rather than 
women's preference for the family speciality was highlighted in the iirst 
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place by the respondents. In addition, they believe that women prefer the 
family subject matter as a consequence of their different personal 
experiences and their larger involvement with the family. 
Thus, the traditional sexual division of labour within the family emerged as 
a factor determining the choices men and women members of the legal 
profession make when they opt for the sections in which to develop a 
career. This pointed to the significance of the "double burden". According 
to the judges, following the societal stereotype, men tend to opt on the 
basis of their function as the main economic family providers and women 
on the basis of their family commitments. While women developed certain 
strategies to juggle career and motherhood that brought discontinuities to 
their professional lives, men, in general, had continuous careers since 
their family responsibilities did not affect with their wives in charge of the 
home and children. 
Both men and women judges appeared to have little awareness of gender 
discrimination. They ten~ed to deny and minimise discrimination and 
mainly spoke about it as something that happened in the past and was 
disappearing due to the incorporation of a new system for the selection 
and appointment of the judges. Although the reasons that could explain 
this general denial of discrimination especially on the part of the women 
were put forward, it was argued that this denial was suggestive of an 
excess in tolerance to Injustice that was worrisome on the part of those 
who administer justice. 
While the judges were reluctant to acknowledge discrimination within the 
judiciary and the family, they were very aware of the potential for 
discriminatory practices in their own work through the imposition of a 
family model that may not coincide with that of the actual families that 
come to court. 
I also found very little awareness among the judges of the effects of 
gender on the family. I argued that, as those having to make important 
decisions with respect to the future of the families that come to court, the 
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family law judges would have benefited from a more complete vision of 
the effects of gender on family life and the lives of its individual members. 
With respect to the judges' opinions regarding the women judges' possible 
contribution to the administration of justice, the responses obtained from 
men and women were very different. While women judges initially denied 
any capacity that could be derived from gender, men judges very much 
sustained the traditional stereotype. In the opinion of the men, women's 
entry has a potential to make a big difference in the administration of 
justice, particularly to the family judiciary where, in their own words, the 
humanity women bring is welcome. 
I also gave an account of women's initial denial of any gender differences 
affecting their activity as judges is frequently reversed in other sections of 
the interview when they identify some tendencies that, in a way, contradict 
their first response. Reminded of the fact that the law evolved for 
centuries as a masculine discipline, I explained this .in terms of a strategy 
from the part of the women judges to anticipate and avoid discrimination, 
by insisting that gender does not make any difference in adjudication and 
the women can administer justice as well as. the men do. 
There is, however, an aspect related to the potential contribution women 
could make to the administration of justice where there is a high level of 
agreement in the responses of both men and the women judges. This 
relates to women's greater tendency to resort to interdisciplinarity, as an 
essential tool for the exercise of their work as family judges. lt is not 
surprising that women who did riot participate in the creation of the law 
attempt to expand its boundaries to make it more reflective of their 
conceptions on social health, and more responsive to the needs of the 
litigants. After all, the law particularly family law must serve not just to 
organise social life but also to help people to lead rewarding and happier 
lives. 
This was explained in the first place in terms of their greater exposure to 
the human disciplines, as women judges had a greater level of 
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educational attainment than their men counterparts, particularly in the 
human disciplines. In the second place it was argued that resort to 
interdisciplinarity, as the possibility to rely on a consistent body of 
knowledge on which to found their decisions, could bring women judges a 
sense of assurance that they might be lacking, for they are relatively 
newcomers to the profession. In the third place, it was explained that 
women judges tended to look at family problems in their full complexity 
with a greater sensitivity to the context, a different conception of psycho-
social health. They are prepared to understand the problems at a deeper 
level, as a means to not only find a legal resolution to the case, but also 
attempt to work out a resolution of the underlying conflicts, as a means to 
prevent new ones. 
Overall, both men and women judges eventually mentioned the existence 
of certain gender specific attributes women bring to the judiciary with a 
potential to bring about changes to the family judiciary, especially in terms 
of making it more sensitive to the reality of the litigants undergoing a 
family conflict and particularly bringing an improved understanding of the 
underlying non-legal problems. 
lt was also noted that, while the women judges appear as the "champions 
of interdisciplinarity", the Supreme Court does not allow judges to have 
members of the "psy" professions as full members of their staff. This 
reminded me of Thornton's observation in terms of the persistence of 
women's marginality within the legal field (Thornton, 1996: 3). 
Nevertheless, apart from resorting to the cooperation of professionals 
from the social and state provided health services and on independent 
experts nominated and authorised by the judiciary, the judges are entitled 
to consult a limited number of times a year, both men and women judges 
(probably more often the women than the men) deploy strategies that 
enable them to rely frequently on the collaboration of psychiatrists or 
psychologists that aid the court free of charge. 
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In the concluding section I integrate the different aspects investigated 




The originality of this study lies in the fact that it is the first comprehensive 
attempt to depict the situation of women in the legal professions in Buenos 
Aires. lt is also the first research project studying the Family Law Courts 
and the first one to consider women judges and the difference they might 
make to the administration of justice. 
In order to assess women's contribution to the Family Law judiciary this 
thesis explored the attitudes, values and beliefs of the men and women 
family law judges of the city of Buenos Aires and their opinions with 
respect to the difference that the increasing number of women entrants 
could make to the judiciary. In this concluding section, I shall briefly 
recount my work, highlighting what I deem to be my most important 
findings. 
In Argentina until the last couple of months, for the reasons discussed 
further below, this subject has not generated much interest. Thus, existing 
research on women in the judiciary is very scarce, and the little there is, 
touches only tangentially on the issue of gender difference. The structure 
of the thesis reflects the unavailability of relevant knowledge and data. 
This meant that I had to start from a very low base, putting together a 
~ 
considerable body of existing and new information to supply my research 
into the family law judges with the necessary theoretical, socio-historical 
and institutional context. Accordingly, the first part of the thesis presents 
the background for my study, while the second part reports the findings of 
the qualitative research. 
This thesis began by analysing the theoretical framework provided by 
feminist legal theory, paying particular attention to the ways legal feminism 
has explained the situation of women in the legal professions. Feminist 
legal theory accounts for a very rich, prolific, complex and controversial 
theoretical tradition working across disciplinary boundaries and paralleling 
the development of feminism. lt is a theoretical body that has progressed 
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in different strands, the main tenets of which are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. 
The analysis of "cultural feminism" -the strand within legal feminism that 
oriented my research- against the backdrop of the main debates within 
feminist legal theory provoked much reflection about the research 
questions, its aims and the. risks involved in the proposed enquiry. The 
current debate within feminist legal theory acknowledges the theoretical 
problems involved in the subject matter, taking the anti-essentialist critique 
seriously. The discussion of the dangers of essentialism entailed in the 
cultural feminist approach point to the need to design a research strategy 
aiming at counteracting such risks. In line with the work of other 
researchers working internationally on women in the legal professions, I 
consider the issue in a renewed light, bringing complexity and caution into 
it. The theoretical revision enabled me to frame valid and thoughtful 
research questions. Accordingly, my research project is set in a specific 
environment -the Family Law Courts of the city of Buenos Aires- searching 
for results only applicable to its particular context. This enquiry is thus 
sceptical and cautious with respect to the attribution of the care orientation 
to women in law and considers other aspects besides gender and different 
social forces related to the values and attitudes that women can bring into 
judging. 
The acquaintance with the various strands within feminist legal theory, 
facilitated the appreciation of the different theoretical and methodological 
tools these strands could supply for the advance of this research. 
Therefore, the enquiry resorts to research tools devised by the different 
strands of legal feminism. The methods of liberal feminism intending to 
examine the participation of women in society were very helpful to search 
into the situation of women within the legal profession in Buenos Aires, 
while, the approach of difference feminism proved most valuable to 
envisage the exploration of the impact of gender differences in the values 
and attitudes of men and women judges. 
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Likewise, the review of the main socio-historical trends giving rise to 
women's increasing participation within the professions in Argentina 
demonstrated the multifarious relationship between the strengthening of 
democratic institutions and the advance of women within society. The 
analysis of Argentinean women's incorporation into education and their 
fight to obtain civil and political rights in the context of the systemic 
fluctuations of the country's emerging democracy and its fragile economy 
proved to be extremely useful. lt revealed that while a democratic context 
is crucial for women's social progress, even within democratic rule, 
women's demands for equality are relatively marginal. Thus, while 
democratic rule appears as a necessary requisite for women's 
advancement in society, it is, nevertheless, not a sufficient condition. This 
explains part of the difficulties in promoting significant transformations in 
gender related issues. 
The description of women's participation in the different branches of the 
legal profession constitutes a most necessary base line that was 
previously unavailable. As such, it will be extremely helpful for further 
research. lt basically showed that, like in other parts of the world, law is an 
inhospitable institution when it comes to incorporating women. The 
analysis of the situation of women in the legal professions in Argentina 
demonstrates that the large increase in the number of women receiving 
legal education is not making itself felt in terms of women's participation in 
the legal realm. Despite women's advances, all areas of legal practice 
exhibit a high degree of vertical and horizontal segregation, the large legal 
firm being the main locus of discrimination. Women are mostly situated at 
the lower end of the hierarchy of the firms and only very rarely become 
partners. While large law firms prove to be inimical to the incorporation of 
women, legal education and the judiciary appear as branches of the 
profession where women can develop careers that are easier to combine 
with their needs and family responsibilities. In the view of the judges that 
participated in this study, this explains women's preference for the 
judiciary over large law firms. In a similar way, the central roles of men and 
women within the family; i.e. men's role as economic providers and 
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women's role as those in charge of the home and children are the reasons 
given by the judges throughout the research to justify important choices 
and decisions. 
One remarkable finding is that women in law teaching -a part-time and 
low-paying branch of the profession- work on a full-time basis more often 
than men do, and, when they perform important roles as authorities of 
UBA Law School, they frequently occupy the less prestigious and more 
time consuming posts, performing pastoral and housekeeping tasks. 
Another revealing finding is that women judges are concentrated in the 
lower instances of the judiciary, within the sections more related to their 
traditional family roles. Although the participation of women in second 
instance courts and in the Supreme Courts of the provinces is increasing, 
there are still no women at the Supreme Court of the Nation. 
The examination of the recent trends in family life and family law provided 
a valuable context for the enquiry with the family law judges. Women's 
increased participation in paid employment as a result of their enlarged 
educational opportunities and growing male unemployment, appears as 
one of the more striking phenomena over the last 20 to 25 years in 
Argentine society. Even if its effects need still to be fully studied, this 
appears as a very important issue framing the work of family law judges. 
The creation of the Family Law Courts coincided with a period of profound 
changes initiated with the recovery of democracy. Embedded in a general 
societal trend to update family law and eliminate gender inequalities within 
the law, it should be seen as an aspect of the modernisation of family law 
centred around the passing of the law of divorce, and as a response to the 
demands posed by changes in family life. Thus, if the study of the Family 
Law Courts presents a very partial view of the situation of women within 
the judiciary, it certainly accounts for a key period in Argentinean history. 
The latter period, characterised by important transformations, coincides 
with a time of relatively intense activity of the women's movement, which 
became more involved in matters strongly related to gender. 
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The high number of women in the family law judiciary, as compared to 
other sections of the judiciary, parallels the transition from private to public 
undergone by Argentine women in recent times. The family law judiciary 
represents a bridge between the private sphere of the home and the public 
realm of the law and legal institutions. In that sense, it is analogous to 
women's public participation in other branches of the State, such as the 
legislature and the executive, in which women are frequently in charge of 
areas related to the roles they .have traditionally performed within the 
family. 
The findings show a considerable uniformity in the composition of the 
Family Law Courts: the judges are all white, able bodied and have 
received a Catholic upbringing; most come from middle class 
backgrounds, are or have been married and have children. In such a 
homogeneous context, the sex of the judges seems a strong criterion for 
differentiation and so does their age, since women are, on average, 9 
years younger than men judges. Men and women family law judges also · 
differ with respect to their practice of the Catholic religion, men seeming to 
practise the Catholic religion more often than women, although all of them 
have had a Catholic upbringing. Civil status also varies with gender: while 
men are all married, half of the women are widows, separated or divorced. 
Men and women judges in the family law section also differ in terms of 
their educational attainment and career trajectories. Women have a higher 
level of educational attainment and men a longer seniority in the judicial 
post. While the men judges have had continuous careers, the women 
judges' careers have often been discontinuous. 
As members of the first generation of women judges, the judges 
participating in this study are pioneers who occupy positions of prestige 
stemming from their professional roles. Thus they break certain patterns in 
relation to their family and social role models. However, the responses of 
both the men and women judges reveal that these women belong to a 
transitional generation. Since parental responsibilities within their families 
have not yet been redefined in accordance with their increased 
participation in the public sphere, their domestic responsibilities have 
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affected their career choices and chances for advancement. Thus, I found 
that younger women judges who are mothers of young children have been 
significantly overburdened as a consequence of the traditional parental 
role allocation along gender lines. As mentioned, before, whereas the 
careers of the men are continuous, those of the women are comparatively 
more discontinuous. The discontinuities in the women's careers, due to 
interruptions related to motherhood and child caring, have certainly had 
negative effects on their chances of professional advancement. Bearing in 
mind the situation of women within the judiciary and the effects of the 
double shift, I will borrow the expression coined by Spanish sociologist 
M.A. Garcfa de Le6n (1994: 76) to characterise the women judges in this 
study as members of "a discriminated elite". 
Whereas men's roles of economic providers inspire their career options, 
women judges show a stronger vocational orientation and understand 
their work in a "missionary" fashion more often than the men. Along the 
same lines, the judges explain the large numbers of women in family law 
mostly as a consequence of the entry of women into the legal profession. 
They argue that women's entry into the profession has resulted in the men 
leaving the family law area to look for more profitable sectors. The large 
proportion of women among the family law judges is also explained in 
terms of family gender roles. The fact that the Family Courts work only in 
the mornings, rather than women's preference for the family specialty was 
highlighted by the respondents as a reason for the large numbers of 
women in the Family Law Courts. In addition, women's preference for the 
family subject matter appears to be related to their different personal 
experiences and their larger involvement with the family. In the view of the 
judges, through such an involvement, women develop both the preference 
and the capacities that make them more suitable to deal with family 
matters. Besides, particularly women judges believe that the Family Law 
judiciary requires specialised knowledge and training on the family. 
Accordingly, they explain the large numbers of women in the Family Law 
judiciary as a consequence of women's higher propensity to add further 
specialised training to their legal studies. 
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Although I observed a considerable overlap in terms of the qualities 
attributed by men and women judges to the "ideal" family law judge, there 
are however, differences in emphasis as well as the mention of attributes 
that clearly differentiate the men and the women judges' ideals. Qualities 
such as empathy, immediacy, sensitivity to the context, humility, lack of 
prejudice, honesty, and knowledge of the law often appear in the 
discourse of both men and women judges. The abilities that clearly 
differentiate the men judges' ideal are objectivity, equanimity, 
equidistance, composure, thoughtfulness, moderation. The need for the 
judge to be well acquainted with interdisciplinary knowledge and to view 
his/her work as a public service are the required characteristics of an 
"ideal" family law judge emphasised by women judges. I associate these 
different abilities highlighted by men and women.judges with a tendency 
towards a more individual work style on the part of the men judges and a 
tendency to a more collective work style on the part of the women judges. 
As the ideal of women appears to be more demanding than that of men, I 
propose that the difficulty to live up to such a demanding ideal can partly 
explain the more acute sense of discomfort with the power and 
responsibility associated to their role and their professed difficulties to 
exert authority. 
Both men and women judges appear to have little awareness of gender 
discrimination, they tend to deny and minimise discrimination and mainly 
speak about it as something happening in the past, destined to disappear 
due to the incorporation of a new system for the selection and 
appointment of judges. In fact, it will be very interesting to examine the 
processes of selection of new judges by the "Consejo de la Magistratura", 
with a focus on how gender impinges on the nomination of judges. In the 
meantime, the denial of discrimination on the part of the judges suggests · 
a preoccupying excess of tolerance to injustice on the part ·of those 
whose task is to administer justice. 
Similarly, very little awareness was found on the effects of gender on the 
family. As those who make important decisions affecting the future of the 
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families that come to court, family law judges would benefit from a more 
complete vision of the effects of gender on family life and on the lives of 
its individual members. While both men and women judges are resistant 
to acknowledge discrimination within the judiciary and the family they are 
very aware of the potential for discriminatory practices involved in their 
own work. 
They are very conscious of the danger of symbolic violence they might 
exert through the imposition of a family model that may not coincide with 
that of the actual families that come to court. This reveals a tendency to 
contextual thinking that is also evident when they describe the way they 
reach their decisions in the resolution of the cases that come before them. 
That is, they first find the just solution and only then look for the law that 
gives support to that decision. This challenges one of the main tenets of 
the civil law system, according to which civil law judges are just "the 
mouth of the law", and shows the high level of discretion actually involved 
in adjudication. In turn, this points to the relevance of the real persons 
behind the judges' robes, to their moral values and personal conceptions 
of justice. 
With respect to the contribution that women judges could make to the 
judiciary, the responses obtained from men and women are very different. 
While women judges initially tend to deny any capacity that could be 
derived from gender, the men judges very much sustain the traditional 
stereotype. Men judges think that women have a potential to make a big 
difference in the administration of justice, particularly in the Family Law 
judiciary where, as they claim, the humanity that women bring is 
necessary and welcome. Women's initial denial of any gender differences 
that might affect their activity as judges is frequently reversed with the 
progress of the interview, when they identify some tendencies which, to 
some extent, contradict their first response. Bearing in mind the masculine 
character of law, this can be explained as a strategy on the part of women 
judges to anticipate and avoid discrimination by asserting that gender 
does not make any difference in adjudication and ~hai women can 
administer justice as well as men do. 
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A point of convergence among men and women judges is women's 
greater tendency to resort to interdisciplinarity as an essential tool for their 
work as family law judges. lt is not surprising that women who did not 
participate in the creation of the law attempt to expand its boundaries to 
make it more reflective of their conceptions on social health, and more 
responsive to the needs of the litigants. After all, the law, and particularly 
family law, must serve not just to organise social life but also help people 
to lead rewarding and happier lives. 
Women judges' greater tendency towards interdisciplinarity can be 
interpreted in terms of various factors. In the first place, as a consequence 
of their greater exposure to the human disciplines. In the second place, it 
seems to me that leaning on a consistent body of knowledge on which to 
found their decisions can provide the women judges with a sense of self 
confidence which, as newcomers to the profession, they might be lacking. 
In the third place, I associate women's tendency to interdisciplinarity with 
their propensity to look at family problems in their full complexity with a 
greater sensitivity to the context and a different conception of psycho-
social health and to understand the problems at a deeper level. Thus, they 
not only find a legal solution to the case but also work out a solution of the 
underlying conflicts in order to prevent new ones. Actually, the most 
significant contribution that women are making to the family law judiciary 
consists in the introduction of an interdisciplinary approach for the 
resolution of family problems. 
Overall, both men and women judges eventually mention the existence of 
certain gender specific attributes that women judges contribute to the 
activity of judging with a potential to Introduce changes to the family law 
judiciary. In their opinion, these differences move in the direction of 
making the family judiciary more sensitive to the reality of the litigants 
undergoing a family conflict, More particularly, women bring an improved 
understanding of the underlying non-legal problems. 
Although fthe aim of my research was not to test the cultural feminist 
approach in the context of the family law judiciary, I used its conceptual 
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framework to orient my enquiry on gender differences among the family 
law judges. Following Gilligan's model of two different moral orientations 
associated to gender, Menkei-Meadow speculated on the possibility that, 
once the number of women in the legal profession became significant, 
differences might emerge on men's and women's professional attitudes. 
While men would approach their work by means of an "ethic of justice", 
women would deploy an "ethic of care" (Gilligan, 1982; Menkel Meadow, 
1989 and 1995). 
However, if I relate my research findings to Gilligan's model of two 
different moral orientations corresponding to the way men and women 
approach their professional activities, by means of an "ethic of care" for the 
case of women as opposed to an "ethic of justice" for the case of men, my 
findings are not conclusive. This is consistent with the research results of 
other scholars working internationally on the subject. As a matter of fact, 
while some of the results of my work with the family Jaw judges seem to 
substantiate the cultural feminist thesis, others do not. 
The findings suggest that, while men judges stress on objectivity, neutrality 
and equidistance, the women emphasise vocation, care and personal 
involvement. In addition to this, the cultural feminist thesis about different 
moral orientations associated to gender would be supported by the way 
women view their professional activity as a service to the community and 
experience the power they wield as a strong responsibility. On the other 
· hand, although women Jay a stronger emphasis on empathy, immediacy 
and a contextual approach, the fact that men as well as women deem 
those aspects- as important would suggest that the men judges embrace 
certain qualities more characteristic of the "women's voice" and the "ethic 
of care". This questions Gilligan's assertion with respect to the prevalence 
of either the "ethic of care" or the "ethic of justice" in the majority of the 
cases. 
The nature of the family subject matter could provide a possible 
explanation for my findings about men and women embracing certain 
characteristics related to the "ethic of care". By way of example, the 
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presence of children, who are frequently abused, and of women suffering 
from domestic violence epitomising those in need of care in family conflicts 
would justify the deployment of the .. ethic of care" among family law 
judges, irrespectively of their gender. While involvement with families 
appears as fostering a particular type of approach connected to the "ethic 
of care", performing similar research in other branches of the judiciary 
could elucidate the point. 
On the other hand, religion can be considered as a variable intervening in 
the judges' adoption of a care approach. The testimonies of the judges the 
sample reflect a considerable uniformity in terms of religion, as all of the 
judges in the sample have had a Catholic upbringing and most of the men 
practise the Catholic religion. Given that care and compassion constitute 
central imperatives of the Catholic ethic, religion could also be considered 
to be a factor explaining the judges' embrace of a caring approach, 
especially since the men judges who appear as the most caring are those 
who explicitly expressed the strongest adherence to Catholic principles. 
Let's just remember that Gilligan's work was set up in the North-American 
scene with an overall preponderance of the Protestant religion, thus not 
reflecting the particularities of the Argentine case. Although the latter point 
would, however, make the subject of a whole new thesis, it can certainly 
be pointed out that the contents of a "Catholic ethic of care" would 
presumably be somewhat different from those of a "Feminist ethic of care". 
While these ethical approaches are not mutually exclusive, one could 
expect the former to be rather conservative, while the latter would be more 
progressive. What my research clearly shows is that the deployment of an 
ethic of care does not lead to an adherence to feminism on the part of 
either men or women judges. 
As mentioned before, a very significant finding of this research referred to 
the way the judges reached their decisions. Both women and men judges 
stated that the way they reached their decisions was by first deciding what 
a fair solution would be and then look for the law that would give legal 
support to that solution. As was argued above, this pointed 'to the 
significance of a judge's approach and moral values. 
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Despite the fact that women judges lay a stronger emphasis on care than 
men judges, both tend to deploy their caring capacities when exercising 
their work as family law judges. This is a crucial discovery. According to 
the family law judges that participated in this study, a caring approach 
certainly makes a difference to those coming to court searching for a legal 
resolution to their family problems. Thus, I think that it must be valued 
positively as an important constituent of an adequate ·service of justice. 
Bearing in mind that a new process for the selection of judges is being 
implemented in Buenos Aires, I would suggest that when considering 
candidates for the family law judiciary, special consideration be given to 
the candidates' capacities for deploying a caring approach, along with the 
more traditional requirements, such as knowledge of the law, fairness and 
honesty. In addition, the demonstration that both men and women judges 
value a caring attitude with respect to the litigants and are capable to 
deploy a compassionate approach will contribute to demystify the 
conventional stereotype that regards family law as an area within the legal 
profession for which women are better endowed. 
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An important event is taking place in Argentine society as I am writing this 
concluding section that puts the research question that inspired this thesis 
at the centre of the public debate. As part of a general process towards 
the strengthening of key public institutions, the newly elected government 
has taken the lead in a movement aimed at "cleaning" the judiciary from 
corruption and political patronage. lt has gone as far as to promote the 
impeachment of a member of the Supreme Court. In addition, faced with 
the new reality, a highly controversial Supreme Justice decided to resign 
from his post. There are presently two vacant posts in the Supreme Court 
of the Nation and the President has decided, for the fist time ever in 
Argentine democratic history, to nominate a woman as a candidate to fill 
the vacant post. As was mentioned in chapter three, a woman was 
appointed to the Supreme Court only once in the 1960's by a "de-facto" 
government, but no women have taken part in the Supreme Court after her 
resignation. 
Through this nomination the present government has demonstrated its 
intention to settle a long standing debt with Argentinean women and the 
desire to start balancing the lack of gender equilibrium prevailing within the 
judiciary documented in chapter 3. Likewise, important reforms have been 
initiated by both the executive and the parliament, Inspired by a 
determination to instil equity and transparency and thus Improving the 
process of appointment of the Supreme Courts Judges. Traditionally, the 
nomination of candidates for the Supreme Court had been a very closed 
·and opaque event that involved only the President, the Agreements 
Commission of the Senate and the Senate itself. Thus, the President 
elevated a request for agreement for a candidate of his choice to be 
considered by the Agreements Commission of the Senate. This 
commission analysed the proposal sent by the President for the 
appointment of the nominee as a Justice together with information related 
to the candidate, to later reach an opinion with respect to the candidate 
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and recommend that the Senate should give its consent or dismiss the 
candidate postulated by the President. 
In the last six months, and as a result of the pressure exerted by a group 
of civil society organisations working in the area of justice and democracy, 
both the executive and the parliament have taken important steps aimed 
at changing this state of affairs, opening up a space for the participation of 
civil society in the process of appointment of the Supreme Court judges1• 
In June 2003 the President decided to limit his constitutional powers with 
respect to the nomination of the Supreme Court Judges2 and give more 
participation to society in the process of appointment. Accordingly, in July 
2003, the Senate reformed the rules governing the process3• Thus, a 
space was opened up in which the executive publishes an extended 
curriculum vitae of the appointee, and the citizens are given some time to 
express in writing ~either individually or through their organisations- their 
support or disagreement with the President's appointee. Likewise, they 
can send questions to the Senate that will be incorporated into a Senate-
held public hearing, in which the candidate has to respond to the 
questions posed by the representatives and the citizens. Only after all 
these steps have been fulfilled will the Senate reach a decision as to 
whether or not to consent to the President's nomination . 
Towards the end of last year, a Supreme Court vacancy4 was filled using 
the new procedure. A very prestigious man of law was appointed to the 
Upper Court. His nomination met with great support from most sectors, but 
not from the qhurch, for he is presumed to be a homosexual, with a very·. 
progressive standing. At that time, in spite of expressing their support for 
the candidate, women's organisations made it clear that they had 
expected a woman to be appointed then. Probably this had some effect on 
the President's choice for a woman for the present vacancy. 
1 See document presented by the organizations: "Una Corte para la Democracla" www.adc.org.ar 
2 Decree 22~)2003 , June 19, 2003. 
3 See www.senado.qoy.ar for the full text of the new rules of procedure Vor ihe appolntmeni oV 
Justices. 
4 Created by the resignation of one of the Justices in 2002. 
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Thus, from July 2003 Argentina saw an increasing public interest in the 
judiciary and mainly in the constitution of its Supreme Court. Additionally, 
the nomination of a woman in January 2004 brought to the larger society a 
discussion that had rarely escaped the secluded boundaries of the 
feminist movement and the conservative Catholic Church. The fact that the 
new appointee, Dr. Carmen Argibay, presently serving as a judge at the 
Hague's Court of Human Rights, made very daring declarations to the 
press, identifying herself with feminism, disclosing her position as a 
militant atheist and advocating the de-penalisation of abortion originated a 
most fervent public discussion. 
Issues that until very recently had been a very marginal matter, both within 
academic and political spheres, became the object of the most heated 
discussions and, for weeks, the subject of editorials in the most important 
newspapers. Gender representation and other matters widely discussed 
throughout the thesis, such as the reasons for wanting more women in the 
judiciary and the difference women could make to the administration of 
justice, became central matters within the public debate. Instead of being 
centred on the candidate's capacities for holding the post of Justice, the 
ensuing public debate focused on abortion. The Catholic church, in 
despair, brought all its weapons into the battle. The Ministry received 
thousands of letters both in support and in opposition to Argibay's 
nomination. 
In the first days of March 2004, the President announced that he was 
going to nominate another woman for the next vacancy. He has already 
given the name of a judge of the Upper Civil· Court, Dr. Helen Highton, who 
was mentioned before in the thesis as one of the introducers of mediation 
in the judicial system. According to political commentators, to neutralise 
the public unrest caused by Argibay's declarations and to appease public 
deliberation, President Kirchner chose the most conservative among the 
women he had listed as candidates to the Supreme Court as the nominee 
for the next vacant post. The President's attitude denotes that the 
interference of the Catholic church is far from being someihing of ihe past 
Highton herself declared to the press that she only spoke through her 
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judgements. In any event, it seems that there will shortly be two women, 
two very different women indeed, in the Argentinean Supreme Court, thus 
reversing a very long standing tradition of gender exclusion. 
Although the previous discussion and the ensuing ideological controversy, 
may seem anecdotal and marginal to the chore of this thesis, the debate 
now taking place epitomises the strong internal connection between the 
contents of the chapters constituting the first part of this thesis. The 
different profiles of the two women candidates clearly illustrate the 
argument about the differences· existing between women that constituted 
an important part of the theoretical discussion in chapter 1. The 
nomination of two women to the Supreme Court, associated with a 
process of increasing transparency and public participation in the process 
of nomination of Supreme Court Judges, demonstrates the connection 
between gender equality and the development of strong democratic 
institutions. This association was considered in chapter 2 as I overviewed 
women's public participation in the context of the democratic fluctuations 
that characterise Argentina's recent history and when I described the 
inequality in the participation of women investigated in chapter 3. 
Furthermore, the presence of two women among the nine justices In the 
Supreme Court of the Nation will, in a few years, provide the opportunity to 
analyse their decisions and see whether they make a difference to the 
administration of justice. I hope that my work will serve then as a 
precedent to these new and exciting possibilities for research on the 
subject. 
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This study's general methodological strategy was presented in the 
Introduction. The techniques used to collect and analyse the data obtained 
were introduced as I proceeded with the analysis. The methodological 
strategy was justified In the Introduction and at the end of the section on 
international research on women judges to be found in chapter 4. 
Accordingly, this appendix just contains a few explanations regarding 
timing and the two pieces used for data collection. 
Chapter 3 refers to the situation of women lawyers in the different 
branches of the legal profession. This involved the use of quantitative 
methods. As I searched for secondary data that was mainly unavailable I 
had to produce my own data. I started by interviewing key informants who 
provided me with a general explanation of the workings of the different 
branches of the legal profession. Thus between March and October 2000 I 
held various interviews with the following persons: 
-Dr. Hebe Herb6n, Director of Postgraduate Studies at UBA Law School; 
with Dr. Gladys Mackinson, Director of the School of Socio-legal Studies at 
UBA Law School; Dr. Roberto Saba, professor of Constitutional Law at 
UBA Law School; Dr. Cecilia Grossman, Director of the Postgraduate 
Course on Family Law; at UBA Law School; Dr. Martin Bohmer, professor 
of Law at UBA Law School; Dr. Nelly Minyersky, President of the Lawyer's 
Association, Dr. Horacio Lynch from the Buenos Aires' Lawyer's 
Association; Dr. Sotra Harari, Dr. Haydee Birgin, family law lawyers and 
with Dr. Paola Bergallo and. Dr. Natalia Gherardi, lawyers working in two 
large law firms. I also conducted an interview with a woman who selects 
personnel for large law firms and who asked for her name not to be 
disclosed. 
I then contacted different persons at the Law School of the UBA, at the 
Bar Association the Lawyers' Association the Association of Buenos Aires' 
!o.wycu-s and the AAWJ that provided me with data that was available on 
the basis of which I proceeded to the analysis. In order to analyse the 
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evolution of the situation of women lawyers in law firms I used 4 different 
numbers of the Martindale-Hubbel Directory for Argentina and to measure 
women's situation within the judiciary I consulted the Judicial Directory for 
1999. In order to assess the evolution of women's participation in the 
Family Law Courts I was allowed to consult the files of the "Under-
Secretariat of the Civil Upper Court". 
Two instruments for data collection were designed for the research into the 
Family Law Judiciary. One was a self administered questionnaire aimed at 
obtaining a picture of this section of the judiciary that the judges had to fill 
in with their personal data. The other was the interview guide that led me 
through the interview. The objective of the interview was to explore the 
views and opinions of the family judges of the City of Buenos Aires on the 
impact of the massive entry of women into the judiciary and its possible 
impact. While the questionnaire collected both quantitative and qualitative 
data, the interview collected just qualitative data. 
In order to proceed with the research I decided to approach all 24 family 
judges. There are 24 Family Courts in the City of Buenos Aires. The 
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official records shows 13 women and 11 men. However, three were vacant 
at the time when I started the fieldwork in June 2001. One of the judges, a 
man, had resigned to go into private practice. Two, a man and a woman, 
were on sick leave. In all three cases they were substituted by one of the 
men judges, who then became responsible for two Courts. Of the 
remaining 21 judges, 12 are women and 9 are men. 
The question~aire schedule was prepared and handed in personally by 
myself to the private secretary of the judge, together with a letter of 
presentation explaining the purpose of the research study and inviting the 
judges to fill in the questionnaire and, if possible, to be available for a later 
interview of approximately one hour was . The letter also explained that the 
information provided by the judges would be confidential and, in case the 
research was later published, their names would not be identified. The 
questiormairo aimed at obtaining personal and demographic data, data on 
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the judge's family and educational and social background, civil status, 
religious affiliation, teaching and other activities. 
I had expected most of the judges to fill in the questionnaire, so that I 
would obtain a fair picture of this section of the judiciary and have the 
opportunity to process the questionnaires before the interview: In actual 
fact, many of them filled in the questionnaire before me at the same 
occasion as the interview was held, which actually gave me a very short 
time to consider the answers of the questionnaires. 
Of the 21 judges, 14 filled in the questionnaire and 12 were available for 
an interview, 6 men and 6 women. Of the two women judges who filled In 
the questionnaires but were not available for the interview, one said she 
was too busy and so would not be available, and the other agreed with me 
on a date for the interview, but in the meantime had a serious health 
problem which led into a very long sick leave. This interview was 
postponed until a later time when the judge would recover and resume her 
activity. Of the 7 judges who decided not to fill in the questionnaire, at 
least three said that they thought the questions were too personal and 
invasive. The remaining four said they were too busy and consequently 
not interested. Obtaining the interviews was very difficult. The judges are 
very busy people who zealously defend their time and their privacy. lt was 
I 
easier to atrange the interviews with the men, who answered quite readily 
to my request, while the women took more time to decide whether they 
would be willing and available. An interview lasting approximately an hour 
was arranged with the judges at their office. Between the months of June 
and December 2001, I interviewed the 12 judges. In one of the interviews 
with a man judge, his personal secretary, who is very interested in 
mediation and family violence, was present at the Interview. Of the 12 
Judges, two men did not allow recording but were patient while I made 
extensive notes. 
By April 2002, I had transcribed the interviews, translated two of them into 
English and proceeded to the analysis of the questionnaires. 
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From May to June I prepared a brief of each interview in English. From 
July 2002 to July 2003 I analysed the interviews, and translated the quotes 
into English. 
~rostmctlcms fto ~m ill'il ihis q~estnormaire: In the open questions I have 
left an open space for the answer that might vary according to the 
respondents' needs. If you find yourself in need of more space please 
attach more paper. For the closed questions please write an X to show 
your answer. 
Complete confidentiality in the treatment of the provided information will be 
secured. If you feel that you would not like to answer any of the questions 
posed please move to the next question. The completion of this 
questionnaire is essential for the purpose of this research. Thank you very 
much 
1 ~Personal information: 

























U nlverslty Qual ificaiicms: 
University: 
Year of entry and graduation : 
Post graduate courses If any, institutions attended, years: 
Other studies: 
3aProfessional background: career information 
How long have you been a judge? 




o as tal ~olo practltDoneli" 
o as taJ partnelf' o~ a~ ~aw filf'm witlhl (Q)ii1J®Il' ~awy®li'$ 
o ta~s an employe® ili'il a law ~orrm 
0 as a In company lawyeli' 




Was your worlking life ccmtinucus 
YES NO 
11 you stopped woli"k at certallf'il times, ghre the treasons 
4-Soclal information 
Professional Associations you belong to: 
Community associations you belong to: 
Do you practise a religion? 
If so, which?·: 
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1-1 see from your answer to the questionnaire that you have been a family 
judge for X years now. Can you tell me how you became a judge and if it 
was something you had intended from your early days as a law student 
and, if not, when did you decided to become a judge? What were your 
motivations? Can you tell me about your role models and mentors, If any? 
2- What are, according to you, the qualities of an "ideal" Family law judge? 
3- How do you feel about the power you wield as a judge and about the 
responsibility implied In being a judge? 
4- What would be your definition of the family in the light of the social and 
legal changes that have been taking place in the Argentine family in the 
last few years? 
5- What do you think about the main changes that have been set forth in 
family law in the last 20 years? 
6- What do you think about the introduction of mediation, its potentialities 
and problems? Why would you say there are so many women mediators? 
7- Are there formal or informal opportunities for the family judges to get 
together to share problems, experiences, preoccupations. Would you say 
there is a "culture" in this section of the judiciary? Do you feel that your 
personal values fit those the system requires from your position? Explain. 
Or do you feel you can be yourself at work? Explain 
8- Do you think that the fact of being a man/a woman has affected your 
work in any way? 
9-Do you think men and women have to demonstrate different qualities? 
Explain 
1 0- One of the most important changes that have taken place in Argentina 
is the large number of women entrants Into the legai pro1ession? How do 
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you explain this? How do you experience this? Do you think that this has 
made or will make any difference to the profession? In what way ? 
11- The same for the judiciary. Do you think that women bring something 
different to the judiciary? 
12- In your view, is there any discrimination within the judiciary? 
Have you been the object of any discrimination yourself? 
13- Have you found that the application of the law sometimes does not 
lead to the just decision? How do you face such a dilemma? How free or 
constrained do you feel by the letter of the law? 
14-What are, in your view, the most serious family problems that appear in 
the Court? Please state them in order of importance. 
15- How effective do you think Family Courts are? Which would you say 
are the main obstacles you have to face as a family judge? Do you feel 
you can make a difference in the quality of life of the people involved in 
judicial conflicts? 
16- Please tell me about the professional resources you have in your staff 
at the Court . Do you have an interdisciplinary team? Please describe how 
you work with your team ? 
17- 1) Could you tell me about a difficult case that left you a feeling of 
satisfaction because, in spite of the difficulties involved, you could reach a 
suitable solution ? Please explain . 
2) Could you tell me about a case which left you with a feeling of 
dissatisfaction because you could not reach a suitable solution? Please, 
explain. 
18.; Would it be possible for me to see a judgment of yours that you find 
particularly significant ? 
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